Troy Fischer v. Bruce G Karevold, et al

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1360

Troy Fischer,
Appellant,

vs.

Bruce G Karevold, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed March 30, 2026
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CV-24-2657

Michelle E. Weinberg, Larry M. Wertheim, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant)

David C. Piper, Andrew D. Cook, Ohnstad Twichell, P.C., West Fargo, North Dakota (for
respondents)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Appellant-purchaser argues that the district court erred by determining that
respondent-sellers terminated their contract for deed with appellant, claiming that

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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respondents waived any right to terminate by accepting payments from appellant after
serving the statutory notice of termination. We affirm.
FACTS
In November 2017, appellant Troy Fischer and respondents Bruce G Karevold and
Jolene M. Karevold entered into a contract for deed (the contract). The Karevolds agreed
to sell property to Fischer for $160,000 and provide financing. The contract included a
balloon payment due on November 30, 2018. Fischer retained an option to renew the
contract for 12 months, requiring a final balloon payment on December 1, 2019.
Fischer tendered all monthly payments in 2018. He then extended the contract.
Although Fischer made the monthly payments in 2019, he did not tender the final balloon
payment. Thereafter, Fischer continued to live on the property. The Karevolds continued
to accept monthly payments from Fischer, believing that they were rent payments.
Upon learning that they were required to formally terminate the contract, the
Karevolds initiated legal action. On June 1, 2024, Fischer was served with notice of
termination of the contract, describing the default as “failure to make installment payments
totaling $134,907.40.” Fischer was notified that the contract would terminate 60 days after
service of the notice. After he was served with the notice, Fischer delivered monthly
payments on June 1 and July 1, 2024. The Karevolds accepted the payments.
On July 29, 2024, Fischer sued the Karevolds, alleging that they breached the
contract because he “made all payments due under the [c]ontract . . . as subsequently
modified by the parties.” The same day, Fischer moved for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to prevent the Karevolds from terminating the contract. Fischer asserted in his
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memorandum of law in support of the TRO motion that, by accepting the payments after
service of the notice, the Karevolds waived any right to terminate the contract.
On August 1, 2024, the district court granted the motion for a TRO . The district
court ordered: “The parties are temporarily restrained from terminating the Contract for
Deed . . . or taking any further action, until a hearing can be held on [Fischer]’s motions.”
The TRO was vacated on April 15, 2025.
On September 30, 2024, the Karevolds filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging
that Fischer breached the contract because he failed to tender the balloon payment.
The district court held a court trial to address which party breached the contract.
Bruce Karevold testified that the parties never agreed to modify the contract. He also
testified that it would have been “wonderful” if Fischer had tendered a cashier’s check, but
Fischer never provided proof that he was able to cure the default. Fischer testified that he
believed that the contract continued on a yearly basis and the Karevolds could not
“suddenly ask for a balloon payment, in the middle of a term.” He also testified that he
was unable to make the payment during the cure period.
On July 2, 2025, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Karevolds ,
determining that Fischer did not make the balloon payment as required by the contract.
The district court determined that, although Fischer insisted that he had the ability to cure
because the TRO extended his 60- day deadline, the TRO actually allowed Fischer an
opportunity to present evidence regarding his attempts to cure and his financial ability to
satisfy the terms of the contract. The district court found that Fischer never showed that
he was able to cure the default. The district court determined that the contract was
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terminated, granted the Karevolds’ counterclaim for breach of contract, and ordered
Fischer to vacate the property. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Fischer argues that the Karevolds’ acceptance of his two payments during the
statutory 60-day cure period constitutes a waiver of the termination. See
Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a (2024) (providing that seller may terminate contract by
serving notice specifying default conditions and stating that contract will terminate 60 days
after service of notice unless purchaser cures). Fischer admits, however, that this argument
was not raised at trial. The Karevolds argue that, because Fischer did not present this
argument to the district court, we should decline to consider it. See Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating reviewing court must generally consider only
issues that were presented to and considered by district court). We agree.
Fischer raised the waiver argument in his motion for a TRO. But he is not appealing
from the TRO. Fischer claims that an exception to Thiele should apply because the
argument appears in the record and we can address it “in the interests of justice.”
See Blakey v. Jones, 997 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Minn. 2023) (stating that generally litigants are
bound by theories presented below, but an appellate court has authority to review any
action “as the interest of justice may require”). However, there is no dispute that Fischer
did not tender the balloon payment as required by the contract. And he also failed to present
any evidence that he was able to cure the default at any point during the pendency of the
matter. We do not agree that the interests of justice require us to deviate from Thiele and
consider this argument. Because Fischer did not raise this argument and allow the district
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court an opportunity to rule on it when deciding the merits of the dispute, we decline to
consider it.1
Fischer also argues that the district court improperly interfered with his statutory
right to cure by issuing a TRO that prevented the parties from taking any action. The TRO
“temporarily restrained [the parties] from terminating the Contract for Deed . . . or taking
any further action, until a hearing.” Fischer apparently believes that the taking-any-further-
action language in the TRO that he requested precluded him from curing the default. But
the TRO was not in effect during the 60-day cure period (notice was served on June 1,
2024, and the TRO was entered on August 1, 2024). As the district court stated, the TRO
allowed Fischer the opportunity to present evidence regarding his attempts to cure and his
financial ability to satisfy the terms of the contract. But Fischer admitted at trial that he
was unable to make the full payment during the cure period. And Bruce Karevold testified
that Fischer’s payment would have been accepted had Fischer tendered it. The district
court’s language in the TRO did not prevent Fischer from curing the default.
Fischer has not demonstrated that the district court erred in determining that the
contract was terminated.
Affirmed.

1 The Karevolds argue that we can affirm the district court’s judicial determination of
termination that was entered when the district court granted their breach-of-contract
counterclaim. We need not address this claim, however, having decided that Fischer
forfeited his waiver argument on appeal.