A25-1390

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1387
A25-1390

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey William Boysen,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Scott County District Court
File Nos. 70-CR-24-15738; 70-CR-24-5740

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jeffre y William Boysen with six
counts of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) for assaulting his stepson from the time stepson
2
was approximately four to 13 years old. Later, the state charged Boysen with 15 counts of
CSC for assaulting his stepdaughter from the time stepdaughter was 13 to 18 years old. The
district court joined the two cases at Boysen’s request. A jury found Boysen guilty of all
six counts related to stepson and guilty of nine of the 15 counts related to
stepdaughter. After entering convictions for six counts for stepson, the district court
sentenced Boysen to a 522-month prison term. And upon entering convictions for four of
the nine counts for stepdaughter, the district court sentenced Boysen to a 372-month prison
term. The district court ordered the sentences related to stepson to run consecutively to the
sentences related to stepdaughter, for a total of 894 months in prison.
On appeal, Boysen challenges his convictions and sentences. 1 First, he argues that
he is entitled to a new trial because the state committed prosecutorial misconduct during
closing argument. Second, he argues the district court erred when it imposed sentences for
certain counts. Finally, relying on his aggregate sentences, Boysen argues the district court
imposed excessive and unjustifiable sentences . For the reasons set forth in detail below,
we affirm.
FACTS
Boysen is married to M.B. (mother). Mother is the biological mother to K.C.
(stepson) and R.C. (stepdaughter). Boysen moved into the family home when stepson was
approximately four years old and stepdaughter was approximately six years old. The

1 In August 2025, Boysen filed a notice of appeal in both cases. He then moved to
consolidate his appeals since the cases were resolved in a joint jury trial. We granted
Boysen’s motion.
3
following summarizes the incidents of sexual abuse against stepson and stepdaughter that
were elicited at a jury trial.
Stepson
In April 2024, a Scott County child-protection supervisor received two reports
alleging that Boysen anally penetrated stepson and forced stepson to perform oral sex. 2
The child-protection supervisor and a law-enforcement officer went to the family home to
investigate.
Shortly thereafter, Boysen was charged with one count of first-degree CSC for
assaulting stepson. In January 2025, the state filed an amended complaint charging Boysen
with seven counts of CSC to account for different sexual acts that took place from the time
stepson was approximately four to 13 years old.
At trial, stepson testified that, beginning when he was about four years old, Boysen
would rub his erect genitals between stepson’s legs until Boysen ejaculated (the genital-
rubbing conduct). This conduct began in the family’s apartment and continued after the
family moved to a different house. Stepson testified that this genital-rubbing conduct
happened every other week until he was in seventh grade and would take place on the
couch, in Boysen’s bedroom, or in the bathroom. Stepson estimated that the genital-
rubbing conduct occurred “more than a hundred times.”

