In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: A. F. C. and H. B. K. M., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1222

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of:
A. F. C. and H. B. K. M., Parents.

Filed February 17, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Dakota County District Court
File No. 19HA-JV-24-671

John E. Roach, Roach Law PLLC, Burnsville, Minnesota; and

Daniel B. McGuire, McGuire Law Offices PLLC, Roseville, Minnesota (for appellant
HBKM)

Kathryn M. Keena, Dakota County Attorney, Todd P. Zettler, Assistant Dakota County
Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent County)

Scotty Ducharme, Rockpine Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Eric Anderson, Anderson Defense, Minnetonka, Minnesota (for respondent AFC)

Sydney Smoot, St. Paul, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the termination of his parental rights. Because his child
suffered egregious harm while in appellant’s care and the termination is in the child’s best
interests, we affirm.
FACTS
Z.M., the child of respondent-mother A.F.C. and appellant -father H.B.K.M., was
born in 2024. A.F.C. went back to her job as a nurse when Z.M. was a month old, and
appellant became his primary caregiver. He testified that , on May 2, 2024, he put Z.M.
down to sleep in his swaddle , went to sleep himself, and woke because Z.M. was crying.
Appellant found Z.M. with his right arm out of the swaddle and his left arm trapped under
his body. Early t he next morning, Z.M. began to cry and his parents took him to the
emergency room. They were told he had a fractured shoulder, hemorrhaging in his eyes,
and a suspected injury to his thigh. Law enforcement accused appellant of harming Z.M.1
Respondent Dakota County Social Services (DCSS) received a physical -abuse report on
Z.M. on May 3, 2024, and filed a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) petition
in Dakota County District Court on May 8, 2024.
In July 2024, after an emergency -care protective hearing, DCSS filed a petition to
terminate appellant’s parental rights (TPR) and the district court relieved DCSS of its

1 Appellant faced criminal charges based on the allegations in this case, but was acquitted
of those charges.

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obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunite appellant and Z.M. Following a trial on
the CHIPS petition and the TPR petition, at which appellant, A.F.C., and 11 others testified,
the district court found that appellant had caused egregious harm to Z.M. and that a
reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best interests of Z.M. to be in appellant’s
care then and for the foreseeable future and granted the petition to terminate his parental
rights.2
Appellant challenges the termination, arguing that (1) the district court abused its
discretion in granting the TPR petition because no statutory ground for termination was
proved; (2) the district court failed to make sufficient findings as to the best interests of
Z.M.; and (3) appellant is entitled to a new trial because the district court took too long to
terminate his parental rights.3
DECISION
Appellate courts “affirm the district court’s termination of parental rights when at
least one statutory ground for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence
and termination is in the best interests of the child .” In re Welfare of Child of S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008).4 On appeal, “[c]onsiderable deference is due to the district

2 The district court also found that appellant was a palpably unfit parent and failed to satisfy
his parental duties. Because we are affirming the termination of parental rights on the
ground of egregious harm, we decline to address these other grounds.
3 Appellant also argues that the district court erroneously admitted evidence that was
unfairly prejudicial to appellant. Because appellant forfeited review of these issues by
failing to move for a new trial although he had received no pretrial rulings on his
evidentiary objections, the issues are not properly before us, and we decline to address
them.
4 S.E.P. also states, “provided that the county has made reasonable efforts to reunite the
family,” 744 N.W.2d at 385 . But in this case, as the district court found, DCSS “filed a
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court’s decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996).
1. Statutory Ground
One statutory ground for termination is:
that a child has experienced egregious harm in the
parent’s care that is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that
indicates a lack of regard for the ch ild’s well-being, such that
a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best
interest of the child or of any child to be in the parent’s care.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5) (2024). “Egregious harm” includes “substantial
bodily harm” and is “the infliction of bodily harm to a child, . . . which demonstrates a
grossly inadequate ability to provide minimally adequate parental care.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd. 14(2) (2024). The district court found that Z.M. “experienced egregious
harm in [appellant’s] care ” that was “of a nature . . . that indicate[d] a lack of regard for
[Z.M.’s] well-being, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best
interest of [Z.M.] . . . to be in [appellant’s] care.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
Clear and convincing evidence from three witnesses supported the finding that appellant
was the only person with Z.M. when he was injured and that the injury could not have been
accidental.
First, Dr. N.J., a pediatrician knowledgeable about child abuse who was called to
the emergency room when Z.M. was there, examined Z.M and testified that the emergency-

