In re the Marriage of:

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1208

In re the Marriage of:

Kayla Frances Wills, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Josh Michael Wills,
Respondent,

Otter Tail County,
Intervenor.

Filed May 4, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Ross, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-FA-20-2505

Christopher J. Cadem, Carolyn A. Cadem, Cadem Law Group, PLLC, Fergus Falls,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Richard D. Crabb, Hill Crabb, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
∗
ROSS, Judge
The district court considering a mother’s child-custody- modification motion in a
dispute between the divorced parents of minor children determined that the statutory best-

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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interest factor of whether domestic abuse had occurred favored mother’s motion. But it did
so without making an express finding that father had in fact committed any abuse and after
finding that “[f]ather has been investigated and cleared by Child Protection Services
several times” and that a police investigator determined that “there is no evidence to prove”
mother’s recent report that father committed abuse. We hold that, because the district
court’s finding that the domestic -abuse factor favors mother suggests that it found that
father committed domestic abuse, it was obligated to make detailed findings bearing on the
statutory presumption that joint custody is not in the children’s best interests and to address
the nature and context of the abuse and its implications on parenting and the children’s
well-being. Because the district court determined custody without these necessary findings,
we reverse the custody order and remand for further findings.
FACTS
Kayla Wills and Josh Wills divorced in April 2021, and the district court later
adopted their custody stipulation regarding their three minor sons. The stipulation assigned
the parties joint legal custody, assigned Kayla sole physical custody, and afforded Josh
parenting time every other weekend. The court-adopted stipulation also contemplated an
expansion in Josh’s parenting time, contingent on his participating in a mixed program of
therapy and parenting coaching. Josh signed a release allowing Kayla to monitor his
completion of a mandatory parental-conflict class and his attendance of counseling
sessions.
Kayla moved the district court to modify custody and parenting time in August
2023, alleging that Josh had failed to complete the agreed -upon coaching, class, and
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counseling sessions. She also alleged that, about a year and a half earlier, Josh had left the
boys unattended at a park and then called them “scaredy cat [s]” when they expressed
concern about his departure. Kayla alleged too that Josh engaged in “verbal abuse,”
including an incident in which he called the boys “dumb” and “stupid.” Josh denied all
these allegations in a countermotion, asserting that Kayla exaggerated his conduct as
maltreatment. He cited a recent police report, allegedly filed by Kayla, that claimed he had
given one son unknown prescription medication but concerning which the investigating
officer determined was over-the-counter allergy medicine . Josh also contested Kayla’s
characterization of the park incident, stating that he had left the two younger boys at the
park for only five minutes under the care of the oldest, then seven-year-old boy.
Before the district court could address the parties’ competing motions, Kayla moved
ex parte to assign her temporary sole legal custody, alleging that Josh had punched the
oldest boy’s legs and bruised his cheek. She also alleged that he twice choked the middle
son. The district court granted the ex parte motion, temporarily awarding Kayla sole legal
custody, suspending the parenting-time schedule, and ordering Josh to complete an anger-
management assessment.
Josh disputed the ex parte order and responded to the allegations by affidavit. He
maintained that he had merely playfully slapped the boy’s leg while they played video
games and that the boy had involuntarily jerked his knee up into his face. Josh did not
address the choking allegations but agreed to comply with the court-ordered programming
to expediently restore his parenting time. The district court concluded that Kayla presented
a prima facie case for child endangerment, set the matter for an evidentiary hearing, and
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appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to explore whether the original custody arrangement
served the children’s best interests.
The parties appeared for the evidentiary hearing, for which the record contains only
the district court’s factual findings because Kayla did not order the transcript. See Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 110.02, subd. 1 (allowing an appellant to provide the relevant transcript
necessary for appeal). The findings indicate that Kayla testified to several episodes of
Josh’s alleged domestic abuse before their divorce. She said that Josh had once thrown a
laptop computer over the children’s heads and that he had beaten dogs. Josh conceded that
