Troy Kenneth Scheffler, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1209

Troy Kenneth Scheffler,
Appellant,

vs.
Rosemary R. Franzen,
Defendant,

Joshua M Heintzeman, et al.,
Respondents,

Lowell A Smith,
Respondent.

Filed April 27, 2026
Reversed and remanded.
Jesson, Judge*

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CV-22-3881

Troy Kenneth Scheffler, Merrifield, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Samuel W. Diehl, Harry N. Niska, CrossCastle P.L.L.C., Anoka, Minnesota (for
respondents Joshua M. Heintzeman and Keri E. Heintzeman)

Lowell A. Smith, Baxter, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Jesson,
Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Troy Kenneth Scheffler challenges the district court’s grant of
respondents’ motion to dismiss appellant’s defamation and conspiracy suit under
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Appellant also claims that the district court demonstrated bias and
erroneously held him to a higher standard as a self-represented litigant.
We discern no judicial misconduct or bias. Because, however, the pleading of the
alleged defamatory statements is sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss, we reverse
and remand.
FACTS
During the 2022 election cycle, Scheffler and Rosemary Franzen campaigned
against each other for the position of Crow Wing County Commissioner. After losing the
election, Scheffler filed a lawsuit against respondents, Josh ua M. Heintzeman, Keri E.
Heintzeman, and Lowell A. Smith, alleging that they conspired to sabotage his campaign
by spreading falsehoods in order to lower his reputation in the community. 1 Central to
Scheffler’s defamation claims was the accusation that respondents knowingly made false

1 Scheffler initially asserted claims against Franzen. In November 2023, Scheffler and
Franzen jointly stipulated to a settlement and the district court dismissed the claims against
Franzen with prejudice.
3
statements accusing Scheffler of falsely claiming political endorsements. At the time, Josh
Heintzeman was a member of the Minnesota House of Representatives.2
While the complaint is lengthy, after its third amendment the false statements
Scheffler attributes to respondents are summarized as follows:
• Josh Heintzeman told a local media outlet that Scheffler
had falsely claimed his endorsement;
• Josh and Keri Heintzeman shared the media outlet’s story
containing the allegedly false statements to their Facebook
pages;
• Keri Heintzeman told Eric Klang, a candidate for Crow
Wing County Sheriff, that Scheffler claimed he had earned
the endorsements of both Josh Heintzeman and Klang; and,
• Lowell Smith claimed to have a video of Scheffler falsely
claiming these endorsements.

As a result of th eir conduct, Scheffler alleged that his reputation was harmed and
lowered in the eyes of his community and filed suit for defamation and civil conspiracy.
He sought damages for emotional distress, as well as general and special damages.
After Scheffler filed his third amended complaint, respondents filed motions to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions,
concluding that Scheffler failed to allege the defamatory statements with sufficient
specificity. Further, as a candidate for public office, the court explained, Scheffler was a
public figure. And public figures cannot prevail in defamation claims unless they prove
actual malice, which the district court concluded Scheffler had failed to plead with
specificity in this case.

2 Because Josh and Keri Heintzeman share the same last name, we will refer to each party
by their first name.
4
Scheffler appeals.
DECISION
I. Scheffler’s defamation and conspiracy claims were erroneously dismissed
under rule 12.02(e).

Scheffler challenges the district court’s dismissal of his defamation and conspiracy
claims, arguing that he satisfied the pleading requirements set forth in Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 12.02(e), and that the district court improperly demanded “proof” of
defamation at the initial stage of the litigation rather than accepting as true the facts he
pleaded in his complaint.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo.
In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 826 (Minn. 2011). In doing so, “[w]e
consider only those facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id. at 826-27. In
our de novo review here, we begin with a brief overview of the law of defamation. We
then turn to the specific claims in the complaint to test whether they meet defamation law’s
pleading-specificity requirements.
Pleading Requirements under Defamation Law
To establish a defamation claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant
communicated the statement to someone other than the plaintiff; (2) that the statement was
false; (3) that the statement tended to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and lowered their
reputation in the eyes of the community; and (4) that the recipient of the false statement
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reasonably understood the statement to concern the plaintiff. Larson v. Gannett Co., Inc.,
940 N.W.2d 120, 130 (Minn. 2020).
While Minnesota’s general rules of pleading require only “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01,
defamation claims require greater specificity in pleading.
Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Minn. 2000) (“Minnesota
law has generally required that in defamation suits, the defamatory matter be set out
verbatim.”) (citing Am. Book Co. v. Kingdom Pub. Co., 73 N.W. 1089, 1090 (Minn. 1898)).
The allegedly defamatory statements must be pleaded with enough specificity to provide
notice to the defendant of the defamatory statement allegedly made. See Am. Book Co., 73
N.W. at 1090; DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019) (stating a
defamation complaint need only contain “information sufficient to fairly notify the
opposing party of the claim against it”) (quotation omitted). And to be actionable in
defamation, statements must be one of fact, not opinion, given that the First Amendment
protects statements of opinion. Jankalow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.
1986) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974))
3.
But First Amendment freedom of speech protections do not end at the fact-versus-
opinion distinction. Not all plaintiffs stand on equal footing. When the plaintiff is a public
official or candidate for public office, the Constitution demands more. Such plaintiffs may

