State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1267

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Amanda Tracy Major,
Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Wheelock, Judge

McLeod County District Court
File No. 43-CR-25-46

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Marc A. Sebora, Hutchinson City Attorney, Hutchinson, Minnesota; and

Kenneth G. Janssen, Assistant City Attorney, Gavin, Janssen & Stabenow & Moldan, Ltd.,
Glencoe, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges her theft conviction, asserting that she did not validly waive
her right to counsel. We reverse and remand for a new trial because the district court failed
to obtain a valid waiver of her right to counsel.
FACTS
In January 2025, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Amanda Tracy
Major with one count of misdemeanor theft pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.52,
subd. 2(a)(1) (2024), after a store’s theft-prevention employee reported to Hutchinson
police that she saw Major take multiple items from the store, proceed to the self-checkout
lane, scan some but not all the items, and leave without paying for the unscanned items.
Major appeared at her arraignment hearing by video conference along with multiple
other defendants. The district court provided an advisory of rights to all the defendants
simultaneously, stating to the group:
One of the things that all you have here is the right to have
counsel represent you. If you wish to see if you qualify for a
court-appointed attorney, an application will be sent to you and
you can do that process, but just let me know if that’s what you
would like.

The district court then began to call individual cases. When it called Major’s case, the
district court asked Major several questions:
Q: And you read that complaint, so you don’t need me to read
it to you, do you?
A: No.

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Q: All right. And you understand what your rights are because
you were here when I went through them with everyone earlier,
correct?
A: Correct.

Q: All right. Any questions about your legal rights, right to
counsel, any of that stuff right now?
A: I don’t think so.
After Major indicated that she intended to plead not guilty, the district court asked, “And
as far as representation, are you wanting to continue to represent yourself or you’re thinking
of maybe looking at private counsel, or even a court-appointed attorney. What’s your
thoughts about all that?” Major responded, “I’ll just represent myself.” At no other point
in the proceedings did the district court advise Major of her right to counsel, and Major
also did not raise the subject of counsel.
At her pretrial hearing, Major requested a bench trial and waived her right to a jury
trial with no additional discussion of her right to counsel. At trial, the theft- prevention
employee testified that she saw Major take various items from different sections of the
store, proceed to a self-checkout lane, and pay for only some of the items but not all, before
leaving the store with unpaid-for merchandise. The employee confronted Major after she
confirmed that Major had taken items without paying. She testified that Major denied
taking items without paying for them and was “combative.” After Major left the store, the
employee notified the police of the theft.
The police officer who responded testified that he stopped Major as she was driving
away from the store after the incident and that, upon his request to see Major’s receipt from
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the transaction, she answered that she threw it away but later said that the wind blew it
away.
The district court found Major guilty of theft. It sentenced Major to one year of
supervised probation and ordered her to pay restitution to the store in the amount of $99.27,
plus a $285 fine and surcharge.
Major appeals.
DECISION
Major argues that she did not validly waive her right to counsel, either expressly or
by a course of conduct indicating waiver. We agree.
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal
defendant’s right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. A defendant
may waive the right to counsel, but any waiver of that right must be knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 172-73 (Minn. 1997). When the facts
are undisputed, appellate courts review de novo whether a waiver was knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. State v. Turner, 32 N.W.3d 546, 553 (Minn. 2026). “The state bears the
burden of proving that the waiver was valid.” State v. Brown, 346 N.W.2d 187, 189 (Minn.
App. 1984). “The denial of the right to counsel is a structural error that does not require a
showing of prejudice to obtain reversal.” State v. Maddox, 825 N.W.2d 140, 147 (Minn.
App. 2013) (quotations omitted).
The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide different waiver requirements
depending on whether a defendant is charged with a felony or misdemeanor. State v.
Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. App. 2021). Where, as here, a defendant is
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charged with a misdemeanor, the defendant “must waive counsel in writing or on the
record.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(3). A district court “must not accept the waiver
unless the court is satisfied that it is voluntary and has been made by the defendant with
full knowledge and understanding of the defendant’s rights.” Id. Though a district court
may provide a group advisory of constitutional rights to multiple defendants, “each
defendant must be asked individually . . . whether the defendant heard and understood the
rights as explained earlier.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.03. Group advisories “must be
supplemented by individual questioning to [e]nsure that defendants understand which
portions of the warnings apply to them” because of the increased potential for confusion
they pose. Brown, 346 N.W.2d at 189.
1 In the context of group advisories, “individual
questioning on the record is crucial to determining whether an accused has knowingly and
voluntarily waived [their] constitutional rights.” State v. Grunewald, 378 N.W.2d 55, 58
(Minn. App. 1985). And reviewing courts “closely scrutinize the record when an
uncounseled defendant allegedly waived constitutional rights after receiving a group
warning.” State v. Foncesa, 505 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Minn. App. 1993).