2 Stepdaughter’s abuse was not mentioned in the initial reports. At trial, stepdaughter
explained that she waited to report the abuse until after she moved out of the family home.
Stepdaughter moved out at age 19.
4
Between the time stepson was in fourth grade through seventh grade, Boysen forced
stepson to perform oral sex on Boysen (fellatio conduct). Stepson stated that the fellatio
conduct occurred in the bathroom and Boysen’s bedroom. Stepson estimated that Boysen
forced stepson to perform fellatio “around 50” times.
When stepson was in fifth or sixth grade, Boysen began anally penetrating stepson
(anal-penetration conduct). Stepson testified that the anal-penetration conduct occurred in
the bathroom and Boysen’s bedroom. Stepson further testified that the anal penetration
was painful, and one time when stepson cried during penetration, Boysen stated he would
give stepson ice cream if he kept quiet. Stepson estimated that Boysen anally penetrated
him “20 to 30 times.”
Stepson further testified that, on multiple occasions, Boysen forced stepson to stroke
Boysen’s genitals with his hands until Boysen ejaculated (the genital-stroking conduct).
Stepson stated the genital-stroking conduct would occur on the couch or in Boysen’s
bedroom.
Stepson testified that all the sexual acts stopped when he was in seventh grade.
Stepson did not report the abuse to his mother because he was uncomfortable doing so, but
he eventually told stepdaughter.
Stepdaughter
In August 2024, stepdaughter—accompanied by her husband—visited the police
station to make a formal complaint that Boysen sexually assaulted her. After an
investigation, the state charged Boysen in a separate case file with six counts of CSC. The
complaint alleged that Boysen sexually assaulted stepdaughter from the ages of 15 to 18
5
years old. In April 2025, the state filed an amended complaint, charging Boysen with
sixteen counts of CSC for abuse relating to stepdaughter.
At trial, stepdaughter testified that, starting when she was about 13 years old,
Boysen would rub his erect genitals between her legs until he ejaculated (sexual-touching
conduct). Stepdaughter stated that the sexual-touching conduct occurred weekly until she
was 15 years old.
When stepdaughter was 15 years old, Boysen began vaginally penetrating her
(vaginal-penetration conduct). The vaginal -penetration conduct occurred in Boysen’s
bedroom or on the couch and continued until just after stepdaughter turned 18 years old.
The last time Boysen vaginally penetrated stepdaughter was on July 13, 2023, during a
family camping trip. Boysen told stepdaughter not to tell anyone about the sexual abuse,
and stepdaughter stated she was too scared to report the abuse to her mother. However,
stepdaughter documented the vaginal-penetration conduct that took place between April
2022 through the final incident in July 2023 on a mobile-phone app she used to track her
menstrual cycle.
Throughout the time the sexual abuse occurred, Boysen also sent explicit text
messages to stepdaughter. For example, in these text messages, Boysen asked stepdaughter
if they could sleep naked together, and he asked stepdaughter if she wanted him “inside ”
her.
Stepson corroborated stepdaughter’s testimony at trial, stating that he suspected
Boysen was “doing stuff” to stepdaughter. Stepson recalled that, on one occasion, he
6
witnessed stepdaughter sitting on Boysen’s lap, facing Boysen. Stepson also testified that
Boysen slept in the same bed as stepdaughter for approximately a month.
Procedural History
At first, the cases regarding stepson and stepdaughter proceeded separately. Then,
just before the trial related to stepson, the district court granted the state’s Spreigl motion,3
allowing stepdaughter to testify at stepson’s trial about the sexual abuse she experienced.
Shortly after the district court granted the state’s motion, Boysen requested that the district
court join the two cases, and the district court granted his request.
Both stepson and stepdaughter testified at the joint trial consistent with the facts set
forth above. Mother testified on Boysen’s behalf, and Boysen testified—denying that any
sexual abuse occurred . One of the theories presented in Boysen’s defense was that
stepdaughter’s husband—who is a convicted sex offender—coerced stepson and
stepdaughter to fabricate their stories because Boysen disapproved of stepdaughter’s
relationship with her husband. In response, during closing arguments, the state twice urged
the jury not to focus on that “sex offender”—meaning stepdaughter’s husband— but this
“sex offender”—referring to Boysen. Boysen did not object.
The jury found Boysen guilty on six counts
4 related to stepson. The district court
determined that none of the counts were lesser-included offenses and entered convictions

3 Spreigl evidence is “[e]vidence of another crime, wrong, or act” and is inadmissible “to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith,” but it
“may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Minn. R.
Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (Minn. 1965).
4 The state dismissed one of the seven counts before trial.
7
on all six counts. The district court then imposed sentences on all six convictions, ordering
the sentences on counts I, II, IV, and VI to run consecutively, and the sentences on
counts III and V to run concurrently. In total, the district court imposed a 522-month prison
term for the convictions related to stepson.
With regard to stepdaughter, the jury found Boysen guilty of nine of the 15 counts
and acquitted him of the remaining counts. The district court entered convictions on four
counts—counts III, IV, VI, and XV— and imposed four sentences to run consecutively. 5
In total, the district court imposed a 372-month prison term for the convictions related to
stepdaughter. The district court then ordered the sentences related to stepson to run
consecutively to the sentences related to stepdaughter, for a total of 894 months in prison.
Boysen appeals.
DECISION
On appeal, Boysen challenges both his convictions and sentences. With regard to
his convictions, he argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the state committed
prosecutorial misconduct when it called him a “sex offender” during closing argument. In
the alternative, he argues the district court erred when it imposed multiple sentences,
violating Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2024), because certain offenses arose from the
same behavioral incident. Finally, Boysen contends the district court imposed excessive
and unjustifiable sentences. We address his arguments in turn.

