At Home Apartments, L.L.C., Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1279

At Home Apartments, L.L.C.,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Berscheid,
Appellant,

John Doe, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed May 4, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CV-25-4657

Christopher T. Kalla, Douglass E. Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Nicholas Berscheid, St. Cloud, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant was a tenant in respondent’s multiunit apartment building. Appellant
challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondent on an
eviction complaint based on appellant holding over after termination of the tenancy.
Appellant argues for reversal for two reasons: (1) respondent retaliated against him when
he sought to enforce his “right to smoke medical cannabis” in multifamily housing, and
(2) respondent discriminated against him based on his status as a medical-cannabis patient.
He also urges that the proper remedy is a civil fine. Because we conclude that appellant
was not entitled to a retaliation or discrimination defense as a matter of law, respondent
was entitled to summary judgment, and the district court’s remedy followed the applicable
statutes, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the undisputed facts and procedural history on summary
judgment. In November 2011, appellant Nicholas Berscheid began leasing an apartment in
St. Cloud from respondent At Home Apartments L.L.C. The most recent lease took effect
on November 1, 2022, and expired on October 31, 2023. The lease included an addendum
that stated a tenant “shall not smoke anywhere in the unit,” including the patio and deck
space, the building where the “dwelling is located,” or “any of the common areas of the
building.” The addendum also stated that violations “shall be a material breach of the Lease
and grounds for immediate termination of the Lease” by At Home.
As of November 1, 2023, Berscheid had a “month-to-month” tenancy.
3
In August 2024, At Home sent Berscheid a notice of rent adjustment and lease
renewal options. Relevant to this appeal, the notice discussed termination and included an
amendment of the lease terms. The notice stated that, “[s]tarting 11/01/2024,” the “new
lease term options” for a month-to-month tenancy allowed “termination at any time with a
two-full month written notice to vacate.”
The notice also stated that, under the month-to -month tenancy, Berscheid’s lease
would be “formally amended to add” terms prohibiting tenants from smoking “non-tobacco
products,” including cannabis and medical cannabis. Specifically, the notice stated that the
term “smoking,” as used in the lease, prohibited tenants from the “use or possession of
burning, lighted, vaporized, or ignited non-tobacco products including but not limited to
any lit product that may emit smoke, whether or not inhaled, such as incense, sage,
cannabis, including medical cannabis, candles, scented candles, lamps, or lanterns.”
(Emphasis added.)
Berscheid asked At Home for an accommodation to smoke medical cannabis in his
apartment. On March 14, 2025, At Home denied Berscheid’s request, stating that “other
residents may have had health issues, (such as [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease],
other respiration conditions, or allergies), that could be adversely affected by the smoke.”
Despite the denial of his request, Berscheid does not dispute that he smoked medical
cannabis in his apartment.1

1 During district court proceedings, Berscheid argued that there was “no physical evidence
in the record to prove” that he “was smoking in the apartment.” The district court received
photographs of “three cannabis ‘roaches,’ paraphernalia used to smoke cannabis, and an
ashtray” found in Berscheid’s apartment. The district court determined that this
4
On March 28, 2025, At Home sent Berscheid a “lease termination notice.” At Home
cited Berscheid’s violation of the no-smoking policy as its reason for not renewing the
lease. At Home gave Berscheid two months—until May 31, 2025—to vacate the
apartment. Berscheid failed to vacate.
In June 2025, At Home commenced an eviction action and claimed that Berscheid
was holding over under Minnesota Statutes section 504B.285, subdivision 1 (2024). The
district court conducted an initial hearing, both parties appeared, and Berscheid represented
himself. The district court scheduled a jury trial “on the issues of holdover eviction and the
defenses of failure to reasonably accommodate [Berscheid’s] use of medical [cannabis]
and retaliation.”
In his answer after the initial hearing, Berscheid argued that he should not be evicted
because, “under state law,” he was “protected as a medical cannabis patient.” In an
amended answer, Berscheid explained that he was “defending his rights” under Minnesota
Statutes section 342.56 (2024). Among other things, Berscheid stated that he asked for “a
reasonable accommodation to use and smoke medical cannabis flower” in his apartment.
Berscheid argued that At Home retaliated against him for making this request when it sent
the lease termination notice “within 90 days of a good faith attempt to enforce his rights.”

