State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1268

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jorge Luis Sandoval,
Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-23-3841

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kevin M. Magnuson, Washington County Attorney, Andrew Jackola, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan A. Ottaviani, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant Jorge Luis Sandoval challenges his fifth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct
conviction on the basis that respondent State of Minnesota committed multiple instances
of prosecutorial misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
The following facts are based on the evidence received at a jury trial. S.L. (victim)
and K.L., victim’s sister (sister), left their cousin’s birthday party and discovered their car
had been towed. Victim and sister noticed a “permit parking only” sign posted where their
car had been parked and contacted the towing company listed on the sign. After confirming
their car had been towed, victim, sister, and L.B., victim’s mother (mother), went to the
impound lot. Sandoval was the only employee working in the impound lot that night.
At the impound lot, victim and sister got into a tow truck with Sandoval to retrieve
their car while mother went to a gas station to get cash for the towing fee. Because the tow
truck only had two seats, victim and sister shared the passenger seat. While in the tow
truck, Sandoval asked victim if she was wearing a bra; then, without victim’s consent,
Sandoval touched and squeezed victim’s breast over her clothing.1

1 Sister’s recollection differed slightly. Sister recalled Sandoval asking victim why victim
was “touching her” breasts before Sandoval touched victim’s breast. Victim testified that
Sandoval asked her if she was wearing a bra then touched her breast and squeezed it three
times. Despite these discrepancies, both sister and victim recall Sandoval touching
victim’s breast without victim’s consent.
3
After Sandoval brought the car to the front of the impound lot, victim exited the tow
truck, walked to mother’s car, and texted her boyfriend about the incident. Sister reported
the incident to mother. Despite encouragement from sister and mother, victim was hesitant
to report the incident to law enforcement. Later that evening, victim made a police report.
The state charged Sandoval with one count of fifth-degree criminal sexual conduct under
Minn. Stat. § 609.3451 (2022).
Before trial, the state filed a motion requesting that the district court prohibit any
mention of victim’s previous sexual conduct in front of the jury; Sandoval did not object.
The district court granted the state’s motion. At the jury trial, victim, sister, mother, a
responding police officer, and Sandoval testified. As relevant here, s ister testified about
victim’s demeanor following the incident, stating that victim was “very distraught” and
attributing this to victim’s “past history of sexual assault.” Sandoval did not object to
sister’s testimony. When Sandoval testified, he denied touching victim.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor highlighted pertinent aspects of victim’s
testimony and noted that sister and mother corroborated victim’s version of events. The
prosecutor stated that Sandoval’s “testimony that this didn’t happen doesn’t make sense.”
Thereafter, the prosecutor reiterated that victim’s version of events remained consistent
and corroborated and, therefore, “[victim] should be believed. So believe [victim] and
return a verdict of guilty.”
The jury found Sandoval guilty on the sole count. The district court imposed a 364-
day jail sentence, with 334 days stayed for up to two years.
Sandoval appeals.
4
DECISION
Sandoval argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor committed
multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The central concern regarding
prosecutorial-misconduct claims “is that [the] misconduct may deny the defendant’s right
to a fair trial.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006). Prosecutors are
ministers of justice with “an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a
fair trial, no matter how strong the evidence of guilt.” Id.
Because Sandoval did not object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we apply
the modified plain-error test. State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). Under
this test, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted (1) an error
(2) that was plain. Id. “An error is plain if it is clear or obvious,” usually when the
prosecutor contravened “case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Sontoya,
788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
If the defendant establishes plain error, “the burden then shifts to the [s]tate to
demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’ s substantial rights.” Portillo,
998 N.W.2d at 248 (quotation omitted). Misconduct does not affect substantial rights if
“there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would
have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. To
determine whether a reasonable likelihood exists, “we consider the strength of the evidence
against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the
defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.”
Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 251-52 (quotation omitted). If the state fails to meet its burden,
5
we “will not grant relief to correct the error unless our failure to do so will cause the public
to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.” Pulczinski v. State,
972 N.W.2d 347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Here, Sandoval argues prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the state:
(1) elicited improper testimony from sister regarding victim’s sexual-assault history;
(2) shifted the burden of proof during closing argument; (3) improperly vouched for the
victim during closing argument; and (4) made an improper social-policy argument.
Sandoval also argues that, even if each individual error was insufficient to require reversal,
the cumulative errors require a new trial. We address these arguments in turn.
A. Sexual-Assault History
Sandoval first argues the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it elicited
improper testimony from sister regarding victim’s sexual-assault history. A prosecutor
engages in misconduct when they introduce evidence the district court previously ruled
inadmissible. See State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 744- 46 (Minn. 2003). Here, the district
court granted the state’s pretrial motion to prohibit witnesses from testifying about victim’s
prior sexual conduct, which included references to allegations of sexual abuse. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.347 (2022); see also State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Minn. App. 1991)
(concluding that the term “sexual conduct” as used in Minn. Stat. § 609.347 includes
“allegations of sexual abuse”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 1991). At trial, the prosecutor
elicited testimony from sister about victim’s demeanor following the incident, which
revealed victim’s sexual-assault history. The exchange occurred as follows:
6
PROSECUTOR: Okay. How did [victim] seem when [the
touching] happened?