3 Though they do not bind us, we consider federal court opinions for their persuasive value
and afford those opinions “due deference.” Laliberte v. Dollar Tree, Inc., 987 N.W.2d
590, 594, n.4 (Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted).
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recover for defamation only by proving actual malice—that is, knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964); see also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) (extending the
actual-malice standard to candidates for public office). As the Minnesota Supreme Court
has explained, “to avoid chilling constitutionally protected speech, the Supreme Court has
imposed prerequisites to recovery in certain types of defamation actions. For example, the
Court has held that public figures and public officials must meet a higher standard when
challenging defamatory statements, requiring proof of actual malice.”
Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868, 873 (Minn. 2019).
Finally, Minnesota generally requires that defamation suits— even those not
involving public figures—be pleaded with a greater degree of specificity. See Moreno,
610 N.W.2d at 326 (citing Am. Book Co., 73 N.W. at 1090). In cases involving written
defamation, the allegedly defamatory language must generally “be set out verbatim” in the
complaint. Id. For oral statements, however, courts have recognized that “fail[ure] to
recite the exact language spoken is not fatal to [a] defamation claim,” but the plaintiff must
identify who made the defamatory statement, to whom it was made, and the context.
See Schibursky v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 820 F.Supp. 1169, 1181 (D. Minn. 1993).
With this legal backdrop in mind, we turn to Scheffler’s defamation claims, first
addressing whether the alleged defamatory statements were pleaded with sufficient
specificity. We then turn to whether Scheffler adequately pleaded actual malice.

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Pleading of the Alleged Defamatory Statements with Specificity
Scheffler alleged that Josh “knowingly falsely or with reckless disregard to the
truth” told the Brainerd Dispatch that Scheffler had falsely claimed the endorsements of
Josh; that Keri and Josh then shared the media outlet’s story containing the allegations on
Facebook; that Keri told Klang that Scheffler falsely claimed the endorsement of Josh; and
that Smith knowingly spread falsities, including by claiming to have a video of Scheffler
claiming these endorsements to other members at a Christian Constitutional Conservatives
(CCC) meeting in February 2023.
Here, the district court began its specificity analysis by observing that Scheffler
failed to allege verbatim the defamatory statements. Noting that this is not always required,
the court then characterized Scheffler as raising only “[ g]eneral allegations [of] vague
statements” made to “unidentified individuals”, at an “unspecified time and/or place,” thus
failing to notify respondents “of what defamatory remarks he or she allegedly made.” As
a result, the complaint did not meet the heightened specificity requirements that govern
defamation lawsuits, the district court concluded.
But the district court’s characterization of the allegations as “vague” cannot be
reconciled with the third amended complaint. The complaint identifies the speakers, the
audience to whom the statements were directed and the context in which they were made.
See Schibursky, 820 F.Supp at 1181; cf. Yohannes v. Minn. IT Sers., No. A24-1634, 2025
WL 1554578, at *4- 5 (Minn. App. June 2, 2025) (affirming rule 12.02(e) dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint for failure to allege the speakers, recipients, and settings in which the
8
defamatory statements were made), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 12, 2025). 4 For example,
Scheffler identified the three speakers as Josh, Keri, and Smith. He then identified the
recipients as the Brainerd Dispatch, the sheriff candidate, and attendees of the CCC
meeting. Scheffler also included the timeframes and contexts in which the statements were
made: Josh and Keri made the statements during an election cycle on October 1, 2022, and
Smith made the statement to a political -action group on February 7, 2023. Finally, he
described the allegedly defamatory statements made by the speakers, namely that each one
told a third party that Scheffler had falsely claimed another’s endorsement for office.
Our analysis of these four alleged defamatory statements is guided by the fact that,
in reviewing an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must “accept the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). And
we observe that Scheffler will need more robust, concrete facts to survive summary
judgment, should the case progress to that stage. But given that the third amend ed
complaint outlines the speakers, recipients , and settings of the alleged defamation, it
provides respondents with the necessary notice to which they are entitled. Schibursky, 820
F.Supp. at 1181. Accordingly, the district court erred in determining that Scheffler did not
plead the allegedly defamatory statements with sufficient specificity.

