In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1232

In the Marriage of:

Todd Charles Sherette, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Melissa Ann Sherette,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-23-3258

Kathryn M. Lammers, Courtney Latcham, Heimerl & Lammers, LLC, Minnetonka,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Melissa Ann Sherette, Jordan, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Appellant challenges numerous aspects of the district court’s judgment dissolving
her marriage to respondent, including the district court’s custody determination for their
then-minor child, its award of transitional spousal maintenance, and its division of the
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parties’ property. Because we see no basis to conclude that the district court abused its
discretion or otherwise erred, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Melissa Sherette and respondent Todd Sherette were married for nearly
26 years. Together, they have two sons. T he younger son was 17 years old at the time of
the district court’s decision, but he is now over 18. The family lived together in the family
home in Jordan, Minnesota, until early 2023. Todd filed for dissolution of the marriage in
March 2023. During the dissolution proceedings, the parties participated in psychological
assessments and Melissa underwent an employability assessment. The employability
assessor concluded that Melis sa was qualified for a job in finance as a paraplanner and
calculated her corresponding earning potential as $50,000 to $60,000 per year, with
potential for higher earnings if she were to obtain licensure.
The district court held a three-day trial in February 2025. The parties presented
documentary evidence and offered testimony from eight witnesses, including Todd,
Melissa, and both sons. The resulting May 2025 judgment awarded the parties joint legal
custody of their then-minor child and awarded Todd sole physical custody of the child with
designated parenting time to Melissa. The judgment also divided the couple’s marital assets
with the marital home going to Todd, awarded transitional spousal maintenance to Melissa
for three years in the amount of $2,000 per month, and awarded $1,500 in conduct-based
attorney fees to Todd. When calculating Melissa’s spousal maintenance, the district court
considered Melissa’s employability assessment and found that she was “voluntarily
3
unemployed in bad faith.” As a result, it imputed income consistent with that assessment
to her. The district court denied Melissa’s request for need-based attorney fees.
In reaching those determinations, the district court made numerous findings of fact.
Those findings of fact included adverse credibility findings against Melissa. For example,
the district court found, with respect to both parties’ allegations of domestic abuse , that
“[t]he Court did not receive any credible evidence reflecting [Melissa] has any fear of
[Todd]. Although [Melissa] testified about [Todd] committing domestic violence against
her, there was nothing to corroborate this and [Melissa] appears to instigate most of their
conflict.” The district court also made findings about the assets and property of Todd and
Melissa, which will be detailed as relevant below. After the district court entered the
judgment and decree ( J&D), Todd sought, and the district court granted, a Qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) regarding the division of a retirement fund as ordered
in the J&D.1
Melissa appeals the May 2025 J&D.
DECISION
Melissa challenges multiple aspects of the J&D. Before reaching those issues, we
explain a limitation on our review in light of the fact that Melissa did not provide this court
with transcripts of any of the district court proceedings.
“An appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record for appeal.” Custom
Farm Servs., Inc. v. Collins, 238 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Minn. 1976). Thus, “[i]t is an