5 The district court did not enter convictions for counts I and II because they are lesser-
included offenses of count III. The district court did not enter a conviction for count V
because count IV accounted for the same time period. The district court did not enter a
conviction for counts IX and XI because they are lesser-included offenses of count XV.
8
I.
Boysen first argues the state committed prosecutorial misconduct when it called him
a “sex offender” during closing argument. Boysen did not object during closing argument,
therefore, we apply the modified plain-error test. See State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242,
248 (Minn. 2023). Under this test, Boysen must show that the prosecutor’ s conduct
constituted (1) an error (2) that was plain. Id. An error is plain if it “contravenes case law,
a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn 2006).
If Boysen successfully establishes plain error, “the burden then shifts to the [s]tate
to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.” Portillo,
998 N.W.2d at 248 (quotation omitted). Misconduct does not affect substantial rights if
“there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would
have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Ramey , 721 N.W.2d at 302
(quotation omitted). To determine whether a reasonable likelihood exists, “we consider
the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper
suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the
improper suggestions.” Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 251 (quotation omitted). If the state fails
to meet its burden, we “will not grant relief to correct the error unless our failure to do so
will cause the public to seriously question the fairness and integrity of our judicial system.”
Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 359 (Minn. 2022).
Boysen argues the state committed misconduct when the prosecutor stated during
closing argument:
9
Now, the defense wants you to believe [stepdaughter’s
husband], the sex offender. A red herring. Don’t fall for it.
Don’t look at this sex offender, look at this one.

Then, during rebuttal, the prosecutor proceeded to say:
All right. [Stepdaughter’s husband] . . . Again, ignore this sex
offender, look at this sex offender. No, we’re here about this
sex offender, right here. This guy, [Boysen].

We agree with Boysen that these statements constituted plain-error misconduct. In
State v. Ture, during closing argument, the prosecutor called the defendant a “rapist and
murderer” and a “predator” to attack the veracity of the defendant’s testimony. 353
N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984). The supreme court concluded these statements were
improper. Id. at 516-17. The statements here are analogous. By calling Boysen a “sex
offender,” the state improperly attacked Boysen’s character and implied6 that Boysen had
a previous CSC conviction, which he did not. See Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 20 (Minn.
2004) (“Character attacks are improper during closing argument.”); see also State v.
Duncan, 608 N.W.2d 551, 555 (Minn. App. 2000) (stating evidence of prior bad acts may
not be used “to attack the defendant’s character or to establish a criminal propensity”), rev.
denied (Minn. May 16, 2000). While we agree with the state that a prosecutor is “not
required to make a colorless argument,” see State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127 (Minn.
1998), calling a defendant a “sex offender” in this manner is an improper character attack.

6 During closing, the prosecutor compared Boysen to stepdaughter’s husband, who the jury
knew to be a convicted sex offender; thus—as Boysen argues —the prosecutor seemingly
implied that Boysen was also a previously convicted “sex offender.”
10
Because we conclude that it was plain error to repeatedly call Boysen a “sex
offender,” we must determine whether the state met its burden to show the error did not
affect Boysen’s substantial rights. We conclude the state met its burden.
First, the error was not pervasive. The two statements made up a small portion of
the state’s closing argument, which spanned approximately 17 pages of the trial transcript.
Second, the state presented strong evidence to support Boysen’s convictions.
Stepson and stepdaughter testified in detail about the abuse. S tepdaughter’s account was
corroborated by text messages. And Boysen’s internet search history—which was also
introduced a trial—further supported the convictions, revealing both that he looked up the
punishment for a first-time child sex offender and had numerous searches for pornographic
material involving stepfamilies.
Third, Boysen had an “opportunity to respond” to the improper statements because
the first “sex offender” statement was made before Boysen’s closing argument. See
Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 251-54. And although the state repeated its improper suggestion
in rebuttal, the later statement “reiterated earlier points” to which Boysen had an
opportunity to respond. See State v. Thompson, 3 N.W.3d 257, 264 (Minn. 2024).
Finally, “[w]here the jury has acquitted the [defendant] of some counts, but
convicted the [defendant] of others, we view the verdicts as an indication that the members
of the jury were not unduly inflamed by the prosecutor’s comments.” See State v.
Washington, 521 N.W.2d 35, 40 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted). Here, the jury did not
convict Boysen on all counts; rather, Boysen was acquitted of several counts related to
stepdaughter.
11
For these reasons, we conclude Boysen is not entitled to a new trial because the
state’s error did not affect his substantial rights.
II.

