State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1280

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Clarence Jason Bibbs,
Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-14222

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Matthew D. Hough, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal -Hill,
Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his first-degree assault conviction, arguing that the evidence
supporting the conviction was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict . He also
challenges his sentence. We affirm.
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FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Clarence Jason Bibbs with
attempted second-degree murder, first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and unlawful
possession of a firearm. The state alleged that , on June 22, 2024, Bibbs got into an
argument with the victim and shot him multiple times. The case was tried to a jury.
Although the victim did not fully cooperate with the investigation or testify at trial,
the victim’s mother, KC, did. KC testified that she lived with the victim in an apartment
on the fourth floor of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred . There are 12
apartments on that floor, and there are four elevators in the hallway in the center of the
floor, with two on each side of the hallway, facing each other. A stairwell is located at
each end of the hallway. KC lived at the end of the hallway, and one of the stairwells was
across from her apartment.
KC testified that she used to be in a relationship with Bibbs and that they had a dog
named Luna. Around the time of the shooting, Bibbs was going out of town, and Bibbs
and KC argued because KC did not want to watch Luna. The night before the shooting,
Bibbs went to KC’s apartment and banged on the door, but KC did not answer. The next
day, Bibbs went to KC’s place of employment. He asked KC why she had not responded
to his communications. KC told Bibbs, “I’m allergic to Luna [,] and . . . I don’t want to
have anything to do with you.” Bibbs replied, “[O]h, you[’re] going to watch Luna.”
KC testified that Bibbs went to her apartment later that day, and when she answered
the door, Bibbs “threw” Luna into the apartment and ran down the stairs. KC texted Bibbs
and threatened to take Luna to the dog pound. Around this time, the victim arrived at the
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apartment and asked KC why Luna was there. When KC explained the situation, the victim
was upset that Bibbs had dropped off the dog without permission. In the past, Bibbs and
the victim had occasionally argued with each other, particularly when Bibbs was
disrespectful to KC.
The victim called Bibbs and told him to retrieve the dog. The victim then left the
apartment with the dog, and KC heard the victim and Bibbs arguing in the hallway a few
minutes later. Then KC heard three gun shots. KC stepped into the hallway and saw the
victim running towards her and Bibbs running towards the victim. KC heard Bibbs say,
“[Y]ou ain’t so tough now, n-gg-.” The victim ran down a stairwell, and Bibbs followed
him. KC did not see any shots fired.
The victim collapsed in the lobby of the apartment complex. He was severely
wounded, but he survived the shooting. KC went down the stairwell that the victim and
Bibbs had used, and she spoke to the victim as he lay on the lobby floor. KC testified that
the victim said, “ [T]hat n-gg- shot me.” KC testified that the victim did not have a gun
when he lived with her, she did not see him with a gun on the day of the crime, and she did
not see a gun when she went down the stairwell.
A friend of the victim testified that she was on the phone with the victim when the
shooting occurred, that she heard an argument, and that she did not hear the victim make
any threats. But she testified that she heard the victim say, “if you going to blow then
blow,” which she understood to mean, “[i]f you’re going to shoot then shoot.” Immediately
afterward, she heard gunshots.
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Investigators did not recover a firearm from the victim or the crime scene. But they
recovered three spent cartridge casings and three bullets. A firearms investigator testified
and opined that all three bullets were fired from the same firearm.
The state presented video surveillance footage from the crime scene, which showed
the following sequence of events. First, Bibbs adjusted a gun near his waist before entering
an elevator in the lobby. When the elevator door opened, the victim was standing outside
the elevator door, and Bibbs stepped out of the elevator. The victim turned Luna over to
Bibbs and walked away. Bibbs placed one foot back in the elevator and then motioned
toward the inside of the elevator with his arm . Next, Bibbs pulled his gun from his waist,
stepped out of the elevator, crossed the hall , and entered another elevator . Finally, Bibbs
appeared to fire his gun as he exited the second elevator while moving toward the victim.
Bibbs testified and claimed self-defense. He said that he was a gang member in his
youth, that he believed the victim was also a gang member , and that the victim had
threatened him in the past. On the day in question, he knocked on KC’s door, and when
she answered, Luna ran into the apartment. Bibbs told KC that he was going out of town.
After Bibbs drove away, KC texted him and told him she planned to take Luna to the pound,
so Bibbs returned to retrieve the dog.
Bibbs testified that , around the time he arrived at the apartment complex , he
received a threatening call from the victim, and the victim told Bibbs to come up to KC’s
apartment to get the dog. Bibbs was carrying a gun when he entered the apartment
complex, and he adjusted the weapon near his waist while heading to KC’s apartment .
Bibbs suspected that the victim might also be armed.
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Bibbs testified that when he exited the elevator on KC’s floor, the victim was
“talking crazy to [him].” The victim handed Bibbs the dog, repeatedly insulted him, and
told him not to return to KC’s apartment. Bibb testified that the victim was walking away
and then turned around and that the victim “went for his firearm.” According to Bibbs, he
and the victim then stood with their guns drawn and pointed at each other. Bibbs then
walked across the hallway —with his gun drawn —to the other elevator and ente red it
because “it opened up.” Bibbs testified that he was only a “few feet” from the victim, and
that he observed the victim’s finger touch the trigger of his gun, so he shot at the victim.
Bibbs testified that he got out of the elevator and continued firing at the victim because the
victim “was literally still right there.” Bibbs admitted that he fired his gun three times at
the victim. Bibbs then followed the victim into the stairwell, explaining “[it’s] the exit that
I normally take.” Bibbs then left the scene because he was nervous about the situation, and
he disposed of the gun in a river.
The district court instructed the jury regarding self-defense. The jury found Bibbs
not guilty of attempted second -degree murder, guilty of first -degree assault, guilty of
second-degree assault, and guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm.
Prior to sentencing, the district court received a presentence investigation report
(PSI). The PSI indicated that the presumptive sentence for the first-degree assault was 161
months in prison, with a presumptive sentencing range of 138 -192 months. The district
court entered judgment of conviction for first-degree assault and sentenced Bibbs to serve
192 months in prison for that offense. The district court also entered judgment of
conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and sentenced Bibbs to serve a concurrent
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60-month prison term for that offense. The district court did not enter judgment of
conviction for second-degree assault, concluding that it was a lesser-included offense.
Bibbs appeals.
DECISION
I.
Bibbs contends that his “convictions” for first - and second-degree assault must be
reversed because the evidence was insufficient to disprove his self-defense claim. Because
the district court did not enter judgment of conviction for second -degree assault, we limit
our analysis of Bibb s’s sufficiency challenge to the first-degree assault conviction. See
State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979) (declining to consider a sufficiency
challenge because the district court did not enter judgment of conviction for the challenged
offense).
“In Minnesota, a person may act in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that
force is necessary and uses only the level of force reasonably necessary to prevent the
bodily harm feared.” State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Minn. 2014). The right to
self-defense is codified under Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(3) (2022), which states that a
person may use “reasonable force” if he or she “reasonably believes” that the force is
needed to “resist an offense against the person .” The statute has been read to include the
following elements:
(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the
defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he
or she was in imminent danger of bodily harm; (3) the
existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the
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absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the
danger.

Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258 (quotation omitted). “Once a defendant meets the burden of
going forward with evidence to support a claim of self-defense, the [s]tate bears the burden
to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the four elements.” Id. (quotation
omitted); State v. Radke , 821 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Minn. 2012) ( stating that t he state need
only disprove one of the self-defense elements).
“A finding of guilt can be based on direct or circumstantial evidence. ” State v.
Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn. App. 2022). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence
from which the [fact-finder] can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”
State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). “In contrast, direct
evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true,
proves a fact without inference or presumption.” Id. (quotations omitted).
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a
conviction, we “carefully examine the record to determine whether the facts and the
legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that
the de fendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was
convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the fact -finder
“disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict .” Id. We defer to the jury’s
credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v. Franks ,
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765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State v. Watkins , 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App.
2002).
We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could have
reasonably concluded that the state proved the defendant’s guilt. Bernhardt v. State, 684
N.W.2d 465, 476 -77 (Minn. 2004). But if the state relied on circumstantial evidence to
prove an element of an offense, we apply a heightened standard of review. See Harris, 895
N.W.2d at 601-03 (applying circumstantial -evidence standard to individual element of
criminal offense that was proved by circumstantial evidence) ; State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d
468, 473 (Minn. 2026) (reiterating the “long-standing two -step circumstantial -evidence
test”).
The parties disagree regarding the appropriate standard of review. Bibbs applies
only the heightened circumstantial -evidence standard. The state argues that it disproved
Bibbs’s claim of self -defense with direct evidence , including the surveillance -video
footage. If direct evidence is sufficient to disprove an element of self-defense, an appellate
court need not apply the heighted circumstantial-evidence standard of review. See State v.
Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 -61 (Minn. 2015) (determining that there was sufficient
direct evidence of constructive possession and that, therefore, there was no need to apply
the circumstantial-evidence standard of review). For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that the state disproved the duty-to-retreat element of self-defense.
Again, a valid self-defense claim requires the absence of a reasonable possibility of
retreat to avoid the danger. Devens, 852 N.W.2d at 258 (quotation omitted). Stated
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differently, “a person is required to retreat if reasonably possible before acting in self -
defense.” State v. Valdez, 12 N.W.3d 19 1, 197 (Minn. 2024). A reasonable opportunity
for safe retreat exists if there are “options for escape or avoidance of peril . . . rather than
directly confronting” someone. See State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. 1983).
Here, the surveillance video shows that after Bibbs took Luna from the victim, Bibbs
stepped back into the elevator . But he then got out of the elevator with his gun drawn.
And although Bibbs entered another elevator, he got out of that elevator and moved toward
the victim while firing at him. The surveillance video provided an observation that allowed
the jury to reasonably conclude —without inference or presumption —that Bibbs had a
reasonable opportunity to retreat to avoid the alleged danger.
In sum, the direct evidence was sufficient to disprove one element of Bibbs ’s self-
defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt and, therefore, to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict
on the first-degree-assault charge. We therefore do not disturb the verdict.
II.
Bibbs contends that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
Specifically, Bibbs complains that the district court imposed the longest presumptive
prison sentence allowed under the sentencing guidelines.
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal
offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability
in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). We generally will not interfere with
a sentence that falls within the presumptive range. State v. Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d 10, 14
(Minn. 2015). However, a district court’s sentencing po wer “is not absolute.” Id. We
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retain the ability “to determine whether the sentence is inconsistent with statutory
requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably disparate, or not
warranted by the findings of fact issued by the district court.” Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd.
2(b) (2022).
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.
Kangbateh, 868 N.W.2d at 14. A district court abuses its discretion by basing its decision
on an erroneous view of the law, making a decision that is against logic and the facts in the
record, or exercising its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Crow v. State, 923
N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 2019).
In sentencing Bibbs for first-degree assault, the district court explained its reasoning
as follows:
In determining what sentence to give in that matter, I do think
it’s appropriate to review your criminal history which includes
a felony drug offense in 1999, a felony drug offense in 2002,
two charges of felony burglary in 2005 and 2007, felony
aggravated battery in 2012, possession of first-degree drugs in
2016, prohibited person in possession of a firearm in 2016, and
a third-degree assault conviction in 2023. That’s a significant
criminal history. Some of those offenses are violent.

