State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1304

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

John Warren Harris,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2026
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-20-414

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Erik I. Withall, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this second appeal after a remand from this court for resentencing, appellant
challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by including a Florida felony
conviction in calculating his criminal-history score. Appellant contends that his previous
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felony conviction under a Florida statute is not equivalent to a felony under Minnesota law
because “(1) the Florida great-bodily-harm element is broader than substantial bodily harm
in Minnesota” and (2) the facts underlying his Florida conviction “do not describe
substantial bodily harm in Minnesota.” Appellant maintains that his Florida conviction
should be considered a gross misdemeanor to determine his criminal-history score. We
affirm.
FACTS
Appellant John Warren Harris was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (Supp. 2019), and felony domestic assault under
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242 , subd. 4 (2018), for offenses he committed in January 2020. 1 For
the criminal-sexual-conduct conviction, the district court sentenced Harris to 216 months
in prison. The district court relied, in part, on Harris’s criminal-history score of three, which
included one misdemeanor point, one point for a Florida felony conviction from a 2014
battery offense, and one point for Harris’s felony domestic-assault conviction from the
January 2020 incident.2
Harris appealed. We affirmed in part as to Harris’s convictions. State v. Harris,
No. A23-1708, 2024 WL 4927648, at *2-6 (Minn. App. Dec. 2, 2024). But as to Harris’s
sentence, we reversed in part after determining that respondent State of Minnesota “did not

1 Harris also was found guilty of four additional counts for which no sentence was imposed.

2 Harris’s misdemeanor point also stemmed from an out-of -state conviction. On remand,
the state presented evidence of Harris’s Florida misdemeanor conviction and the district
court assigned one point, which was used in Harris’s criminal -history score. On appeal,
Harris does not challenge the misdemeanor point in his criminal-history score.
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put into evidence any proof regarding [Harris’s] Florida convictions.” Id. at *6. We
remanded for resentencing and allowed the state “to further develop the sentencing record”
on Harris’s out-of-state conviction. Id. (quotation omitted).
On remand, the state introduced certified copies of judgments related to two Florida
felony battery convictions. The judgments stated that Harris entered guilty pleas to two
felony battery offenses for which he was sentenced.
Following argument by the parties at the resentencing hearing, the district court
determined that the second Florida battery conviction, arising out of a 2014 offense, was
“a felony level conviction in Minnesota, both because of the [offense] definition and also
the sentence.” The district court assigned one point for the Florida felony battery
conviction, which, when added to the other two points mentioned above, yielded a total
criminal-history score of three. The district court resentenced Harris to 216 months in
prison.
Harris appeals.
DECISION
Harris contends that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence
based, in part, on a criminal-history score that included one point for Harris’s Florida
felony battery conviction. Appellate courts generally review a district court’s
determination of a defendant’s criminal-history score for abuse of discretion. State v.
Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d 856, 860 (Minn. App. 2025). Our deferential review also applies to
criminal-history-score challenges based on out-of-state convictions. State v. Edwards,
900 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d mem., 909 N.W.2d 594 (Minn. 2018).
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The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines set presumptive sentences for felony
convictions using two factors—the severity of the offense and a convicted defendant’s
criminal-history score. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2, 2.C.1 (Supp. 2019). “A defendant’ s
criminal-history score is calculated, in part, by allotting ‘points’ for each of a defendant’s
prior convictions for which a felony sentence was imposed.” State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d
514, 521 (Minn. 2009). “The state has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to justify consideration of out-of- state convictions in
determining a defendant’s criminal history score.” State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349, 355
(Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2008). “The state also
has the burden to establish the proper classification of a prior offense for inclusion in a
criminal-history score.” State v. Strobel, 921 N.W.2d 563, 574 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d,
932 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 2019).
The guidelines provide that a district court “must make the final determination as to
whether and how a prior non-Minnesota conviction should be counted in the criminal
history score.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.a. “An offense may be counted as a felony
only if” two requirements are satisfied: (1) the offense would be “defined as a felony in
Minnesota” (felony-definition requirement), and (2) “the offender received a sentence that
in Minnesota would be a felony-level sentence” (felony-sentence requirement). Minn.
Sent’g Guidelines 2. B.5.b. The district court “does not have discretion to assign
prior-felony points for a prior non-Minnesota offense unless both requirements are
satisfied.” Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d at 860.
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The parties agree that the felony-sentence requirement is satisfied by Harris’s
24-month sentence for his Florida felony battery conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02,
subd. 2 (2024) (defining “felony” as “a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment for
one year or more may be imposed”).
But Harris contends that the felony-definition requirement—whether Harris’s
Florida felony battery offense would be “defined as a felony in Minnesota” —is not
satisfied. See Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d at 862. In analyzing the felony-definition requirement, the
guidelines direct us to “[f]ind the equivalent Minnesota offense based on the elements of
the prior non-Minnesota offense.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b (emphasis added).
Harris was convicted under the Florida felony battery statute, which provides:
“(1) A person commits felony battery if he or she: (a) Actually and intentionally touches
or strikes another person against the will of the other; and (b) Causes great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.” Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) (2024)
(emphasis added).3 This opinion refers to (b) as the harm element. Harris argues that the
harm element of the Florida felony battery statute is equivalent to the harm element of
Minnesota’s misdemeanor fifth-degree assault statute.
The district court compared Florida’s felony battery statute and Minnesota’s
first-degree assault statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2024), which requires, like the
Florida felony battery statute, “great bodily harm,” among other harms. The district court

