State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1264

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Bruce Alvin Thompson,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Carlton County District Court
File No. 09-CR-24-1533

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Jeffrey L.H. Boucher, Carlton County Attorney, Carlton, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.∗

∗Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
Bruce Alvin Thompson pleaded guilty to domestic assault. He moved for a
downward dispositional departure from the presumptive sentencing range. The district
court denied the motion and imposed an executed sentence of 32 months of imprisonment.
We conclude that the district court did not err by denying the motion. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2024, Thompson and a cousin, M.O., drank alcoholic beverages
together outside the apartment building where both of them lived. They later went to
Thompson’s apartment, where they continued drinking. While in the apartment,
Thompson hit M.O. in the face, thereby causing significant bruising. Also, M.O. reported
that, before hitting her, Thompson touched her breasts without her consent and told her that
he wanted to have sex with her.
The state charged Thompson with domestic assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 4 (2024); third-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.223,
subd. 1 (2024); and fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 609.3451, subd. 1a(1) (2024). T he state later dismissed the charge of criminal sexual
conduct.
In March 2025, the district court conducted a hearing at which it ruled on various
pre-trial issues, including motions in limine. After a recess, Thompson informed the
district court that he wished to plead guilty. During the plea hearing, Thompson admitted
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that he hit M.O. in the face and injured her. The district court accepted Thompson’s plea
with respect to the charge in count 1.
Before sentencing, Thompson filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure
from the presumptive sentencing range. Thompson argued that there are substantial and
compelling reasons for a departure, including his need for chemical-dependency treatment,
his advanced age of 72 , and significant health issues. The state opposed the motion and
argued that substantial and compelling reasons for a departure are not present because of
Thompson’s record of violent felonies and his prior criminal conduct while on probation .
The state also argued that Thompson’s health issues did not prevent him from engaging in
violent criminal acts.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties presented oral arguments in support of their
respective positions. Thompson argued that his age, his health issues, his need for
chemical-dependency treatment, and the support of his family made him particularly
amenable to probation. In response, the state argued that placing Thompson on probation
posed a significant risk to public safety given his history of violent conduct while on
probation. The state read a victim-impact statement. Thompson spoke in allocution. He
expressed regret about pleading guilty and stated that he had “never hit her.” Thompson
also spoke at length about M.O.’s size and weight and said that he found her unattractive.
The district court denied Thompson’s motion for a departure. In doing so, the
district court stated that it had reviewed the pre-sentence investigation (PSI ) report “a
number of times” and had “been thinking about this sentencing for quite some time.” The
district court noted that Thompson’s statements at the sentencing hearing are “in stark
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contrast” to the statements he had made during the pre-sentence investigation. The district
court noted Thompson’s lengthy criminal record, including serious offenses, which the
district court recited on the record. The district court acknowledged Thompson’s health
issues but noted that they had not prevented him from engaging in violent criminal activity.
The district court also noted Thompson’s lack of remorse and his disrespectful and
offensive remarks about the victim. The district court concluded b y stating that there are
“absolutely no reasons” to depart from the presumptive sentencing range, which would
require “substantial and compelling reasons,” a finding that “the court cannot in any way
make.” The district imposed an executed sentence of 32 months of imprisonment.
Thompson appeals.
DECISION
Thompson argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a downward
dispositional departure.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe presumptive sentences for felony
offenses. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.C (2024). For any particular offense, the guidelines
sentence is “presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and
offense severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.13 (2024). Accordingly, a
district court “must pronounce a sentence . . . within the applicable [presumptive] range
unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances to support a
departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2024).
If a defendant requests a downward departure, a district court first must determine
whether “‘mitigating circumstances are present’” and, if so, whether “those circumstances
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provide a ‘substantial[] and compelling’ reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” State
v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Best,
449 N.W.2d 426, 427 (Minn. 1989), and Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2012)). If
substantial and compelling reasons exist, the district court has discretion to order a