“undisputed circumstantial evidence” shows that Berscheid “engaged in smoking medical
[cannabis] in his apartment.”
On appeal, Berscheid does not challenge the district court’s determination and
concedes that he smoked medical cannabis in his apartment. Berscheid’s appellate brief
states that he “began using [his] legally prescribed medication, as instructed, in the safety
and privacy of [his] home.” Berscheid’s brief also states that he felt “confident in [his]
rights to be able to combust and vaporize [his] medications as directed from [his] doctor.”
5
At Home moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts showed
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The next day, the district court held a hearing
to discuss the issues for trial. After discussing Berscheid’s statutory arguments, the district
court asked Berscheid if there were “any facts that [he thought] a jury would have to
resolve,” or if the parties disputed only the interpretation of relevant statutes. Berscheid
responded, “I guess it’s going to be the interpretation of what the legislature meant when
they wrote these statutes covering this.” Berscheid agreed that there was no need for a jury
trial. The district court struck the trial date, gave Berscheid a deadline for filing a written
response to At Home’s motion for summary judgment, and stated that At Home’s motion
would be taken under advisement after the court received Berscheid’s response.
Berscheid filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and argued, among other
things, that section 342.56 “clearly states that medical cannabis flower and medical
cannabinoid products are protected and are allowed to be smoked and vaped in a
multifamily housing building, whereas other cannabis products are not.” Berscheid
reasserted that At Home retaliated against him by serving the lease termination notice
within 90 days of his request to smoke medical cannabis in his apartment. Berscheid also
argued that At Home discriminated against him based on his “status as a patient enrolled
in the registry program.”
In July 2025, the district court filed an order granting summary judgment in favor
of At Home. The district court reasoned:
Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact.
[At Home’s] property is smoke-free. The lease’s general
prohibition of smoking does not amount to discrimination or
6
retaliation and is permissible under Minnesota law. There is no
statutory exception for people participating in a medical
cannabis program to consume cannabis by combustion or
vaporization of the product and inhalation of smoke, aerosol,
or vapor from the product where the lease agreement between
the parties prohibits such consumption. [Berscheid] has failed
to vacate after being given notice to vacate and notice of the
termination of the lease. [At Home] is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

Judgment was entered on the same day. The district court issued a writ of recovery and
ordered Berscheid to vacate the apartment.
Berscheid appeals.
DECISION
Berscheid, who is self-represented on appeal, asks us to reverse the district court’s
summary-judgment decision, contending that his appeal “is not about an eviction by
holdover”—rather, it “is about the rights of medical cannabis patients and whether or not
the district court ruled correctly in their interpretation of Minnesota law.”
2
A district court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Hanson v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 972 N.W.2d 362, 371 (Minn.
2022). We will affirm if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the district court
properly applied the law. Id. at 371-72. And we “ view the evidence in the light most

