GEP XI Maple Grove LLC, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1311

GEP XI Maple Grove LLC,
Respondent,

vs.

Dofa Liban Mohamed,
Appellant,

Adna Ahmed, et al.,
Defendants.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-HC-25-4661

Christopher Kalla, Douglass E. Turner, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Dofa Mohamed, Maple Grove, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant tenant challenges the district court’s entry of an eviction judgment in
favor of respondent landlord. Because we discern no error by the district court, we affirm.
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FACTS
This appeal arises from an eviction judgment in favor of respondent landlord, GEP
XI Maple Grove LLC, and against appellant tenant, Dofa Liban Mohamed. The following
facts are drawn from the district court’s order following a court trial.
Mohamed rented a townhome from landlord at a townhome community. The parties
had a written, signed lease. The lease includes a provision prohibiting tenants from
engaging in activities that disturb or threaten the rights, comfort, health, safety, or
convenience of other tenants. The lease also provides that it is the responsibility of tenants
not to unreasonably disturb the peace and quiet of others. And the lease states that residents
shall not engage in any illegal or criminal activity on the property.
On April 27, 2025, after midnight, Mohamed entered a nearby townhome where
N.A. resided. N.A. was asleep on the living room floor with her child when she awoke to
find Mohamed in her kitchen. N.A. did not know Mohamed and did not give Mohamed
permission to be in her townhome. According to N.A., when she tried to speak to
Mohamed, Mohamed slapped N.A. across the face, informed N.A. that she was tired, and
then fell asleep in N.A.’s living room. Although N.A. was not injured by the slap, she was
concerned for her safety. N.A. did not want to escalate the situation and N.A.’s child called
the police.
A police officer responded to the emergency call about a possible burglary. N.A.
confirmed to police that she did not know Mohamed. The officer smelled alcohol on
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Mohamed and determined that she was under the influence. The officer arrested Mohamed
for first-degree burglary based on the assault and entry without consent. 1
Following a report of the incident to the landlord’s leasing manager , the landlord
commenced an eviction action against Mohamed alleging that she violated the lease by
engaging in illegal activity and endangering the safety of others. The complaint asserted
two causes of action, seeking to evict Mohamed for breaching the lease. The landlord
sought judgment against Mohamed, an order for possession of the property, and a writ of
recovery.
The district court held a one-day bench trial at which the district court heard
testimony from N.A., the responding police officer, the leasing manager, and Mohamed.
Both N.A. and Mohamed testified with the assistance of a language interpreter. The district
court received several exhibits into the record, including the lease. Mohamed was
represented by an attorney at trial.
N.A., the responding police officer, and the leasing manager all testified in a manner
consistent with the above facts. The district court found these witnesses to be credible.
In her testimony, Mohamed did not deny entering N.A.’s townhome. Instead, she
testified that she mistook N.A.’s townhome for her own townhome. She explained that,
earlier that night, she went to a man’s house for a date and that he gave her a drink. She
thought the drink was juice, but it likely contained alcohol. When asked whether she drank
alcohol prior to that evening, she had varying responses. According to Mohamed, the man

1 Mohamed was later charged with first-degree burglary for this offense.
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later brought her back to the townhouse community and dropped her off in front of a
building. Mohamed testified that she thought she entered her own townhome and did not
intentionally go into N.A.’s townhome. She also did not recall slapping N.A. The district
court did not find Mohamed’s testimony to be consistent or credible.
Following trial, the district court determined the landlord met its burden to prove
that Mohamed committed a material breach of the lease supporting eviction under count
two.2 The district court found that Mohamed breached the lease “by entering another
tenant’s residence without permission and committing an assault .” The district court
rejected Mohamed’s explanation that she was confused, stating that: “This [c]ourt does not
find intoxication and confusion due to intoxication a viable defense for entering another
resident’s home and committing an assault.” And while the district court acknowledged
that N.A. was not injured, the district court reasoned it “[did] not change the fact that an
assault was committed and there was a violation of [N.A.’s] safety and right to feel secure
in her home.” The district court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the landlord
for the recovery of the premises. Mohamed filed a request to vacate the judgment and grant
a new trial, which was denied.
Mohamed appeals.

2 The district court determined that the landlord failed to prove Mohamed committed a
breach to support eviction under count one.
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DECISION
Mohamed challenges the district court’s eviction judgment. She raises two
arguments on appeal in a two-page letter brief. First, Mohamed contends she did not breach
the lease. Second, she asserts that complications during trial—including a language barrier
and technical issues — prevented the district court from hearing all relevant evidence and
limited her ability fully to present her case. We address each argument in turn but, before
doing so, we provide a general overview of legal standards applicable to this appeal.
“[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively
before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who
relies upon it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464- 65 (Minn. 1944). We may
decline to address inadequately briefed questions. State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz
Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997).
Further, “[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for [self-represented]
litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that [they] are generally held to the same
standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald ,
629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001). Self-represented litigants must support their
claims with “either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla ,
755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) . An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere
assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is forfeited “unless prejudicial error
is obvious on mere inspection.” Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co.,
187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
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I. The district court did not err by finding that Mohamed breached the lease
and entering an eviction judgment in favor of the landlord.