SISTER: Very distraught because we both looked at each
other because she’s had a past history with sexual assault.

Because the district court ruled that such testimony was inadmissible, we conclude that the
prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct when they elicited this testimony from
sister.2 See Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 744-746. Having identified a plain error, the burden shifts
to the state to demonstrate that this error did not affect Sandoval’s substantial rights. See
Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248.
We conclude that the state met its burden here. The state had a strong case against
Sandoval. Victim’s testimony that Sandoval touched her breast was consistent with
victim’s police report and corroborated by sister. The error was not pervasive; rather, it
was a single fleeting remark. And the state neither asked follow-up questions, nor revisited
sister’s improper testimony during closing arguments. Moreover , Sandoval had an
opportunity to respond to the testimony, see Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 251, because he used
the testimony to argue “[victim’s] past . . . could be a reason [victim] would lie about this.”

2 To the extent the state argues there was no misconduct because the prosecutor did not
intentionally elicit the improper testimony, we are not persuaded. Our courts recognize
that a state witness providing improper testimony may constitute prosecutorial misconduct,
even when it is unclear that the prosecutor intentionally elicited the improper testimony.
See State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 689 (Minn. 2007) (“Based on the record, we cannot
determine whether [the witness’s] violation of the trial court’s order was intentional or not;
nonetheless, it was misconduct attributable to the prosecutor.”); see also State v. Carlson,
264 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn. 1978) (noting the state must prepare its witnesses so they
“will not blurt out anything that might be inadmissible and prejudicial”); State v. McNeil,
658 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. App. 2003) (“The state has a duty to prepare its witnesses,
prior to testifying, to avoid inadmissible or prejudicial statements.”).
7
For these reasons, sister’s improper testimony did not affect Sandoval’s substantial
rights.
B. Burden of Proof
Sandoval argues second that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it
shifted the burden of proof during closing argument. Specifically, Sandoval contends that
the prosecutor’s statement that “Sandoval’s testimony that this didn’t happen doesn’t make
sense” impermissibly shifted the burden of proof.
“[M]isstatements of the burden of proof are highly improper.” State v. Strommen,
648 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn. 2002) (quotation omitted). A prosecutor improperly shifts
the burden of proof “when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his
innocence.” State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).
However, a prosecutor does not improperly shift the burden of proof if they point to the
absence of evidence to support a defendant’s alternative theory. See State v. Nissalke, 801
N.W.2d 82, 106-07 (Minn. 2011). When reviewing whether a prosecutor improperly
shifted the burden of proof, we “must look at the closing argument as a whole, rather than
just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue
prominence to determine whether reversible error has occurred.” McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d
at 751 (quotation omitted).
Sandoval argues the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument was analogous
to the improper burden shifting that occurred in Strommen. There, during closing
argument, the prosecutor stated, “[w] hen we have difficult cases like this, sometimes the
only way to deal with it is just to weigh the story in each hand and decide which one is
8
most reasonable, which one makes the most sense.” Strommen, 648 N.W.2d at 685. The
supreme court concluded the prosecutor’s statement was plainly erroneous because it
misstated “the state’s burden to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt” and “may have” affected the jury’s decision. Id. at 690. Strommen is
distinguishable from this case. Here, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to “weigh” the
parties’ testimony and “decide which one” makes more sense. Rather, the prosecutor made
the statement that Sandoval’s testimony did not “make sense” while high lighting and
analyzing discrepancies in Sandoval’s testimony regarding the incident.
The prosecutor’s statement was more akin to Nissalke. 801 N.W.2d at 106. There,
during closing argument, the prosecutor discredited the defense’s theory when they stated,
“there’s nobody who can really provide an alibi for the defendant.” Id. The supreme court
concluded the statement was not an attempt “to shift the burden of proof. Instead, these
comments argued that there was an absence of evidence to support theories that [the
defendant] put before the jury.” Id. at 107. Similarly here, the prosecutor did not shift the
burden of proof to Sandoval because, when viewed in context, the prosecutor made the
“make sense” statement to highlight discrepancies in Sandoval’s testimony, which
demonstrated an absence of evidence to support Sandoval’s version of events.
3
We therefore conclude the prosecutor’s statement was not plain-error misconduct.

