Maryam Yusuf Ahmed, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1362

Maryam Yusuf Ahmed,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed April 6, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-25-3592

Peter Lindstrom, Subzero Criminal Defense, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kristyn M. Anderson, Minneapolis City Attorney, Caleb A. Johnson, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Ede, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court’s
order suppressing evidence and dismissing charges of driving while impaired (DWI). The
state argues that the district court erred by concluding that a law enforcement officer lacked
reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a DWI investigation after stopping respondent
2
Maryam Yusuf Ahmed. Because the officer reasonably suspected impaired driving, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings after an evidentiary
hearing as well as other evidence relevant to the issue on appeal.
At about 2:30 a.m. on February 10, 2025, a Minneapolis police officer was parked
in a marked squad car near the intersection of Lake Street and Lyndale Avenue in
Minneapolis. The officer saw a blue sport utility vehicle (SUV) driving east on Lake Street
toward the intersection with its headlights off.
The officer followed the SUV. The SUV “got into the left turn lane, signaled, and
turned left onto Lyndale Avenue.” The officer turned on his emergency lights, but the SUV
“continued driving for approximately another block.” The officer “sped up to catch up
with” the SUV and “turned on his sirens.” The SUV “quickly pulled over without signaling
near the intersection of Lyndale and 28th Street.” The SUV “never veered out of its
designated lane or violated other traffic laws beyond the lack of headlights.”
The officer approached the driver’s window and saw the driver, later identified as
Ahmed, alone in the SUV. As they spoke through the open window, the officer did not
detect the odor of an alcoholic beverage or observe “any signs of impairment” in Ahmed’s
eyes. The district court’s order noted the officer testified that “there was a very strong
perfume scent emanating from” inside the SUV and that he knew perfume could be used
to mask the odor of alcohol. The officer asked Ahmed for her driver’s license and proof of
insurance. While retrieving her driver’s license, Ahmed fumbled and dropped a credit card.
3
The officer asked Ahmed where she was coming from. Ahmed replied, “Where am
I coming from?” and identified a “bar or nightclub” that the officer knew was five blocks
away from where he first saw Ahmed’s SUV. The officer asked Ahmed if she had anything
to drink that night. S he replied, “[N]o, I don’t drink, so . . . I just took my anxiety pill.”
Ahmed added that she had “anxiety about being pulled over by the police.” The officer
inspected Ahmed’s license and asked her why she had a limited license. Ahmed replied
that she had a DWI offense. When the officer asked if the DWI was alcohol- or
drug-related, Ahmed replied, “It was alcohol for my first time. I’ve never drank alcohol
before, and it was that.” The officer testified that Ahmed’s limited license restriction “had
expired at the time of the stop.”
The officer again asked Ahmed if she had anything to drink. Ahmed replied, “I got
my anxiety pill right when you pulled over.” The officer responded, “Well, your anxiety
pill wouldn’t make you drive with your lights on. Or off, rather.” Ahmed replied, “No,
they’re off because—” and the officer interrupted her to ask, “What was that you just put
down? Was that a pill?” Ahmed said that it was gum and held a wad of chewed gum in her
hand. The officer told Ahmed that sometimes people chew gum to mask the odor of
alcohol. Ahmed responded, “[O] h no, I have not been drinking. And I’m saying this
because I took an anxiety pill because I saw headlights and I pulled over. But you can —
whatever you want to do I will respect it.”
The officer asked Ahmed if she would submit to a preliminary breath test (PBT),
and she agreed to do so. Ahmed’s PBT sample showed an alcohol concentration of 0.20.
4
The officer arrested Ahmed for DWI, and the state charged her with two counts of
second-degree DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1), (5) (2024).
Ahmed moved to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges, arguing that the
officer did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion “to support expanding the stop into a
[DWI] investigation.” At a July 2025 evidentiary hearing, the district court received
recordings from the officer’s body-worn camera and squad-car camera. The officer
testified to the events summarized above. The officer also testified that he asked Ahmed to
take a PBT “because her headlights were off, she did not immediately pull over, she was
chewing gum, the car smelled strongly of perfume, she was coming from a bar, and she
had a limited license restriction because of a prior DWI.” And the officer testified that,
when he turned on his siren, Ahmed “just abruptly moved to the right and stopped,” which
“wasn’t normal” driving conduct.
