

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1229**

Debra Ann Edwards, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

**Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Florey, Judge***

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-CV-25-37

Debra Ann Edwards, Monticello, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Victoria Bernhagen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Florey, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FLOREY, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court's order sustaining the revocation of her driving privileges, arguing that the underlying traffic stop was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion and that the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine was not

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

supported by probable cause. Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence not timely disclosed. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Commissioner of Public Safety revoked appellant Debra Ann Edwards's driving privileges after her arrest for driving while impaired. The following factual summary is based on the evidence received at an implied-consent hearing.

A sheriff's deputy initiated a traffic stop after seeing that Edwards's vehicle had a malfunctioning brake light and observed her vehicle fail to yield to another vehicle and drift across lane lines while driving. At that time, the deputy did not suspect impairment. However, he developed suspicion of impairment after approaching Edwards and noticing slurred and rapid speech, reddened eyes, "tremors in the area of the cheeks and eyes," a rapid heart rate, and a collection of rocks in the backseat of her vehicle. The deputy testified that, in his training and experience, "individuals who use methamphetamine or other stimulants can sometimes collect rocks and keep them in their vehicles."

The deputy administered the following field-sobriety tests, each of which indicated impairment:

1. **Horizontal gaze nystagmus test.** The deputy observed "a lack of smooth pursuit, so the ability of the eyes to focus and smoothly track from side to side."
2. **Lack of convergence test.** Edwards's eyes, "when they began to focus in towards the bridge of the nose, where [his] finger was moving to, instead bounced back to center, so instead of crossing, fixed ahead again."

3. **One-leg stand test.** Edwards began counting and, after reaching the number seven, began to wobble and put her foot down.
4. **Walk-and-turn test.** Edwards “raised her arms from the sides in order to balance,” “stepped on her own foot,” and “step[ped] off to the side in order to balance.”
5. **Modified Romberg Test.** Edwards guessed that 29 seconds had passed, but the deputy stated that only 22 seconds had passed. The deputy “noticed that there was eyeball movement while [Edwards’s] eyes were closed, that her eyelids themselves were fluttering, and twitching of the fingers as they were along her legs, waist area.”

The deputy also (1) administered a preliminary breath test, which produced a 0.00 reading, and (2) took Edwards’s pulse, measuring it at “about 126” beats per minute. Edwards told the deputy that she was taking medications for several health conditions. The deputy testified that this information did not lessen his “concerns of impairment”; instead, it “further narrowed down that medication being prescribed was not a factor.”

The deputy arrested Edwards for suspicion of driving while impaired. A canine search of the vehicle detected the presence of controlled substances and a subsequent search revealed suspected methamphetamine and smoking paraphernalia.

After Edwards’s arrest, the deputy applied for and received a warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine. The warrant application stated that the deputy initiated the traffic stop because the vehicle had a malfunctioning brake light and the deputy saw the vehicle cross a lane line. It listed the following as indicating that Edwards was under the influence:

1. **Traffic violations.** Edwards pulled out in front of another vehicle, malfunctioning brake light, and crossed lane lines.
2. **Deputy's observations.** Slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, tremoring in area of cheeks and eyes, collection of rocks in back seat of vehicle, and rapid heart rate.
3. **Edwards's statements.** Edwards "initially denied drinking then admitted to it," "referenced repeatedly where [she was] going but not where [she] was coming from," was "evasive regarding [her] last methamphetamine use," and reported "be[ing] around people using methamphetamine a couple days prior."
4. **Field sobriety testing.** Edwards "performed [Standardized Field Sobriety Testing] with lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes," had a preliminary breath test result of 0.00, exhibited eyeball movement and rapid eyelid tremoring" during Modified Romberg Test, and estimated "22 seconds . . . as 29 while counting."
5. **Vehicle search.** "[S]uspected methamphetamine and paraphernalia found in vehicle after K9 sniff and alert."

The deputy testified that, while he did not note the medications that Edwards reported taking in the warrant application, the inclusion of those medications would not "have eliminated [his] probable cause."

Edwards provided a urine sample pursuant to the warrant. The sample tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.

Edwards petitioned for a hearing on the reinstatement of her license. The hearing took place over three days, with the first day occurring in March 2025 and the second two days occurring in May 2025. In the time between the first and second days of the hearing, Edwards filed an exhibit list and a motion to suppress statements made during the traffic

stop. The court denied the motion as untimely. It also determined that Edwards could not introduce the evidence in her exhibit list because it was not timely disclosed.

In June 2025, the district court filed an order denying Edwards's request to rescind the revocation of her driving privileges. It reasoned that (1) the traffic stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion; (2) subsequent "expansion of the scope of the stop was justified by the [deputy's] observations"; (3) probable cause supported Edwards's arrest; and (4) the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine was supported by probable cause.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Edwards argues that (1) the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, (2) the warrant to obtain a sample of her blood or urine test was not supported by probable cause, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence as untimely.

