Colton Seelye, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1246

Colton Seelye,
Relator,

vs.

Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51586627-3

Colton Seelye, Bena, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, Cass Lake, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Rebecca Wittmer, Melannie Markham, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent department)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Cleary, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator seeks review of the decision of an unemployment -
law judge (ULJ) that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged
for employment misconduct. Relator argues that (1) the ULJ’s conclusion was an error of
law and unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) he did not receive a fair hearing, (3) his
termination was an act of retaliation, and (4) the ULJ made unsupported credibility
determinations. Because we conclude that the ULJ’s decision and factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence, and we discern no legal or procedural errors, we affirm.
FACTS
The following facts derive from the testimony and exhibits in the record before the
ULJ. Respondent Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe (the employer) discharged relator Colton
Seelye from his role as a part-time emergency medical technician (EMT) attendant in
January 2025. Seelye was in his 90-day probationary period in the role at the time. After
he was discharged, Seelye applied for unemployment benefits with respondent Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). DEED initially
determined that Seelye was ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for
employment misconduct. Seelye appealed that determination, and the matter was
scheduled for a hearing.
At the hearing, the ULJ received exhibits from the employer and heard testimony
from Seelye and his supervisor, K.C., as well as an employee-relations representative with
the employer and one of Seelye’s coworkers.
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During the hearing, K.C. explained the three main incidents that led to Seelye’s
discharge from employment. In the first incident, as reported by multiple employees,
Seelye confronted a coworker because of a disagreement over a patient-care decision.
Seelye reportedly stood up and yelled aggressively at the coworker, “Are you scared?”
After the argument, Seelye went to the emergency room and received treatment for anxiety.
In the second incident, Seelye failed to appear for a scheduled shift. K.C. testified
that when he called Seelye to ask him to come in, Seelye said, “I don’t care. I’m not coming
in. No, I didn’t sign up for the shift.” Seelye also stated he was three hours away from work
at that time. K.C. wrote Seelye up for a no-call, no-show.
In the third incident, reflected in an incident report filed by a coworker, Seelye drove
an ambulance carelessly during a snowstorm. Seelye reportedly hit a sign while reversing
the ambulance, and he drove erratically while transporting a patient. After dropping off the
patient, Seelye then drove at “speeds of 70 miles an hour, swerving from rumble strip to
rumble strip,” despite poor visibility and snow coverage on the road. Seelye also activated
the vehicle’s emergency lights “so he could get people driving slower to move out of his
way.” K.C. stated that Seelye’s driving went against the expectations and policy of the
department.
After K.C.’s testimony, Seelye testified that he believed he was discharged by the
employer because he filed “multiple incident reports against a couple of [his] co-workers
who were actively harassing [him].” Seelye also disputed K.C.’s descriptions of the
incidents leading to his discharge. First, Seelye attributed his aggressive behavior toward
a coworker to a severe anxiety attack. Second, regarding the missed shift, Seelye explained
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that he refused to work the shift because he was several hours away, and he claimed that
he did not sign up for the shift and the copy of his work schedule saved on his phone did
not show that he was supposed to work that day. As for the third incident, the driving
complaint, Seelye confirmed that he hit the sign, repeatedly ran over the rumble strips on
the road to try to identify the sides of the lanes under the snow coverage, and drove 65
miles-per-hour in a 60 mile-per-hour zone. When the ULJ asked Seelye about his
understanding of the employer’s ambulance driving policy, Seelye stated that he believed
he was allowed to drive above the speed limit when the vehicle’s emergency lights were
activated, but he otherwise had to follow the speed limit. Seelye conceded that he drove
above the speed limit when the emergency lights were off that evening.
After the hearing, t he ULJ found that Seelye was discharged because “he did not
use due care while driving the ambulance in a snowstorm,” “he yelled at a coworker,” and
“he refused to work a shift.” The ULJ found credible both K.C.’s testimony and Seelye’s
admissions about his driving and his argument with a coworker. The ULJ then concluded
that Seelye’s lack of due care while driving and his refusal to work a scheduled shift
amounted to employment misconduct. The ULJ further concluded that Seelye did not
engage in employment misconduct when he yelled at his coworker because his “conduct
was due to mental illness or impairment.”
Seelye requested reconsideration. In a written decision, a ULJ affirmed the original
decision and determined that Seelye failed to provide new evidence that would likely
change the decision and failed to prove that any existing evidence was likely false.
Seelye seeks review by writ of certiorari.
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DECISION
When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, we may affirm or remand, or we may reverse or
modify the decision “if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024). A petitioner’s substantial rights may be
prejudiced if the ULJ’s decision was
(1) in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the department;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
hearing record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.

