Troy K. Scheffler, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1210

Troy K. Scheffler,
Appellant,

vs.

Bob Jacobson,
as Commissioner of Minn Dept of Public Safety, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed April 13, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-24-7889

Troy K. Scheffler, Merrifield, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Madeleine DeMeules, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Bond, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his constitutional claims, asserting that the
district court abused its discretion by (1) granting respondents’ motion to dismiss his
original complaint after he filed an amended complaint as of right under Minn. R. Civ. P.
15.01 and (2) awarding costs to respondents. We affirm.
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FACTS
Appellant Troy K. Scheffler filed a lawsuit against the State of Minnesota, Bob
Jacobson in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Public
Safety, Timothy Walz in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Minnesota, Tamar
Gronvall in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of
Administration, and John Doe in their individual and official capacity (collectively
“respondents”), alleging that they infringed upon his freedom of conscience and free
exercise of religion. Scheffler claimed that respondents “establish[ed] a State religion” of
Satanism by permitting placement of a “Satanic altar” in the Minnesota State Capitol
building. Scheffler simultaneously requested injunctive relief via a court order requiring
the state to remove the altar pending the outcome of his lawsuit. The district court denied
Scheffler’s request for injunctive relief.
Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss Scheffler’s complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure
12.02(e) (the first motion). On January 3, 2025, respondents served the first motion upon
Scheffler by mail. On February 27, 2025, Scheffler filed and served an amended complaint
in lieu of filing an answer to respondents’ first motion. The parties also filed competing
motions to stay and compel discovery.
On March 4, 2025, the district court held a hearing to address the first motion,
respondents’ motion to stay discovery pending the outcome of the first motion, and
Scheffler’s motion to compel discovery. At the hearing, respondents consented to having
the amended complaint considered for purposes of their first motion “to preserve judicial
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resources.” Scheffler objected to the district court hearing the first motion. The district
court noted the objection but allowed arguments on the first motion. After hearing
arguments on all three motions, the district court granted respondents’ motion to stay
discovery until it decided the first motion and the motion to compel discovery, both of
which it took under advisement.
On March 11, 2025, respondents filed and served a written motion to dismiss the
amended complaint (the second motion), summarizing the March 4 hearing and their
consent for the district court to consider Scheffler’s amended complaint when deciding the
first motion. On June 2, 2025, the district court issued an order dismissing Scheffler’s
amended complaint.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Scheffler argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) hearing oral
arguments on respondents’ first motion after he filed an amended complaint and
(2) awarding costs to respondents.1 We address each argument in turn.
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by hearing oral arguments on
respondents’ first motion after Scheffler filed an amended complaint.
Scheffler argues that the district court abused its discretion by relaxing Minnesota
General Rule of Practice 115.03(a) in a way that prejudiced him by proceeding on
respondent’s first motion after he had submitted an amended complaint. Specifically,

1 Appellant also argues that the district court discriminated against him as a self-represented
litigant. But because this argument merely restates his previous arguments, we do not
address this issue separately.
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Scheffler claims that he (1) had no meaningful notice and was unprepared to defend against
the first motion because he had not read it and it addressed his now -mooted complaint; 2
(2) had no meaningful opportunity to brief the issues or respond orally to the second motion
because respondents did not file it until after the motion hearing; and (3) lacked knowledge
of the proper procedures as a self-represented litigant. We are not persuaded.
“Enforcement of local rules is left to the discretion of the district court.” Hopkins
by LaFontaine v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Minn. App. 1991).
To determine whether a district court abused its discretion, appellate courts consider
whether there is “prejudice to the parties.” Brault v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 538
N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 21, 1995). “[P]rejudice is a
question of fundamental fairness,” that “may be demonstrated by lack of notice, procedural
irregularities, or lack of a meaningful opportunity to respond to the motion.” Bradley v.
First Nat’l. Bank of Walker, N.A., 711 N.W.2d 121, 128 (Minn. App. 2006).
Minnesota General Rule of Practice 115.03(a) states that “[n]o motion shall be heard
until the moving party” serves the notice of motion and motion, proposed order, any
affidavits or exhibits, and memorandum of law “on all opposing counsel and self-
represented litigants and files the documents with the court administrator at least 28 days
before the hearing.” However, a district court may “relax[] or modif[y]” the General Rules
of Practice “in any case, or [relieve a party] from the effect thereof on such terms as may

