Magnifi Financial Credit Union, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1205

Magnifi Financial Credit Union,
Respondent,

vs.

Harriet Lewis,
Appellant,

The Patio Park Association, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed February 17, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-24-3670

Kyle R. Kroll, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Jodie Leigh Grabarski, Grabarski Law PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for respondent)

Harriet Lewis, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant mortgagor seeks review of the district court’s order enforcing a settlement
agreement with respondent mortgagee along with review of the district court’s denial of
appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant argues that this court should reverse
the district court’s order for many reasons, including the following: respondent committed
fraud in amending the settlement agreement, resulting in a violation of appellant’s
due-process rights; the settlement agreement was procured by economic duress; respondent
hindered appellant’s performance; respondent violated notice and inquiry-response
requirements under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA); and appellant did
not receive reasonable accommodations under title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) during settlement negotiations. Alternatively, appellant argues that the district
court abused its discretion by denying her motion to vacate the judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Harriet Lewis owned a home in Brooklyn Park. Lewis used her property
to secure a loan from respondent Magnifi Financial Credit Union. Lewis first provided a
mortgage to Financial One Credit Union to secure the loan. Later, the mortgage was
transferred to Magnifi.
In March 2024, Magnifi served a complaint alleging that Lewis was in default on
the loan by failing to make payments for several months. 1 Lewis answered the complaint

1 The complaint also named Patio Park Association, a homeowners’ association, as a
defendant. Magnifi sought a declaration that its mortgage interest in the subject property
3
and admitted defaulting on payments but contested the amount owed; Lewis also asserted
statutory and equitable defenses. After court-ordered mediation, Lewis and Magnifi
entered into a settlement agreement on September 9, 2024.2
The settlement agreement provided the conditions and consequences of any default
by Lewis: “A failure by Ms. Lewis to timely pay the arrearage by the deadline, to pay any
monthly regular Mortgage payments . . . or pay any accrued late fees by the deadline is a
default of this Agreement.” Upon default, “Magnifi shall make a written request
to . . . move this Case back to ‘active’ status” and Lewis “agrees to entry of money
judgment against her” and “agrees that Magnifi can proceed with the foreclosure process
after the Court issues the Judgment.”

was “prior and superior to any interest claimed by any other Defendants.” On June 10,
2025, Patio Park consented to a default judgment and stipulated to the priority of Magnifi’s
mortgage over Patio Park’s lien. Patio Park is not involved in this appeal.