Id. A ULJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence when it is based on “‘(1) such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
(2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any
evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety. ’” Dourney v. CMAK Corp. , 796
N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011) (quoting Minn. Ctr. for Env’t. Advoc. v. Minn.
Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002)).
On appeal, Seelye argues that (1) the ULJ erred in concluding that he was discharged
for misconduct, (2) his discharge was retaliatory, (3) the ULJ made erroneous credibility
determinations, and (4) the proceedings were unfair. We consider each argument in turn.
I. The ULJ did not err in concluding that Seelye was discharged for
misconduct.

Employees discharged for misconduct are “ineligible for all unemployment
benefits.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4 (2024). Misconduct is defined as “any intentional,
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negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the job, that is a serious violation of the
standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.”
Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6 (2024). Certain conduct is exempt from being considered
misconduct, including “conduct an average reasonable employee would have engaged in
under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(4).
“Whether an employee engaged in conduct that disqualifies the employee from
unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp.,
644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). The question of whether the employee engaged in
certain conduct is a question of fact. Lawrence v. Ratzlaff Motor Express Inc., 785 N.W.2d
819, 822 (Minn. App. 2010). This court reviews the ULJ’s factual findings “in the light
most favorable to the [ULJ’s] decision, giving deference to the credibility determinations
made by the ULJ,” and we will not disturb those findings when the evidence substantially
sustains them. Id. We review de novo the legal question of whether that conduct amounts
to disqualifying misconduct. Id.
Seelye argues that the ULJ’s conclusion that he was discharged for misconduct was
erroneous and unsupported by substantial evidence. The ULJ specifically concluded that
both Seelye’s lack of due care while driving an ambulance and his refusal to work a
scheduled shift amount to employment misconduct. We agree with the ULJ’s legal
determination as to both incidents, and we are persuaded that the record supports those
determinations.
Beginning with Seelye’s behavior while driving, the record supports that Seelye
violated the employer’s policies and reasonable expectations. K.C. testified that the
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employer requires ambulance drivers to “take in the road conditions at the time, the
weather, all the factors out there to adjust their speed,” and to “definitely slow down” in
snowy conditions. He also stated that drivers were “not allowed to speed.” This is a
reasonable safety policy for an ambulance service to establish, particularly because the
drivers are transporting ill and injured patients.
We agree with the ULJ that Seelye’s violation of these expectations amounts to
misconduct. “As a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and
requests amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall, 644 N.W.2d at 804. Based on
Seelye’s admissions at the hearing, he knew of these policies and intentionally violated
them. Seelye testified that he knew he was expected to follow the speed limit, but he
nevertheless drove above the posted speed. Seelye also admitted that he did not slow down
for weather conditions, and he repeatedly swerved the vehicle back and forth onto the
road’s rumble strips. These admissions reflect violations of the employer’s expectations
and policies in multiple respects, and we therefore conclude that Seelye’s actions amounted
to misconduct.1

1 Seelye argues that he was not discharged based on his driving because that incident was
not cited on his discharge paperwork, and he was not informed of it prior to being
discharged. Seelye cites no authority showing that he was entitled to additional notice about
the incident report before he was discharged. There is also evidence in the record showing
that the driving complaint was consistently cited by the employer as a reason for Seelye’s
termination. Even if Seelye did not know this incident report was filed, that the record
shows that the employer considered this incident in its decision to terminate Seelye’s
employment.

