State of Minnesota v. Chad Alan Blood Milhausen, Jr.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1217

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Chad Alan Blood Milhausen, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Bond, Judge

Redwood County District Court
File No. 64-CR-24-136

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shannon M. Ness, Redwood County Attorney, Marissa Pacheco, Assistant County
Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Rasmusson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BOND, Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for five counts of

nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images, appellant argues that he is entitled

to a new trial due to the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct. Alternatively,

appellant argues that the warrant of commitment is incorrect. We affirm appellant’s

convictions, but we reverse and remand for the district court to correct the warrant of

commitment.

FACTS

Appellant Chad Alan Blood Milhausen, Jr. and A.O. were in an “on and off”

relationship for about six years. Early in the relationship, when A.O. was 19 or 20, they

consensually created sexually explicit photos and videos together using Milhausen’s

cellphone. The relationship later ended and A.O. moved out of Milhausen’s apartment in

May 2023. A.O. asked Milhausen to delete the photos and videos from his phone.

In February 2024, A.O. learned that sexually explicit photos and videos of her had

been posted to the website FetLife. 1 A.O. created a FetLife account so she could view the

materials and saw that six photos and three videos had been posted between June and

October 2023 on an account she identified as Milhausen’s. A.O. recognized her face or

body in several of the photos, and, while she could not fully watch the videos without

paying, she was certain they were the same videos that Milhausen had recorded during

1
FetLife is a “fetish site” which operates as a type of social-media platform where users
can upload photos and videos to their own profile and communicate with others.

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their relationship. A.O. believed that Milhausen posted the materials because he was the

only person with access to them. A.O. never gave Milhausen permission to post the photos

and videos online.

A.O. felt “really disgusted, really embarrassed, [and] confused” that Milhausen had

publicly posted sexually explicit material of her without her consent. And A.O. was

especially concerned that the general availability of the photos might become known to her

kids and would affect her “ability to interact and be a part of [her] community.”

In March 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged Milhausen with nine counts

of nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 617.261, subd. 1 (2022). The state later dismissed four of the charges. The remaining

five charges proceeded to a jury trial, at which A.O., a police investigator, and a crime-

victim services coordinator testified consistently with the above facts.

Milhausen testified in his defense. Milhausen testified that he only had a FetLife

account because A.O. had introduced him to the site while they were still together. Even

though Milhausen and A.O. were not in a romantic relationship when he posted the

materials, Milhausen maintained that A.O. gave him permission to post the photos and

videos on FetLife.

The jury found Milhausen guilty of all five counts. The district court convicted

Milhausen of counts one and two and sentenced him to concurrent, 22-month sentences on

each count.

Milhausen appeals.

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DECISION

I. Milhausen is not entitled to a new trial because of the cumulative effect of
prosecutorial misconduct.

Milhausen argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor engaged

in multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The right to due process includes the

right to a fair trial. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025). Prosecutors are

ministers of justice who “have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives

a fair trial, no matter how strong the evidence of guilt.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,

300 (Minn. 2006). Consequently, prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of a

fair trial. Id. (“The overarching concern regarding prosecutorial misconduct . . . is that

[the] misconduct may deny the defendant’s right to a fair trial.”).

The standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct depends on whether the

defendant objected to the alleged misconduct. “For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct,

[courts] have utilized a harmless error test, the application of which varies based on the

severity of the misconduct.” State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 389 (Minn. 2007). When a

defendant does not object to the alleged misconduct at trial, we apply the “modified plain-

error test.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).

Under this test, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted (1) error

and (2) that the error was plain. Id. “An error is plain if it [is] clear or obvious,” which is

usually established “if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.”

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted).