2 The settlement agreement was filed confidentially with the district court. “Materials filed
in the trial court as ‘confidential’ . . . will remain non-public on appeal without the need
for a motion, unless the trial court or appellate court orders otherwise.” Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 112.02, subd. 1. We quote only those portions of the settlement agreement that have
been disclosed publicly in the district court record. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 112.03
(“Information contained in non-public materials that has been disclosed in publicly
accessible documents in the trial court record must be treated as public on appeal, unless a
specific statute, court rule, or court order directs otherwise.”).
We note, however, that this court is not precluded “from mentioning the contents”
of confidential documents when the information is “relevant to the particular issues or legal
argument being addressed in the proceeding.” Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud.
Branch 4, subd. 4. Nor are we constrained from disclosing information contained in the
publicly filed briefs. See Minn. R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4; see also
Coursolle v. EMC Ins. Grp., Inc., 794 N.W.2d 652, 655 n.1 (Minn. App. 2011) (discussing
these rules under similar circumstances), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 19, 2011).
4
The settlement agreement also stated that the parties “acknowledge that this
agreement is executed voluntarily by each of them through a mediated process without
duress or undue influence,” that “they were represented by counsel in mediation,” and that
“they have read this Agreement, and have had it fully explained to them by their counsel
and that they are fully aware of the contents of this Agreement and its legal effect.” The
parties executed an amendment to the settlement agreement in November 2024. This appeal
concerns enforcement of the amended settlement agreement. For the remainder of the
opinion, we refer to the amended settlement agreement as the “settlement agreement” and
the preamendment settlement agreement as the “original settlement agreement.”
In March 2025, Magnifi requested immediate entry of a money judgment and an
order for foreclosure and filed affidavits stating that Lewis had defaulted on the settlement
agreement. At about the same time, Lewis’s attorney withdrew from representation. After
Magnifi moved to enforce the settlement agreement, Lewis moved to vacate the settlement
agreement and to dismiss the foreclosure action. Lewis challenged the validity and
enforceability of the settlement agreement for several reasons, alleged ADA violations
based on her “recurring cognitive health issues,” and alleged that Magnifi had violated
RESPA. In support of her motions, Lewis filed an affidavit, memorandum, and confidential
medical records.
On June 3, 2025, the district court granted Magnifi’s motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, requiring Magnifi to submit an updated affidavit of attorney fees and
costs. In its memorandum accompanying the order, the district court considered and
5
rejected Lewis’s arguments to vacate the settlement agreement. The district court did not
direct the entry of judgment.
On June 13, 2025, Lewis moved under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02
“for an order vacating the judgment entered on June 3, 2025.” On June 30, 2025, the district
court noted receipt of Magnifi’s affidavit of fees and costs and directed entry of judgment
in favor of Magnifi “for the principal balance of $60,222.16, plus arrearage in the amount
of $10,161.74, accrued and unpaid interest in the amount of $277.19,” and “attorney’s fees
and costs in the amount of $16.096.57.” The district court also directed entry of a decree
of foreclosure in favor of Magnifi.
On July 17, 2025, the district court denied Lewis’s motion to vacate the district
court’s “judgment” of June 3, 2025. The district court’s order noted that Lewis’s motion to
vacate was filed before judgment was entered but concluded that “the question is moot as
either way the motion would be denied.”
Lewis again moved under rule 60.02 to vacate the judgment for Magnifi. The district
court denied the motion, stating, “The Court has already issued its Order denying [Lewis’s]
motion to vacate judgment and will not consider new filings on the same motion.”
Lewis appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by enforcing the settlement agreement.

In granting Magnifi’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the district court
determined that the settlement agreement “is an enforceable contract between Magnifi and
Ms. Lewis” and that “none of Ms. Lewis’s arguments invalidate the Settlement
6
Agreement.” On appeal, Lewis contends that the district court’s “enforcement of the
purported settlement agreement constitutes a fundamental abuse of discretion that violated
basic principles of contract law, attorney ethics, and judicial integrity.”
The district court has the “inherent power to summarily enforce a settlement
agreement as a matter of law when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambiguous.”
Voicestream Minneapolis, Inc. v. RPC Props. Inc., 743 N.W.2d 267, 272 (Minn. 2008)
(quotations omitted). If there are disputed facts, however, the district court must either
grant an evidentiary hearing or “indicate that no material facts are in controversy.” Id. at
273. To be clear, “a district court shall treat a motion to enforce a settlement agreement as
it would a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
Appellate courts review de novo “whether a genuine issue of material fact exists”
and “whether the district court erred in its application of the law.” STAR Ctrs., Inc. v.
Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 77 (Minn. 2002). A genuine issue of material
fact exists “when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence
presented.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods ., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017)
(quotation omitted). In reviewing a summary -judgment decision, appellate courts “view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
granted”—here, Lewis. STAR Ctrs., Inc., 644 N.W.2d at 76-77. But “[s]peculative
assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Minn. Sands, LLC v.
County of Winona, 940 N.W.2d 183, 197-98 (Minn. 2020); see also Nicollet Restoration,
Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 533 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Minn. 1995) (stating that “general
assertions” are not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact). A party “must present
7
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.” Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. App. 1989);
Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05 (requiring a party to “properly address another party’s assertion of
fact”).
Here, the parties submitted cross-motions to enforce and to vacate the settlement
agreement along with legal memoranda and affidavit evidence. The district court’s order
granting Magnifi’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement states that its order was
“[b]ased upon the evidence” and “[p]ursuant to its discussion with the parties.” The district
court took the matter “under advisement on May 2, 2025.” No evidentiary hearing
occurred.
3
On appeal, Lewis makes six arguments for reversing the district court’s order
granting Magnifi’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We discuss each in turn,
combining two arguments at the outset because Lewis raises the issues for the first time on
appeal.
A. Lewis contends that Magnifi committed fraud in amending the
settlement agreement, resulting in a violation of her due-process rights.