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We also agree with the ULJ that Seelye’s refusal to work, as supported by
substantial record evidence, amounts to misconduct. “[A] single absence without
permission from the employer may amount to misconduct.” Hanson v. Crestliner Inc., 772
N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. App. 2009). Courts look to the reason given for the unexcused
absence to determine whether the absence was “a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect. ” Id. at 544. An absence without
notice that resembles “conduct the average reasonable employee would have engaged in
under the circumstances” is not misconduct. Id. (concluding an employee did not commit
misconduct by missing a shift without permission because of the unexpected
hospitalization of a family member); Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(4).
K.C. testified that, once an employee signs up for a shift, “it is their responsibility
to show up and work that shift.” If they cannot work, it is “their responsibility to find a
replacement EMT for that shift.” Seelye admitted that he refused to work when K.C. called
him, which the ULJ deemed a credible admission. Seelye also did not attempt to find
replacement coverage for the shift. We are persuaded that, by Seelye’s own admission, he
committed misconduct because his absence without prior notice violated his employer’s
reasonable expectations. See Hanson, 772 N.W.2d at 544.
Seelye maintains that he did not sign up for the shift and therefore he did not violate
expectations by failing to cover it. The ULJ found that Seelye forgot that he signed up for
the shift “based on the more likely series of events.” The ULJ’s findings here are supported
by the record. K.C. testified that he believed Seelye signed up for the shift because the
handwriting and red ink used on the schedule resemble Seelye’s other handwritten entries.
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As additional support, another employee from K.C.’s department testified that she took a
picture showing Seelye’s name listed on the schedule on the day he missed the shift. Based
on this evidence, there is sufficient support for the ULJ’s finding that Seelye forgot he
signed up for a shift, and he therefore did not meet his employer’s reasonable expectations
of either appearing for work or finding coverage.
Seelye also argues that it was not reasonable for his employer to expect him to drive
multiple hours in the middle of the night to cover a shift. An employee’s absence without
notice may not amount to misconduct if it was “conduct an average reasonable employee
would have engaged in under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(4).
Here, a reasonable employee would have been aware of their work schedule and ensured
they were available for scheduled shifts. But even in the case where an employee forgot
about a shift, Seelye’s conduct was still unreasonable. Based on K.C.’s testimony, Seelye
had another option— he could have attempted to find another coworker to cover the shift.
Instead, Seelye told his employer that he did not care that the schedule showed he had a
shift, and he refused to remedy the situation. We are thus unpersuaded that he acted as a
reasonable employee under these circumstances.
In sum, we discern no error in the ULJ’s conclusion that Seelye committed and was
discharged for employment misconduct.

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II. The ULJ properly considered Seelye’s alternative explanation for his
discharge.

Seelye also argues that the employer terminated him in retaliation for reports he
filed against other employees, and he asserts that the ULJ did not properly consider
evidence reflecting that retaliatory motive.
“When the reason for the discharge is disputed, the hearing process must allow
evidence on the competing reasons and provide factual findings on the cause of discharge.”
Scheunemann v. Radisson S. Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App. 1997) (emphasis
omitted). We are convinced that the ULJ both developed the record on the competing
reasons given for discharge and provided sufficient factual findings.
During the hearing, Seelye testified that he believed that he was discharged for filing
incident reports against his coworkers. Upon the ULJ’s inquiry, Seelye then elaborated on
the contents of the reports, which employees were involved, and when he submitted the
reports. The ULJ also heard K.C.’s testimony on the three incidents that K.C. stated led to
the decision to discharge Seelye. In the written decision following the hearing, the ULJ
concluded that the employer discharged Seelye for the incidents to which K.C. testified
and made over two pages of factual findings supporting that conclusion.
From this record and the ULJ’s written decision, we conclude that the ULJ knew
that Seelye disputed his employer’s stated reason for his discharge, allowed both Seelye
and K.C. to present evidence, and then made factual findings on the cause of discharge.
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See id. at 34. The ULJ therefore did not err or use an improper procedure in considering
Seelye’s alternative explanation.2
III. The ULJ’s credibility determinations are supported by the record and
not arbitrary.