petition for termination of [appellant]’s parental rights and the then presiding judge held
that the petition established a prima facie case that [appellant] subjected [Z.M.] to
egregious harm as defined in section 260C.007, subd. 14,” and . . . “[t]herefore, reasonable
efforts to reunify [Z.M.] and [appellant] were not required in this matter.”
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room doctor said Z.M. had a classic metaphyseal fracture (CML) of the proximal humerus
on the left side by the shoulder, generally seen in infants at the ends of long bones. Dr.
N.J. explained that in such fractures, a fragment of the bone is chipped at the end, and this
is considered specific to inflicted injury, caused by a shearing force or tension to the end
of the bone that does not result from routine care. Dr. N.J. testified that both Z.M.’s parents
told her the CML could have occurred because Z.M.’s left arm was twisted behind him by
his breaking free of the swaddle with his right arm. But her expert opinion was that Z.M.’s
injuries were indicative of physical abuse, or non-accidental trauma. She also testified that
(1) a yank of an infant’s arm could result in a fracture to the humerus, with torsion or torque
of a child’s arm or shoulder, as could grabbing the shoulder of a three -month-old child;
and (2) babies get their arms stuck and twist them but they do not experience fractures or
arm pain and weakness. She concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that
Z.M.’s injuries were indicative of child physical abuse. The district court found Dr. N.J.’s
opinions and testimony, “as the physician who actually saw and cared for the child,
persuasive and credible.”
Second, Z.S., a child-protection investigator with Dakota County, testified that he
received a report about injuries to Z.M. , observed Z.M. in the emergency room, and
consulted with Z.M.’s medical team. He testified that he interviewed appellant, who said
he thought the swaddle might have been involved in Z.M.’s injury but was not sure and he
did not know how the injury could have occurred otherwise. At a later interview, when
Z.S. spoke on the phone with appellant, appellant said that while he was attempting to
swaddle Z.M., he put Z.M. on his side on the dresser, and Z.M. was wiggling around while
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appellant tried to get him swaddled. Appellant grabbed Z.M.’s left shoulder and pushed it
into the dresser while he pulled his left arm down and back into the swaddle and “thought
. . . he had done it too hard.” Appellant thought the pressure he applied when putting Z.M.
on the dresser, grabbing his shoulder, or pulling his hand to the side might have caused the
fracture.
Z.S. decided that maltreatment of Z.M. by appellant had occurred, based on his
egregious injuries, i.e., two fractures in the left humerus. Z.M.’s injuries had a severity
level of “serious,” and Z.S. determined that Z.M. was at high risk and ongoing services
were needed. Z.S. testified that he believes it is in Z.M.’s best interests that appellant’s
parental rights be terminated because Z.M. would be at extreme risk if returned to
appellant’s care. The district court found that Z.S. “provided persuasive and credible
testimony.”
Third, S.G., another Dakota County child-protection worker, testified that this is an
egregious-harm case and it is in Z.M.’s best interests for appellant’s parental rights to be
terminated. S.G. believes appellant’s mental health has not stabilized enough for him to
be a fit parent for th e foreseeable future and has concerns about appellant’s domestic-
violence history and the fact that he has not been accountable or demonstrated remorse.
Thus, evidence supports the finding that Z.M. suffered egregious bodily harm while
in appellant’s care, and one statutory factor for termination has been satisfied.
2. Best-Interests Findings
Appellant also argues that the district court failed to make adequate findings as to
Z.M.’s best interests and that appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial. It is undisputed
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that the child’s best interests are “the paramount consideration” in every termination
proceeding and, “[w]here the interests of parent and child conflict, the interests of the child
are paramount.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024). A best-interests analysis requires
balancing the parent’s interest in preserving the parent -child relationship, the child’s
interest in preserving the relationship, and any competing interest of the child. Minn. R.
Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). Competing interests inc lude health considerations. In re
Welfare of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012). “Because [this] analysis involves
credibility determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global
review of the record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
As a threshold matter, the remedy for insufficient findings is not reversal and a new
trial but rather remand for additional findings. See, e.g., In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623,
626 (Minn. App. 2003) (remanding because of an absence of district court findings on the
best interests of the children in a TPR case).
Here, the district court’s findings included the testimony of the two child-protection
investigators, Z.S. and S.G., and of the guardian ad litem , C.S., all of which provided
support for the best -interest finding. The district court found that Z.S. “determined
maltreatment of physical abuse occurred by [appellant] to [Z.M.] based on his egregious
injuries of substantial bodily harm ”; . . . the severity level of the injuries was “Serious
Injury,” which is the third highest below death and near fatality”; and Z.M. was unsafe and
the risk was high.
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The district court also found that S.G. “testified that she believed it was in [Z.M.’s]
best interests for [appellant’s] parental rights to be terminated”; that she “stated that this is
an egregious harm case”; that she “shares the Court’s concern that [A.F.C.] and [appellant]
are both minimizing and/or lacking transparency”; and that she “believes that [appellant’s]
mental health has not stabilized for a sufficient time for him to be a fit parent for the
foreseeable future.”
Finally, the district court found that C.S. “recommended continued legal custody of
[Z.M.] by DCSS and [that he] remain in his non-relative foster home”; “has safety concerns
with [appellant’s] ability to care for [Z.M.]”; thought it plausible “that [appellant] was the
abuser of [Z.M.]” and “disrupted [Z.M.’s] safety and stability”; had “ongoing concerns if
[Z.M.] is placed in [appellant’s] care”; “continues to recommend no contact with appellant
. . . based on [Z.M.] being a very young child with egregious harm”; and believes “there is
no bond between [appellant] and [Z.M.] because the injuries occurred when [Z.M.] was
very young.” The district court also observed that C.S. testified that appellant’s “desire to
co-parent [Z.M.] does not override [Z.M.’s] right to be safe from harm.”
These findings adequately support the district court’s finding that termination of
appellant’s parental rights is in Z.M.’s best interests.
3. The Timing of the Termination
Within 15 days of the conclusion of the testimony,
during which time the court may require simultaneous written
arguments to be filed and served, the court shall issue its
findings and order regarding whether one or more statutory
grounds set forth in the petition have been proved. The court
may extend the period for issuing an order for an additional 15
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days if the court finds that an extension of time is required in
the interests of justice and the best interests of the child.