3 We further note that, even if the prosecutor’s statement had shifted the burden of proof,
“corrective instructions by the court can cure prosecutorial error.” McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d
at 750. Here, the prosecutor argued the proper burden of proof in closing, and the district
court properly instructed the jury on the state’s burden of proof and instructed the jury to
“disregard” any differing statements by the parties.
9
C. Vouching
Sandoval argues third that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when the
prosecutor improperly vouched for victim during closing argument. Sandoval specifically
challenges the following statements: “So why should you believe [victim]. Because she
has no motivation to lie. She didn’t get anything out of this. They still had to pay th[e]
$420 [towing fee to retrieve the car]. She had nothing to gain from it and quite a bit to
lose, because this is not a dignifying process.” The prosecutor then recounted pertinent
aspects of victim’s testimony. Thereafter, the prosecutor stated:
[Victim] was careful. She readily admitted when she didn’t
remember a fact or she wasn’t sure about a fact. But she was
firm in what she did remember and what she remembered was
being violated by . . . Sandoval. She was frank, she was
sincere, and she should be believed.

The prosecutor ended the closing argument, repeating, “[victim] should be believed. So
believe her and return a verdict of guilty.”
A prosecutor engages in misconduct when they use their personal opinion to bolster
the state’s witness’s credibility. See State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984); see
also State v. Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1998) (stating that vouching occurs
“when the government implies a guarantee of a witness’ s truthfulness, refers to facts
outside the record, or expresses a personal opinion as to a witness’s credibility”). It is the
jury’s job to determine witness credibility, and therefore an advocate “may not throw onto
the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal opinion.” Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 516.
However, “prosecutors are not prohibited from arguing that certain witnesses are
10
believable.” State v. Rucker, 752 N.W.2d 538, 552 (Minn. App. 2008), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 23, 2008).
Sandoval contends that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for victim,
comparing the prosecutor’s argument to State v. Nowels. 941 N.W.2d 430, 439 (Minn.
App. 2020), rev. denied (Minn. June 16, 2020). In Nowels, appellant argued that the
prosecutor improperly vouched for the victim-witness when they stated the victim “didn’t
lie.” Id. at 438. We concluded that the prosecutor committed plain-error misconduct
because “the prosecutor went beyond merely arguing [the victim’s] credibility or that he
was believable —she stated that he did not lie.” Id. at 439. Sandoval asserts that the
prosecutor’s statement to the jury that victi m “should be believed” similarly inserts the
prosecutor’s personal opinion about the victim’s truthfulness. (Emphasis added.)
The state disagrees, urging that, under existing case law, the prosecutor’s statements
were not an improper endorsement of victim’s credibility. The state cites several cases to
support its argument. For example, in Rucker, we determined that no improper vouching
occurred when the prosecutor stated: “This is a search for the truth. A search for the truth
is what we do in criminal court. And that’s what those two girls testified to.” 752 N.W.2d
at 552. And in State v. Leutschaft, we concluded no improper vouching occurred when the
prosecutor said, “[victim] was very honest on the stand , both on direct and cross.”
759 N.W.2d 414, 425 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 17, 2009). In State v.
Gail, the supreme court concluded that the prosecutor calling the witness “a believable
person” and “frank and sincere” was not improper vouching. 713 N.W.2d 851, 866 (Minn.
2006). And in State v. Swanson, the supreme court held that the prosecutor was not
11
vouching for witnesses when they said the witnesses were “very believable,” but the
prosecutor was impermissibly vouching for a witness when they stated “[t]he state believes
[the witness] is very believable.” 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).
We conclude the prosecutor’s statements in this case are akin to those non-vouching
statements in Rucker, Leutschaft, Gail, and Swanson. Here, the prosecutor did not make a
personal endorsement or guarantee of the witness’s truthfulness but instead stated that
victim “should be believed” after drawing upon record evidence. See Rucker, 752 N.W.2d
at 552 (stating that a prosecutor may argue that a witness was or was not credible based on
the evidence presented at trial); see also Gail, 713 N.W.2d at 866 (stating that prosecutors
are not prohibited from arguing that certain witnesses are believable).
Sandoval argues alternatively that, even if the statements about believing the victim
were not improper vouching, the prosecutor’s statements about the difficulties involved in
bringing charges against Sandoval crossed the line into improper vouching. Again, we
disagree. In Rucker, the prosecutor, told the jury that they “can look at [the victim’s]
frankness and their sincerity from the standpoint of how difficult it was for them to be
subjected to” direct- and cross-examination. 752 N.W.2d at 553. And we concluded that
no improper vouching occurred.4 Id.