The district court granted Ahmed’s motion to suppress. It found that Ahmed was
“speaking in a normal, if nervous, manner throughout her interaction with” the officer. The
district court also found that Ahmed removed chewing gum from her mouth while she
continued to speak with the officer, which “weakens the support that the chewing gum
lends to reasonable, articulable suspicion” of impaired driving.
The district court concluded that “none of the facts credibly testified to . . . are
objective indicia of intoxication.” The district court explained that, “although many of the
innocent factors in this case—such as gum chewing, perfume scent, the license restriction,
and Ms. Ahmed coming from a bar—could support the expansion of the stop in other
5
circumstances, they do not clear the reasonable, articulable suspicion threshold in this
case.”
The state appeals.
DECISION
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
law enforcement officer may stop and detain a driver if the officer has a reasonable,
articulable basis for suspecting the driver of criminal activity. State v. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d
747, 752 (Minn. 2021). “The actions of the police” during a traffic stop must be “reasonably
related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.”
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004). Each “incremental intrusion” after
the stop must be “strictly tied to” either the initial basis for the stop or independent
reasonable suspicion. Id. (quotation omitted).
For example, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that a driver is impaired by
alcohol before the officer can expand a traffic stop into a DWI investigation and ask for a
PBT. See State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Minn. App. 2012) (considering whether
a “trooper’s initiation of field sobriety and preliminary breath testing was reasonable”) .
Whether reasonable suspicion justifies the expansion of a traffic stop is a mixed question
of law and fact. State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 486- 87 (Minn. 2016). Appellate courts
review a district court’s factual findings on the circumstances of a stop for clear error. Id.
But whether those circumstances establish reasonable suspicion is a question of law that
we review de novo. Id.
6
The state argues that the officer reasonably suspected Ahmed was impaired and that
this justified his asking Ahmed to perform a PBT.1 The reasonable-suspicion standard is a
“low hurdle,” but it requires “more than a mere hunch that the suspect has done something
illegal.” Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752, 757, 759 (quotation omitted). An officer must point
to “specific facts” that establish “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Lugo, 887 N.W.2d at 486 (quotation s
omitted).
In assessing whether this standard is met, appellate courts evaluate the totality of
the circumstances. State v. Sargent, 968 N.W.2d 32, 38-39 (Minn. 2021). This includes the
facts known to the officer at the time of the intrusion and reasonable inferences drawn from
those facts. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 753. We recognize that law enforcement training
enables an officer to “make inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.” Mesenburg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 969 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. App. 2021)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 15, 2022). “Nonetheless, the reasonableness
of the officer’s actions is an objective inquiry, even if reasonableness is evaluated in light
of an officer’s training and experience.” State v. Koppi, 798 N.W.2d 358, 363 (Minn. 2011)
(quotation omitted).

1 When the state appeals a pretrial order, it must show not only error but also “that the order
will have a critical impact on its ability to prosecute the case.” State v. McLeod,
705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). We conclude that t he district
court’s order had a critical impact on the state’s case because suppression of the evidence
resulted in dismissal of the charges against Ahmed. See State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496,
502 (Minn. 2008) (stating that the dismissal of charges following suppression of evidence
meets the critical-impact requirement).
7
Our caselaw has recognized that reasonable suspicion of impaired driving supports
investigation if an officer observes a traffic violation “coupled with indicia of intoxication,”
such as an odor of alcohol, slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, or lack of coordination.
Mesenburg, 969 N.W.2d at 648 (discussing the odor of alcohol); see also Lorsung v.
Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 30 N.W.3d 777, 786 (Minn. 2026) (listing examples of “physical
signs of impairment,” including “bloodshot eyes, watery eyes, slurred speech, or poor
balance”). But physical indicia of impairment should not be conflated with objective indicia
of impairment. See Otto v. Comm’r of Pu b. Safety, 924 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Minn. App.
2019) (considering a defendant’s driving outside the traffic lane and failure to signal a turn
at 1:20 a.m. to be “objective” indicia of intoxication).
In fact, “no bright line rule requires an officer to observe one of the physical indicia
of intoxication” before reasonable suspicion of driver impairment can be established.
Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 758. If enough “other factors” suggest a driver is impaired, then
reasonable suspicion supports further investigation. Id. While the absence of physical
indicia of impairment is “unusual,” it is considered in the totality -of-the-circumstances
analysis and may be outweighed by other factors. Id.
After the officer stopped Ahmed, he observed no physical indicia of impairment.
And the officer did not observe any alcohol or empty containers in Ahmed’s SUV. These
facts weigh against reasonable suspicion. See id. But the state maintains that , under the
totality of the circumstances, there were enough “other factor s” to establish reasonable
suspicion of impaired driving.
8
We first consider individually the factors on which the officer relied, and then we
consider whether, in totality, they amount to reasonable suspicion. See State v. Garding,
12 N.W.3d 697, 702 -03 (Minn. 2024) ( “Where appropriate, the totality of the
circumstances may be analyzed by looking first to each identified fact supporting
reasonable suspicion independently and then considering whether those facts, even if
independently weak, are sufficient in the aggregate.”).
Chewing Gum and Perfume
The state argues that Ahmed’s use of chewing gum and perfume “to mask the odor
of alcohol” supports reasonable suspicion of impairment. Ahmed counters that she “took
the gum out of her mouth” before the officer asked her to take the PBT and that perfume
“is a strong part of” her culture.
2
The district court determined that Ahmed removed her gum while speaking to the
officer, which weakened any inference that Ahmed was masking the odor of alcohol. This
conclusion is contrary to the record. The officer testified that, based on his training and
experience, he believed Ahmed may have used chewing gum and a strong perfume in an

2 The state cites several nonprecedential opinions that consider a driver’s masking behavior
when analyzing reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See State v. Walbridge,
No. A24-1641, 2021 WL 5442373, at *4 (Minn. App. Nov. 22, 2021) (stating that a
driver’s use of “numerous air fresheners” that were “likely used to mask odors from
controlled-substance use” supported reasonable suspicion of impairment), rev. denied
(Minn. Feb. 15, 2022); State v. Neumann, No. A03-1941, 2004 WL 2521179, at *4-5
(Minn. App. Nov. 9, 2004) (stating that a driver’s “attempt to mask odor” with cigarette
smoke supported reasonable suspicion “that narcotics were in the car”). Nonprecedential
opinions “are not binding authority” but “may be cited as persuasive authority.” Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c); see State v. Monyak, 14 N.W.3d 210, 215 n.2 (Minn. App.
2024) (applying rule 136.01, subd. 1(c), in the criminal context). Walbridge and Neumann
are persuasive given the evidence of Ahmed’s masking behavior.
9
attempt to “mask” or “cover up” odors from alcohol use. When asked if it was “typical”
for drivers masking the odor of alcohol to remove their chewing gum, the officer testified,
“Some people do; some don’t.” We conclude that Ahmed’s masking behaviors contributed
to the officer’s reasonable suspicion of impaired driving.3
Limited License Restriction and Prior DWI
The state argues that Ahmed’s “license restriction and the related DWI offense”
support reasonable suspicion of impairment. Ahmed argues that this factor should not be
considered because she “was not under the limited license restriction at the time that she
was stopped.”
Ahmed concedes that there is no caselaw “that squarely draws a distinction between
expired driving restrictions and current driving restrictions related to past DWIs.” But she
reasons that a driver’s license history is “analogous to past criminal history” and maintains
that criminal history is “generally frowned upon” in a reasonable-suspicion analysis. We
disagree. Even if we assume, without deciding, that driving history is analogous to criminal

3 The state concedes that “masking behavior without additional suspicious activity is not
sufficient for reasonable, articulable suspicion.” The state cites State v. Bell, in which this
court considered whether two officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Bell for suspected
drug possession. 557 N.W.2d 603, 606-07 (Minn. App. 1996), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18,
1997). The officers testified that they thought Bell’s use of a cigar package and cologne
“could be a masking agent for drugs.” Id. at 606. This court concluded that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion because this testimony was “significantly rebutted” by the
officers’ admission they had no training or experience about the items being used as
masking agents and that it could have been innocent use. Id. at 606-07.
But Bell did not categorically reject masking behaviors as possible indicia of
impairment. And unlike the officers in Bell, the officer here testified that, based on his
training and experience, perfume and chewing gum are sometimes used by impaired drivers
to mask the odor of alcohol.
