Steven A. Franklin, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1379

Steven A. Franklin,
Relator,

vs.

C&C Logistics, LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed
Cleary, Judge*

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51466760-3

Steven A. Franklin, New Hope, Minnesota (pro se relator)

C&C Logistics, Maple Grove, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CLEARY, Judge
Relator challenges determinations by an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that he
failed to demonstrate good cause for not appearing at a hearing and that he was ineligible
for unemployment benefits. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Steven A. Franklin worked as a full-time delivery associate for respondent
C&C Logistics LLC, a delivery service provider for Amazon , beginning in May of 2024.
He delivered packages according to an assigned route. His employment with C&C ended
on December 28, 2024, and he sought unemployment benefits. Respondent Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) initially determined that Franklin was
eligible for unemployment benefits. C&C appealed that determination.
In April 2025, a ULJ held an evidentiary hearing. At the beginning of the hearing,
the ULJ called Franklin multiple times using the phone number on file but was unable to
reach him. The ULJ took testimony from C&C’s operations and human -resources
managers. The operations manager testified that Franklin quit his employment. She
testified that on December 27, 2024, Franklin requested that he not be assigned a route
because he had personal business, and his request was denied. She testified that Franklin
ultimately refused to complete his route because his hand was hurting, and she interpreted
his actions as “quitting” and believed his alleged hand injury was merely an excuse. She
testified that Franklin had never mentioned a hand injury prior to that day.
3
On April 8, the ULJ issued an order determining that Franklin was ineligible for
benefits. The ULJ found that “it is more likely than not that Franklin quit to handle his
personal business and not due to an injury.” Franklin requested reconsideration of the
ULJ’s determination. He included, as an attachment, his phone records showing no calls
from the ULJ on the day of the hearing, as well as a timecard and pictures, including one
of his hands.
The ULJ issued an order denying Franklin’s reconsideration request and affirming
the April 8 order. The ULJ noted Franklin’s evidence that the ULJ never called him on the
day of the hearing, but the ULJ found that Franklin had provided the incorrect number and
failed to correct the error until the day after the hearing. The ULJ therefore determined
that “Franklin does not have good cause for failing to participate in the hearing.”
Franklin appeals.
DECISION
I.
Franklin challenges the denial of his reconsideration request. He argues that on the
day of the hearing he “fell ill” and had “short notice,” and after receiving a message from
DEED the day after the hearing, he called DEED. He suggests that he had previously given
them an incorrect phone number. He asserts that this was “a good faith error.”
An employer may appeal an initial determination of eligibility for an employee’s
unemployment benefits and proceed to an evidentiary hearing with a ULJ.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1(a) (2024); see Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2024) (“A
determination of eligibility . . . is final unless an appeal is filed by the . . . employer . . . .”).
4
The benefits applicant is required to personally participate in the evidentiary hearing.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(b) (202 4). Here, Franklin failed to appear, and the ULJ
determined, based on the evidence presented, that he had quit his employment and was not
eligible for benefits.
Franklin then requested a new hearing and submitted evidence, specifically, a
timecard, call logs, and pictures, including one of his hand s. A party may request
reconsideration of a ULJ’s decision. Id., subd. 2(a) (2024). This permits the ULJ “to
correct any factual or legal mistake in the decision, or to order an additional hearing when
appropriate.” Id., subd. 2(b)(1) (2024). The ULJ, in deciding a request for reconsideration,
must not consider evidence that was not submitted at the initial hearing, “except for
purposes of determining whether to order an additional hearing.” Id., subd. 2(c) (2024).
The ULJ must hold an additional hearing if a party shows new evidence that
“(1) would likely change the outcome of the decision and there was good cause for not
having previously submitted that evidence,” or “(2) would show that the evidence that was
submitted at the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence had an effect on
the outcome of the decision.” Id. “Good cause” is defined as “a reason that would have
prevented a reasonable person acting with due diligence from submitting the evidence.”
Id.
If the party who filed the reconsideration request failed to participate in the initial
hearing, “the unemployment law judge must issue an order setting aside the decision and
ordering an additional hearing if the party who failed to participate had good cause for
failing to do so.” Id., subd. 2(d) (2024). We review the decision to deny an additional
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evidentiary hearing to a relator who failed to participate for abuse of discretion.
Petracek v. Univ. of Minn., 780 N.W.2d 927, 929 (Minn. App. 2010).
Here, the record supports the ULJ’s determination that Franklin failed to provide
good cause for not appearing at the evidentiary hearing. As found by the ULJ, a reasonable
person acting with due diligence would have contacted DEED on the day of the scheduled
hearing after not receiving a call. Franklin failed to do so. As for Franklin’s claims to this
court that he failed to appear because he fell ill and had short notice, he failed to raise these
issues in his reconsideration request, the ULJ did not address these claims, and we therefore
need not address them. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating
that an appellate court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district
court); Peterson v. Ne. Bank-Minneapolis, 805 N.W.2d 878, 883 (Minn. App. 2011)
(“[B]ecause this issue was not raised before the ULJ, it is not properly before this court on
review.”). The ULJ did not abuse its discretion by determining that Franklin failed to show
good cause.
We question whether Frankin was permitted to submit additional evidence with his
reconsideration request. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(d) (indicating that the sole
issue is whether the party that failed to appear had good cause). Even presuming that
Franklin was permitted to submit additional evidence, he failed to submit any evidence
with his reconsideration request to show that the evidence relied upon by the ULJ was both
“likely false” and affected the ULJ’s decision. See id., subd. 2(c). The ULJ therefore did
not abuse its discretion by declining to grant an additional hearing on this ground.
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We afford “deference to a ULJ’s decision not to hold an additional hearing.”
Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Minn. App. 2006). The ULJ did not
abuse its discretion by declining to hold one here.
II.
Franklin also challenges the ULJ’s April 8 determination that he is ineligible for
benefits. He argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a determination of
“misconduct”1 and that, instead, “medical evidence” supports his assertion that he was
unable to work.
When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, we may affirm the decision or remand for further
proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024). We may also reverse or modify
the decision if the appellant’s substantial rights were prejudiced because the decision was
in violation of the constitution, in excess of the ULJ’s statutory authority, based on an
unlawful procedure, affected by an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, or
arbitrary or capricious. Id. “Whether an employee has been discharged or voluntarily quit
is a question of fact.” Midland Elec., Inc. v. Johnson, 372 N.W.2d 810, 812
(Minn. App. 1985). Factual findings are not disturbed if the evidence reasonably tends to
sustain them. Schmidgall v. Filmtec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002). The issue
of whether the applicant quit employment because of a reason that is an exception to