Boysen argues second that the district court violated section 609.035, subdivision 1,
when it imposed sentences on certain offenses on the ground that they arose from the same
behavioral incident. We review this issue de novo. State v. Branch, 942 N.W.2d 711, 713
(Minn. 2020).
Under section 609.035, subdivision 1, except under circumstances which do not
apply here, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this
state, the person may be punished for only one of the offenses.” The supreme court has
explained that “the law generally prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences,
for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.” State
v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
To determine whether two intentional crimes constitute a single behavioral incident,
we evaluate the incident’s timing and location and whether the conduct aimed to achieve a
single criminal objective. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011). “The
application of this test depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.” Id. When a district court imposes multiple sentences, the state bears the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses were not part of a single
behavioral incident. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d at 270. We address Boysen’s challenges related
to stepson and stepdaughter separately below.
12
A. Stepson
The district court imposed the following convictions and sentences with regard to
stepson.
Count I Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(a)
(2014)
First-degree CSC –
penetration or contact with
person under 13;
actor > 36 months older

Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(consecutive)

Count II Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(a)
(2016)
First-degree CSC –
penetration or contact with
person under 13;
actor > 36 months older
Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(consecutive)

Count III Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(a)
(2016)
First-degree CSC –
penetration or contact with
person under 13;
actor > 36 months older
Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(concurrent)

Count IV Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(a)
(2014)
First-degree CSC –
penetration or contact with
person under 13;
actor > 36 months older
Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(consecutive)

Count V Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(a)
(2016)
First-degree CSC –
penetration or contact with
person under 13;
actor > 36 months older
Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(concurrent)

Count VI Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343,
subd. 1(h)(iii)
(2014)
Second-degree CSC –
contact with person under 16;
significant relationship;
multiple acts
Convicted,
sentenced to
90 months
(consecutive)

Boysen argues the district court erred when it imposed a separate sentence for
count VI because the state did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
13
behavioral incidents punished under counts I through V were also not used to sustain a
conviction for count VI, which required proving multiple acts. The state disagrees, arguing
Boysen’s argument “ignores how these charges were presented to the jury.”
In State v. Suhon, we concluded that, in a criminal-sexual-conduct case, the state
may charge a defendant with multiple counts for each extended period of abuse, and that
“the abuse . . . charged in separate counts covering different segments of the victim’s
childhood is not a single behavioral incident.” 742 N.W.2d 16, 22-23 (Minn. App. 2007),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008) (emphasis added). And we further stated that “[m]ultiple
acts against the same victim do not constitute a single behavioral incident when the
individual acts are separated by time and place,” including when incidents occur “in
different rooms” within the same house and “at different times.” Id. at 24.
Boysen contends that Suhon does not control the outcome here because it did not
involve a charge—like count VI— that included the entire time period. We disagree.
Here, the jury instructions and pronounced convictions demonstrate that
• Count I regarded the genital-rubbing conduct between
September 1, 2014, and September 1, 2016;
• Count II regarded the anal-penetration conduct between
September 1, 2017, and June 1, 2019, in one location;
• Count III regarded the anal-penetration conduct
between September 1, 2017, and June 1, 2019, in
another location;
7