Lewis argues that the amendment was “fraudulently constructed through
unauthorized document manipulation” and that “foreclosure proceedings based on
fraudulently constructed settlement agreements constitutes deprivation of property without

3 It is unclear from the record whether the district court determined that no material facts
were disputed or, alternatively, that the material facts were disputed and the parties agreed
to submit the motions for factual findings and legal determinations based on the written
submissions. We assume that the district court determined that no material facts were
disputed and review its order as one granting summary judgment.
8
due process of law.” Lewis raised neither issue in her motion to vacate the settlement
agreement. Appellate courts generally will not consider matters— including constitutional
claims—not argued to and considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d
580, 582 (Minn. 1988); In re Welfare of C.L.L., 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981)
(declining to consider constitutional challenges first raised on appeal). Therefore, we
decline to address both issues.4
B. Lewis argues that the settlement agreement was procured by economic
duress.

Lewis maintains that the “original September 2024 settlement agreement was
procured through economic duress” based on her attorney’s statement that Lewis had “no
real choice but to sign the agreement presented or she would lose her home.” The district
court rejected Lewis’s claim and stated that “[m]erely driving a hard bargain or taking
advantage of another’s financial difficulty is not duress.” The district court considered
Lewis’s “claims she was ‘pressured’ into signing the Settlement Agreement ‘with the
looming threat of imminent foreclosure’” and concluded that “[t]his does not constitute
duress.”
“[D]uress is available as a defense to a contract only when agreement is coerced by
physical force or unlawful threats.” Hoskin v. Krsnak, 25 N.W.3d 398, 410 (Minn. 2025)
(quotation omitted). In Hoskin, the supreme court held that the district court erred by
granting a motion to dismiss a complaint alleging, in part, duress in executing a transfer

4 Lewis argued fraudulent document construction in her second rule 60.02 motion to vacate
the judgment. We address the issue in that context below.
9
agreement. Id. at 409-11. In doing so, the supreme court explained that, to establish duress,
coercion by physical force or unlawful threat “must destroy the victim’s free will and
compel [the victim] to comply with some demand of the party exerting the coercion.” Id.
at 410 (quotation omitted). “A party’s ability to resist coercive acts is subjective,” and
courts “focus on the [victim’s] state of mind . . . , not on the nature of the coercion, when
determining whether a party executed a contract under duress.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Whether coercion is an “unlawful threat” is a fact-specific analysis “to determine whether
the circumstances surrounding the execution of a given agreement were coercive enough
to overcome the complainant’s free will.” Id. The supreme court has “never held that
‘economic duress’ cannot constitute an ‘unlawful threat.’” Id.
Caselaw distinguishes between “a threat to bring an action to enforce a lawful
demand” from a demand “exceeding the needs for enforcement” to “oppress” or cause
“unnecessary hardship.” Wise v. Midtown Motors, Inc., 42 N.W.2d 404, 407-08 (Minn.
1950). We conclude that Magnifi’s threat of foreclosure was a lawful demand in response
to Lewis’s default. No genuine issue of material fact remained because Lewis offered no
evidence in support of her claim that Magnifi based its foreclosure threat on “artificially
created default conditions.” And “the limitation of alternatives imposed by one’s own
financial problems does not constitute duress.” Bond v. Charlson, 374 N.W.2d 423, 428
(Minn. 1985). Lewis’s limited alternatives after she defaulted on payments were “imposed
by [her] own financial problems” and therefore do “not constitute duress.” Id. In other
words, although circumstances forced Lewis to choose between two alternatives—
10
foreclosure or settlement—she was not under duress because of an unlawful act by
Magnifi.
In short, Lewis offered no evidence of unlawful coercion, but merely that Magnifi
lawfully demanded payment or foreclosure. Because a genuine issue of material fact “must
be established by substantial evidence,” Lewis’s claim of duress did not create a genuine
issue of material fact. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 5 66 N.W.2d 60, 69-70 (Minn. 1997) (quotation
omitted). The district court therefore did not err when it rejected Lewis’s claim of duress
as a defense to the settlement agreement.
C. Lewis maintains that Magnifi hindered Lewis’s performance of the
settlement agreement.