1 Melissa filed a separate appeal of the QDRO with this court, challenging its compliance
with the J&D at issue here.
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appellant’s burden to provide any transcript necessary for appellate review.” In re Civ.
Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 658 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2019); see Mitterhauser v. Mitterhauser, 399 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App.
1987) (applying Collins in a family-law appeal). This burden is not relieved simply because
an appellant proceeds as a self-represented litigant. “When an appellant acts as attorney
pro se, appellate courts are disposed to disregard defects in the brief, but that does not
relieve appellants of the necessity of providing an adequate record and preserving it in a
way that will permit review.” Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361, 363
(Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
Melissa has not provided an adequate record because she did not request transcripts
of the proceedings in the district court. “When an appellant fails to provide a transcript, the
reviewing court is limited to deciding whether the [district] court’s conclusions of law are
supported by the findings.” Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Minn. App.
1995). That means, in reviewing Melissa’s arguments on appeal, we cannot consider her
challenges to the district court’s fact-finding and, instead, we must assume that the district
court’s findings are correct. Duluth Herald & News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical Co., 176
N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1970) (noting lack of a transcript precludes review of factual
questions). Our review is limited to whether the district court properly exercised its
discretion in applying the law to those findings. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d at 492.
With that framing in mind, we turn to Melissa’s arguments. Her challenges to the
district court’s J&D fall into six categories: (1) arguments relating to her children, child
custody, and parenting time; (2) a dispute regarding the valuation date used by the district
5
court; (3) disagreements with the district court’s spousal maintenance award; (4) issues
relating to the district court’s division of property; (5) a dispute over the district court’s
award of conduct-based attorney fees to Todd; and (6) claims of judicial bias. We address
each category in turn.
I
We understand Melissa to be requesting various forms of relief from the J&D as it
relates to her children.
First, she asks this court to order her older son to attend family therapy. Because the
older son is an adult, however, neither this court nor the district court has jurisdiction to
address issues relating to child custody and parenting time. For purposes of custody
determinations, the definition of “child” is “an individual under 18 years of age” or “an
individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school. ” Minn. Stat. § 518A. 26,
subd. 5 (2024). The statute governing parenting time likewise applies only “during the
minority of the child.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 1(a) (2024). The older son does not fit
within any of these categories. Because he is an adult, there is no relief a court can afford
to Melissa as it relates to him and we decline to reach her request as it is moot. See
Winkowski v. Winkowski, 989 N.W.2d 302, 308 (Minn. 2023) (holding that issues are moot
“when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no
longer possible” (quotation omitted)); Tamburino v. Freeman, 24 N.W.3d 318, 326 (Minn.
App. 2025) (noting that this court generally does not decide moot questions).
Second, we understand Melissa to challenge the district court’s custody and
parenting-time determination relating to the younger son, including arguing that the district
6
court should have ordered Todd to undergo a psychological evaluation. Todd argues that,
because the younger son is now 18 years old, these arguments are similarly moot.
It appears as though the younger son may still meet the definition of a child as “an
individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school,” for purposes of Minnesota
Statutes section 518 and 518A. Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subds. 1, 5 (2024). Todd does not
address this provision or advance an argument why it does not apply to the issues in this
proceeding. We therefore address Melissa’s custody challenge with respect to the younger
son on the merits.2
A district court has broad discretion to determine the custody of the parties’
children. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984). Without the transcripts, we
cannot review the factual findings that underlie the district court’s custody determination.
Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d at 492. Instead, we review for an abuse of discretion, looking
only to whether the district court improperly applied the law. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d
705, 710 (Minn. 1985). In doing so, we are cognizant that “there is scant if any room for
this court to question a district court’s balancing of best-interests considerations. In re

2 We have concerns that, were we to conclude that the district court abused its discretion,
the district court would lack the power to offer any relief based on the limitations imposed
by Minnesota Statutes section 518.155 (2024). That statute prevents the district court from
amending a child custody order when the district court would lack jurisdiction under the
provisions of Minnesota Statutes chapter 518D, which limits custody proceedings to
children, defined as “an individual who has not attained 18 years of age.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518D.102(c) (2024). However, because the parties do not address this provision and we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion on the merits, we do not decide
its applicability here.
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Welfare of C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d 325, 334 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2019).
We see no indication that the district court misapplied the law when making its
custody determination. The district court weighed and considered all 12 best -interests
factors as required by Minnesota Statutes section 518.17, subdivision 1(a) (2024). On
review, we defer to the district court’s weighing of those factors. C.F.N., 923 N.W.2d at
334. We discern no other error of law, and Melissa has pointed to none. Looking
specifically to Melissa’s request that Todd be ordered to complete a psychological
evaluation for purposes of the child custody determination, the record reflects that Todd
underwent an evaluation with the same evaluator who worked with Melissa. The district
court reviewed that evaluation and considered it in its analysis of the best-interests factors,
referencing it multiple times.
Third, Melissa requests additional spousal maintenance, so that she can cover health
insurance costs for the younger son who moved in with her after turning 18 years old. We
cannot reach this argument because it was not presented to the district court and turns on
facts that are not in the record on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn.
1988) (“An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on
appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”).
For these reasons, Melissa is not entitled to relief from the J&D on issues relating
to child custody or parenting time.
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II
Melissa takes issue with the valuation date used by the district court for purposes of
dividing the parties’ marital assets. She argues that the district court should have used a
valuation date based on the start of the February 2025 trial rather than the March 31, 2023
date to which the parties previously had stipulated. She contends that the March 2023 date
is unfavorable to her because “she is unable to build on her retirement with salaried
income,” and she requests that we move the valuation date to help compensate for that
discrepancy.
With respect to setting a valuation date, Minnesota law provides:
The court shall value marital assets for purposes of division
between the parties as of the day of the initially scheduled
prehearing settlement conference, unless a different date is
agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific
findings that another date of valuation is fair and equitable.

Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2024). Within that framework, a district court has broad
discretion in setting reasonable valuation dates. See Desrosier v. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d
507, 510 (Minn. App. 1996). We review its decision for an abuse of discretion. See id. If
the district court articulates specific findings explaining its choice of date and those
findings are not clearly erroneous, the district court will not have abused its discretion. See
Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in setting marital property valuation date “[b]ecause the district
court made specific findings that explained its rationale” and “those findings are not clearly
erroneous”).
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Here, the district court explained that the valuation date it used was agreed upon by
the parties in an April 2023 stipulation and is more appropriate than the date proposed by
Melissa because “both spreadsheets provided by the parties and their supporting documents
for assets were from around March 31, 2023.” The district court’s reasoning is consistent
with the record, which shows that both parties stipulated to the March 2023 valuation date.
It is also consistent with the statutory language allowing parties to agree on a valuation
date. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the
district court in using the March 2023 valuation date to which the parties agreed, rather
than the February 2025 date later requested by Melissa.
III
Next, Melissa challenges the district court’s spousal maintenance award of $2,000
per month for three years and instead seeks indefinite spousal maintenance in the amount
of $7,050 per month. Todd responds that the district court’s findings are supported by the
record and that the spousal maintenance award was not an abuse of discretion.
Spousal maintenance is defined by statute to mean “payments from the future
income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3a (2024). If a party requests spousal maintenance, a district court
must engage in a two- step analysis. First, a district court considers whether the spouse
seeking spousal maintenance has made a “showing of need.” Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d
249, 252 (Minn. 2016). A showing of need may be established on at least one of three
grounds, demonstrating that the spouse seeking maintenance
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(a) lacks sufficient property, including marital property
apportioned to the spouse, to provide for reasonable needs of
the spouse considering the standard of living established
during the marriage, especially, but not limited to, a period of
training or education;
(b) is unable to provide adequate self-support, after
considering the standard of living established during the
marriage and all relevant circumstances; or
(c) is the custodian of a child whose condition or
circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be
required to seek employment outside the home.

Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1 (2024). In evaluating a need for spousal maintenance, the
district court may consider the possibility of employment income or investment income or
a combination of both. See id., subd. 2 (2024); Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 252.
Second, if a party demonstrates a need for spousal maintenance, the district court
may award spousal maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time, either transitional or
indefinite, as the court deems just, . . . after considering all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat.
§ 518.552, subd. 2; see also Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982)
(discussing the statutory factors). Eight of the factors relevant to the amount and duration
of spousal maintenance are prescribed by statute. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a)-
(h).
“In general, [appellate courts] appl[y] an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to
a district court’s decisions concerning the amount and duration of an award of spousal
maintenance.” Schmidt v. Schmidt, 964 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Minn. App. 2021). A district
court abuses its discretion “if it makes findings of fact that are not supported by the record,
misapplies the law, or resolves the matter in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts
on record.” Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 696 (Minn. App. 2019). We begin by
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addressing Melissa’s challenge to the amount of spousal maintenance awarded and then
reach the issue of duration.
Amount of Spousal Maintenance
The district court determined that Melissa had shown a need for spousal
maintenance on two grounds: that she lacks sufficient property to provide for reasonable
needs, Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 1(a), and she is unable to provide adequate self-support,
id., subd. 1(b). In evaluating the amount of maintenance , the district court considered all
eight statutory factors including, as relevant here, Melissa’s financial resources, the “time
necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking
maintenance to find appropriate employment, and the probability, given the party’s age
and skills, of completing education or training and becoming fully or partially self -
supporting,” and the standard of living during the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.
2(a)-(c). Using the parties’ standard of living during the marriage, the district court found
that Melissa’s reasonable monthly budget is $5,500. The court also calculated and imputed
a net monthly income of $4,000 to Melissa based on the employability assessment
conducted for the case. Based on that budget and imputed income, the district court
calculated a monthly spousal maintenance award of $2,000.
Melissa has not shown that t he district court abused its discretion in setting that
amount of spousal maintenance. Melissa does not assert any basis, aside from challenges
to the district court’s fact-finding, that would establish an abuse of discretion. Without a
transcript of the proceedings, we will not disturb the district court’s fact-finding with
respect to its calculations of Melissa’s monthly budget and imputed income. See Peterka
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v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004) (“A district court’s determination of
income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact[.]”); Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d at 492
(providing that when appellant does not provide a transcript, appellate review is limited to
the district court’s legal conclusions). We also will not revisit the district court’s finding
that Melissa was “voluntarily unemployed in bad faith.” Taking those facts as true, as we
must, the district court acted within its discretion in imputing income to Melissa based on
the employability assessment. See Hecker v. Hecker , 543 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Minn. App.
1996) (establishing that a district court may impute income to an individual who had
willfully failed to rehabilitate), aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1997). As noted above,
absent a transcript, this court does not review a district court’s findings of fact.
Duration of Spousal Maintenance
Having determined that the amount of the district court’s spousal maintenance
award was not an abuse of discretion, we consider the district court’s limitation of spousal
maintenance to three years. The appropriate duration for spousal maintenance payments
depends largely on the length of the marriage. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3(a)-(c) (2024).
For marriages lasting “20 years or more,” there is a rebuttable presumption “that indefinite
maintenance should be awarded.” Id., subd. 3(c)(3).
Because Melissa and Todd were married for more than 20 years, the rebuttable
presumption applies. The district court acknowledged that presumption but determined
after considering all the factors that Todd had rebutted the presumption and demonstrated
that indefinite spousal maintenance is inappropriate. In its explanation on this point, the
district court mentioned that Melissa has the ability to work and is employable but, “despite
13
being told numerous times and being imputed income in February 2024 by this Court, has
refused to apply for even one job,” instead remaining unemployed in what the court found
as bad faith. Considering the district court’s broad discretion in granting spousal
maintenance and its careful consideration of all the applicable statutory factors, we discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the presumption of indefinite
spousal maintenance was rebutted here.
Before turning to the next issue, we acknowledge that Melissa takes issue with the
district court’s finding that she was not the victim of domestic abuse by Todd . We
understand Melissa to argue that the alleged abuse supports an increased award of spousal
maintenance. As we have explained, however, because Melissa did not provide transcripts
from the trial, we cannot review the district court’s fact-findings, including its credibility
determinations and its finding that Melissa did not experience domestic violence. Melissa
does not assert arguments relating to the domestic-violence allegation that fall within our
abuse-of-discretion review in the absence of a transcript. See Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d at
492 (considering only “whether the [district] court’s conclusions of law are supported by
the findings”).
In sum, Melissa has not shown that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding transitional spousal maintenance to her in the amount of $2,000 per month for
three years.
IV
Melissa seeks relief from the district court’s division of property on three bases.
First, she challenges the district court’s award of the marital home to Todd. Second, she
14
argues that the district court should have designated a $10,000 gift she received from her
grandmother as nonmarital property. Third, Melissa seeks to reclaim personal property that
was awarded to Todd. We address each issue in turn.
A
Melissa asks this court to reverse the district court’s grant of the marital home to
Todd. By statute, the district court must “make a just and equitable division of the marital
property of the parties without regard to marital misconduct, after making findings
regarding the division of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. The statute further
directs that “[t]he court shall base its findings on all relevant factors.” Id. A district court
has “broad discretion regarding the division of property,” and its division of property “will
only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion.” Lee v. Lee , 775
N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). In reviewing the district court’s conclusion here, we can
inquire only into whether it properly and logically applied the law. See Sirek v. Sirek, 693
N.W.2d 896 , 898 (Minn. App. 2005) (“District courts have broad discretion over the
division of marital property and appellate courts will not alter a district court’ s property
division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of the law.”) . As
with the issue of spousal maintenance, to the extent that Melissa asks this court to
reconsider the district court’s findings regarding domestic violence and use that factor in
determining who should receive the marital home, we cannot do so given the absence of
an adequate record on appeal.
In its order, the district court provided two reasons for awarding the marital home
to Todd:
15
First, under this order, [Todd] will be awarded all of the
parenting time overnights, meaning that both the minor
child . . . and adult child . . . will be able to remain in the home
they were raised in full-time. . . . Second, [Todd] is the only
party who can reliably afford the marital home.