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Milhausen argues that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during

the state’s case-in-chief by introducing evidence in violation of the district court’s pretrial

order. Milhausen also contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

argument by (1) misstating a witness’s testimony, (2) inflaming the passions and prejudices

of the jury, and (3) relying on facts not in evidence. Milhausen does not clearly apply

either the plain-error or the harmless-error standard of review, nor does he argue that any

individual instance of misconduct is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. Rather, he

asserts that the cumulative effect of the alleged prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of

a fair trial. We therefore first consider whether the conduct identified by Milhausen

constitutes prosecutorial misconduct under the applicable standard of review and we then

consider whether the cumulative impact of any misconduct entitles him to a new trial.

Violation of Pretrial Order

Milhausen argues that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by

introducing an unredacted warrant of commitment contrary to the district court’s pretrial

order. A prosecutor engages in misconduct when they introduce evidence the district court

previously ruled inadmissible. See State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 744-46 (Minn. 2003).

Before trial, Milhausen moved in limine to exclude any reference to his prior

convictions or, alternatively, to limit any such evidence to “unspecified convictions.” The

state moved to impeach Milhausen with evidence of three felony convictions. The district

court ruled that, if Milhausen testified, the state could impeach him with evidence that he

had a felony conviction for failure to register as a predatory offender as well as two other

unspecified felony convictions. But the district court ordered that the warrant of

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commitment for the failure-to-register conviction must be “redacted to remove sentencing

components and/or dismissed charges.” Despite the court’s pretrial order, the state offered

the unredacted warrant of commitment as an exhibit at trial. The unredacted warrant of

commitment contained the length of Milhausen’s prison sentence and listed more than 15

sentencing conditions. The district court admitted the unredacted warrant of commitment

into evidence. 2

The state concedes that the prosecutor erred by failing to redact the warrant of

commitment as ordered by the district court. Because the district court’s pretrial order

ruled that the sentencing details contained in the warrant of commitment were inadmissible

and must be redacted, we agree that the prosecutor committed misconduct by introducing

the unredacted warrant of commitment. See id.

Closing Argument

Milhausen argues that the prosecutor engaged in multiple instances of prosecutorial

misconduct during closing argument. “In closing arguments, counsel has the right to

present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the

evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Smith, 541

N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996); see also State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn.

1995) (“While the state’s argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence

2
Milhausen did not renew his objection at the time the state offered the unredacted warrant
of commitment. But because the district court made a definitive ruling on Milhausen’s
motion in limine, the parties agree that Milhausen preserved his objection to admission of
the unredacted exhibit. See Minn. R. Evid. 103(a) (providing that once the district court
makes a definitive pretrial ruling admitting or excluding evidence, a party need not renew
an objection to preserve a claim of error).

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produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

When analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we consider

the argument “as a whole,” not “selected phrases and remarks.” State v. Smith, 876 N.W.2d

310, 335 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

Milhausen contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing

argument by (1) misstating a witness’s testimony, (2) making two statements that inflamed

the passions and prejudices of the jury, and (3) making three statements referencing facts

not in evidence. We consider each argument in turn.

Misstatement of Testimony

Milhausen argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by intentionally

misstating the testimony of a former roommate of Milhausen and A.O., who testified as

part of the defense case. “It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to

misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” State v. Peltier,

874 N.W.2d 792, 805 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

During his testimony, the roommate stated that Milhausen told him that Milhausen

and A.O. had been on FetLife together in an attempt to keep their relationship together.

During closing argument, the prosecutor used the roommate’s testimony to highlight

inconsistencies in Milhausen’s testimony, stating:

One interesting thing, however, that [Milhausen] told
[roommate], that he did not tell you, however, is that
[Milhausen] was posting these images to save their
relationship. Now that’s a different story than what we heard,
isn’t it ladies and gentlemen? We heard that he posted these
after the relationship ended, and she just allowed him to do
that. That’s a different story.

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Milhausen objected after closing arguments. The district court noted the objection

and, after discussing potential curative instructions with counsel, began its final

instructions by instructing the jury that statements of attorneys are not evidence.

On appeal, Milhausen maintains that the prosecutor intentionally misstated evidence

because, while the roommate testified that Milhausen said he and A.O. were on the website

together to attempt to keep their relationship together, the roommate did not testify that

Milhausen said he was “posting these images” to save the relationship. The state maintains

that the prosecutor’s remarks, while imprecise, were not an intentional mischaracterization

of the roommate’s testimony so as to constitute misconduct. We agree with the state.