7 Stepson testified that the anal-penetration conduct occurred in the bedroom and the
bathroom.
14
• Count IV regarded the fellatio conduct between
September 1, 2015, and September 1, 2016, in one
location;
• Count V regarded the fellatio conduct between
September 1, 2016, and September 1, 2018, in another
location;8
• Count VI regarded the genital -stroking conduct
between September 1, 2014, and September 1, 2019.
At trial, the state presented the following evidence with regard to the genital- stroking
conduct. After testifying about the genital-rubbing, fellatio, and anal-penetration conduct,
the state asked stepson whether Boysen did “anything else with him.” Stepson then
described the genital-stroking conduct, stating “[s]ometimes [Boysen] would . . . have me
jerk off his genitals.” Stepson stated that the genital-stroking conduct took place on the
couch and Boysen’s bedroom. Then, during closing argument the state stressed that
count VI was for when Boysen “would make [stepson] masturbate him with his hand.” At
sentencing, the district court reiterated that count VI was for Boysen forcing stepson “to
give [him] a hand job.”
We conclude the state established by a preponderance of the evidence that count VI
was for the genital- stroking conduct, which comprised distinct behavioral incidents that
were not accounted for in the other convictions and sentences. Stepson’s testimony
described the genital-stroking conduct without regard to the other incidents. See State v.
Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 266 (Minn. 2020) (determining victim’s testimony supported
that the two penetration incidents that occurred in the same location did not occur at

8 Stepson testified that the fellatio conduct occurred in the bedroom and the bathroom.
15
substantially the same time because victim described each incident “without any mention”
of the other). Further, stepson’s testimony regarding the genital-stroking conduct alone
established that Boysen committed a single act of sexual contact and multiple acts of sexual
abuse,9 which the state needed to prove to sustain a conviction on count VI. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(h)(iii) (2014). Accordingly, the district court did not err when it
imposed a sentence for count VI.
B. Stepdaughter
The district court imposed the following convictions and sentences with regard to
stepdaughter.
Count I Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(g)
(2018)

First-degree CSC – penetration
with person under 16;
significant relationship

Found guilty,
no adjudication

Count II Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(b)
(2018)

First-degree CSC – penetration
with person between 13-15;
position of authority

Found guilty,
no adjudication

Count III Minn. Stat.
§ 609.342,
subd. 1(h)(iii)
(2018)
First-degree CSC – penetration
with person under 16;
significant relationship;
multiple acts
Convicted,
sentenced to
144 months
(concurrent)

Count IV Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343,
subd. 1(h)(iii)
(2018)
Second-degree CSC –
contact with person under 16;
significant relationship;
multiple acts
Convicted,
sentenced to
90 months
(consecutive)

9 We have defined “sexual abuse” as either sexual penetration or sexual contact. State v.
Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 520, 524-25 (Minn. App. 1988), rev. denied (Minn. June 10, 1988).
16
Count V Minn. Stat.
§ 609.343,
subd. 1(g)
(2018)

Second-degree CSC –
contact with person under 16;
significant relationship

Found guilty,
no adjudication

Count VI Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344,
subd. 1(a)
(2022)
Third-degree CSC –
penetration; coercion
Convicted,
sentenced to
90 months
(consecutive)

Count IX Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344,
subd. 1a(e)
(Supp. 2021)
Third-degree CSC –
penetration with person
between 16-17;
actor > 36 months older;
position of authority

Found guilty,
no adjudication

Count XI Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344,
subd. 1a(e)
(Supp. 2021)
Third-degree CSC –
penetration with person
between 16-17;
actor > 36 months older;
position of authority

Found guilty,
no adjudication

Count
XV
Minn. Stat.
§ 609.344,
subd. 1a(g)(iii)
(Supp. 2021)
Third-degree CSC –
penetration with person
between 16-17;
significant relationship;
multiple acts

Convicted,
sentenced to
48 months
(consecutive)