2 “Medical cannabis” is not a statutorily defined term. For clarity, this opinion uses medical
cannabis to refer to medical cannabis flower and medical cannabinoid products, both of
which are statutorily defined, as discussed infra note 7.
7
favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts and factual inferences against” the
movant. Henson v. Uptown Drink, LLC , 922 N.W.2d 185, 190 (Minn. 2019) (quotation
omitted). While Berscheid is the nonmoving party and entitled to have the facts viewed in
his favor, the relevant facts are largely undisputed.
An “eviction” is “a summary court proceeding to remove a tenant or occupant from
or otherwise recover possession of real property by the process of law” set out in
chapter 504B of the Minnesota Statutes. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2024). A
landlord may recover possession by eviction when “any tenant at will holds over after the
termination of the tenancy by notice to quit.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 1(a)(3).
At Home’s notice to quit was titled, “lease termination notice.” This opinion uses notice to
quit interchangeably with termination notice.
A tenant may defend against an eviction action “following the alleged termination
of a tenancy by notice to quit” if the tenant can “prove by a fair preponderance of the
evidence” that “the alleged termination was intended in whole or part as a penalty for the
[tenant’s] good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease or contract, oral or
written, under the laws of the state or any of its governmental subdivisions, or of the United
States.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 2(1) (2024). If the notice to quit was served within
90 days of the date a tenant attempted to secure or enforce their rights, “the burden of
proving that the notice to quit was not served in whole or part for a retaliatory purpose”
shifts to the landlord. Id., subd. 2 (2024).
The parties do not dispute that, at the time At Home terminated the lease, the
tenancy was at-will and subject to termination and that Berscheid held over after the date
8
specified in a timely termination notice.3 The parties, however, dispute whether Berscheid
was a patient enrolled in Minnesota’s medical-cannabis registry program. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 342.01, subd. 59 (2024) (defining “patient”), .52 (Supp. 2025) (describing patient
registry program). The district court assumed that Berscheid was an enrolled medical-
cannabis patient, and At Home does not appear to challenge that inference on summary
judgment.4 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Berscheid as the nonmoving
party, we also assume that Berscheid is a patient enrolled in the medical-cannabis registry
program.
On appeal, Berscheid argues that the district court erred by entering an eviction
judgment because his tenancy was unlawfully terminated. Berscheid contends that
At Home (1) retaliated against him for attempting to exercise in good faith his right to
smoke medical cannabis and (2) discriminated against him as a protected medical-cannabis
patient. Alternatively, Berscheid argues that (3) the remedy should be a civil fine, not
eviction. We address each issue in turn.5

3 “‘Tenancy at will’ means a tenancy in which the tenant holds possession by permission
of the landlord but without a fixed ending date.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 13 (2024).
To terminate an at-will tenancy without cause, the landlord must give the tenant “notice in
writing” and the “time of the notice must be at least as long as the interval between the
time rent is due or three months, whichever is less.” Minn. Stat. § 504B.135 (2024).
Berscheid does not contest the timeliness of At Home’s termination notice, which gave
him two months to vacate the apartment.

4 At Home states that, in the event of a remand, it “would seek an evidentiary hearing” on
this enrollment dispute.

5 The parties’ briefs to this court argue about the lawfulness of the no-smoking addendum
in the lease. We conclude that the lawfulness of the no-smoking addendum in the lease is
not an issue on appeal, and we therefore do not rule on it. This appeal is about termination
9
I. Berscheid is not entitled to a retaliation defense as a matter of law.

Berscheid argues that At Home retaliated against him when it served the termination
notice within 90 days of his good-faith attempt to enforce his rights as a medical-cannabis
patient. See Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.285, subd. 2 (providing retaliation defense), 342.57,
subd. 6a (Supp. 2025) (stating that a landlord “must not retaliate against a patient for
asserting the patient’s rights or seeking remedies” under Minnesota’s cannabis statutes).
Specifically, Berscheid argues that Minnesota law protects a tenant’s right to smoke
medical cannabis in multifamily housing. Because Berscheid raises a legal issue that
requires us to interpret Minnesota statutes, we review the issue de novo. Reetz v. City of
Saint Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 2021).
“The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the
Legislature.” In re Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711, 715 (Minn. 2024)
(quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). When interpreting a statute,