3 When calculating a criminal-history score, prior offenses are classified “using the law in
effect at the time of sentencing on the current offense, not the law in effect when the prior
offense was committed.” State v. Morgan, 968 N.W.2d 25, 27 n.1 (Minn. 2021).
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reasoned that, because great bodily harm is “often associated” with first-degree assault in
Minnesota, the Florida felony battery offense “certainly could meet” the felony-definition
requirement. The district court also stated that “[w]hatever Mr. Harris indicated in his plea
colloquy” for the Florida felony battery offense “met the definition of great bodily harm,
permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”
After the district court concluded that the felony-definition requirement was met,
the district court assigned one criminal-history point for Harris’s Florida felony battery
conviction, which is appropriate for a third-degree assault conviction under Minnesota law.
See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.1.b (providing the “weight assigned to each prior felony
sentence according to its severity level”). In doing so, the district court relied on the rule
of lenity. See State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 440 (Minn. 2017) (stating that the
rule of lenity “directs courts to favor a more lenient interpretation of a criminal statute”
(quotation omitted)). Because the district court’s application of the rule of lenity favors
Harris and is not challenged on appeal, we need not consider this aspect of the district
court’s decision.
We agree with the district court that the felony-definition requirement is satisfied
for Harris’s Florida felony battery offense. The Florida felony battery statute requires
“great bodily harm.” Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1)(b). Minnesota’s first-degree assault statute also
requires a harm element and uses the same language: “Whoever assaults another and
inflicts great bodily harm” may be punished for first-degree assault. Minn. Stat. § 609.221,
subd. 1.
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Florida statutes do not define “great bodily harm.” But the Florida felony battery
statute’s harm element also includes “permanent disability” and “permanent
disfigurement.” Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1)(b). These phrases are analogous to language in
Minnesota’s statutory definition of great bodily harm, which includes “serious permanent
disfigurement” and “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2024).
Because the statutory language defining the harm element of the Florida felony
battery offense is equivalent to the harm element in Minnesota’s first-degree assault statute,
we conclude that Harris’s Florida felony battery conviction satisfies the felony-definition
requirement for calculating his criminal-history score in Minnesota. See Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d
at 861-62 (determining that “identical” language in Minnesota and federal statutes
established equivalence between two offenses for a criminal-history score calculation).
We also consider Florida’s misdemeanor battery statute—which requires ordinary
“bodily harm”—and conclude that it supports our conclusion that Florida felony battery is
equivalent to Minnesota first-degree assault. Florida statutes provide that misdemeanor
battery occurs when, among other things, a person “[i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to
another person.” Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(2) (2024). Like Florida battery statutes,
Minnesota assault statutes require more than “bodily harm” for a felony offense. Compare
Minn. Stat. § 609. 224, subd.1 (2) (2024) (defining fifth-degree assault and providing
misdemeanor punishment for a defendant who “intentionally inflicts . . . bodily harm”),
with Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (defining first-degree assault and providing felony
punishment for a defendant who “assaults another and inflicts great bodily harm”).
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In short, based on our analysis of the Florida felony battery statute under which
Harris was convicted, the Florida felony battery offense is equivalent to an offense under
Minnesota’s first-degree assault statute. Because the felony-sentence and felony-definition
requirements are satisfied for Harris’s Florida felony battery conviction, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion by including Harris’s prior Florida felony
battery conviction as a felony point when calculating Harris’s criminal-history score.
Harris argues otherwise for two reasons. First, he contends that the harm element is
equivalent to Minnesota’s misdemeanor assault statute. Second, Harris maintains that his
criminal-history score is incorrect because his Florida felony battery conviction did not
“necessarily prove” a felony under Minnesota law.
Starting with Harris’s first reason, we consider Harris’s arguments for concluding
that his Florida felony battery offense is equivalent to a misdemeanor fifth-degree assault
in Minnesota. First, Harris contends that the harm element in Florida’s felony battery
statute is “so broad, it includes injuries that fall under ordinary bodily harm in Minnesota”
and “seems to include a range of injuries from life-threatening to anything more than a
mere bruise.” We reject this argument because it ignores the language of the Florida felony
battery statute, which requires “great bodily harm.” Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1)(b) (emphasis
added). Harris’s argument also does not consider Florida’s misdemeanor battery statute,
which punishes batteries that cause “bodily harm,” as does Minnesota’s fifth-degree assault
statute. Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)(2); Minn. Stat. § 609.224, subd.1 (2).
Second, pointing to the district court’s reference to the rule of lenity and
Minnesota’s third-degree assault statute, Harris argues that “great bodily harm” in the
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Florida felony battery statute excludes the harm required by Minnesota’s third-degree
assault statute. 4 Harris maintains that the “ district court found that the Minnesota
equivalent offense” to his Florida felony battery offense “was third-degree assault based
on its interpretation of Florida’s great bodily harm element in conjunction with the facts
alleged in the Florida charging affidavit.”
This is not our reading of the district court’s conclusion. The district court
determined that the language of the Florida felony battery statute was “very similar” to
Minnesota’s first-degree assault statute, which tracks our conclusion that the two statutes
are equivalent for the felony-definition requirement. And the district court analyzed the
felony-definition requirement by referencing Harris’s plea testimony on the elements of
the Florida felony battery statute. The district court concluded that Harris’s guilty “plea
met the definition of great bodily harm” under the Florida statute.
Harris also argues that the statutory definition of “substantial bodily harm”—the
harm element in Minnesota’s third- degree assault statute —“does not bear a catch-all
clause” and thus requires proof of the injuries enumerated in the statute. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.223, subd. 1. This argument is unconvincing. The relevant harm element for our
analysis is “great bodily harm,” not “substantial bodily harm.” Both Minnesota’s