In addition to articulating those two reasons, the district court made lengthy findings on
this issue that, for reasons previously explained, are not subject to our review. The district
court’s reasoning demonstrates that, consistent with the statute, the district court considered
“all relevant factors,” such as the interests of the children and each party’s ability to afford
and maintain the home. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. Because the district court’s decision
was logical and consistent with the law, it did not abuse its discretion, and Melissa is not
entitled to relief on this issue.
B
Melissa challenges the district court’s determination that a brokerage account held
jointly and valued at $111,576 is marital, rather than nonmarital, property. Melissa
contends that she owns the account in its entirety and has evidence that it was the result of
her investment of a $10,000 gift from her grandmother that grew passively over time. She
explains that she is therefore seeking “the full investment amount of her grandmother’s
gifted money.”
Property acquired by one spouse as a gift from a third party is generally considered
nonmarital property. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b(a) (2024). But “[w]hen nonmarital
and marital property are commingled, the nonmarital investment may lose that character
unless it can be readily traced.” Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn. App.
1991). The party seeking to have property classified as nonmarital, in this case Melissa,
16
bears the burden of proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that the asset is readily
traceable to a nonmarital source.” Hafner v. Hafner, 406 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. App.
1987). Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law that this court reviews
independently, but we give “deference to the district court’s findings of fact.” Baker v.
Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008). Separately, “[w]hether a nonmarital interest
has been traced is . . . a question of fact.” Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App.
2009).
Applying that standard here and because of the limited record on appeal, we must
accept the district court’s finding that Melissa’s claimed nonmarital interest in the
brokerage account was not properly traced and that there was “no evidence that marital
funds had not been added to the account.” Under those factual circumstances, the district
court was within its discretion in determining that the nonmarital investment had lost its
character because it could not be “readily traced.” Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d at 344. For that
reason, Melissa has not shown that the district court erred in determining that the $10,000
gift and the rest of the brokerage account were part of the marital funds and dividing the
account accordingly.
C
Melissa maintains that she “submitted the almost identical personal property items
in discovery that was awarded to Todd” and that she “seeks those items in her discovery.”
We construe her statement as a challenge to the district court’s division of personal
property.
17
As established above, the district court has wide discretion to “ make a just and
equitable division of the marital property,” and must consider “all relevant factors” when
making those decisions. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1; Lee , 775 N.W.2d at 637. Here , the
district court considered both parties’ personal property requests. Todd submitted a list
with a particular focus on furniture and other necessities for the marital home while Melissa
submitted a list that was “23 pages, landscape, single spaced.” When making its
determination about dividing the property, the district court stated,
Because [Todd] is receiving the homestead and has both
children residing with him, he should retain their bedroom
items so it stays furnished. [Todd’s] proposed items that he
wants to keep are reasonable, especially in comparison to the
list provided by [Melissa]. [Melissa] should get the remaining
marital property not listed above.

Those conclusions and the district court’s further discussion of the subject in its order show
that, consistent with the law, the district court considered “all relevant factors” before
dividing the personal property. Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1. We also see no evidence that
the district court was acting against logic. So, Melissa has not shown that the district court
abused its discretion, and she is not entitled to relief on this basis.3