of an at-will tenancy, not termination by breach of lease. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.285,
subds. 1(a)(2), 4(a), 5 (2024) (indicating that a landlord may bring an eviction action
against a tenant for a material breach of the lease agreement). The record shows that
At Home ended Berscheid’s tenancy with a termination notice, which does not require a
breach of the lease. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.135 (stating that a party may terminate a
tenancy at will with notice); Cent. Hous. Assocs., LP v. Olson, 910 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Minn.
App. 2018) (stating that a statutory retaliation defense “applies when a tenancy is
terminated by notice to quit, not when a tenancy is terminated based on a breach of lease”),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 929 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 2019) (noting that this court’s
statutory retaliation ruling was not on review and reversing in part based on a common-law
retaliation defense). Although At Home’s termination notice referred to Berscheid’s breach
of the no-smoking addendum, it is undisputed that Berscheid failed to vacate the apartment
after the period set out in the termination notice. In other words, At Home’s reference to
the no-smoking addendum does not transform the notice-to -quit eviction into a
breach-of-lease eviction.
10
appellate courts “first determine whether the language is ambiguous.” Scheurer v.
Shrewsbury, 24 N.W.3d 670, 674 (Minn. 2025). If there is only one reasonable
interpretation of the text, then the statute is unambiguous and we enforce its plain meaning.
Id. We interpret a statute “as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts, and
where possible, no word, phrase, or sentence will be held superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 496 (Minn.
2009) (quotation omitted).
We begin with the text of Minnesota Statutes section 342.56, subdivision 1, the
statute on which Berscheid relies as authority for his right to smoke medical cannabis in
multifamily housing. First, we conclude that this statute does not prohibit smoking medical
cannabis in multifamily housing, but we also conclude that this statute does not create a
statutory right to smoke medical cannabis . Next, we consider Minnesota Statutes
section 504B.171, subdivision 1 (2024), a separate provision enacted at the same time as
section 342.56, subdivision 1. Section 504B.171, subdivision 1, states that a landlord may
prohibit smoking “any” cannabinoid product on the leased premises. Because we conclude
that these statutes are unambiguous, we interpret them to give effect to both statutes and
determine that Berscheid’s retaliation defense lacks merit.
A. Minnesota Statutes section 342.56, subdivision 1(b)
Berscheid asserts he has a right to smoke medical cannabis in multifamily housing.
Berscheid relies on section 342.56, subdivision 1, which, for the most part, limits the
11
consumption of cannabis. Subdivision 1(b) prohibits smoking and vaporizing cannabis in
buildings with multifamily housing, but excepts medical cannabis from this prohibition:
Except for the use of medical cannabis flower or
medical cannabinoid products, the vaporizing or smoking of
cannabis flower, cannabis products, artificially derived
cannabinoids, or hemp-derived consumer products is
prohibited in a multifamily housing building, including
balconies and patios appurtenant thereto. A violation of this
paragraph is punishable through a civil administrative fine in
an amount of $250.

Minn. Stat. § 342.56, subd. 1(b) (emphasis added).
6
Both parties agree that this statute is unambiguous, but they disagree on how we
should interpret it. Berscheid argues that the italicized language in section 342.56,
subdivision 1(b), provides “that medical cannabis patients currently have the right to
vaporize/smoke medical cannabis flower and medical cannabinoid products in a
multifamily housing building.”
At Home counters that Berscheid’s interpretation is “inconsistent with the plain
reading” of the statute. At Home argues that, although subdivision 1(b) “creates a general
right of individuals to consume medical [cannabis] by smoking,” it does not “expressly
limit what a landlord can do to regulate the vaporizing or smoking of medical [cannabis]”
and that Berscheid’s right to smoke medical cannabis in rental housing is subject to
section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), which allows a landlord to prohibit tenants from
smoking cannabis.

