In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: C. B. B. and M. C. P., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1396

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: C. B. B. and M. C. P., Parents.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-JV-25-41

Jennifer L. Thompson, JLT Law & Mediation, Litchfield, Minnesota (for appellant C.B.B.)

Abby Wikelius, Lyon County Attorney, Julianna F. Passe, Assistant County Attorney,
Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent Southwest Health and Human Services)

Shanna Latterell, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Rasmusson, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
On appeal from the termination of her parental rights, appellant mother challenges
the district court’s determination that respondent county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child, that termination is supported by three

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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separate statutory grounds, and that termination is in the best interests of the child. We
affirm.
FACTS
This appeal arises from the termination of appellant C.B.B.’s parental rights to her
child, K.J.B., born in 2024.1 The following summary is taken from the district court’s
findings of fact in its order terminating mother’s parental rights and the evidence presented
at trial.
County’s Involvement with the Family
Respondent Southwest Health and Human Services (the county) became involved
with the family in 2023, after receiving a report that mother tested positive for marijuana
while pregnant with the child. After the child’s birth in February 2024, the county learned
that mother had a prior termination of parental rights to an older child. A social worker
met with mother to check on the child. The social worker had safety concerns about the
child’s environment. When the social worker returned for a second visit, she noticed that
mother had not made any changes in the home to correct the county’s safety concerns.
The county was also concerned about the presence of domestic violence in the
household. In December 2023, while she was still pregnant with the child, mother called
the police to report that she had been assaulted by the child’s father. Father was arrested
for domestic assault and the district court subsequently issued a domestic abuse no contact

1 Father voluntarily terminated his parental rights to the child and is not a party to this
appeal. Mother also has an older child. Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights
to her older child in 2020.
3
order (DANCO) against father. Between December 2023 and November 2024, police
officers responded to about six emergency calls involving mother and father. The child
was present during some of the incidents that led to the emergency calls. For example, in
April 2024, law enforcement responded to a call about a dispute between mother and father
during which the child’s stroller was “violently” shoved. Officers observed that the child
was not fastened into the stroller. Father was arrested for violating the DANCO. Officers
administered a drug test to mother, which returned positive results for amphetamine and
THC. The following day, the child was placed in a non-relative foster home.
Following the child’s removal from the home, the county developed an out-of-home
placement plan. The plan required mother to: address her chemical dependency, address
her mental health, provide a safe and secure home for the child, cooperate with the county
and the guardian ad litem (GAL), maintain contact with the child, and refrain from
engaging in domestic violence. The out- of-home placement plan included similar
provisions for father. The county filed the plan with the court in May 2024.
Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Petition and Order
Shortly after, the county filed a CHIPS petition. In June 2024, following a court
trial, the district court adjudicated the child CHIPS. The CHIPS determination was based
on mother’s admission at trial that her issues with domestic violence were negatively
impacting her ability to properly parent the child. The district court concluded that: “It is
in the best interests and safety of the child to remain in foster care until [mother] can
provide a safe environment for her child, demonstrated through her substantial compliance
with” the case plan. The district court ordered the county to provide reasonable efforts to
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reunify the family. The district court also ordered mother to follow the May 2024 case
plan.
In January 2025, the county created an updated case plan , which identified similar
issues and goals as the existing case plan. First, the case plan required mother to address
her chemical dependency by maintaining her sobriety, abstaining from alcohol and drugs,
submitting to random drug tests , and completing chemical-use assessments. Second,
mother was required to address her mental health by continuing psychiatric assessments,
taking prescriptions as recommended, and attending therapy. Third, the case plan directed
mother to provide a safe and secure home for the child. Fourth, mother was required to
cooperate with the county and the GAL. Fifth, the case plan instructed mother to maintain
contact with the child. Sixth, mother was required to refrain from engaging in
domestic violence. The updated case plan was filed with, and approved by, the court in
February 2025.
Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) Petition and Order
In March 2025, approximately nine months after the CHIPS adjudication, the county
petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. The county alleged four separate statutory
grounds for termination: (1) failure to comply with the duties imposed by the parent and
child relationship; (2) palpable unfitness; (3) failure to correct the conditions that led to the
child’s out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts by the county; and (4) the child
is neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (3), (4), (7)
(2024). The petition further asserted that the county put forth reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate mother and reunify the family, and that termination was in the child’s best
5
interests. Mother entered a denial to the statutory grounds and factual allegations in the
petition during an admit/deny hearing.
In June and July 2025, the district court held a trial on the TPR petition. The parties
presented testimony from mother, a police officer, a special-education teacher, mother’s
service providers, social workers, and the GAL. The district court also received over 60
exhibits into evidence. At the time of trial, the child had been placed out of the home for
450 days.
On August 8, 2025, the district court filed a written order terminating mother’s
parental rights to the child. Based on the testimony from the county’s witnesses, which the
district court found credible and persuasive, t he district court concluded that the county
proved by clear and convincing evidence that three of the four statutory grounds set forth
in the petition for termination were met : mother was palpably unfit to be a party to the
parent and child relationship; mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s
out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts by the county; and the child was
neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3), (4), (7).
The district court further determined that the county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate mother and reunify the family. These efforts included, among others: case
management, housing resources and rent assistance, transportation services, parenting
time, parent mentoring, diagnostic assessments, chemical testing, and safety plans.
Finally, the district court concluded that termination of mother’s parental rights was
in the child’s best interests. The district court found that the child’s interests were not
served by delaying permanent placement; that mother had not demonstrated stable mental
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health or an “openness to services” to stabilize her mental health; that although mother
wanted to make changes, she was unable to do so; that the child was doing well in foster
care; and that the child deserved a safe and stable environment that mother co uld not
provide.
Based on its analysis of the statutory grounds for termination, the reasonable efforts
put forth by the county, and the best interests of the child, the district court ordered the
termination of mother’s parental rights to the child.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). To involuntarily terminate
parental rights, a district court must determine that: (1) the county made reasonable efforts
to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or that such efforts were not required; (2) at
least one of the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights exists; and (3) termination
is in the child’s best interests. Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8 (2024); .317,
subd. 1 (2024); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385
(Minn. 2008). Mother challenges the district court’s determination that each of the three
requirements for termination were met.
An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights “to
determine whether the district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether
the district court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly
erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is either
7
manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the
evidence as a whole.” In re Welfare of Child of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 660-61
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). In reviewing the district court’s factual findings, we
“view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,
963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021); see also In re Welfare of Child of J.H.,
968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a TPR appeal), rev.
denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). But, in reviewing the district court’s ultimate decision to
terminate parental rights, “[w]e give considerable deference to the district
court[] . . . .” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385; see also J.H., 968 N.W.2d at 600 (stating that we
review a district court’s ultimate decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of
discretion).
I. The district court’s determination that the county made reasonable efforts is
supported by the record.