he struck one dog they had been watching but that he did so only after it nipped at one of
the boys. And he conceded that he threw the family dog into a wall but said that he did so
only because it had bitten one of the other boys. He acknowledged he had acted
inappropriately toward the children , but he provided formal investigation reports that
cleared him of allegations of any domestic abuse. The district court credited the reports
from Otter Tail County Child Protective Services (CPS), in which CPS dismissed the
allegations that he had neglected the children during the supposed park-abandonment
incident and physically accosted them in November 2023. The district court also credited
a police report that concluded that no evidence substantiated Kayla’s allegations that he
had struck or choked the boys. And the district court credited only the GAL’s testimony
that Josh merely “played rough with the children” and encouraged the boys to hit each
other back.
The district court concluded that the statutory best-interest factor of whether
domestic abuse has occurred in the parents’ home favored Kayla ’s motion to modify
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custody. In doing so, it never expressly found that Josh had engaged in domestic abuse
under the statutory definition or discussed how the implied finding of abuse implicated the
statutory, best-interest presumption against joint custody that results from the finding. The
district court nevertheless ordered Kayla to have sole physical custody and the parties to
have joint legal custody.
Kayla appeals.
DECISION
Kayla challenges the district court’s award of joint legal custody , raising two
arguments. She argues first that the district court found that domestic abuse occurred in the
household but failed to explicitly determine whether she had rebutted the statutory
presumption of joint legal custody. She argues second that the record does not support the
district court’s finding that the parents could cooperate in joint child rearing. We address
each issue in turn.
I
We first address Kayla’s contention that the district court misapplied the best-
interest presumption that follows a finding of domestic abuse. A district court must
consider whether a proposed custodial arrangement serves a child’s best interests by
weighing all relevant factors, including twelve that are statutorily listed. Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024). For each factor, the district court “must make detailed
findings” based on the evidence and explain how each one led to its custody decision. Id.,
subd. 1(b)(1) (2024). Although a rebuttable presumption that a child’s best interests are
best served by joint legal custody exists when either parent requests joint legal custody, the
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court must instead apply a rebuttable presumption that the child’s best interests are not best
served by either joint legal or joint physical custody if d omestic abuse occurred in the
marital household or in either parent’s household. Id., subd. 1(b)(9) (2024). Before turning
to Kayla’s specific argument that the district court failed to properly address this domestic-
abuse-generated presumption, we first observe a peculiarity about the premises of the
argument.
Kayla’s argument arises from her premises that the district court found that domestic
abuse occurred in the marital household, or in either parent’s household, and that Josh
committed the abuse. Josh seems to accept th ose premises, arguing that the district court
appropriately engaged in “a nuanced consideration” of the presumption as applied “against
father as a parent who had committed domestic abuse.” But the bases of Kayla’s premise
and Josh’s concession are unclear to us; the district court never expressly found that Josh
engaged in domestic abuse, and the findings do not specify the evidence that would support
the finding. Borrowing from the statutory language of the domestic-abuse factor of
Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a)(4), the district court framed the issue
properly, heading that section of its order in part as “[w]hether domestic abuse, as defined
in section 518.01, has occurred . . . .” But it never expressly discussed th at statutory
definition of domestic abuse or applied it to Kayla’s allegations, which Josh specifically
denied. And the absence of an express finding that domestic abuse occurred is in the context
of the district court’s merely outlining Kayla’s accusations and Josh’s contrary responses,
summarizing the testimony of Josh’s mother, mentioning that the GAL was “concerned”
that Josh told the boys to hit one another back , and referencing the portions of the official
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reports by CPS and police that generally exonerated Josh as to Kayla’s reported allegations.
Although these findings leave it unclear why the district court concluded that “[t]his factor
favors Mother,” we will nevertheless discuss the appellate arguments presented based on
the implication (and Josh’s tacit concession) that the district court actually found that
domestic abuse as defined by Minnesota Statutes section 518 B.01 (2024) occurred, that
Josh committed the abuse, and that those findings are supported by the evidence.