6 For ease of discussion, this opinion refers to “smoking” medical cannabis, but our use of
that term includes the statutory references to “vaporizing or smoking.”
12
We conclude that section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), broadly prohibits the smoking
of cannabis “in a multifamily housing building” and excepts medical cannabis from this
general prohibition. Minn. Stat. § 342.56, subd. 1(b). In other words, subdivision 1(b) does
not prohibit the smoking of medical cannabis in multifamily housing. But it also does not
discuss whether a landlord may prohibit a tenant from smoking medical cannabis on leased
premises.
Berscheid asks us to infer from section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), that a landlord may
not prohibit a tenant from smoking medical cannabis. We decline to do so. If the legislature
had intended to recognize a tenant’s right to smoke medical cannabis in subdivision 1(b),
we would reasonably expect the legislature to have said so. The Minnesota Supreme Court,
in other contexts, has refused to draw similar inferences from statutory provisions. See
Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 264 (Minn. 2022) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute
because, had the legislature intended such an interpretation, “one would reasonably expect
that” the legislature would have used critical words in the statute).
The medical-cannabis exception in subdivision 1(b) does not refer to the
landlord-tenant relationship. Courts “cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were
intentionally or inadvertently omitted.” Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Digit. Corp., 854 N.W.2d
750, 759 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). In other words, interpreting the
medical-cannabis exception in subdivision 1(b) as granting tenants the right to smoke
medical cannabis in multifamily housing would impermissibly expand unambiguous
statutory language. Thus, we conclude that section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), does not create
a statutory right to smoke medical cannabis in multifamily housing.
13
B. Minnesota Statutes section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c)
Our interpretation of subdivision 1(b) is reinforced by the text of section 504B.171,
subdivision 1(c), which is specific to the landlord-tenant relationship. The legislature
adopted b oth statut es—section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), and section 504B.17 1,
subdivision 1(c)— at the same time, as part of the same enactment, and for the same
purpose—to clarify an individual’s ability to use and smoke cannabis in housing. See
2023 Minn. Laws ch. 63, art. 1, § 57, at 2777, art. 6, § 55, at 2893 (codified at Minn. Stat.
§§ 342.56, subd. 1(b), 504B.171, subd. 1(c)).
“When two statutes were enacted at the same time and for the same purpose, we
may properly consider both in our effort to understand the plain language of the statute.”
Lykins by Duranske v. Anderson Contracting , Inc., 20 N.W.3d 880, 890 (Minn. 2025)
(quotation omitted); see also State v. Beganovic, 991 N.W.2d 638, 645 (Minn. 2023)
(explaining that the pre-ambiguity whole-statute canon of interpretation applies to two
statutes only when they are enacted at the same time and for the same purpose). Because
the legislature enacted these two statutes at the same time and for the same purpose, “it is
reasonable to assume that all of the provisions inform[ed] the legislators’ understanding of
the text of the statutes.” Lykins, 20 N.W.3d at 891 (quotation omitted).
We therefore turn to section 504B.171, subdivision 1, which generally prohibits
landlords and tenants from allowing unlawful activity on rental property. Subdivision 1(c)
14
also directs that a landlord may not prohibit a tenant’s legal use or possession of certain
cannabis products, except that a landlord may prohibit consumption by smoking:
A landlord cannot prohibit a tenant from legally
possessing, and a tenant cannot waive the right to legally
possess, any cannabis products, lower-potency hemp edibles,
or hemp-derived consumer products, or using any cannabinoid
product or hemp-derived consumer product, other than
consumption by combustion or vaporization of the product and
inhalation of smoke, aerosol, or vapor from the product.

Minn. Stat. § 504B.171, subd. 1(c) (emphasis added).
Berscheid contends that subdivision 1(c) does not expressly refer to a tenant’s use
of medical cannabis, and he appears to imply that the exception does not allow a landlord
to prohibit smoking medical cannabis. He is correct that subdivision 1(c) does not expressly
mention medical cannabis. We therefore briefly consider whether subdivision 1(c)’s
reference to “any cannabinoid product or hemp-derived consumer product” includes either
form of medical cannabis—medical cannabis flower or medical cannabinoid product.7
Statutory definitions guide our analysis. A cannabinoid product “means a cannabis
product, [or] a hemp derived consumer product.” Minn. Stat. § 342.01, subd. 12 (2024)
(emphasis added). But a cannabis product “does not include cannabis flower,” even though