3 Melissa also requests that we order the parties to “amicably divide the remaining assets,”
but she does not specify what the remaining assets are, or which assets were awarded to
Todd that, in her view, should have been awarded to her. We also see no indication that
Melissa requested this remedy from the district court at trial. Regardless, it was well within
the district court’s discretion to divide all the personal property between Melissa and Todd
rather than leave it to the parties to make those decisions. We will not disturb that
determination on appeal.
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V
Melissa also asks us to reverse the district court’s award of conduct-based attorney
fees to Todd and requests, instead, that she be awarded conduct-based attorney fees to
cover her outstanding attorney costs. Melissa did not request conduct-based attorney fees
in the district court and only asked for need-based fees, so we will not consider that aspect
of her argument on appeal. See Doe 175 ex rel. Doe 175 v. Columbia Heights Sch. Dist.,
ISD No. 13 , 842 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. App. 2014) (noting that “[i]t is an elementary
principle of appellate procedure that a party may not raise an issue or argument for the first
time on appeal and thereby seek appellate relief on an issue that was not litigated in the
district court”). We turn to her challenge to the district court’s award of $1,500 in conduct-
based fees to Todd.
Conduct-based fee awards “are discretionary with the district court.” Szarzynski v.
Szarzynski, 732 N.W.2d 285, 295 (Minn. App. 2007); see al so Minn. Stat. §§ 518.14,
subd. 1a (stating that conduct-based fees “may” be awarded against a party who
unreasonably contributes to the length or expense of the proceeding), 645.44, subd. 15
(stating that “may” is permissive) (2024). In the context of reviewing a conduct -based
award of attorney fees, “[a]mong other ways, a district court abuses its discretion if it acts
against logic and the facts on record, or if it enters fact findings that are unsupported by the
record, or if it misapplies the law.” In re Adoption of T.A.M., 791 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Minn.
App. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted).
In awarding Todd conduct-based fees , the district court, referencing Minnesota
Statutes section 518.14, subdivision 1a, recognized that an award of conduct -based fees
19
may be appropriate “if it determines, in its discretion, that a party’s actions contributed
unreasonably to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Applying that law, the district
court found:
[Melissa] has unreasonably increased this proceeding’s
length and costs. [Melissa] has taken unreasonable positions,
unsupported by the law, and has resulted in a trial on all issues
in this case. . . . One example of [Melissa’s] delay through an
unreasonable position is her opposition to even seeking
employment in spite of not claiming an inability to work. This
resulted in the need for a costly employability assessment.
These costs were necessitated by [Melissa’s] unreasonable
position.

The district court’s characterization of the law was accurate, and after analyzing
Melissa’s conduct, it made the requisite findings under the law that she “unreasonably
contribut[ed] to the length or expense of the proceeding.” Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1a.
Because the district court correctly applied the law and its determination is not against
logic, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding conduct-based attorney fees
to Todd.
VI
As a final matter, Melissa argues that the district court judge was biased against her
and that we should order a new trial. Melissa alleges that the judge exhibited multiple
showings of bias including, among other allegations, rushing Melissa during court
hearings; rolling eyes when she was speaking; at the end of Zoom hearings, “star[ing] at
the Appellant until the Appellant disconnected from the Zoom hearings, making the
Appellant intimidated”; finding that Melissa was not a victim of domestic abuse; and
referencing her expunged criminal history.
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Minnesota judges are required to perform their duties “without bias or prejudice.”
Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.3(A). To be disqualifying, such bias or prejudice “must
stem from an extrajudicial source,” resulting in an opinion “on some basis other than what
the judge learned from [their] participation in the case.” In re Est. of Lange, 398 N.W.2d
569, 573 (Minn. App. 1986). Adverse rulings alone do not constitute bias. Olson v. Olson,
392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986). Appellate courts review allegations of judicial
bias de novo. State v. Reek, 942 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Minn. 2020).
Looking at Melissa’s allegations of bias, the examples she offers do not constitute
bias under the code of judicial conduct. Melissa refers to “evidence” of bias but none of
this evidence stems from an “extrajudicial source.” Lange, 398 N.W.2d at 573. A display
of irritation or disapproval by a judge “does not ordinarily justify disqualification.” Hooper
v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 93-94 (Minn. 2004). The district court’s finding that Melissa was
not a victim of domestic abuse amounts to an adverse ruling that similarly does not
constitute disqualifying bias. Olson, 392 N.W.2d at 341. And we see no indication in the
order that the district court improperly relied on Melissa’s expunged criminal record. The
district court’s three references to her criminal record in the J&D were limited, appropriate
within the context, and focused on the underlying facts rather than the charge itself. The
district court also acknowledged the expungement. We are not convinced that those
references were inappropriate or show bias in violation of the code of judicial conduct.
As a final note, we have independently reviewed the record available to us on appeal
and do not discern any judicial bias. We therefore decline to order a new trial on this basis.
Affirmed.