Mohamed argues that she “disagree[s] with the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s decision.” She
claims that she has “not violated the lease in any way that would justify an eviction.” And
she further denies “engag[ing] in any behavior that would create a nuisance, danger, or
disturbance to others.” Mohamed argues that her eviction “is not supported.” We construe
this as a challenge to the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the
reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded.
An eviction action “is a summary proceeding through which an occupant may be
removed from possession of real property by the process of law.” Nationwide Hous.
Corp. v. Skoglund, 906 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2018); see also Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2024). A landlord may seek to evict a
tenant upon the tenant’s violation of a material provision of a lease agreement.
Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Minn. App. 1985),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986). The materiality of a breach is a question of fact.
Cloverdale Foods of Minn., Inc. v. Pioneer Snacks, 580 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Minn. App. 1998).
A reviewing court determines whether the evidence sustains the district court’s findings of
fact and whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Minneapolis Pub. Hous.
Auth. v. Greene, 463 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Minn. App. 1990). We review the district court’s
legal conclusions de novo, and we will uphold the district court’s factual findings unless
they are clearly erroneous. Nationwide Hous., 906 N.W.2d at 907. Appellate courts will
not conclude that a clear error occurred “unless, on the entire evidence, [we] are left with
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a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” NY Props., LLC v.
Schuette, 977 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Minn. App. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Here, the lease prohibits residents from “behaving in a loud or obnoxious manner,”
“disturbing or threatening the rights, comfort, health, safety, or convenience” of other
tenants, or “engaging in or threatening violence.” It also provides that residents may “not
unreasonably disturb the peace and quiet of others.” Residents may not engage “in any
illegal or criminal activity on the grounds of the premises,” including any breach of the
lease that “jeopardizes the health, safety, and welfare” of other residents. Any violation
“constitutes a material violation of the parties’ lease contract and good cause for
termination of tenancy.” Further, “[a] single violation shall be good cause” for terminating
a resident’s lease.
The landlord sought to evict Mohamed for violating the lease by engaging in illegal
activity and endangering the safety of others. The district court found that Mohamed
materially breached the lease “by entering another tenant’s residence without permission
and committing an assault.” The district court found the testimony presented by N.A., the
police officer, and the leasing manager to be credible. And it found that Mohamed’s
testimony was not “consistent or credible. ” Based on its findings and credibility
determinations, the district court concluded that the landlord met its burden of
demonstrating that Mohamed committed a material breach of the lease justifying eviction
under count two of the complaint.
The record supports the district court’s findings. N.A. testified that she was sleeping
in her townhome with her child when Mohamed entered the townhome. N.A. did not know
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Mohamed. According to N.A.’s testimony, which the district court found credible,
Mohamed slapped N.A. across the face, which caused N.A. to be worried about her safety.
See Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (noting that appellate courts
defer to a district court’s credibility determinations). The responding police officer
testified that N.A. seemed “afraid or scared,” and that N.A.’s child showed “the same level
of fear or concern” as N.A. On this record, the district court found that Mohamed
committed a material breach of her lease. And while Mohamed disagrees with the district
court’s decision, a party’s disagreement with a district court’s findings and credibility
determinations does not, without more, render that decision erroneous. See, e.g., Am. Bank
of St. Paul v. City of Minneapolis, 802 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. App. 2011). We therefore
determine that the evidence sustains the district court’s findings of fact. Further, the district
court’s factual findings support its legal conclusion that Mohamed materially breached the
lease. Thus, we discern no error in the district court’s eviction order.
II. Mohamed’s remaining arguments are forfeited.
Mohamed argues the district court “was unable to hear all relevant evidence due to
[a] language barrier and poor interpretation and technology difficulties throughout the
hearing” and that “[t]hese issues prevented [her] from fully explaining the situation and
presenting [her] case accurately.” Mohamed does not provide any evidentiary support for
her argument that a language barrier or technological difficulties affected the district
court’s ability to hear or understand the testimony at trial. And we discern no prejudicial
error on inspection of the record. We therefore deem these arguments forfeited.
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First, the trial transcript reflect s that there were two language interpreters at trial
who assisted Mohamed and N.A. The district court gave both interpreters an oath to
accurately translate the proceedings, and we presume the interpreters followed the court’s
instruction. See State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1982) (noting that
appellate courts “cannot presume . . . that the interpreter did not adequately interpret the
trial”). The appellant bears the burden of showing that a translation was inadequate. Id.
Because Mohamed does not show a basis on which to conclude that the translation was
inadequate, we conclude this argument is forfeited. See Schoepke, 187 N.W.2d at 135
(noting that unsupported assertions are forfeited).
Second, Mohamed has not presented any evidence of technological problems. “[I]n
a civil case, a party forfeits arguments on appeal based on any technological problem they
experience during a virtual proceeding before a district court when evidence of that issue
does not appear in the record and the party failed to correct or supplement the record.”
Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Minn. App. 2022). Mohamed’s trial occurred using
remote meeting technology. But Mohamed points to no evidence in the record that the
court experienced technological problems, nor is there evidence that Mohamed raised her
concerns with the district court. We therefore consider this issue forfeited. Id.
Affirmed.