We must therefore decide whether the district court, having functionally found that
domestic abuse occurred between the parents, met its statutory obligation to apply the
rebuttable presumption that the children’s best interests are not best served by joint legal
custody, as required by section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(9). To adequately address whether
this presumption has been rebutted, the district court “shall consider” two elements: first,
the “nature and context of the domestic abuse” and, second, its implications “for parenting
and for the child’s safety, well-being, and developmental needs.” Id. This best-interest
assessment should be clearly presented to inform the parties and also to facilitate our
review on appeal, because the district court “must make detailed findings on each of the
[best-interest] factors” and also “explain how each factor led to its conclusions and to the
determination of custody.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1). Kayla argues that the district court failed to
consider the two elements necessary to rebut the domestic-abuse, best-interest presumption
regarding custody. We agree that the findings on this issue are inadequate.
We are not convinced by Josh’s counter to Kayla’s argument, as he asserts that we
should accept the district court’s custody decision because it “properly analyzed all of the
evidence and balanced all of the best interest factors before rendering its decision regarding
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joint legal custody.” It is true that the district court’s custody order includes multiple
sections, each beginning with a heading that captures the best-interest factors listed by
statute. But the supreme court interpreted these statutes and concluded that they direct
“district courts . . . to address domestic abuse in whatever context it arises and to explicitly
consider its impact on the child.” Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 793 (Minn. 2019)
(emphasis added). The domestic -abuse factor requires “special focus” that “must” be
considered in its determination of the joint-custody presumption. Id. As we have described,
the district court’s section under its domestic-abuse heading is mostly a recitation of the
evidence rather than specific factual findings on disputed evidence. And it includes no
findings or discussion informing the parties or this court how, or whether, it considered the
nature and context of the abuse that it implicitly found to have occurred. Nor does it discuss
the implications that the abuse has on parenting as it regards the children’s safety, well-
being, and developmental needs. Because the district court is obligated to, but did not,
provide the detailed findings or explanation necessary to meet the statutory requirement
sufficient to support its legal conclusion and facilitate appellate review, we must reverse
and remand for additional findings.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Josh’s contention that the district court’s implied
findings rebutted the best-interest presumption against joint custody. He cites the
nonprecedential case Hatfield v. Hatfield for the proposition that express consideration of
the 12 best-interest factors may implicitly rebut the joint-custody presumption. No. A24-
0863, 2025 WL 1681971, at *5–6 (Minn. App. June 16, 2025). But our nonprecedential
decisions do not bind our analysis, and we add that, unlike the findings that we considered
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in Hatfield, the district court’s findings here lack any consideration of how domestic abuse
affected the children’s well-being or the parties’ ability to coparent.
II
Kayla also argues that the record inadequately supports the finding that the parties
can cooperate in parenting decisions. The twelfth best-interest factor concerns whether the
parents maintain a “willingness and ability” to cooperate in child rear ing, to maximize
information sharing and minimize conflict, and to utilize dispute-resolution methods for
the children’s major life decisions. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(12). This factor bears
significant weight if domestic abuse has occurred. See Thornton, 933 N.W.2d at 795. Kayla
contends that the district court does not reconcile its conclusion that “both parents can put
their differences aside and cooperate” with contradictory factual findings. We review for
an abuse of discretion, examining for clear error whether the factual findings are
unsupported by the record or are contrary to logic. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50
(Minn. 1984). The district court identified the “high conflict” between the parents and
observed their ongoing communication difficulties. But no findings reconcile the conflict
between these observations and the district court’s conclusion that the parents could
eventually cooperate after “many years” of development. Because the weighing of
conflicting evidence is exclusively the province of the district court and we are remanding
for the reasons already stated, we instruct the district court to also undertake the fact finding
and analysis necessary for our review of its decision on this factor as well.
Reversed and remanded.