1 The ULJ determined that Franklin quit. We therefore question the relevance of his
misconduct argument. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095 (2024) (indicating that a “quit” and a
“discharge” based on misconduct are separate bases for ineligibility).
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ineligibility under the statute is a question of law that we review de novo.
Peppi v. Phyllis Wheatley Cmty. Ctr., 614 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 2000).
An unemployment benefits applicant who quits employment is ineligible for
benefits unless an exception applies. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1. One exception is that
an applicant remains eligible if “the applicant’s serious illness or injury made it medically
necessary that the applicant quit,” so long as “the applicant informs the employer of the
medical problem and requests accommodation and no reasonable accommodation is made
available.” Id., subd. 1(7).
Here, the ULJ found that Franklin quit his employment “because he had personal
business to handle,” and “[i]t was not medically necessary for Franklin to quit.” We review
the ULJ’s factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision and will not disturb
those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to sustain
them. Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016).
The record supports the ULJ’s findings. The operations manager testified that on
the day Franklin quit, he asked not to be assigned a route because of “personal business”
and “something personal,” and the operations manager told him that he needed to complete
his route. The operations manager testified that, after Franklin went on his route, he called
and said, “an emergency came up,” and he later called and said that his hand was hurting.
The operations manager testified that Franklin had never previously mentioned that his
hand was hurting, and she believed that he was simply making up an excuse to not work.
The ULJ found the testimony of the operations manager to be credible. “Credibility
determinations are the exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.”
8
Bangtson v. Allina Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation
omitted). In sum, the ULJ did not err in determining that Franklin quit and was ineligible
for benefits.
In his brief to this court, Franklin points to “medical evidence” that he offered in his
motion for reconsideration. But even presuming that Franklin was permitted to submit
additional evidence, 2 the ULJ was not permitted to consider that evidence “except for
purposes of determining whether to order an additional hearing.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 2(c). For the reasons discussed above, the ULJ did not err by determining that an
additional hearing was not warranted. Franklin also argues that he was unable to perform
his job duties due to his hand injury . But the ULJ made a credibility determination and
ruled otherwise, and we may not reweigh evidence on review.
Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995). In sum,
we see no grounds for reversal.
Affirmed.

2 Again, we question whether Franklin was permitted to submit additional evidence. See
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(d).