7 “Medical cannabis flower” means cannabis flower provided to “a patient enrolled in the
registry program,” among others, and “does not include adult use cannabis flower.” Minn.
Stat. § 342.01, subd. 54 (2024). “Medical cannabinoid product” means a product that
“consists of or contains cannabis concentrate or hemp concentrate or is infused with
cannabinoids, including but not limited to artificially derived cannabinoids,” and “is
provided to a patient enrolled in the registry program,” among others. Id., subd. 52(a)
(2024). A medical cannabinoid product “must be” in certain enumerated forms and “does
not include adult use cannabis products or hemp derived consumer products.” Id. ,
subd. 52(b)-(c) (2024).
15
it includes “medical cannabinoid products.” Id., subd. 20(b) (2024) (emphasis added).
Also, cannabis flower does not include “hemp derived consumer products.” Id ., subd. 16
(2024). We conclude that neither a cannabinoid product nor a hemp-derived consumer
product include cannabis flower and therefore do not include medical cannabis flower. But
by definition, cannabinoid product includes medical cannabinoid product, and thus,
subdivision 1(c) includes medical cannabinoid product.
Section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), therefore, creates an exception for a landlord to
prohibit a tenant from “consumption by combustion or vaporization of the product and
inhalation of smoke, aerosol, or vapor from the product” with an immediately preceding
reference to “any cannabinoid product. ” The supreme court recently explained, when
interpreting a statute, that “using the word ‘any’ demonstrates an intent to be inclusive, not
restrictive.” In re Welfare of Child of B.D.D., 25 N.W.3d 707, 712 (Minn. 2025) (quotation
omitted). “When used in the affirmative, ‘any’ means ‘every’ or ‘all.’” Id. (quotation
omitted). “Because the term ‘any’ is all-encompassing, we give the word broad application,
regardless of whether we consider the result reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus,
under the plain language of section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), a landlord may prohibit
the smoking of all types of cannabinoid products, including medical cannabinoid
products.8

8 Berscheid states that he does not “believe that the products prohibited from consumption
by combustion or vaporization ” in section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), “are meant to
include medical cannabis flower or medical cannabinoid product.” Berscheid appears to
argue that the legislature intended to grant tenants the right to smoke medical cannabis in
multifamily housing. He relies in part on a MinnPost article that states, “Medical cannabis
users who are registered with the program and have a medical card must be allowed to use
16
Significantly, if we were to interpret the exception in section 342.56,
subdivision 1(b), as providing tenants with a right to smoke medical cannabinoid products
in multifamily housing, then we would render part of section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c),
meaningless. Under Berscheid’s interpretation of section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), the
landlord could prohibit only the smoking of cannabinoid products that are not medical,
which revises and narrows the plain language of section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c).
Instead, we interpret statutes to give effect to all their provisions. See Jackson ,
770 N.W.2d at 496 (stating that appellate courts interpret a statute “as a whole so as to
harmonize and give effect to all its parts, and where possible, no word, phrase, or sentence
will be held superfluous, void, or insignificant” (quotation omitted)). We therefore
conclude that a tenant is not prohibited from smoking medical cannabis in multifamily
housing under section 342.56, subdivision 1(b). But a landlord may prohibit smoking all
types of cannabinoid products, including medical cannabinoid products, as provided in

smokable and vapable cannabis, even in multifamily housing.” Peter Callaghan, Tired of
smelling pot in your apartment building? Minnesota law has your back, unless your
neighbor is medically exempt, MinnPost (July 31, 2024), https://www.minnpost.com/state-
government/2024/07/updated -minnesota -law- bans -smoking- vaping -cannabis -in-
apartments-multifamily-housing/ [https://perma.cc/2B65-ZEF3].
Even if we assume, without deciding, that the MinnPost article is evidence of the
legislature’s intent in passing these statutes, we need not consider legislative intent because
section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), is unambiguous. See Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell
Int’l, Inc., 911 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Minn. 2018) (“Although legislative history can help us
to clarify the Legislature’s intent when a statute’s language is ambiguous, we do not
consider legislative history if the statute’s language is clear on its face.”).

17
section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c). Thus, a tenant has no right to smoke medical cannabis
in multifamily housing.9
In sum, Berscheid did not have a statutory right to smoke medical cannabis in his
apartment and, therefore, his request to At Home for an accommodation to smoke medical
cannabis was not “a good faith attempt to secure or enforce rights” under Minnesota law.
Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 2 (1). We conclude that Berscheid was not entitled to a
retaliation defense as a matter of law.
II. Berscheid is not entitled to a discrimination defense.