You were on parole and on probation at the time of this
offense. The victim in this matter did suffer extensive injuries
as noted by the state, and the shooting did occur in an occupied
building. For those reasons, Mr. Bibbs, I do think it’s
appropriate to sentence you to the higher end of the guideline
sentence box.

Bibbs argues that the district court should not have considered the “two charges” in
2005 and 2007 because “[n]either charge resulted in a conviction.” Bibbs also argues that
the district court should not have considered his “decayed” convictions, his custody status,
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or the victim’s injuries when selecting a sentence within the presumptive range . As
support, Bibbs relies on caselaw that governs sentencing departures. Because the district
court imposed a presumptive sentence in this case, such caselaw is inapplicable.
The record shows that the district court heard arguments from counsel and
considered all the information presented, including the information in the PSI, before
imposing a sentence within the presumptive range. If the record shows that the district
court carefully considered and evaluated the testimony and information presented to it, we
“may not interfere” with its imposition of a presumptive sentence. State v. Van Ruler, 378
N.W.2d 77, 80 -81 (Minn. App. 1985). In addition, the district court explained the
presumptive sentence that it selected even though —as Bibbs acknowledges—the district
court was not required to provide any reason for imposing a sentence within the
presumptive range. State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
In sum, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s imposition of a
presumptive sentence for Bibbs’s first-degree assault conviction.
Affirmed.