10
history, an officer’s knowledge of a defendant’s criminal history may, in some
circumstances, support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. State v. Gilchrist,
299 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn. 1980); see also State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663
(Minn. App. 1992) (considering a police officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s history of
burglary offenses among the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion that the
suspect participated in a recent burglary), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 1992). Thus, we
reject Ahmed’s argument that we should not consider past driving history under the totality
of the circumstances.
A driver’s history that includes impaired driving may contribute to reasonable
suspicion of present impairment. See Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 755-56 (concluding that an
officer’s reasonable inference that a motorist’s license was canceled because of “multiple
alcohol-related driving incidents” may contribute to reasonable suspicion of impaired
driving). The officer testified that Ahmed’s driver’s license had “a limited license
restriction.” When he asked her why she had the restriction, Ahmed told the officer that
she had a prior DWI. It does not matter that Ahmed’s limited license restriction was not in
effect at the time of the stop. Ahmed’s history of impaired-driving conduct contributes to
reasonable suspicion that Ahmed was impaired at the time of the stop.
Leaving a Nearby Bar Around Closing Time
The state argues that the “time and location, 2:45 a.m. and leaving a nearby bar,”
support reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. Ahmed counters that her “[m]ere
presence in a bar does not give an officer license to engage in a search or seizure.”
11
The time and location of a traffic stop are relevant when evaluating the
reasonableness of a DWI investigation. See State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn.
1998) (stating that a driver’s failure to observe traffic laws at 3:00 a.m., when “drinking is
often found to be involved,” can provide an objective basis to investigate DWI (quotation
omitted)). For example, in State v. Morse, law enforcement stopped Morse in his truck on
suspicion of DWI, and the state later charged him with DWI. 878 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Minn.
2016). The supreme court affirmed the district court’s determination that reasonable
suspicion supported the investigation. Id. at 502-03. The supreme court agreed with the
district court that the relevant circumstances included not only Morse’s driving conduct,
but also “the fact that the events occurred close to 2:00 a.m. bar closing time” and “that
Morse was leaving downtown, an area with bars,” among other factors. Id. at 502.
The officer agreed it was “significant” that Ahmed said she was coming from a bar,
and he testified that, based on his experience, “typically people who go to bars drink.” The
officer testified that the traffic stop occurred at 2:45 a.m. and agreed that it was “sometime
after bar close.” And t he officer testified that he first saw Ahmed’s SUV “roughly five
blocks” from the bar Ahmed had identified. Because the officer encountered Ahmed after
closing time of a nearby bar and she admitted to having just left the bar, where patrons
usually drink alcohol, this factor contributes to reasonable suspicion.
Driving Conduct
The state argues that Ahmed’s failure to use headlights, to stop immediately when
the officer turned on his emergency lights, and to signal to pull over support reasonable
12
suspicion of impaired driving. 4 Ahmed concedes that the officer was justified in stopping
her for the headlight violation but appears to argue that her driving conduct does not
support reasonable suspicion of DWI.
“Erratic driving and failing to observe traffic laws can be indicia of intoxication.”
Otto, 924 N.W.2d at 661. This can include a driver’s “failure to turn on lights immediately
after restarting [their] engine” at night, State v. Driscoll, 427 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. App.
1988), as well as a driver’s failure “to signal a turn,” Otto, 924 N.W.2d at 661. The officer
testified that he followed Ahmed’s SUV for “[a]bout two blocks” with his emergency lights
activated. The officer testified that, when he turned on his siren, Ahmed quickly pulled
over without using her turn signal. When asked what Ahmed’s driving conduct showed,
based on his training and experience, the officer testified, “Some distraction. Something
was wrong. It wasn’t normal.”
It is undisputed that Ahmed did not turn on her headlights at night , did not stop
immediately when the officer activated his emergency lights, and did not use her turn signal
to pull over. But the officer was “about half a block behind” Ahmed when he first activated
his emergency lights. Ahmed quickly pulled over once the officer activated his siren and

4 The state argues that Ahmed also “quickly jerked to the side of the road” when the officer
activated his siren. At the hearing, the officer testified that the SUV “just abruptly moved
to the right and stopped.” But the district court found that the officer’s testimony was
“clearly disproven” by the squad-car recording. The district court found that Ahmed’s SUV
“can be seen quickly pulling to the right when [the officer] activated his siren” and that
“there were no other cars around, it was the middle of the night, and [the SUV] glided to a
stop for six seconds before completely halting.” The district court also found that the SUV
“never veered out of its designated lane or violated other traffic laws beyond the lack of
headlights.” Because the district court’s findings are reasonably supported by the record,
we conclude that they are not clearly erroneous.