Magnifi supported its motion to enforce the settlement agreement with an affidavit
of default, showing that Lewis owed a principal balance of $60,222.16, “[a]rrearage (as
defined in the Settlement Agreement) in the amount of $10,148.23,” unpaid interest, and
attorney fees and costs. In district court and on appeal, Lewis argues that her performance
was excused by Magnifi’s “material breach of the settlement agreement through systematic
payment processing failures,” which “created artificial default conditions that were then
used to justify foreclosure proceedings.” The district court rejected Lewis’s argument,
stating that “Ms. Lewis cites Exhibits 19, 21, and 22 in support of this argument, which do
not prove Magnifi hindered Ms. Lewis’s performance of the Settlement Agreement.”
“Under Minnesota law, every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing requiring that one party not unjustifiably hinder the other party’ s
performance of the contract.” In re Hennepin Cnty. 1986 Recycling Bond Litig.,
11
540 N.W.2d 494, 502 (Minn. 1995) (quotation omitted). We therefore consider Lewis’s
evidence to support her claim that Magnifi hindered her from making payments as directed
in the settlement agreement.
Exhibit 19 is an email exchange between Lewis, Magnifi, and others that does not
discuss payment processing. Exhibit 21 is an email exchange between Lewis and her
attorney in which Lewis asserted that Magnifi was “locking [her] out of [her] account” and
“preventing [her] from paying online.” The email does not explain or provide any details
to support Lewis’s assertion. Exhibit 22 is a screenshot of an email exchange between
Lewis and a person to whom Lewis refers as a “collections specialist.” The collecti ons
specialist writes, “We are unable to allow you access to the escrow account.”
During district court proceedings, Lewis also referred to exhibit 40, which shows
Lewis paid Magnifi about once per month from October 2024 through February 2025.
Exhibit 40 does not establish that Magnifi rejected or otherwise interfered with Lewis’s
payments under the settlement agreement. And Lewis cites an email exchange to
demonstrate that Magnifi interfered with payments in July 2023. This exchange occurred
before the original settlement agreement was finalized in September 2024, so it is outside
the relevant time period.5