Seelye next argues that the ULJ arbitrarily found testimony by employees of the
employer more credible despite a lack of “independently verifiable evidence to support
their claims.” We defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations. Skarhus v. Davanni's Inc.,
721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. App. 2006). In proceedings in which witness credibility “has
a significant effect on the outcome of a decision,” ULJs are directed by statute to “set out
the reason for crediting or discrediting that testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a)
(2024).
The ULJ here appropriately set out the reasons for the credibility determinations.
The ULJ found K.C.’s testimony credible because “it was candid, specific, and based on
reports by multiple staff members.” The ULJ also found Seelye’s admissions about his own
misconduct credible “because they were against his interest and consistent with the
employer’s testimony.”
The ULJ’s credibility determinations are also supported by the record and not
arbitrary. K.C. provided clear and specific explanations of the events leading to Seelye’s

2 Relatedly, Seelye also argues that the incident reports he filed were evidence of negligent
retention and supervision by the employer. Because this argument was not presented to the
ULJ, we decline to consider it on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.
1988) (“A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows
were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.” (quotation
omitted)).

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discharge, and he cited evidence to support his statements. Seelye made several admissions
about his own conduct that confirmed K.C.’s testimony and were contrary to his interest,
such as admitting that he drove an ambulance above the speed limit in a snowstorm, refused
to come in for a shift, and yelled at a coworker during an anxiety attack. Even if this court
did not defer to the ULJ’s credibility findings, the ULJ’s determinations are supported by
the record and based on reasoned analysis.
IV. Seelye received a fair hearing.
Seelye last challenges the fairness of the hearing he received before the ULJ. He
specifically argues that the ULJ showed preferential treatment toward the employer on the
issue of Seelye’s lack of due care while driving the ambulance. We are not persuaded.
Under DEED’s rules, a ULJ “must exercise control over the hearing procedure in a
manner that protects the parties’ rights to a fair hearing,” and “must ensure that all relevant
facts are clearly and fully developed.” Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2023). The ULJ also “may
obtain testimony and other evidence from department employees and any other person the
judge believes will assist the judge in reaching a proper result. ” Id. The ULJ “must assist
all parties in the presentation of evidence.” Id.
The ULJ fully investigated the facts relevant to the complaint about Seelye’s
driving. The ULJ received testimony from both K.C. and Seelye on the competing versions
of events underlying the driving complaint to clarify the employer’s policies and Seelye’s
understanding of them. The ULJ also inquired into whether any other evidence supported
the complaint, such as whether the ambulance contained speed monitoring equipment. The
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ULJ’s balanced inquiry into this issue thus reflects appropriate development of the relevant
facts and fairness in conducting the proceedings.
Seelye argues that K.C.’s testimony on this incident lacked “independently
verifiable evidence.” Seelye appears to be referring to K.C.’s reliance on the incident report
filed by another EMT as evidence of Seelye’s careless driving. But “[a] witness at an
evidentiary hearing is not required to have firsthand knowledge” and “a ULJ may receive
any evidence which possesses probative value, including hearsay.” Skarhus, 721 N.W.2d
at 345 (quotation omitted). Thus, it was appropriate for the ULJ to rely on K.C.’s testimony,
even if his testimony was based on a report by an employee who did not appear at the
hearing to provide firsthand testimony.
Seelye also argues that the ULJ used incorrect terminology to describe facts during
the hearing. But Seelye does not explain how that made the proceedings unfair or whether
this terminology was prejudicial to his substantial rights. Without additional support or
argument, these discrepancies in terminology do not rise to the level of improper procedure
or unfairness.
In sum, we conclude that the ULJ did not err in reaching its determination that
Seelye was discharged for misconduct during his probationary period of employment, and
Seelye’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the ULJ’s decision or the procedures that
the ULJ followed.
Affirmed.