1 We note that some of the caselaw we cite and some authority that the parties cite in their
briefing refer to group advisories given prior to guilty pleas pursuant to Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.02-.03, whereas, here, Major did not plead guilty and instead proceeded to trial. We
find those cases instructive as they apply to waivers following group advisories in the
context of first appearances pursuant to rule 5.03 because the rights that a district court
must confirm were waived with “full knowledge and understanding” for a defendant in a
misdemeanor case, Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(3), are the same rights “requiring full
understanding before a plea is entered in a misdemeanor case” that “are specified in Minn.
R. Crim. P. 15.02.” State, City of Minneapolis v. Edwards , 361 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Minn.
App. 1985).
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Major argues that she never expressly waived her right to counsel and that the
district court made no finding as to waiver. Our review of the record reveals no express
waiver of the right to counsel by Major. Her statements were limited to, “I’ll just represent
myself,” when asked about her thoughts on representation and, “I don’t think so,” when
asked whether she had questions about her rights. “Where there is no record of a
defendant’s waiver of counsel, it is impossible to determine upon appellate review whether
a waiver was knowing and intelligent.” State v. Hawanchak, 669 N.W.2d 912, 915 (Minn.
App. 2003). This is so “even if appellant chose to defend [the m]self” because “it [is] the
duty of the district court to ensure that appellant’s waiver of counsel was knowing and
intelligent.” Id. We conclude that Major’s brief statements here are insufficient to
establish a valid waiver. See State v. Hanson , 360 N.W.2d 460, 461 (Minn. App. 1985)
(“Appellant was asked if he desired to see an attorney and he gave a one word answer, ‘no.’
That question and answer does not satisfy the minimum requirements of Rule 15.03 . . . .”).
The state attempts to convince us otherwise by citing State v. Motl, 337 N.W.2d 664
(Minn. 1983). In Motl, the district court provided a group advisory of rights to a group that
included Motl, a defendant pleading guilty in a misdemeanor case. The court stated:
You have a right to counsel; that is, to an attorney at this stage
of the proceeding and at every stage of the proceedings,
including police lineups and interrogations. If you’re
financially unable to afford counsel, an attorney will be
appointed to represent you upon completion of an application
for court-appointed counsel approved by myself. You have a
right to communicate with your attorney, and a continuance
will be granted to you, if necessary, to enable you to obtain an
attorney or to speak to your attorney.

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337 N.W.2d at 665. The district court subsequently called Motl’s case and asked him
individual questions:
[Q]: You’re Allen David Motl?

[A]: Right.

[Q]: Mr. Motl, you’re charged with driving while under the
influence and over ten percent ethel (sic) alcohol concentration
on Highway 10 on January 9th, 1982. You’re aware of your
constitutional rights?

[A]: Yes.

[Q]: Any questions about them?

[A]: No.

Id. at 666. The supreme court upheld this exchange as a valid waiver of the right to counsel.
Id. The state contends that the facts in Major’s case are similar to the facts in Motl’s and
that Major’s responses to the district court’s individual inquiries constitute a valid waiver
of her right to counsel.
We first observe that the supreme court in Motl stated that the district court’s
questioning was “the absolute bare minimum” necessary to obtain a valid waiver and
declared that “trial courts . . . should be more specific in their questions, particularly in
determining whether the defendant waives [their] right to counsel.” Id. Based on these
statements, we have observed that “it is clear that the supreme court did not hold out the
questioning used by the court in Motl as either complete or recommended.” Hanson,
360 N.W.2d at 461. We further noted that, “although that conviction was upheld, the
logical inference to be drawn from Motl is that the specific individual questions asked in
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Motl should be expanded to [e]nsure that a defendant’s waiver of his right to an attorney is
an intelligent and knowing waiver.” Id. at 462. And we stressed the importance of clarity
in individual questioning following a group advisory because “[t]he most dangerous
combination” of circumstances related to a waiver of constitutional rights that “calls for
the closest scrutiny of the record is when the defendant does not have an attorney and is
given the group advisory.” Id. In Hanson, we emphasized that it is not enough for a
defendant simply to confirm that they do not wish to see an attorney without further
individual questioning sufficient to ensure that they understood their constitutional rights.
Id. at 461-63.
In addition, we conclude that Motl is distinguishable. One key difference is that the
group advisory regarding the right to counsel that was given to Major was far less
comprehensive than the group advisory in Motl because the district court in Motl included
two specific statements required by the rules of criminal procedure that the district court
here failed to provide to Major. 337 N.W.2d at 665. Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 5.04 states that “the court must advise the defendant . . . that [1] the court will
appoint the district public defender if the defendant has been determined to be financially
unable to obtain counsel . . . [and 2] that the defendant has the right to request counsel at
any stage of the proceedings.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(1) (emphasis added).2 But