5 According to Magnifi’s affidavit of default in support of its motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, Lewis defaulted on her obligations under the settlement agreement
because she failed “to cure the defaults occurring under the loan contract” by March 5,
2025, including the “arrearage” that Lewis was to pay in addition to regular monthly
payments.
12
Lewis argues that “Magnifi’s failure to process” her timely September 2024
“payment created the pretext for claiming default under the settlement agreement.” Lewis
does not cite any record evidence to support this claim, and Magnifi offered evidence that
it cured any hindrance that occurred in September 2024 . In an affidavit, Magnifi’s
authorized representative attested that the “initial monthly payment owing on the
Settlement Agreement was applied on September 16, 2024, but no late [fee] was charged
to the account of [Lewis] and [Magnifi] waived the default due to the delay in the initial
payment under the Settlement Agreement.”
We conclude that Lewis’s evidence did not create a genuine factual dispute to
support her claim that Magnifi hindered her performance under the settlement agreement.
See DLH, Inc., 566 N.W.2d at 69-70 (stating that “a genuine issue of material fact . . . must
be established by substantial evidence” (quotations omitted)). Exhibits 19, 22, and 40 do
not establish any act by Magnifi, much less any interference with Lewis’s payments after
execution of the settlement agreement. Exhibit 21 merely repeats Lewis’s assertion that
Magnifi hindered her performance. See Stringer v. Minn. Vikings Football Club, LLC,
705 N.W.2d 746, 754 (Minn. 2005) (“The nonmoving party must do more than rest on
averments or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.”). And Magnifi clarified, in response
to Lewis’s argument, that it did not assert default based on the delayed September 2024
payment. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding that Lewis failed to establish a
material fact dispute regarding whether Magnifi hindered her performance under the
settlement agreement.
13
D. Lewis argues that Magnifi violated RESPA.
Lewis contends, “When a mortgage servicer systematically violates RESPA
requirements, those violations affect the validity of all subsequent collection activities,
including foreclosure proceedings. These are not separate claims that must be pleaded
within specific deadlin es; they are fundamental defects that render the foreclosure action
itself invalid.”
The district court rejected Lewis’s RESPA claim for two reasons. First, the district
court concluded that Lewis’s allegations that Magnifi violated RESPA were “affirmative
claims that do not bear on the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement.” Second, the
district court stated, “The time has passed for Ms. Lewis to bring such claims in this case:
the Scheduling Order in this case provided a deadline of July 15, 2024, for joinder of claims
and amendment of pleadings.”
We agree with the district court’s legal analysis. First, despite Lewis’s broad claims
against Magnifi, Lewis acknowledges that “RESPA noncompliance does not automatically
bar foreclosure” and that RESPA provides a damages remedy for any violations. See
12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) (2018) (establishing damages and costs for violations). And Lewis
cites no authority to support her claim that RESPA violations invalidate the parties’
settlement agreement. Lewis also does not address section 2615, which states, “Nothing in
this chapter shall affect the validity or enforceability of any sale or contract for the sale of
real property or any loan, loan agreement, mortgage, or lien made or arising in connection
with a federally related mortgage loan.” 12 U.S.C. § 2615 (2018). Thus, the district court
14
did not err in concluding that any RESPA violations would not affect the validity of the
settlement agreement.
Second, even if Lewis were entitled to relief under RESPA, she raised her claim too
late by alleg ing Magnifi’s violations of RESPA in her motion to vacate the settlement
agreement. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to allow Lewis
to join these claims after the scheduling order’s deadline for doing so. See Maudsley v.
Pederson, 676 N.W.2d 8, 12 (Minn. App. 2004) (“[W]hether or not to enforce its own
scheduling order is clearly within the district court’s discretion.”). We conclude that the
district court did not err in rejecting Lewis’s RESPA arguments as a defense to enforcement
of the settlement agreement.
E. Lewis contends that she did not receive reasonable accommodations
under the ADA during settlement negotiations.

In her motion to vacate the settlement agreement, Lewis stated that she was
“experiencing documented cognitive impairments” and that she “was not afforded
reasonable accommodation in the negotiation or execution of the settlement agreement.”
According to Lewis, the lack of reasonable accommodations “combined with undue
pressure created by the imminent threat of foreclosure—formed a coercive environment
that undermines the validity of the settlement.” Lewis confidentially filed a
neuropsychological evaluation as evidence of her cognitive impairment.
The district court acknowledged Lewis’s arguments and evidence but determined
that “Ms. Lewis has not proven she suffered from diminished capacity at the time she
entered into the Settlement Agreement.” The district court relied on the uncontradicted
15
affidavit of Magnifi’s general counsel in determining that Lewis’s cognitive impairment
was “not raised before, during, or after mediation by Ms. Lewis or her counsel.” The
district court noted that the original settlement agreement “was drafted by Ms. Lewis’s
counsel” and that the “factual circumstances indicate Ms. Lewis understood the nature and
effect of entering into the Agreement.”
On appeal, Lewis contends that the “systematic failure to accommodate [her ]
documented cognitive disabilities during the settlement process and subsequent legal
proceedings violated Title II of the [ADA], 42 U.S.C. § 12132.” Lewis argues that her
disability “affected her ability to process complex legal and financial information, navigate
digital payment systems, and understand the implications of legal agreements without
appropriate accommodations.” Lewis also argues that her attorney and Magnifi’s attorney
engaged in a “knowing failure to accommodate documented disabilities while pursuing
legal proceedings.”
Before Lewis moved to vacate the settlement agreement, she did not request any
reasonable accommodation or suggest that she needed reasonable accommodations to
proceed with settlement negotiations. But even if Lewis had established that a reasonable
accommodation request had been denied, she fails to cite any caselaw establishing that an
ADA violation during settlement negotiations affects the enforceability of the subsequent
agreement when both parties are represented by legal counsel and no party claims lack of
capacity.
6 An appellate court generally declines to address arguments that are not briefed