4 We reached a similar conclusion in State v. Borg. No. A09-243, 2012 WL 987273 (Minn.
App. Mar. 26, 2012), rev. denied (Minn. June 19, 2012); see also Minn R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01 (noting we may cite nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority). There,
the prosecutor stated in their closing argument “that the [witness] would not have taken the
stand and testified about personal and embarrassing things if she were making them up .”
Id. at *4. We concluded that the prosecutor’s statement was not a personal endorsement
of credibility, but rather “an explanation as to why the complainant’s testimony was
credible.” Id.
12
Because we conclude the statements made in this case are akin to th e permissible
statements in Rucker, Leutschaft, Gail, and Swanson, the closing argument did not
contravene existing caselaw. Accordingly, the prosecutor did not engage in plain-error
misconduct.
D. Social Policy
Sandoval asserts fourth that the state engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when the
prosecutor injected a broad social policy into the case. Specifically, Sandoval argues the
prosecutor committed misconduct when they “repeatedly [told] the jury to believe [victim]
after eliciting testimony that she had a history of sexual assault.” Sandoval contends this
improperly inserted a broader theme—that society should believe sexual-assault survivors.
We are not persuaded.
“[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to make statements urging the jury to protect
society or to send a message with its verdict. ” State v. Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 556
(Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). “[T]he state should refrain from
asking questions or making arguments that would divert the jury from its duty to decide a
case on the evidence by injecting issues broader than a defendant’s guilt or innocence into
the trial.” State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 512 (Minn. 2006).
In Duncan, we concluded that misconduct occurred when the prosecutor urged the
jury to return a guilty verdict “to send a message generally affirming the allegations of
children and the work of law enforcement.” 608 N.W.2d at 556. And in State v. Peterson,
we determined the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when they “urge[d] the jury to send
a message to the children of the world ‘that we will protect you’ . . . [and] drew the jury’s
13
attention away from the particular facts of this case to broader societal problems.” 530
N.W.2d 843, 848 (Minn. App. 1995). Here, unlike Duncan and Peterson, Sandoval does
not point to any specific statement where the prosecutor asked the jury to return a guilty
verdict based on broad social policies,5 nor do we find one in our review of the record.
We conclude that the prosecutor did not insert broad social policies into the case
and, therefore, did not commit plain-error misconduct.
E. Cumulative Error
Finally, Sandoval contends that we should reverse on the ground that the cumulative
errors require a new trial. A defendant “may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where
the errors, when taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying [the] appellant a fair trial.”
State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Here, we conclude
the state only committed one instance of plain-error misconduct, which did not affect
Sandoval’s substantial rights, thus Sandoval has not met his burden to show cumulative
error.
Affirmed.

5 Rather Sandoval points to the combination of the prosecutor’s statements about victim’s
believability and sister’s earlier testimony about victim’s prior sexual-assault history. We
do not agree that, through these separate statements, the prosecutor “inject[ed ] issues
broader than a defendant’s guilt or innocence into the trial.” See Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d at
512.