downward departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308; Best, 449 N.W.2d at 427.
Particular amenability to probation is one of the mitigating factors recognized in the
sentencing guidelines as a basis for a downward dispositional departure. Minn. Sent’g
Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2024). Particular amenability to probation is not established if the
defendant is only somewhat amenable to probation. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308-09. Rather,
the defendant must be “particularly” amenable to probation in a way that “distinguishes
the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling
circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation omitted). In
determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation so as to justify a
downward dispositional departure, a district court may consider, among other things, “the
defendant’s age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court,
and the support of friends and/or family.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).
If a district court departs from the presumptive sentence, the district court is required
to state the reason or reasons for the departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c ( 2024).
But if the district court does not depart, the district court is not required to state reasons for
imposing a presumptive sentence. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App.
2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn.
App. 1985). This court applies an abuse- of-discretion standard of review to a district
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court’s denial of a request for a downward departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307-08. Only
in a “‘rare case’” will an appellate court reverse a district court’s imposition of a
presumptive sentence. State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State
v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).
In this case, Thompson argues that the district court’s decision is against logic and
the facts in the record. He contends that the district court did not give full consideration to
the Trog factors. Specifically, he contends that “the district court failed to consider
Thompson’s age, his need for probationary treatment both for his chemical health and
medical health needs, his support of family and friends, and his cooperation and attitude
while in court.”
Thompson’s contention is inconsistent with caselaw stating that a district court need
not discuss all the Trog factors if the district court denies a motion for a downward
dispositional departure. See S tate v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 254 (Minn. App. 2011). In
addition, Thompson’s contention is inconsistent with the record, which shows that the
district court did consider some of the Trog factors that Thompson says were not
considered. For example, the district court stated, “I understand and empathize with your
health issues,” but the district court also stated that those health issues “have not prevented
you from committing violent acts.” In addition, the district court addressed Thompson’s
cooperation when it stated that Thompson’s statements at the sentencing hearing are “in
stark contrast” to the statements he had made during the pre-sentence investigation.
Furthermore, the district court addressed Thompson’s attitude while in court by stating that
his “comments about the victim . . . are deplorable [and] absolutely sickening.” The district
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court’s reasons for denying Thompson’s motion are supported by the record. The district
court’s recitation of Thompson’s criminal record corresponds to the PSI report. Many of
Thompson’s prior convictions coincide with the time period in which he was experiencing
health issues and receiving medical treatment. During allocution, Thompson denied
assaulting M.O. at least eight times and made numerous disparaging remarks about M.O.
The Trog factors that the district court did not mention do not compel the conclusion
that there are substantial and compelling reasons for a downward dispositional departure
from a presumptive sentence of 32 months. It appears that Thompson was not in chemical-
dependency treatment at the time of sentencing; his attorney represented merely that he
was “willing to do treatment.” Also, the record lacks documentary evidence of support
from Thompson’s family and friends, such as letters. Thompson’s attorney represented to
the district court in motion papers that Thompson’s family “is willing to support him,
having frequently appeared at hearings, and stayed in contact with him in the jail.” At the
sentencing hearing, Thompson’s attorney noted that Thompson’s adult daughter was in the
gallery. The transcript reveals that Thompson’s adult daughter disrupted the proceedings
twice, first to defend Thompson’s derogatory comments toward M.O. and, second, to
criticize Thompson’s attorney for Thompson’s guilty plea. The adult daughter’s comments
raise questions about whether she would provide positive support for court-ordered
probation. Thompson’s contention that his age at the time of sentencing (72 years old)
justifies a probationary sentence is unsupported by caselaw, which generally recognizes
that youth (not advanced age) may justify a more lenient sentence. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d
8
at 310; Trog, 323 N.W.2d at 30-31. Thus, the Trog factors on which Thompson relies do
not overcome the district court’s stated reasons for denying his departure motion.
In sum, the district court did not err by determining that there are no substantial and
compelling reasons for a downward dispositional departure and by denying Thompson’s
motion.
Affirmed.