State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1374

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jason Leonard Moe,
Appellant.

Filed August 3, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-24-608

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Ede,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
In this direct appeal from a final judgment, appellant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to sustain his conviction of first- degree assault—use of deadly force against
a peace officer. Appellant argues that respondent failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
2
that he intentionally used his vehicle to collide with a law-enforcement officer’s squad car
and that the circumstances proved do not eliminate a rational hypothesis that the collision
was an accident. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jason Leonard Moe by amended
complaint with: first- degree assault—use of deadly force against a peace officer , in
violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.221, subdivision 2 (2022) (Count I); fleeing a
peace officer in a motor vehicle, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.487,
subdivision 3 (2022) (Count II); and fifth-degree assault—i nflicting or attempting to inflict
bodily harm, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.224, subdivision 1(2) (2022)
(Count III). Moe pleaded guilty to Count III and proceeded to trial on the remaining
charges, after which a jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts I and II. The following
summary stems from the trial record and is presented with all questions of fact resolved in
favor of the jury’s verdicts.
1
On March 16, 2024, at about 1:15 a.m., a police officer was on patrol when he
observed a vehicle driven by Moe at an intersection for “an extended period of time.” Moe
moved into a turn lane, “almost came to a stop, continued forward, almost came to a stop
again, and then turned.” The officer suspected that Moe was impaired and initiated a traffic

1 See State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026) (instructing that, when a conviction
rests on circumstantial evidence, appellate courts “apply a two-step test to assess the
sufficiency of the evidence,” and that, at the first step, courts “winnow down the evidence
presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict” (quotation
and citation omitted)).
3
stop. Moe continued to drive slowly through an alleyway before turning onto a highway
and accelerating to speeds around 100 miles per hour. The officer activated his squad car
lights and siren while pursuing Moe for roughly 15 miles, during which Moe’s vehicle
traveled within its lane and continued at similarly high speeds.
Additional officers laid down two sets of tire-deflation devices in Moe’s path of
travel. Although the devices deployed successfully on Moe’s vehicle, without causing the
vehicle’s tires to explode, Moe continued driving. At trial, an officer testified that he had
“been involved in between 50 to 100 vehicle pursuits” during his career and that almost
half of those incidents involved the successful use of tire-deflation devices. The officer
explained that the devices deflate tires in a “slow, controlled manner to prevent a vehicle
from operating at very high speeds” and that he had never seen deployment of the devices
cause a vehicle to leave the roadway.
Two peace officers positioned their squad cars facing the direction in which Moe
was traveling on the opposite shoulder of the highway. The officers’ squad car lights were
activated. One of the officers—the alleged victim of the first- degree assault charged in
Count I— was in a squad car that bore insignias, including “reflective stickers, decals, [and]
emergency lights,” which identified it as a law-enforcement vehicle.
About a mile after hitting the tire-deflation devices, Moe drove his vehicle towards
the alleged victim’s squad car “head-on,” despite the squad car’s location on the opposite
side of the highway. As the alleged victim steered into a ditch to avoid being struck, Moe
made an abrupt turn in the same direction, ultimately colliding with the alleged victim’s
squad car. Moe never activated his brake lights after his vehicle went off the road. The
4
squad car’s air bags activated, and the alleged victim sustained injuries, including bruising,
cuts, and a burn on his arm. At the time of the incident, there was neither snow nor ice on
the roads.
After crashing into the squad car, Moe continued driving up an embankment until
he came to a stop at a tree line. Moe was the only occupant in his vehicle and was sitting
in the driver’s seat. When officers approached, Moe was “belligerent and uncooperative.”
He refused to exit his vehicle after law enforcement told him he was under arrest, called
the officers “f-ckers,” accused them of “beat[ing] [him] up,” declared that he hated cops,
and aggressively fought with them, including by striking an officer in the chest several
times with a closed fist.
Moe testified at trial. He said that his sister had recently passed away and that, on
the day of the incident, he “was really depressed and [he] just wanted to be alone.” Moe
claimed that, when he drove over the tire- deflation devices, it became “hard to steer” and
to “control the direction [his] pickup was going in.” He also stated that, before he drove
into the ditch, there were a lot of bright lights that made it difficult for him to see. And Moe
asserted that he was not trying to hit the squad car when the collision occurred.
As mentioned earlier, the jury found Moe guilty of first-degree assault—use of
deadly force against a peace officer (Count I) and fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle
(Count II). As to all three counts, the district court entered judgments of conviction. The
district court sentenced Moe to 120 months in prison on Count I, consecutive to a stayed
sentence of 12 months and one day that the court imposed on Count II. On the charge of
fifth-degree assault—i nflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm (Count III), the district
5
court imposed a jail term of 90 days, concurrent with the sentences the court imposed on
Counts I and II.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Moe challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction of first-
degree assault— use of deadly force against a peace officer. 2 He contends that the state
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally used his vehicle to collide
with the alleged victim’s squad car and that the circumstances proved do not eliminate a
rational hypothesis that the collision was an accident. Moe’s contentions, which focus on
the sufficiency of the evidence of his intent, do not merit reversal.
“In a criminal proceeding, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the State must prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d 271, 283 (Minn. 2025)
(quotation omitted). As relevant here, the elements of first-degree assault—use of deadly
force against a peace officer are: (1) that Moe assaulted the alleged victim; (2) that, in
assaulting the alleged victim, Moe used deadly force; and (3) that, at the time of the assault,
the alleged victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by
law, policy, or rule. Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 2 (providing that “[w]hoever assaults a
peace officer . . . by using . . . deadly force against the officer . . . while the person is
engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by law, policy, or rule” is guilty of first-