Boysen argues the district court erred when it sentenced Boysen for count III
because it is part of the same behavioral incident as count IV. The state argues that these
counts are not part of the same behavioral incident because count III relates to the vaginal-
penetration conduct and count IV relates to the sexual-touching conduct.
17
Here, the jury instructions and pronounced convictions demonstrate that
• Count III regarded the sexual-penetration conduct that
occurred between 2018 and 2020;
• Count IV regarded the sexual-touching conduct that
occurred between 2018 and 2020;
• Count VI regarded a specific instance of sexual
penetration that occurred on or about July 13, 2023; and
• Count XV regarded the sexual-penetration conduct that
occurred between April 21, 2022, and April 8, 2023.
At trial, the state presented the following evidence regarding the sexual-penetration and
sexual-touching conduct that occurred between 2018 and 2020. Stepdaughter testified that,
starting in 2018 (when she was 13 years old), Boysen would rub his erect genitals between
her legs until he ejaculated. Stepdaughter stated that this conduct occurred weekly until
2020, when she turned 15 years old. At that time, Boysen began vaginally penetrating her.
Stepdaughter recalled that the vaginal-penetration conduct occurred in the bathroom and
Boysen’s bedroom. In line with this testimony, the district court instructed the jury that
for count I II the jury must find that “the sexual abuse involved multiple acts of sexual
penetration committed over an extended period of time.” (Emphasis added.) And the
district court instructed the jury on count IV that the jury must find Boysen “engaged in
sexual contact with [stepdaughter],” which includes “touching by [stepdaughter] of
[Boysen’s] intimate parts,” and that “the sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed
over an extended period of time.” (Emphasis added.)
We conclude the state established by a preponderance of the evidence that count III
and count IV involved separate acts and comprised distinct behavioral incidents. See
18
Suhon, 742 N.W.2d at 24 (providing that “[m]ultiple acts against the same victim do not
constitute a single behavioral incident when the individual acts are separated by time and
place.”). Stepdaughter’s testimony described discrete conduct—penetration and sexual
touching. See Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 266. And stepdaughter’s testimony satisfied all
the elements for both offenses. See Minn. Stat. § § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii), .343,
subd. 1(h)(iii) (2018).
Boysen disagrees, arguing that—without a special verdict form—the state cannot
establish that the multiple acts of sexual abuse supporting one conviction were not used to
support the other.10 Our nonprecedential opinion in State v. Lufkins is persuasive on this
point. No. A19-1809, 2020 WL 4743496, at *6 (Minn. App. Aug. 17, 2020), aff’d on other
grounds, 963 N.W.2d 205 (Minn. 2021).11 There, the district court imposed sentences for
four criminal-sexual-conduct offenses that occurred in the same date range. Id. The
appellant argued that the district court erred when it imposed multiple sentences because
the jury did not use a special verdict form. Id. We rejected this argument, reasoning that
the state “only needed to show by a preponderance of the evidence . . . that [the appellant’s]
convictions arose out of separate behavioral incidents.” Id. at *7. We concluded that a
“review of the record satisfie[d] us that . . . the offenses underlying the convictions were
committed as part of four separate behavioral incidents.” Id.

10 Boysen relies on State v. Penn, A15-1775, 2016 WL 4497250, at *1 (Minn. App. Aug.
29, 2016). But Penn involved stalking and arson charges and is, therefore, distinguishable.
11 Nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
19
Like in Lufkins, after reviewing the record, we conclude the record demonstrates
that the state showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct underlying
count III and count IV involved separate acts that were not part of the same behavioral
incident. Based upon the trial testimony and jury instructions, it is clear that cou nt III
related to the vaginal-penetration conduct and count IV related to sexual-touching conduct.
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it sentenced Boysen for count III.
III.
Finally, Boysen argues the district court imposed excessive and unjustifiable
sentences when it imposed a 522-month prison term for the counts related to stepson, a
372-month prison term for the counts related to stepdaughter, and then ordered the
sentences to run consecutively, for a total of an 894-month prison term.
We will interfere with the district court’s sentencing decision only when the
sentence is “disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct.” State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted);
see also Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2024) (permitting appellate review of sentence
to determine if it is “unreasonable” or “excessive”). We review the district court’s
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 322
(Minn. 2009). To assess whether the district court abused its discretion, we “look to past
sentences received by other offenders,” id., and rely on our “collective, collegial experience
in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts, ”
State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Minn. 1982).
20
Boysen relies on Barthman to argue that any sentence over 600 months is excessive
and unjustifiable. 917 N.W.2d 119 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d on other grounds, 938 N.W.2d
257 (Minn. 2020). There, Barthman was convicted of six counts of CSC (three first-degree
and three second-degree counts) for sexually abusing his disabled daughter. Id. at 124.
The abuse began when the victim was nine years old and continued for approximately three
years. Id. at 123-24. Barthman touched victim’s breasts and between her legs, and
penetrated victim with his genitals and other objects. Id. at 124. The district court
sentenced Barthman to consecutive 360-month prison terms on two of the first-degree
charges for a cumulative 720-month prison term. Id. Barthman appealed, arguing his
sentence was excessive. Id. We agreed and remanded for the district court to impose a
lower sentence on one count.12 Id. at 132. After resentencing, Barthman appealed again.
We reversed, concluding that the 704-month sentence was excessive, and remanded with
directions for the district court to impose a sentence not exceeding 600 months. State v.
Barthman, No. A21-1121, 2022 WL 1073225, at *3, *5 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2022), rev.
denied (Minn. June 29, 2022) (hereinafter, Barthman II).
Boysen contends his sentences must be reversed and remanded to impose lower
sentences because his aggregated sentences are significantly longer than the maximum
600-month prison term that we approved in Barthman II. We are not persuaded.