The roommate testified that Milhausen told him that “it”—Milhausen’s FetLife

profile—was an attempt to keep Milhausen and A.O.’s relationship together. But it is

unclear from the roommate’s testimony whether “it” referred specifically to the creation of

the profile, the parties’ engagement with the profile, or the contents of the profile, which

included sexually explicit material. While the prosecutor’s characterization of the

roommate’s testimony may have been imprecise or even slightly inaccurate, the record

does not support a conclusion that the prosecutor intentionally misstated the evidence. See

State v. Barthman, 917 N.W.2d 119, 126 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, 938

N.W.2d 257 (Minn. Feb. 5, 2020) (concluding that prosecutor did not intentionally mislead

the jury when they “slightly misstated” a witness’s testimony during closing argument).

To support his argument, Milhausen relies on State v. Young. In that case, the

prosecutor told the jury during closing argument that a witness testified that her relationship

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ended in October, when in fact the witness testified that it ended in August. 710 N.W.2d

272, 281 (Minn. 2006). The prosecutor used the inaccurate date as support for their

argument that the defendant was the father of the witness’s baby, born the following July.

Id. The supreme court concluded that, while not ordinarily a basis for a claim of

prosecutorial misconduct, “absent the incorrect date, the prosecutor’s argument becomes

implausible.” Id.

The facts here are readily distinguishable. Unlike Young, the prosecutor’s

misstatement does not form the basis of an otherwise implausible argument. Rather, it

reflects a reasonable inference from the roommate’s testimony. See Smith, 541 N.W.2d at

589 (stating that during closing argument counsel may present to the jury “all legitimate

arguments on the evidence” and “all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom”). The

prosecutor therefore did not commit prosecutorial misconduct by intentionally misstating

the evidence.

Inflammatory Statements

Milhausen next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by inflaming

the jury’s passions and prejudices. A prosecutor “must refrain from making statements

that will inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.” State v. Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551,

556 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). When credibility is a central

issue in a case, reviewing courts “pay special attention to statements that may inflame or

prejudice the jury.” State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 236 (Minn. 2005).

Milhausen challenges two statements by the prosecutor as improperly inflaming the

passions and prejudices of the jury because the statements “improperly shifted the jury’s

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focus” to an “emotionally charged narrative.” First, the prosecutor stated, “do you really

think a young mother in a small community wants these types of images shared with the

world? No, she doesn’t.” Second, the prosecutor argued to the jury that “pornography is

usually paid for. . . . Somebody got paid because people are watching these videos, and

you have to pay to watch the videos. It wasn’t [A.O.]. She wasn’t the one getting paid.”

Milhausen objected after closing arguments to the first statement characterizing A.O. “as

a young mother in a small community” but did not object to the second statement.

We are not convinced that the prosecutor’s statements constitute misconduct under

the standard for either objected-to or unobjected-to misconduct. The challenged statements

were couched within the prosecutor’s broader discussion about credibility and the

reasonableness of the defense’s theory. Immediately before describing A.O. as a young

mother in a small town, the prosecutor argued that Milhausen’s testimony that A.O.

consented to disseminating the images was not reasonable considering A.O.’s testimony

that she was concerned that posting the images would impact her children and her ability

to interact with her community. Considering the closing argument as a whole, we conclude

that the prosecutor’s argument was a permissible reference to inferences that could

reasonably be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. See Smith, 876 N.W.2d. at 335.

Accordingly, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct.

We reach the same conclusion regarding the second challenged statement. Multiple

witnesses testified that FetLife users must pay to watch video content and A.O. testified

that she made a temporary account for purposes of verifying the photos and videos but

otherwise did not use FetLife. After stating that someone was paid for the videos but it

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was not A.O., the prosecutor argued, “[j]ust because lots of people consent to these things

being posted doesn’t mean A.O. does or did because she didn’t.” Given the context and

the contested trial issue of whether A.O. consented to the material’s dissemination, the

prosecutor’s argument was properly based on the evidence and the legitimate inferences to

be drawn from that evidence. See Smith, 541 N.W.2d at 589.