6 On appeal, Lewis does not contend that she lacked capacity to enter the settlement
agreement. Assuming that Lewis raised capacity during district court proceedings, this
16
adequately. See State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. by the Special Comp. Fund v. Wintz Parcel
Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997).
Because no evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact about Lewis’s claim of
an ADA violation during settlement negotiations, and because Lewis fails to support her
legal argument with adequate briefing, we conclude that, based on this record, the district
court did not err in rejecting Lewis’s claim that the settlement agreement should be vacated
because of ADA violations.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lewis’s motion to
vacate the order enforcing the settlement agreement.

Lewis cited Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and moved to vacate the
district court’s order enforcing the settlement agreement. Lewis filed two affidavits in
support of her rule 60.02 motion.7 The district court order denying Lewis’s first rule 60.02
motion observed that “Ms. Lewis does not argue her motion to vacate judgment under a
specific subdivision of Rule 60.02, however, it appears to the Court that Ms. Lewis is
arguing excusable neglect under Rule 60.02(a).” The district court concluded that Lewis’s
motion failed as “she [could not] establish a reasonable defense on the merits or a debatably
meritorious claim.” See Finden by Finden v. Klaas, 128 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1964)

issue is forfeited on appeal. Wayne v. State, 860 N.W.2d 702, 704 n.2 (Minn. 2015)
(considering claims forfeited “because they were not addressed in Wayne’s briefs”); see
also Hunter v. Anchor Bank, N.A., 842 N.W.2d 10, 17 (Minn. App. 2013) (“[A]n argument
for reversal that is not raised in an appellant ’s principal brief is forfeited.”), rev. denied
(Minn. Mar. 18, 2014).