4 The Minnesota third-degree assault statute provides felony punishment for a person who
“assaults another and inflicts substantial bodily harm.” Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1
(2024). “Substantial bodily harm” is defined as “bodily injury which involves a temporary
but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of
any bodily member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7a (2024).
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first-degree assault statute and Florida’s felony battery statute require “great bodily harm.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1; Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1)(b).
Third, Harris contends that facts underlying his Florida felony battery conviction
fall short of the harm element for a Minnesota first-degree assault conviction. But Harris
recognizes, as we have noted, that the felony-definition requirement turns on the statutory
elements of the Florida felony battery statute, not the facts of Harris’s Florida felony battery
offense. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.5.b.; see also Pruitt, 16 N.W.3d at 862-63 (rejecting
the state’s argument that a reviewing court should consider the “nature of the offense”
when analyzing the felony-definition requirement). Thus, we do not consider the parties’
arguments about the facts underlying Harris’s Florida felony battery conviction.
Alternatively, Harris asks this court to adopt the “necessarily-proven” approach
used in State v. Martin to decide whether Harris’s Florida felony battery offense meets the
felony-definition requirement. 941 N.W.2d 119, 125-26 (Minn. 2020). In Martin, the
supreme court analyzed whether Martin’s prior California conviction triggered
predatory-offender registration requirements under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(b)(1)
(2012). Id. at 122-26. The supreme court observed that subdivision 1b(b)(1) provided for
registration when a non-Minnesota conviction “would be a violation” under Minnesota law.
Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
The supreme court concluded that, under subdivision 1b(b)(1), an out-of- state
conviction would require registration only “if proving the elements of the out -of-state
offense would necessarily prove a violation” of a Minnesota law that requires registration.
Id. (emphasis added). On the other hand, “if the elements of the out-of-state offense could
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be proven without proving a violation of Minnesota law, then the out-of-state conviction
would not be a violation of a Minnesota offense requiring registration.” Id.
We are not persuaded by Harris’s argument that the necessarily-proven approach
stated in Martin should apply here . Martin did not involve the calculation of a
criminal-history score. Id. at 122-26. And the supreme court has not applied the
necessarily-proven approach in its own review of a district court’s calculation of a
criminal-history score. We decline to extend the necessarily-proven approach to
criminal-history scores.
Finally, we acknowledge, but need not consider, the parties’ arguments about
Florida caselaw interpreting “great bodily harm” as used in the Florida felony battery
statute. Neither party cites authority directing us to consider non-Minnesota caselaw when
analyzing the felony-definition requirement for a prior out-of-state conviction. We
therefore decline to do so.
In sum, because the harm element of the Florida felony battery statute is equivalent
to the harm element of Minnesota’s first-degree assault statute, we conclude that Harris’s
prior Florida felony battery offense meets the felony-definition requirement. Because
Harris’s Florida felony battery conviction also satisfies the felony-sentence requirement,
the district court did not abuse its discretion by including the Florida felony battery
conviction in Harris’s criminal-history score. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by assigning one prior-felony point to Harris’s criminal -history score for his
Florida felony battery conviction.
Affirmed.