References to Facts Not in Evidence

Milhausen contends that the prosecutor improperly referred to facts not in evidence

during closing argument. As already discussed, a prosecutor’s closing argument must be

based on the evidence presented at trial and inferences reasonably drawn from that

evidence. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 804; see also State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 143 (Minn.

2009) (“Prosecutors may not make arguments that are not supported by evidence.”).

Milhausen’s argument concerns the prosecutor’s repeated references to matters that

the jurors had agreed to during voir dire. Specifically, the prosecutor stated:

So, how do we know [A.O.] had a reasonable expectation of
privacy? I think that is pretty crystal clear, ladies and
gentlemen. And I think you all agreed in [v]oir [d]ire that what
happens in the bedroom is private.

....

It’s not uncommon for people to be sharing and taking
these kind of images for each other, and that’s the agreement,
right? And you all agreed to this yesterday, that once a
relationship ends, those images should be deleted, or at the
very least not shared with others, and that’s exactly what
[A.O.] believed as well[.]

....

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[Y]ou all agreed in [v]oir [d]ire when we talked
yesterday morning that sexual images between two individuals
should stay between two individuals. That is a universal truth.
A universal truth. They are not to be shared or published
without explicit consent. An explicit agreement. In this case,
[A.O.] is saying that there was no consent given in this, on
these images, and that is pretty clear[.]

Because Milhausen did not object to these statements, our review is for plain error.

Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248. “An error is plain if it [i]s clear or obvious,” which is usually

established “if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Ramey,

721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). Here, we agree with Milhausen that the

prosecutor’s repeated references to “what jurors agreed to in voir dire” was plain error

because it contravenes well-established caselaw.

In State v. Bauer, the prosecutor referred to answers that jurors gave during voir

dire, including jurors’ answers about what they would do if someone asked them to sell

drugs. 776 N.W.2d 462, 475 (Minn. App. 2009). The prosecutor then used those answers

to attack the reasonableness of the defendant’s version of events. Id. We concluded that

while a prosecutor may urge the jury to rely on common sense, the prosecutor “improperly

asked the jurors to use the answers that they gave during voir dire as a means to determine

the credibility of [the] defense.” Id.

Like the prosecutor’s statements in Bauer, the prosecutor’s statements in this case

went beyond the evidence presented at trial by referencing jurors’ answers during voir dire

on the issue of whether, in their experience, sexually explicit images should be shared

outside a relationship. The prosecutor urged jurors to rely on those answers to assess

Milhausen’s credibility on the issue of whether A.O. consented to Milhausen’s

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dissemination of the sexually explicit images and videos. In so doing, the prosecutor

plainly erred and committed prosecutorial misconduct. See id.; see also Wren, 738 N.W.2d

at 392 (holding that references to jurors’ responses in a pretrial jury questionnaire went

“beyond the evidence” and indicated prosecutorial misconduct).

Cumulative Error

Milhausen argues that the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct entitles

him to relief. A defendant “may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors,

when taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appellant a fair trial.” State v.

Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “When considering a

claim of cumulative error, we look to the egregiousness of the errors and the strength of

the State’s case.” Id. We also consider whether the misconduct was isolated or mitigated

either by the district court’s instructions or defense counsel’s closing argument. Id.

(determining that errors at trial were not egregious on the basis that instances of misconduct

were “brief[]” and “accompanied by a limiting instruction”).

In this case, we identified two instances of prosecutorial misconduct: introducing

the unredacted warrant of commitment contrary to the district court’s pretrial order and

relying on facts not in evidence during closing argument. Milhausen does not argue that

either instance of misconduct was individually sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new

trial. Our careful review of the record convinces us that this is not the “rare case” in which

the cumulative effect of the misconduct requires reversal. See id.