“No landlord may refuse to lease to . . . or otherwise penalize a patient or person
enrolled in the registry program . . . solely because the patient or person is enrolled in the

9 Even if we assume that the exception for medical cannabis in section 342.56,
subdivision 1(b), conflicts with a landlord’s ability to prohibit smoking all types of
cannabinoid products in section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), we still conclude that
Berscheid does not have a statutory right to smoke medical cannabis in multifamily
housing.
When there are two conflicting statutes, “the two shall be construed, if possible, so
that effect may be given to both.” Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2024). If the conflict is
irreconcilable, the more specific statute usually controls. Id.; see also Connexus Energy v.
Comm’r of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Minn. 2015) (“The principle of construction
that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of
the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling is well settled.”
(quotation omitted)).
Here, section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), is the more specific statute because “it
deals with the specific topic at issue”—whether a landlord may prohibit smoking cannabis
on leased premises. See Reed v. Westgate Invs., Inc., 8 N.W.3d 651, 654-55 (Minn. App.
2024). Section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), on the other hand, broadly prohibits smoking
cannabis, except for medical cannabis, “in a multifamily housing building.” As the more
specific statute, section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c), prevails over the general language of
section 342.56, subdivision 1(b). Because section 504B.171, subdivision 1(c) , allows
At Home to prohibit smoking of all types of cannabinoid products on the leased premises,
Berscheid does not have a statutory right to smoke medical cannabis in his apartment.
18
registry program,” with few exceptions. Minn. Stat. § 342.57, subd. 3(b) (Supp. 2025); see
also Minn Stat. § 152.32, subd. 3(a) (2024) (providing identical protections for
medical-cannabis patients) (repealed 2025).
Berscheid argues that At Home “discriminated against [him] by refusing to lease to
[him] based on [his] status [as ] a medical cannabis patient.” But Berscheid concedes that
he smoked medical cannabis in his apartment contrary to At Home’s lease provision
prohibiting tenants from smoking cannabis. A lease violation is distinct from Berscheid’s
status as a medical-cannabis patient. The district court explained that Berscheid was “not
prohibited from using medical [cannabis] under the terms of the lease.” (Emphasis added.)
Still, as discussed above, Berscheid did not have a statutory right to smoke medical
cannabis in multifamily housing, and Minnesota law allows At Home to prohibit its tenants
from smoking medical cannabis on the leased premises. See Minn. Stat. §§ 342.56,
subd. 1(b), 504B.171, subd. 1(c). Therefore, At Home lawfully refused to renew
Berscheid’s lease based on his decision to smoke medical cannabis on the leased premises.
Thus, we conclude that Berscheid is not entitled to a discrimination defense as a matter of
law.
III. Remedy
Berscheid argues in the alternative that the “correct punishment in this case” was “a
civil administrative fine of $250 and not eviction as was ordered by the district court.”
Berscheid makes this argument for the first time on appeal, so we may decline to consider
it. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that, generally, appellate
courts review only issues considered by the district court).
19
Even if we consider Berscheid’s argument about a civil administrative fine, it is
unavailing. Berscheid is correct that section 342.56, subdivision 1(b), provides for a $250
civil administrative fine for smoking or vaporizing nonmedical cannabis flower and related
products in multifamily rental housing. But that administrative remedy is unavailable to a
landlord in a landlord-tenant dispute. We understand Berscheid’s argument about the civil
administrative fine to essentially ask us to restrict our focus to section 342.56,
subdivision 1(b), as the applicable law. But we have rejected that position for the reasons
stated in this opinion.
In conclusion, because Berscheid does not dispute that he held over after the date
specified in At Home’s timely termination notice, and because we conclude that
Berscheid’s defenses do not entitle him to relief as a matter of law, we also conclude that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of At Home.
Affirmed.