Mother first challenges the district court’s determination that the county made
reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child. Prior to terminating
parental rights, a district court must rule that the county made reasonable efforts to
rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family or determine that reasonable efforts are not
statutorily required. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8; see also Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)
(2024); T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 664. Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere
matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,
727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,
2007). The efforts “must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that gave rise to out-of -
8
home placement, and they must conform to the problems presented.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012). In performing its evaluation of
whether a county’s efforts were reasonable, the district court must consider whether the
services offered were:
(1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
appropriate, the child;
(2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
family;
(3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the
child;
(4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
family;
(5) culturally appropriate;
(6) available and accessible;
(7) consistent and timely; and
(8) realistic under the circumstances.
Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2024) ; see also In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532
(Minn. App. 1990) (noting that courts also weigh “the length of the time the county was
involved and the quality of effort given”) , rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). “[W]hat
constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ depends on the facts of each case.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d at
601 (citation omitted). We review the district court’s determination about the
reasonableness of the county’s efforts for an abuse of discretion and the related findings of
fact for clear error. In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Minn.
App. 2015), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2015).
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In its written order, the district court ruled that the county made reasonable efforts
to reunify mother and child and to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home
placement. The se efforts included: case management, housing resources and rent
assistance, transportation services, supervised parenting time, parenting and diagnostic
assessments, counseling, chemical testing, safety plans, furniture, baby supplies, and
household goods and services. In addition, the district court found that the social worker
contacted mother one to three times per week, but that some of these communications were
unproductive due to mother’s “dysregulation and occasional non-responsiveness.” The
district court further found that, “[d]espite the provision of extensive mental health
services,” mother’s mental health was “unpredictable and dysregulated.” The court noted
that mother’s “explosive behavior can come out of nowhere with no identified trigger.” It
also found that mother struggled with developing parenting skills, despite the county’s
attempts to provide mother with parenting education. And the district court stated that
“[t]here was no evidence presented regarding any additional services that could reasonably
have been provided” to mother. Relying on these findings, the court determined that: “The
services provided have been reasonable, appropriate, and relevant to the safety and
protection of the child, adequate to meet the needs of the child and family, culturally
appropriate, and realistic under the circumstances, as required by Minn. Stat. § 260.012
[2024].”
Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in its factual findings or abuse its discretion in making its ultimate finding
that the county put forth reasonable efforts. The record includes ample testimony to
10
support the district court’s determination regarding the reasonableness of the county’s
efforts.
To persuade us otherwise, mother argues that the county’s reunification efforts were
not reasonable because the county restricted mother’s visits with the child in
November 2024 and did not allow her to have overnight visits. The county responds that
visitation was limited in November 2024 due to mother’s behavior and the county’s
continuing concerns for the child’s safety. The county further contends that the restrictions
on her visitation with the child do not render the county’s efforts unreasonable. We agree
with the county and conclude that mother has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion by
the district court.
The record shows that, in November 2024, mother called the police to report father
was being “verbally aggressive.” At the time of the call , the child was at mother’s
apartment for an unsupervised in-home visit. The social worker arranged for mother and
the child to go to a safe place for the night and instructed mother not to return to the
apartment because father was still there. Mother ignored the social worker’s instruction.
The next day, the social worker went to the apartment and heard the parents yelling at one
another. The child was also present. The social worker told mother that she was ending
the child’s in-home visit and took custody of the child. Mother stayed in the apartment
with father. Father was later charged with, and convicted of, domestic assault and violating
a DANCO.
Prior to the November incident, parenting time with the child had transitioned to
unsupervised in-home parenting time and the parties were working towards transitioning
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to a trial home visit. Mother is correct that the county cancelled the trial home visit
following the November 2024 incident. The testimony from the social worker also
establishes that, after the November 2024 incident, mother “was doing well” and the county
was “progress[ing] forward again to home visits.” But, in December 2024, the county
became concerned that mother was not abiding by the parenting- time rules. The county
arranged for the child’s therapeutic providers to accompany the social worker to mother’s
home to observe an at-home visit. During the visit, mother became angry, yelled and swore
at the providers, “was out of control,” ordered the social worker and providers to leave her
home, and made the providers feel unsafe in her home. After that incident, the social
worker had concerns about the child’s safety “due to the level of [mother’s] anger.” And,
in another incident, mother “exploded and was yelling and screaming” at a social worker
during a parenting-time exchange in May 2025. The social worker stated that the child
“was inconsolable for fifteen minutes.”
At the TPR trial, the social worker testified that mother’s “continued outbursts” and
failure to follow the county’s parenting-time rules prompted the county to “revert back to
supervised visits.” Mother remained on supervised visits at a third -party location at the
time of trial. Contrary to mother’s assertions, the record shows that the county tried to
transition to unsupervised home visits in an effort to reunify mother with the child. And
“what constitutes reasonable efforts depends on the facts of each case.” J.H., 968 N.W.2d
at 601 (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court found, and the record supports, that the county did not move
forward with overnight, in-home visitation because it had concerns about mother’s
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behavior and the child’s safety. Further, caselaw does not compel the county to provide
overnight visit s to render a county’s reunification efforts reasonable. See, e.g., In re
Welfare of M.A. , 408 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming the termination of
parental rights even in the absence of any visitation), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987).
Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the county put forth
reasonable rehabilitation and reunification efforts, notwithstanding the lack of
unsupervised, overnight visitation.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the district court’s factual findings regarding
the efforts the county made, and those findings support the district court’s determination
that the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family. We
therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the
county’s efforts were reasonable.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the county
established a statutory ground for termination of mother’s parental rights.

