State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1382

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Devin Lee Arola Johnson,
Appellant.

Filed April 27, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, John, Judge*

Hubbard County District Court
File Nos. 29-CR-21-393, 29-CR-21-453

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Olson, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, JOHN, Judge
We affirm the district court’s decision to revoke appellant’s probation because the
record supports the district court’s determination that the need for confinement outweighs
the policies favoring probation.
FACTS
In March 2021, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Devin Lee Arola
Johnson with third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344,
subd. 1(b) (2020). In April 2021, in a separate file, the state charged Arola Johnson with
third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b). The
underlying files are 29-CR-21-393 (file 393) and 29-CR-21- 453 (file 453), respectively.
Following a guilty plea in file 393, the district court sentenced Arola Johnson to 36 months
in prison, stayed for 10 years with probationary conditions. Following a guilty plea in file
453, the district court sentenced Arola Johnson to 20 months in prison, stayed for 10 years
with probationary conditions.1
The district court imposed materially identical probationary conditions in each file.
Pertinent to the issues on appeal, Arola Johnson was required to:
• Complete sex-offender treatment;
• Abstain from possessing or viewing pornographic or sexually explicit material;
• Maintain contact with his probation officer;

1 The district court imposed Arola Johnson’s stayed sentence in file 453 as consecutive to
the stayed sentence in file 393. In our decision in State v. Johnson, 999 N.W. 2d 103, 105
(Minn. App. 2023), we concluded that the district court erred by imposing consecutive
stayed prison sentences without stating reasons for a sentencing departure and remanded
with instructions to impose concurrent stayed prison sentences.
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• Cooperate with searches of property as directed by his probation officer; and
• Inform his probation officer of changes in his telephone number.

In March 2025, Arola Johnson’s probation officer filed a probation-violation report
in each file. The probation officer subsequently filed two addenda in each file alleging
additional violations. Arola Johnson appeared for a probation-violation hearing in June
2025. The district court framed the violations in similar but slightly different terms than
the violation reports and addenda, discussing that Arola Johnson violated probation by
failing to complete sex-offender treatment, failing to report to jail as directed by his
probation officer, failing to stay in contact with his probation officer, and possessing or
using pornographic material.
Arola Johnson admitted to the violations and the district court determined them to
be intentional or inexcusable. The district court explained that probation revocation was
appropriate because Arola Johnson is in need of treatment which can be most effectively
provided in prison. The district court executed Arola Johnson’s prison sentences in both
files, resulting in a 36-month prison sentence and lifetime conditional release.
DECISION
In challenging the district court’s decision to revoke probation, Arola Johnson
argues that the record does not support the district court’s determination that t he need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
A district court has “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence
to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980). A district court “abuses its
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discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic
and the facts in the record.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Minn. App. 2023)
(quotation omitted). To revoke probation, a district court must “(1) designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated; ( 2) find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable; and (3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250 (the Austin factors). Arola Johnson only challenges
the district court’s analysis of the third Austin factor.
When applying the third Austin factor, the district court considers whether
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further
criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need
of correctional treatment which can most effectively be
provided if he is confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.

State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 606-07 (Minn. 2005) (the Modtland subfactors).
“Only one Modtland subfactor is necessary to support revocation.” State v. Smith, 994
N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). A district court
may not reflexively revoke probation in response to a series of technical violations.
State v. Osborne, 732 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Minn. 2007).
Arola Johnson argues that his failure to complete sex-offender treatment and other
instances of noncompliance with probation stem from mental and physical problems,
including sleep issues and suicidal thoughts. He adds that he can live with a relative who
lives within walking distance of the probation office. Arola Johnson contends that, by
“undervaluing these facts,” the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation.
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In addressing whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation, the district court relied primarily on the second Modtland subfactor in
determining that Arola Johnson is in need of treatment which can be most effectively
provided while imprisoned. Specifically, the district court stated that “sex offender
treatment is the most important component of his probation” and that “he was late to start
treatment and then terminated.” The district court added that Arola Johnson’s “dishonesty
with respect to possession of the phone is the compelling factor in executing his sentences.
It was a tool that he could and should have used to attend sex offender treatment and contact
his probation officer. Instead, he used it to access the dark, dark world of pornography.”
Because both of Arola Johnson’s convictions involve acts of criminal sexual
conduct, the record supports the district court’s characterization of sex-offender treatment
as an important aspect of probation. Additionally, the record demonstrates that, while on
probation, Arola Johnson was unable to successfully complete this treatment, adding
support to the district court’s determination that this treatment can be most effectively
provided while incarcerated. Although Arola Johnson’s argument that certain
considerations may counsel in favor of extending probation is not completely without
merit, it cannot be said that the district court clearly abused its discretion by revoking
probation because its decision is supported by facts in the record. See Fortner, 989 N.W.2d
at 374.

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Arola Johnson additionally relies on State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 637
(Minn. 2008), in arguing that the district court may only revoke probation when
rehabilitation is not possible, adding that rehabilitation was still possible and the district
court did not consider whether an intermediate sanction was appropriate. Cottew explained
that “[i]ntermediate sanctions are imposed when the district court has determined that the
defendant has violated his probation but that revocation of the defendant’s probation and
execution of the underlying sentence is not appropriate, at least in par t, because
rehabilitation is still possible.” 746 N.W.2d at 637. Cottew is distinguishable because it
explains when an intermediate sanction may be appropriate without directly addressing
what constitutes an adequate ground for revoking probation. See id. Arola Johnson has
not cited authority interpreting Cottew as overruling appellate analysis of the third
Modtland subfactor.
2
Arola Johnson concludes by arguing that a de facto “life sentence ” through having
lifetime supervised release “is not a reasonable sanction” for his “technical violations.” He
points to language from Austin that “[t]he decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive reaction
to an accumulation of technical violations.” 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted).
However, the record demonstrates that the district court appropriately considered the third

2 We addressed a similar argument— that revocation is not appropriate when rehabilitation
is still possible —in our nonprecedential decision in State v. Edberg- Anderson, No. A25-
0615, 2025 WL 3750704, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 2025). In dispensing with this
argument, we pointed to language from Cottew that grants district courts broad discretion
in determining whether to impose an intermediate sanction. Edberg- Anderson, 2025 WL
3750704, at *4-5 (citing Cottew, 746 N.W.2d at 637).

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Modtland subfactor and did not reflexively revoke Arola Johnson’s probation in doing so.
Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion by revoking Arola Johnson’s
probation.
Affirmed.