2 In this appeal, Moe does not challenge his convictions of Counts II (fleeing a peace officer
in a motor vehicle) and III (fifth-degree assault).
6
degree assault). Assault includes “the intentional infliction of . . . bodily harm upon
another.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 10(2) (2022).
When analyzing a sufficiency-of-the -evidence claim, “[t]he applicable standard of
review depends on whether the conviction —or . . . the specific element at issue—is
supported by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d at 283 .
“Direct evidence is evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that,
if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224,
247 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is
evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not
exist.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If a conviction, or an element of the offense, is based solely
on circumstantial evidence, [appellate courts] review the sufficiency of the evidence under
a heightened standard of review.” Id. “Intent is generally proven by circumstantial
evidence.” State v. Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280, 291 (Minn. 2023); see also State v. Cruz,
997 N.W.2d 537, 552 (Minn. 2023) (“Intent is a state of mind, which generally is proved
circumstantially, by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the
incident.” (quotation omitted)). “To prove intent, it is permissible for the jury to infer that
a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” Cruz, 997 N.W.2d
at 552. (quotations omitted).
It is undisputed by the parties that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review
applies here. Because the element at issue concerns intent—i.e., that Moe intentionally
inflicted bodily harm upon the alleged victim—and because the state relied solely on
7
circumstantial evidence to prove this element, we agree that the heightened standard
applies. See Nyonteh, 24 N.W.3d at 283.
We must therefore “apply a two-step test to assess the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. As noted earlier, appellate courts first “winnow down the
evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact in favor of the jury’s verdict,
which results in a subset of facts that constitute the circumstances proved.” Id. (quotations
omitted). In identifying the circumstances proved at the first step, appellate courts are “not
permit[ted] to re- weigh the evidence and sit, in essence, as a 13th juror.” Id. at 479
(quotation omitted). “At the second step, [appellate courts] consider whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and
not as discrete, isolated facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. at 478 ( quotations
omitted). “During the second step, [appellate courts] do not defer to the factfinder but
examine the reasonableness of the inferences.” Id. at 483 (quotation omitted). “If the
circumstances proved when viewed as a whole, support a reasonable inference that is
inconsistent with guilt , the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction and
[appellate courts] must reverse.” Id. (quotations omitted). “But [appellate courts] will not
reverse a conviction based on mere conjecture.” Id. (quotation omitted).
At the first step, as it pertains to the intent element, we discern from the record the
following circumstances proved:
• On March 16, 2024, at about 1:15 a.m., a police officer observed Moe
operating his vehicle in a manner that caused the officer to suspect Moe was
impaired.
8

• The officer activated his emergency lights and siren to initiate a traffic stop,
but Moe continued driving.

• Moe drove onto the highway and reached speeds of around 100 miles per
hour while the officer pursued him for about 15 miles, during which Moe
never pulled to the side of the road and remained within his lane of travel.