13
did not swerve in her lane or exhibit any other driving behavior associated with impaired
driving. Some of Ahmed’s driving conduct supports reasonable suspicion of impairment,
and some does not. Thus, we conclude Ahmed’s driving conduct that supports impairment
is a weak factor under our totality-of-the-circumstances analysis and contributes slightly to
reasonable suspicion.
Anxiety Pill
The state argues that Ahmed’s statement that she took an anxiety pill—“a potential
controlled substance”—may support reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. The state
appears to contend that Ahmed’s admitted “consumption of an intoxicating substance may
go towards reasonable, articulable suspicion.” 5 Ahmed counters that the “anxiety pill has
no bearing on determining reasonable, articulable suspicion to administer a PBT” because
a PBT “is directly tied to alcohol use.”
The officer testified and confirmed that Ahmed “mentioned that she had taken an
anxiety pill.” And the district court found that Ahmed told the officer multiple times during
the stop that she took an anxiety pill. But there is no evidence about the kind of anxiety pill
Ahmed may have taken. And the officer did not testify that he suspected
controlled-substance impairment or that Ahmed took more than one pill. The limited record
on the anxiety pill does not support a reasonable inference that Ahmed was impaired and
therefore does not contribute to reasonable suspicion.

5 The state cites Klamar, which involved a driver’s statement about consuming “one drink,”
among other indicia of impairment. 823 N.W.2d at 694. For the reasons expressed above,
we conclude that Klamar does not apply to the specific facts before us.
14
Fumbling a Credit Card
The state argues that Ahmed’s “mishandling of the credit card” while talking to the
officer should be considered in our totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Ahmed
concedes that “difficulty with coordination in retrieving a driver’s license can be an
indicator of impairment.” But Ahmed argues that “merely [dropping] a credit card in the
process of grabbing her license” is “not an extreme level of incoordination” that would
support reasonable suspicion of impairment. Ahmed notes that “[p]eople drop things while
sober all the time” and that the evidence shows she was nervous around police officers.
Both parties rely on Otto, in which this court considered whether a deputy had
reasonable suspicion that a driver was impaired before requesting sobriety tests.
924 N.W.2d at 661-62 . “When asked to produce his license, [the driver] attempted
unsuccessfully to remove it from his wallet; he then gave the wallet to the deputy, who
removed the license without difficulty.” Id. at 660. This court determined that the driver’s
poor coordination helped establish reasonable suspicion that he was intoxicated. Id. at
661-62.
The officer testified that, as Ahmed “was getting her driver’s license out, she kind
of fumbled a bit [and] dropped a credit card.” Unlike the driver in Otto, Ahmed removed
the license from her wallet and gave it to the officer. We conclude that Ahmed’s fumbling
of her credit card supports reasonable suspicion of DWI, if only slightly given that Ahmed
successfully produced her license.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances shows that the officer had reasonable
suspicion of impairment. Some circumstances suggest that Ahmed was not impaired— for
15
example, the lack of physical indicia of intoxication and her quick response to the squad
siren. But we conclude that other objective indicia of impairment reach the “low hurdle”
of reasonable suspicion. Taylor, 965 N.W.2d at 752, 757. Ahmed had left a nearby bar and
was driving without using her headlights after 2:30 a.m. Ahmed did not immediately pull
over when the officer activated his emergency lights and did not use her turn signal when
she did pull over. The officer also saw Ahmed chewing gum and smelled a strong odor of
perfume while talking to Ahmed; the officer knew both behaviors could mask the odor of
alcohol. Further, Ahmed had a prior history of DWI and fumbled her credit card during the
stop.
These facts and circumstances, taken in totality, demonstrate that the officer had
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Ahmed was driving while impaired; therefore, the
officer’s request for a PBT was lawful. Thus, we reverse the district court’s order granting
Ahmed’s motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.