I. The traffic stop was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

Edwards asserts that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion because (1) the squad camera footage offered at the implied-consent hearing "shows the white line in question disappears, contradicting the deputy's testimony"; and (2) the deputy "stated that he had no reason to suspect driver was under the influence." Edwards's assertions are unavailing.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. "Warrantless searches and

seizures are per se unreasonable,” *State v. Malecha*, 3 N.W.3d 566, 572 (Minn. 2024), but one exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to “conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” *State v. Taylor*, 965 N.W.2d 747, 752 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be particularized and based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” *Lorsung v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety*, 30 N.W.3d 777, 784 (Minn. 2026) (quotation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion is not a high standard,” although the suspicion must be based on “something more than an unarticulated hunch.” *Id.* at 785 (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “assess reasonableness through an objective examination of the totality of the circumstances” and do not focus on “[t]he actual, subjective beliefs of the officer.” *Id.* at 784-85 (quotations omitted). “[T]here is no bright-line rule requiring physical signs of impairment to establish reasonable suspicion.” *Id.* at 786. Generally, any traffic violation provides an objective basis for conducting a traffic stop. *State v. George*, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).

“Determining the existence of reasonable suspicion presents a question of fact and a question of law.” *Lorsung*, 30 N.W.3d at 784. This court reviews de novo “the district court’s determination that its factual findings support reasonable suspicion.” *Id.* We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. *See id.* We “view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings” and “will not conclude that a fact[-]finder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” *In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney*, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotations and citation omitted). We defer to the district court’s credibility findings and weighing of evidence. *See Pechovnik v. Pechovnik*, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009).

Deferring to the district court’s decision to credit the officer’s testimony that Edwards crossed the lane line, *see id.*, and viewing the squad camera footage in the light most favorable to the district court’s factual findings, we have no firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, *see Kenney*, 963 N.W.2d at 221. This traffic violation, on its own, provides an objective basis for conducting the traffic stop. *See George*, 557 N.W.2d at 578. The deputy’s subjective belief concerning Edwards’s impairment does not undercut this conclusion. *See Lorsung*, 30 N.W.3d at 785, 787.

II. The warrant to obtain a sample of Edwards’s blood or urine was supported by probable cause.

Edwards argues that the district court erred by determining that the warrant was supported by probable cause because the officer omitted “details about medication used” and “[t]he rocks said to be seen were not completely visible.” We are not persuaded.

A blood or urine test is a search that is subject to Fourth Amendment protections. *See State v. Thompson*, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233-34 (Minn. 2016). “A warrant is supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” *State v. Holland*, 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). This court presumes that the affidavit supporting the search warrant is valid, *Franks v. Delaware*, 438 U.S. 154, 171

(1978), but the “warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause,” *State v. Andersen*, 784 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). A defendant challenging a search warrant on that basis must satisfy the two-prong *Franks* test¹ by “show[ing] that (1) the affiant deliberately made a statement that was false or in reckless disregard of the truth, and (2) the statement was material to the probable cause determination.” *Andersen*, 784 N.W.2d at 327 (quotation omitted). To establish that “a misrepresentation or omission is material,” the defendant must show that, “when the misrepresentation is set aside or the omission supplied, probable cause to issue the search warrant no longer exists.” *Id.*

Edwards satisfies neither prong of the *Franks* test. First, she does not argue that the deputy intentionally or recklessly included material misrepresentations or omissions of fact in the warrant application. Second, probable cause to issue the warrant would exist even if the application included mention of the medications and excluded mention of the rocks. The application’s inclusion of the observed indica of intoxication as well as the discovery of “suspected methamphetamine and paraphernalia” in the vehicle provided sufficient grounds for the probable-cause determination.

III. Edwards inadequately briefs her argument about excluded evidence.

“The question of whether to admit or exclude evidence rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an

¹ The *Franks* test is derived from *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 171-72, and *State v. Causey*, 257 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn. 1977). See *Andersen*, 784 N.W.2d at 327.

erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion.” *Uselman v. Uselman*, 464 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn. 1990).

Edwards asserts that the evidence excluded by the district court was “filed on time,” but does not describe the evidence excluded or identify record support for her assertion. “On appeal, the appellant is responsible for providing the court with an adequate record. An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal.” *State v. Taylor*, 650 N.W.2d 190, 204 n.12 (Minn. 2002). Edwards provides this court with insufficient legal argument, authority, and record support to consider her challenge to the district court’s evidentiary decision. We therefore decline to address the issue. *See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp*, 895 N.W.2d 647, 653 (Minn. App. 2017) (“Minnesota appellate courts decline to reach an issue in the absence of adequate briefing.”), *rev. denied* (Minn. June 20, 2017).

Affirmed.