• Notwithstanding that additional officers laid down two sets of tire-deflation
devices in Moe’s path of travel and that those devices successfully deployed
on Moe’s vehicle, without causing the vehicle’s tires to explode, Moe kept
driving.

• In one officer’s experience of the successful use of tire-deflation devices in
about 25 to 50 vehicle pursuits, the devices deflated tires in a “slow,
controlled manner to prevent a vehicle from operating at very high speeds”
and did not result in vehicles leaving the roadway.

• Moe travel led around one mile after his vehicle struck the tire-deflation
devices to where the alleged victim had positioned his squad car on the
opposite shoulder of the highway, facing the direction from which Moe was
approaching.

• The squad car’s lights were activated and the vehicle bore insignias,
including “reflective stickers, decals, [and] emergency lights,” which
identified it as a law-enforcement vehicle.

• Although the alleged victim’s squad car was located on the other side of the
road, Moe drove his vehicle directly towards the squad car, “head-on” at a
high rate of speed, without activating his brake lights.

• As the alleged victim steered into a ditch to avoid being struck, Moe made
an abrupt turn in the same direction and collided with the squad car.

• At the time of the incident, there was neither snow nor ice on the roads.

• Moe continued driving up an embankment until he reached the tree line.

• He was the only person in the vehicle and was sitting in the driver’s seat.

• Moe was “belligerent and uncooperative” when officers approached,
inasmuch as he refused to exit his vehicle after law enforcement told him he
9
was under arrest, called them “f-ckers,” accused them of “beat [ing] [him]
up,” declared that he hated cops, and aggressively fought with them,
including by striking an officer in the chest several times with a closed fist.

• Moe’s sister had recently passed away and, on the day of the incident, he
“was really depressed and [he] just wanted to be alone.”

Having identified these circumstances proved, 3 we next consider whether the reasonable
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, viewed as a whole rather than as discrete, isolated
facts, are consistent with the hypothesis that Moe had the requisite intent and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than his guilt in that regard. See id.
We conclude that, when viewed as a whole, the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the above circumstances proved are consistent with a rational hypothesis that
Moe intentionally struck the alleged victim’s squad car. Moe nonetheless argues that “it is
reasonable to conclude that [he] lost control of his vehicle, causing him to swerve off the
road into the ditch, and accidentally collide with [the alleged victim’s] squad car.” The
state counters that, “while the element of intent was necessarily based on circumstantial
evidence, the only rational inference was that [Moe] intentionally assaulted [the peace
officer].” We agree with the state.

3 In light of the above circumstances proved, Moe’s testimony about his intent—that, when
he drove over the tire -deflation devices, it became “hard to steer” and to “control the
direction [his] pickup was going in,” that, before he drove into the ditch, there were a lot
of bright lights that made it difficult for him to see, and that he was not trying to hit the
squad car when the collision occurred—presents a question of fact that conflicts with the
jury’s verdicts. We cannot reweigh this testimony. See id. at 479. Thus, in winnowing down
the evidence at the first step of the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, we must
resolve this question of fact in favor of the jury’s verdicts and exclude the foregoing aspects
of Moe’s testimony from the circumstances proved. See id. at 478.
10
Because it lacks support in the circumstances proved, Moe’s argument largely
requires that we either reweigh the evidence or reverse his conviction based on conjecture,
neither of which we may do. See id. at 479, 483. As much as Moe contends that we may
reasonably infer from the circumstances proved that he accidentally collided with the
alleged victim’s squad car because he was impaired, traveling at a high rate of speed, and
the headlights of the two squad cars on scene were glaring, that contention is unavailing.
This is because Moe asks us to focus on the aforementioned discrete and isolated facts
rather than view the circumstances proved as a whole, as we must. See id. at 478. Simply
put, it is not reasonable to infer that the collision was an accident given the totality of the
circumstances proved, which we will not reiterate here.
In sum, Moe’s words and acts, both before and after the incident — as well as the
natural and probable consequences of his conduct—are consistent only with the hypothesis
that he intentionally inflicted bodily harm on the alleged victim by driving his vehicle into
the squad car. See id. at 483; see also Cruz, 997 N.W.2d at 552. And the circumstances
proved are inconsistent with Moe’s assertion that the collision was an accident because that
hypothesis is not rational. See Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 483. Accordingly, we reject his
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to his first-degree assault conviction.
Affirmed.