7 For clarity, we refer to Lewis’s “rule 60.02 motion” to avoid confusion with her earlier
motion to vacate the settlement agreement.
17
(describing factors necessary for relief under rule 60.02 for “excusable neglect,” including
“a reasonable defense on the merits”). The district court noted that Lewis’s first rule 60.02
motion was “entirely comprised of the allegations and arguments made in her response to
[Magnifi’s] motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement” and that she had “not introduced
any new facts as to why she has a reasonable defense on the merits.”
Lewis moved to vacate the district court’s June 30, 2025 judgment for Magnifi, this
time citing rule 60.02(c) (fraud) and (f) (any other reason justifying relief). The district
court denied Lewis’s second rule 60.02 motion, stating, “The Court has already issued its
Order denying Ms. Lewis’s motion to vacate judgment and will not consider new filings
on the same motion.” The district court’s order also states that “Ms. Lewis’s submissions
are again comprised of the allegations and arguments in her response to [Magnifi’s] motion
to enforce the settlement agreement, which the Court addressed” in its previous order.
On appeal, Lewis contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying
her second rule 60.02 motion because she presented “newly-discovered” evidence of
“documentary fraud involving pagination inconsistencies and unauthorized signature
transfer.” Specifically, Lewis emphasizes that “the settlement agreement contains two
separate pages both labeled ‘Page 5 of 5’ in a six-page document.” In her brief to this court,
Lewis does not argue the grounds raised in her first rule 60.02 motion. We understand
Lewis’s appeal to challenge the district court’s denial of her second rule 60.02 motion
18
because that is where she first raised arguments about “documentary fraud” that she urges
on appeal.8
We read the district court’s order denying Lewis’s second rule 60.02 motion to treat
the motion as a request to move for reconsideration of the court’s previous denial of rule
60.02 relief. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.11 (“Motions to reconsider are prohibited except
by express permission of the court, which will be granted only upon a showing of
compelling circumstances.”). Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to deny
relief under rule 60.02 for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child. of Coats, 633 N.W.2d
505, 510 (Minn. 2001). We consider Lewis’s two arguments in turn.
A. Documentary Fraud
First, Lewis contends that the original settlement agreement has two signature
pages, both labeled “5 of 5,” which is evidence of “documentary fraud,” and she also argues
that the settlement agreement “contains only both parties’ September 9, 2024, signatures,
which were transferred from the original agreement without authorization.”
Lewis’s argument challenges signature in counterparts—a well-established method
of consenting to a contract. Cf. Danov v. ABC Freight Forwarding Corp., 122 N.W.2d 776,
779-80 (Minn. 1963) (reviewing a trust agreement that provided that it “may be executed
in as many counterparts as desired by the Parties thereto, any one of which shall have the
full force and effect of an original copy”). The settlement agreement appears to have been

8 Lewis’s brief refers to the district court’s July 17, 2025 order, which denied her first
rule 60.02 motion. For the reasons stated, we understand Lewis to seek review of the
district court’s July 24, 2025 order denying her second rule 60.02 motion.
19
signed in counterparts; each page 5 of 5 bears the signature of one party. That two pages
of the settlement agreement are numbered “5 of 5” is not evidence of fraud.
Lewis’s argument that the parties’ signatures from the original settlement agreement
were “transferred” to the amendment is not supported by the record. Signatures on the
executed settlement agreement filed with the district court are dated November 1, 2024,
and October 9, 2024. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
Lewis’s documentary-fraud argument in support of her second rule 60.02 motion.
B. Validity of the Amended Settlement Agreement
Lewis argues that the settlement agreement is unenforceable because she was
excluded from the negotiations of the amendment. Lewis contends that her “systematic
exclusion . . . from the amendment process precludes any finding of [a] meeting of the
minds and renders the purported amendments void under Minnesota law.” Lewis maintains
that the “absence of valid offer and acceptance is conclusively established by the complete
lack of evidence showing any communication between the parties regarding proposed
amendments.” Lewis argues that the amendments “modified payment obligations,
extended deadlines, and altered fundamental terms of the original agreement.”
We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion by denying
rule 60.02 relief based on this claim. First, Lewis’s argument does not account for her
signature on the settlement agreement filed with the district court. A party’s signature to a
written contract is strong evidence of consent. Webb Publ’g Co. v. Fosshage, 426 N.W.2d
445, 449 (Minn. 1988) (“The general rule is that one who signs his name to a writing that
20
purports to be a contract does an act that is strong evidence that he intends to make himself
a party thereto . . . .” (quotation omitted)).
Second, even if we assume that the amendments to the settlement agreement were
unenforceable, the district court did not err in denying rule 60.02 relief. When contract
language unambiguously permits severability, courts may sever an unenforceable
provision and enforce the remaining provisions of the contract. Cf. Guercio v. Prod.
Automation Corp., 664 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that “the intent of the
parties must be ascertained in determining whether contract provisions are severable” and
considering whether the contract at issue had a severability clause). We have thoroughly
reviewed the settlement agreement and conclude that the district court’s order enforcing
the settlement agreement does not depend on any of the terms added to or changed by the
amendment.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Lewis’s
second rule 60.02 motion based on Lewis’s challenge to the validity of the settlement
agreement.
Affirmed.