State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1247

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Dean Potter,
Appellant.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69VI-CR-23-644

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Chris Florey, Assistant County Attorney,
Virginia, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Joseph Dean Potter challenges his stalking conviction on the basis that
the district court plainly erred when it allowed a police officer to testify that she suspected
Potter had sent certain text messages. Because the district court did not plainly err, we
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Potter in an amended complaint with
stalking under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2020) (count I); violation of an order for
protection (OFP) under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(a) (2022) (count II) ; and
harassment, second or subsequent violation, under Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 4(a) (2022)
(count III). The following facts were elicited at a jury trial.
Potter and S.D. (victim) maintained a romantic relationship for about 20 years. On
multiple occasions during the relationship, victim attempted to leave Potter. In 2017, after
victim left Potter, Potter continued to send text messages that were often threatening and
demeaning. For example:
Ur dead . . . I going hunting for u . . . 50 cal to the head . . . Ur
one dirty c-nt wait till I find it fat a-- I know u took it u been
up for 3; or 4 days now ur dead c-nt[.]

U get a pay check c-nt and u take my only way to live I really
am coming for ur sl- t lying a-- I will walk if I have too ur f-
cking dead . . . I guess I walking don’t worry I got my strap
ready for u . . . Leaving now[.]

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Victim reported these text messages to a police officer (the officer). Based on her
experience, the officer believed “50 cal” and the “strap” referenced a firearm. In late
November 2017, the district court issued an OFP prohibiting Potter from having any
contact with victim for two years.
In 2021, while at Potter’s house, victim and Potter got into an argument and Potter
“hauled back and [] punched [victim] on the side of [her] face . . . the hardest he had ever
hit [her].”
Around March 2023, victim ended the relationship with Potter. At that time, victim
obtained another OFP, again prohibiting Potter from contacting victim for two years. Yet,
victim continued to receive threatening text messages. Victim forwarded some text
messages to the officer. The text messages continued until November 2024. During this
time, victim was sent approximately 100 text messages from various phone numbers .
Some examples include:
1 two I’m coming for you 34 better lock your door 56 picking
up Sticks 78 better not wait 910 doing it again[.]

[Y]ou will see what I have become my true inner soul will be
set free you will beg and plea to see the old f-cked up me when
you see what I’ve become nothing will stop there because the
devil will be set free and be on the hunt for his pray[.]

[Y]our pals were here last night they better try getting me
somewhere else because I don’t f-ck around with these guys
I’m not going peaceful or nice[.]

I know your stupid a-- is awake at least you admit you guys
were just trying to get money out of me I don’t f-cking care
take the f-cking money ill get more f-ck you I’m done with the
sh-t so if she wants money let me know before I’m paid after
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that f-ck it I’m done I f-cking hate you I can’t wait to see you
because nothing is gonna f-cking stop me[.]

At trial, victim testified that she believed the text messages came from Potter, in part,
because the text messages described incidents only Potter would know—like, Potter’s offer
to purchase a car for their daughter.1 The text messages stopped the day police officers
located Potter.
The officer testified at trial. The officer noted that, during her investigation, she
determined the text messages came from various phone numbers, and despite attempts to
connect the messages to Potter, she could not do so. The officer also recounted a
conversation she had with victim after victim reported an OFP violation.
Q: And did you speak to [victim]?

A: I did.

Q: And what did you learn from [victim]?

A: Mr. Potter had been messaging her through various modes
of communication – through a bunch of different phone
numbers or she suspected that it was him and then based on the
conversations that she was having with the party, I suspected
that it was Mr. Potter.

(Emphasis added.)
The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The district court convicted Potter
on count I and sentenced him to a 60-month prison term.
2

1 The state also called Potter’s sister, who revealed that in June 2023 Potter spent time in
the hospital. One of the text messages was dated June 14 , 2024, and mentions the sender
being in the hospital a year prior.
2 The district court did not enter convictions or impose sentences for count II or count III,
but the guilty verdicts were retained.
5
Potter appeals.
DECISION
Potter argues he is entitled to a new trial because the officer improperly testified that
she believed Potter sent the text messages to victim. Because Potter did not object at trial,
we review this issue for plain error. See State v. Chavez-Nelson, 882 N.W.2d 579, 589
(Minn. 2016); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02.
To meet the plain-error standard, Potter must show that “(1) there was an error,
(2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected [Potter’s] substantial rights.” State v.
Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 804 (Minn. 2016). “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious,
which is typically established if the error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of
conduct.” State v. Webster, 894 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Plain
error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood that the error
had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Bustos, 861 N.W.2d 655, 663 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). If the first three requirements are satisfied, we will not exercise
our discretion to grant relief unless the “failure to do so will cause the public to seriously
question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d
347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Potter contends the district court plainly erred when it allowed the officer to testify
that she “suspected” the text messages were sent by “Mr. Potter.” According to Potter, the
officer improperly testified to an ultimate issue, violating Minn. R. Evid. 701.
Under rule 701, lay witnesses can provide opinion testimony, but only to opinions
“which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness; (b) helpful to a clear
6
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (c) not
based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge . . . .” “A lay witness’s
opinion . . . testimony may help the jury by illustrating the witness’s perception in a way
that the mere recitation of objective observations cannot.” State v. Pak, 787 N.W.2d 623,
629 (Minn. App. 2010). Such lay-opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because
“it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Minn. R. Evid. 704.
Police officers can offer their lay opinion on factual issues so long as they avoid making
legal conclusions. State v. DeWald, 463 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. 1990).
But a district court should exclude ultimate-issue testimony if it “embraces legal
conclusions or terms of art” or “merely tell[s] the jury what result to reach.” State v. Moore,
699 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Minn. 2005) (quotations omitted). When a jury is improperly
exposed to ultimate-issue testimony, it constitutes a plain error. See State v. Hogetvedt,
623 N.W.2d 909, 915-16 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001).
We conclude Potter has not met his burden to show the district court plainly erred
when it allowed the officer to testify that she suspected Potter sent the text messages. The
officer offered lay-opinion testimony on a factual issue. See DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744.
And, while it embraced the ultimate issue of whether Potter engaged in the behavior that
constituted stalking, the officer did not testify that she believed that Potter was guilty or
tell the jury to reach a particular result. See Moore, 699 N.W.2d at 740.
Potter disagrees, citing Hogetvedt , 623 N.W.2d at 91 1 and State v. Myrland, 681
N.W.2d 415 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 2004). But both are
distinguishable. In Hogetvedt, the officer testified that he “believed it was appellant that
7
assaulted her,” in direct violation of a pretrial order regarding permissible testimony. 623
N.W.2d at 915-16. Unlike Hogetvedt, the officer’s testimony here did not violate a pretrial
order and avoided legal terms (like “assaulted”) to infer Potter’s guilt. And Myrland
addressed officer testimony about “a fact that had no bearing on the jury’s decision.” 681
N.W.2d at 421. Unlike Myrland, the officer’s testimony here had considerable bearing on
the jury’s evaluation of who sent victim the text messages. See, e.g., State v. Patzold, 917
N.W.2d 798, 808 (Minn. App. 2018) (affirming admission of officer lay-opinion testimony
because the officers testified about facts and evidence revealed by their investigation), rev.
denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). Thus, neither Hogetvedt nor Myrland favor Potter’s
position.
For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not plainly err when it allowed
the officer to testify that she suspected Potter sent the text messages.
Affirmed.