First, the errors were isolated. The state offered the unredacted warrant of

commitment for the sole purpose of impeachment and did not reference any of the

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sentencing details when the document was introduced or during closing argument. See

Peltier, 874 N.W.2d at 806 (stating that a prosecutor’s improper remarks were not

egregious when the state did not “emphasize, or repeat, any of these points, and none of

them [were] central to the State’s case”). As far as the prosecutor’s argument referring to

the juror’s answers during voir dire, the prosecutor’s three statements consist of

approximately half a transcript page in a closing argument otherwise spanning over 15

pages. See id. (holding that improper statements spanning one full page were not egregious

in light of a 39-page closing argument).

Second, the district court’s instructions mitigated the effect of the prosecutor’s

misconduct. After the state introduced the unredacted warrant of commitment, the district

court instructed the jury that “[e]vidence concerning a prior conviction of Mr. Milhausen

is admitted only for the purpose of considering whether he’s telling the truth in this case.

You must not consider . . . this conviction as evidence of character or conduct, except as

you think it may reflect on credibility.” As part of its final instructions, the district court

told the jury that statements by the attorneys are not evidence and that the jury should

disregard any statements which differ from its recollection of the evidence and instead

decide “factual issues solely [based] on your own memory.” We assume the jury followed

the district court’s instructions. See State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 207 (Minn. 2022)

(stating that a court’s instruction that jurors should rely on their own recollections mitigated

any impact of a prosecutor’s misstatements during closing argument).

Finally, the supreme court has stated that courts should be more inclined to order a

new trial “in very close factual cases.” Fraga, 898 N.W.2d at 279. Here, the state’s

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evidence was relatively strong. The contested issue at trial was whether Milhausen posted

the photos and videos without A.O.’s consent. A.O. testified that she never consented to

Milhausen posting the photos online and she asked Milhausen to delete them once the

relationship ended. The state’s evidence established that, while Milhausen’s FetLife

profile was created when the parties were together, Milhausen posted the sexually explicit

material after A.O. had moved out and the relationship was over. A.O.’s testimony that

she was concerned that her children and other young people in the community would learn

about the photos and videos—which tends to show that she did not consent to public

posting—was corroborated by text messages and the investigator’s description of A.O.’s

reaction and demeanor upon learning that the material was online. Thus, while the jury

had to weigh the parties’ relative credibility, this is not the close factual case that requires

reversal for cumulative error. See id. at 278.

In sum, we conclude that the cumulative impact of the two instances of prosecutorial

misconduct—introducing the unredacted warrant of commitment and referring to facts not

in evidence—did not sufficiently “tip the scales” to deprive Milhausen of a fair trial. See

id. (quotation omitted).

II. The district court erred by listing convictions for all five counts on the warrant
of commitment.

Milhausen argues, alternatively, that the warrant of commitment incorrectly lists

convictions for all five counts. The state agrees that we should reverse and remand for

correction of the warrant of commitment. We also agree.

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Minnesota law provides that, “[u]pon prosecution for a crime, the actor may be

convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat.

§ 609.04, subd. 1 (2022). Courts may correct clerical errors in the warrant of commitment

at any time. Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 10.

The jury found Milhausen guilty of all five counts. The district court adjudicated

Milhausen guilty on counts one and two while stating it was “specifically and intentionally”

not entering convictions or imposing sentences on counts three, four, and five. Contrary

to the court’s oral pronouncement, however, the warrant of commitment lists convictions

for all five counts. Generally, appellate courts “look to the official judgment of conviction

in the district court file as conclusive evidence of whether an offense has been formally

adjudicated.” Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted).

But when a district court’s orally pronounced sentence differs from the warrant of

commitment, the oral pronouncement controls. State v. Statloch, 643 N.W.2d 329, 331

(Minn. App. 2002). Because the warrant of commitment conflicts with the district court’s

oral pronouncement by erroneously stating that Milhausen was convicted of all five counts,

we reverse and remand to the district court to correct the warrant of commitment so it

reflects convictions on counts one and two only.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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