2 Rule 15.02, applicable to guilty pleas, also requires a district court to inform a defendant
in a misdemeanor case of their right to an attorney “at every stage of the proceedings.”
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.02, subd. 1. It likewise provides that the district court must advise a
defendant in a misdemeanor case that “defense counsel will be appointed for a defendant
unable to afford counsel.” Id.
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the district court’s group advisory here did not include either required statement.
Specifically as to the first required statement, the district court said only that, if the
defendants “wish[ed]” to apply for a court -appointed attorney, they had the option to do
so. This stands in contrast with the group advisory the district court in Motl gave, which
specified: “If you’re financially unable to afford counsel, an attorney will be appointed to
represent you.” 337 N.W.2d at 665.
Another key difference is that Major did not confirm that she had no questions about
her rights, as the appellant in Motl did, answering only, “I don’t think so,” in response to
the district court’s inquiry. In Hanson, we explained that a defendant’s confirmation that
they fully understand their rights is necessary to establish the “absolute bare minimum” for
a valid waiver. 360 N.W.2d at 461-62. The defendant in Hanson answered, “No,” when
the district court asked if he wished to see an attorney, but the district court never asked
him individually if he understood the constitutional rights it read during the group advisory.
Id. at 461. We held that there was no valid waiver, distinguishing Motl because the district
court did not confirm with “the individual question relative to awareness of constitutional
rights” that the appellant understood his rights, despite the appellant’s confirmation that he
wanted to represent himself. Id. at 462. Because a group advisory issued to an
unrepresented defendant is subject to the “closest scrutiny,” id., we conclude that the
district court’s failure to include mandatory statements about the right to counsel, combined
with its minimal individual questioning of Major, falls short of the “absolute bare
minimum” identified in Motl to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel. “[C]losely
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scrutiniz[ing]” the record, Foncesa, 505 N.W.2d at 372, we are also persuaded that Motl is
distinguishable and does not support that there was a valid waiver here.
Our conclusion that Major did not provide a valid waiver is bolstered by a persuasive
nonprecedential case, State v. Kramer. No. A22-0093, 2022 WL 17958564 (Minn. App.
Dec. 27, 2022).3 In that case, which is factually similar, we reversed after determining that
no valid waiver of counsel occurred. Id. at *5. Kramer also involved a challenge to a
waiver of counsel after a district court administered a group advisory of rights to a group
that included a defendant in a misdemeanor case. Id. at *1. During individual questioning,
the district court asked the unrepresented defendant if he wanted to apply for a public
defender, and the defendant declined. Id. The district court then asked the defendant if he
wanted to represent himself; the defendant responded, “Sure.” Id. At a later settlement
conference, the district court asked the defendant, “And you’ re representing yourself . . .
and you want to continue to represent yourself?” Id. at *2. The defendant answered, “Yes.”
Id. The district court then asked, “And you understand you have the right to an attorney,
and if you can’t afford one, you can apply for a public defender?” Id. The defendant again
said, “Yes.” Id. As in Major’s case, the district court never again inquired about the
defendant’s right to counsel. Id. On these facts, we reversed because “the district court’s
bare inquiry did not ensure that [the defendant’s] waiver was knowing and intelligent.” Id.
at *4. These facts are not distinguishable from those present here.

3 We may cite nonprecedential opinions of this court for their persuasive value. Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
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The state next contends that, even if there was no express waiver, Major’s conduct
supports a finding of a valid waiver because she never asked for an attorney. “[A] district
court’s failure to conduct an on-the-record inquiry regarding waiver does not require
reversal when the particular facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate a valid
waiver.” Bonkowske, 957 N.W.2d at 442 (quotation omitted). We consider “the particular
facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused.” Id. (quotation omitted). We also “may consider the defendant’s
familiarity with the criminal justice system and whether [they were] represented by counsel
prior to the waiver.” Id.
Nothing indicates that Major had familiarity with the criminal justice system, and
the record does not show that she was previously represented by counsel at any point. The
state cites no authority that a defendant’s mere failure to request an attorney amounts to
conduct from which we may infer a valid waiver of the right to counsel. Though a
reviewing court may infer a waiver of the right to counsel by conduct, this applies when a
defendant engages in dilatory tactics or otherwise affirmatively indicates that they are
rejecting their rights. See Maddox, 825 N.W.2d at 147; State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270,
276 (Minn. 1998) (inferring waiver after defendants fired their court-appointed attorneys);
State v. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d 407, 412-13 (Minn. 1990) (inferring waiver from the
“[d]efendant’s interaction with 12 different judges, his letters to those judges, his various
conversations with two different public defenders, and his refusal to accept representation
from the public defender’s office” and concluding that “the defendant was fully aware of
the consequences of proceeding pro se”). Our review of the record reveals no such conduct
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on Major’s part. Accordingly, we discern no basis from which to infer a waiver absent an
express waiver on the record.
We conclude that, because Major did not waive her right to counsel expressly or by
her conduct, she is entitled to a new trial. See Hawanchak, 669 N.W.2d at 915.
Reversed and remanded.