Minn R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(a). Appellant argues that , because testimony concluded on
May 16, 2025 , the district court’s order should have been issued by May 31, or June 15
with the additional “good cause” days , and the fact that the order was not filed until July
14, 2024, entitles appellant to a reversal, a remand, and a new trial.
As a threshold matter, appellant’s failure to make any objection to the date of the
district court’s order prior to this appeal and to move for a new trial means that he has
forfeited appellate review. See Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. 1986)
(reaffirming “the general rule that in order to preserve for appellate review issues arising
during the course of trial, counsel—in addition to taking the other requisite steps, including
making timely objection—must move the [district] court for a new trial pursuant to Minn.
R. Civ. App. P. 59.01”); see also C ounty of Hennepin v. Bhakta , 922 N.W.2d 194, 199
(Minn. 2019) (holding that “[t]he Sauter rule continues to apply to motions brought or
decided during trial” but not to pretrial orders on motions in limine). Thus, appellant’s
objection to the timing of the order is not properly before the panel.
Moreover, appellant’s argument on appeal directly conflicts with his remarks to the
district court at the end of the trial. After checking that there was no further testimony, the
district court conversed with the attorneys.
Court: . . . Most attorneys prefer to send in the closings, in a
written letter.
. . . . And, I would ask that you each send in a proposed
Findings of Fact. . . .

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And just be nice to yourselves about time, right? The
holiday is coming up, etc. You know, the long weekend.

. . . . .

How do you want to do it, simultaneously? What works for
you guys?

Appellant’s atty: Yes, I think that makes sense.

Court: Okay. What works for you guys? And I’m as flexible
as—as you need me to be.

DCSS atty: Are you within a certain time frame, because, if the
record is closing today—

Court: Yeah but – but, if—I can extend that –

DCSS atty: You have 16, plus 15, right?

Court: [F]or good cause, right? You know, if there is a good
cause.
And good cause is everything that people may have
going on in life; and a whole bunch of other trials, and a whole
bunch of other stuff.

DCSS atty: I – I was going to say two weeks.

Court: I was going to give you more than that.

Appellant’s atty: . . . I’m fine with that, too. I have a couple
day trials coming up, in the next couple of weeks. Those always
push everything out for me.
I would be fine with three weeks, if that works. So, the
[sixth]. I think that would be June [sixth]. Does that work?.

Court: That should—that should work fine.

Two things are obvious from this exchange. First, while the district court and the
attorneys were familiar with Minn R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(a), none of them took the “[w]ithin
15 days of the conclusion of testimony” language literally. They assumed it meant within
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15 days of closing argument, to which another 15 days could be added for good cause.
Second, appellant’s attorney, who asked the district court for three weeks to provide closing
argument, i.e., until June 6, which brought the 15 days plus 15 additional good-cause-days
deadline to July 7, now argues that appellant is entitled to reversal, remand, and a new trial
because of the “extreme delay” in the district court’s order. But appellant is bound by the
district court record, which indicates that the distr ict court and both attorneys agreed to a
three-week interval between the end of testimony and the submission of written closing
arguments. Having requested the three -week interval, appellant cannot argue that he is
entitled to a new trial because the district court did not comply with Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(a) by granting his request. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988).
Affirmed.