12 The supreme court affirmed this case on other grounds but notably agreed with our
conclusion that that the sentence “unduly exaggerated the criminality of Barthman’s
conduct.” See Barthman, 938 N.W.2d at 275 n.6.
21
Here, Boysen’s argument urges us to evaluate his aggregate sentences in light of
Barthman II. But, unlike Barthman II, this case involves two victims.13 Moreover,
considering the facts of stepson’s case alone, the sentence complied with Barthman II.
While stepson was not disabled—like the child in Barthman II —the abuse against stepson
involved more acts, continued for a longer period of time, and began when the stepson was
a younger age. And regarding stepdaughter, like in Barthman II, the sexual abuse involved
numerous instances of both sexual contact and penetration; but Boysen received a lower
sentence in stepdaughter’s case than in Barthman II, even though the abuse spanned a
longer time period—five years. See Fardan, 773 N.W.2d at 322 (providing we look to past
sentences received by other offenders to assess whether an abuse of discretion occurred).
We must also consider our “collective, collegial experience” when evaluating
whether these sentences exaggerate Boysen’s criminality. See Norton, 328 N.W.2d at 146-
47. While the district court imposed long aggregate sentences, we must evaluate these
sentences in context. See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1998) (“A [district]
court’s decision regarding permissive, consecutive sentences will not be disturbed unless
the resulting sentence unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”).

13 Boysen cites only one case, State v. Kindred, that involved two victims to support that
his sentences are excessive. No. A14-2212, 2016 WL 22239, *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 4, 2016).
There, the defendant abused the two victims “on multiple occasions over the course of
approximately ten years.” Id. The defendant was convicted on two counts of first-degree
CSC (one for each victim), and he received sentences for two 144-month prison terms,
which the district court ran consecutively for a total of 288 months in prison. Id. Thus,
Kindred is consistent with the district court’s decision in this case to impose consecutive
sentences for two different victims. And the difference in the length of sentences is
attributable to the number of convictions—two for Kindred and ten for Boysen.
22
This case involves a trial where two different cases were joined at the defendant’s request.
The jury found that the defendant committed extensive and prolonged sexual abuse against
two different victims. And the district court imposed sentences for the two different
cases—a 522-month prison term for the counts related to stepson and a 372-month prison
term for the counts related to stepdaughter —both of which are consistent with the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and our prior single -victim caselaw.14 And Boysen
offers no case—and we find none in our review—to support that the cumulative length of
his aggregate sentences are comparatively excessive under factually similar circumstances.
The district court did not impose excessive and unjustifiable aggregate sentences simply
because Boysen elected to have the two cases joined. Accordingly, we conclude the length
of sentence s imposed was within the district court’s discretion and did not unduly
exaggerate his criminality under these circumstances.
Affirmed.

14 These sentences are in line with State v. Rakowiecki, No. A24-1040, 2026 WL 797064,
at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 23, 2026) (ordering a sentence not to exceed 504-months in prison),
rev. granted in part on other grounds and stayed, rev. denied in part (Minn. June 17, 2026),
and State v. Kellogg, No. A03-16, 2004 WL 422703, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 9, 2004)
(ordering a sentence of 537-months in prison), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2004). Both
Rakowiecki and Kellogg involved a single victim.