4 Because nonprecedential opinions of this court are not binding authority, we cite
Yohannes for its persuasive value only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c)
(“Nonprecedential opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions
may be cited as persuasive authority.”)
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Pleading of Actual Malice
Scheffler does not contest the district court’s determination that he was a public
figure because he was campaigning for the Crow Wing County Commissioner position.
As a public figure, he needs to show that the defamatory statements were made with actual
malice. Moreno, 610 N.W.2d at 329; see Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873. Accordingly,
Scheffler ultimately must present clear and convincing evidence that any defamatory
statements were “made with the knowledge that [they were] false or with reckless disregard
of whether [they were] false or not.” Maethner, 929 N.W.2d at 873 (quotations omitted);
Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003) (stating a plaintiff must
establish “a prima facie claim of defamation by clear and convincing evidence”).
“[R]eckless disregard requires that a defendant make a statement while subjectively
believing that the statement is probably false.” Chafoulias, 668 N.W.2d at 655.
In his complaint, Scheffler states that the allegedly defamatory statements
summarized above were made “knowingly falsely or with reckless disregard to the truth.”
The district court concluded that Scheffler failed to sufficiently plead actual malice because
his complaint did not point to sufficient facts showing that Heintzemans and Smith had
“knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.”
But this imposes too high a burden at the motion to dismiss stage. Rule 9.02 of the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.” It provides no exception for
allegations of actual malice in defamation lawsuits. Considering that malice and
10
knowledge “may be averred generally,” the complaint’s allegations of actual malice are
adequate at this stage of the litigation.5
II. The district court did not engage in judicial misconduct or demonstrate judicial
bias.

Scheffler raises several other arguments related to the handling of his defamation
case below. He argues that the district court improperly held him to a higher standard as a
self-represented litigant and unfairly managed the parties’ motions throughout litigation,
never ruled on his motion to compel discovery, improperly ordered him to file a brief
detailing the procedural posture of the matter, and demonstrated bias. These arguments are
unavailing.
Scheffler argues that the district court held him to a stricter standard than it should
have. He contends that “self-represented litigants lack legal training and cannot be
expected to draft complaints.” Therefore, he suggests that he should have been given more
leeway in the proceedings below.
“Although some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has
repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as
attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115,
119 (Minn. App. 2001); see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 1.04 (“Whenever these rules require
that an act be done by a lawyer, the same duty is required of a self-represented litigant.”).
Here, the district court accommodated Scheffler as a self-represented litigant. It allowed

5 Our conclusion here is in accord not only with rule 9, but also with our nonprecedential
opinion in Harpel v. Thurn, No. A14-0680, 2014 WL 6609272, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov.
24, 2014), which also involved a dismissal under rule 12.02(e).
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him to amend his complaint three times, invited him to brief the procedural history of the
matter at the January 2024 hearing, and considered all of his motions and objections.
Indeed, when the district court asked Scheffler to brief the procedural history of the case,
Scheffler did not object; instead, he asked how he could best caption the brief to assist the
district court. While our de novo review of the district court’s rule-12 decision determines
it was made in error, nothing in the record shows the district court treated Scheffler unfairly
as a self-represented litigant.
Finally, Scheffler argues that the district court never ruled on his motion to compel
discovery. However, the district court determined that his motion to compel discovery was
rendered moot as a result of its dismissal under rule 12.02(e). Because we reverse that
dismissal, we defer to the district court on remand to determine the appropriate discovery
parameters.
In sum, t he district court did not engage in judicial misconduct or bias based on
Scheffler’s status as a self -represented litigant.
6 However, the court erred in dismissing
the third amended complaint pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Reversed and remanded.

6 Scheffler also argues that the district court erred in its order by citing to caselaw not
argued by respondents at trial. However, Scheffler provides no authority or analysis in
support, and we therefore decline to consider this argument because of inadequate briefing.
State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn.
1997).