2 The parties agree that “filing an amended complaint moots a motion to dismiss the
original complaint.”
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be just.” Minn. Stat. § 484.33 (2024); see also Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 115.07 (district court
may “waive or modify” time limits if “interests of justice otherwise require.”).
We have previously addressed the question of whether it was proper to hear
arguments on an oral dispositive motion. For example, in Bradley, we concluded that the
district court properly allowed the respondent’s statute-of-limitations defense because the
parties had already “aggressively disputed” the underlying issue and, the appellant was not
prejudiced “in the sense that she was treated fundamentally unfairly.” 711 N.W.2d at 123;
see also Zirnhelt v. Carter, 843 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. App. 2014) (concluding that,
because “district court gave both sides a full opportunity to brief the statute-of-limitations
issue,” appellant was not prejudiced by district court’s consideration of issue raised for first
time at trial). But see Rhee v. Golden Home Builders, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Minn.
App. 2000) (concluding that plaintiffs were “unfairly prejudiced ” by district court’s
“failure to enforce” rules when plaintiffs had no notice of motion prior to hearing).
Here, the district court relaxed the process outlined in Minnesota General Rule of
Practice 115.03(a) by allowing the amended complaint to serve as the operative complaint
when hearing arguments on respondents’ first motion, so we must determine whether
Scheffler was prejudiced by a lack of notice or an opportunity to respond, resulting in
fundamental unfairness to him.
First, respondents served Scheffler with their first motion on January 3, 2025, two
months before the March 4 hearing, giving Scheffler meaningful notice and ample time to
read the first motion and prepare an oral argument, a written response, or both. In claiming
that he was denied notice and an opportunity to respond, Scheffler relies on Sharkey v. City
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of Shoreview, in which we concluded that the appellant had “an absolute right to amend his
complaint one time as a matter of course” prior to a responsive pleading. 853 N.W.2d 832,
836 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. It is clear from the record that
the district court allowed Scheffler to amend his complaint as required under Sharkey.
Scheffler’s arguments regarding the district court’s decision to hear oral arguments on
respondents’ first motion are not implicated by Sharkey.
Second, after the hearing, respondents served the second motion upon Scheffler on
March 11, 2025. This second motion did not introduce any new arguments but confirmed
that respondents had consented at the hearing to having Scheffler’s amended complaint
considered for the purposes of their first motion. The district court did not issue its decision
until June 2, 2025, giving Scheffler over two months to respond in writing to respondents’
second motion, had he chosen to do so. Furthermore, because the second motion did not
contain any changes to respondents’ arguments, even if the district court had held a separate
motion hearing to address respondents’ second motion, Scheffler’s arguments should not
have substantively changed from what he argued at the March 4 hearing.
As to Scheffler’s third claim that he did not know which filing mechanism to use,
which deadline applied to the filings, whether the district court would accept them, and
which motion the filing could have addressed, we are not persuaded. Throughout the
proceedings at the district court and in his briefing on appeal, Scheffler demonstrated a
knowledge of district-court rules and procedures.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by using the amended complaint as the operative complaint when hearing
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respondents’ first motion because doing so did not prejudice Scheffler or result in any
fundamental unfairness.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding statutory costs and
fees for motions filed by respondents.
Scheffler claims that the district court inappropriately awarded (1) $200 in statutory
costs pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 549.02, subdivision 1, and (2) $225 to
reimburse motion-filing fees for respondents’ three motions pursuant to Minnesota Rule of
Civil Procedure 54.04. Scheffler’s claims are unavailing.
We review a district court’s grant of statutory costs to a prevailing party for an abuse
of discretion. Capacity Wireless, LLC v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 978 N.W.2d
275, 279-80 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 18, 2022). “The district court has
discretion to determine not only the amount of an award of costs and disbursements, but
also who the prevailing party is for purposes of such an award.” Staffing Specifix, Inc. v.
TempWorks Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 896 N.W.2d 115, 127 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d, 913
N.W.2d 687 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). “The district court abuses its discretion
when its decision is against logic and facts on the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“In every action in a district court, the prevailing party . . . shall be allowed
reasonable disbursements paid or incurred.” Minn. Stat. § 549.04 (2024); see also Lake
Superior Ctr. Auth. v. Hammel, Green & Abrahamson, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 458, 482 (Minn.
App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 23, 2006). The district court shall allow an amount
of $200 to the defendant upon “dismissal or when judgment is rendered in the defendant’s
favor on the merits.” Minn. Stat. § 549.02 (2024). Furthermore, a judge or court
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administrator “may tax any costs and disbursements allowed by law” after “all parties have
been allowed an opportunity to file applications and to object to the application of any other
party.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.04.
A. Statutory Costs
Scheffler first argues that the district court improperly granted statutory costs based
on a “void” proceeding.
“A judgment is void if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter,
lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties . . . , or acted in a manner inconsistent with
due process.” Bode v. Minn. Dept. of Nat. Res., 594 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Minn. App. 1999),
aff’d, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000). Because the district court had jurisdiction and
properly heard the first motion, the proceeding was not void.
Scheffler also argues that the district court’s “procedural violations preclude a
merits-based dismissal.” He references the district court’s determination that the award
was proper because section 549.02, subdivision 1, “allows costs ‘to defendant [u]pon
discontinuance or dismissal or when judgment is rendered in the defendant’s favor on the
merits.’” (emphasis added). The district court clarified that the statute distinguishes costs
awarded “[t]o defendant” and “[t]o the prevailing party,” determining that it properly
awarded the statutory amount to the defendant because it dismissed the case. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding statutory costs to respondents
when it dismissed the case.
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B. Cost Award for Motion Filing Fees
Scheffler also argues that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs
on all three of the motions filed by respondents. We address each challenged motion
separately.
Scheffler first claims that the district court abused its discretion by awarding costs
for respondents’ first motion because his amended complaint rendered the motion moot.
We discern no reason that the district court should not award fees to a moving party for a
motion that was proper at the time of filing, and Scheffler cites no legal support for this
argument. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs
for respondents’ first motion.
Scheffler next claims that the district court improperly awarded motion fees for
respondents’ motion to stay discovery because respondents “were already in violation of
Rule 26.06(a), which requires a conference” within 30 days. Appellate courts will not
disturb a district court’s decision to grant or deny discovery requests “unless the [district]
court abused its discretion, exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, or
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” 1300 Nicollet, LLC v. Cnty. of Hennepin,
990 N.W.2d 422, 431 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.06(a) states: “Except . . . when the court
orders otherwise, the parties must confer as soon as practicable—and in any event within
30 days from the initial due date for an answer.” “Upon motion by a party . . . and for good
cause shown, the court . . . may make any order . . . that the discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.03(a)(2).
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The district court determined that respondents properly filed and served their motion
to stay discovery under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.03(a)(2). The district court
then exercised its discretion under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.06(a) to grant the
motion to stay discovery pending the outcome of the first motion. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs for this motion.
Third, Scheffler argues that the district court’s decision to allow costs for
respondents’ second motion was “particularly problematic” because the second motion was
filed after the hearing, never heard, and never ruled upon. In support of his contention,
Scheffler cites part of a 2014 statute that he acknowledges is no longer in effect. Scheffler
also makes a policy argument regarding fairness to litigants, but this is not a legal argument
addressing any abuse of discretion by the district court.
If a brief “does not contain an argument or citation to legal authority in support of
the allegations raised, the allegation is deemed waived.” State v. Meldrum, 724 N.W.2d
15, 22 (Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2007); see also Brodsky v. Brodsky,
733 N.W.2d 471, 479-80 (Minn. App. 2007) (recognizing that inadequately briefed
arguments are forfeited). Scheffler forfeited this argument by improperly briefing it when
he failed to provide a legal argument or citation to legal authority in support of his
allegations. We therefore decline to address this argument.
Affirmed.