Mother next argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that
the county established at least one statutory ground for termination of mother’s parental
rights by clear and convincing evidence. This argument is unavailing.
To terminate parental rights, the district court must rule “that one or more” of
the statutory grounds for termination have been established by clear and convincing
evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b); In re Child. of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 708
(Minn. 2005) (“In reviewing a decision to terminate parental rights, the appellate court
determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support at least
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one statutory ground for termination . . . .”). If clear and convincing evidence supports at
least one of the statutory grounds, an appellate court need not address whether the other
statutory grounds are supported by the record. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (noting that
appellate courts “need only one properly supported statutory ground in order to affirm a
termination order”).
The district court concluded the county proved by clear and convincing evidence
that three of the four statutory grounds set forth in the petition for termination of mother’s
parental rights were met. Those three statutory grounds are: (1) palpable unfitness;
(2) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s out -of-home placement
despite reasonable efforts by the county; and (3) the child is neglected and in foster care.
2
See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3), (4), (7). We focus our analysis on the first
ground—palpable unfitness—and conclude the record supports the district court’s
determination that the county proved this ground by clear and convincing evidence.
A district court may terminate parental rights if “a parent is palpably unfit to be a
party to the parent and child relationship. ” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3).
Generally, a natural parent is presumed to be a “fit and suitable person to be entrusted with
the care of his or her child,” and the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that a parent is palpably unfit. In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995).
A parent may be palpably unfit if the county establishes there is “a consistent pattern of

2 The district court also concluded that the county did not prove the other statutory ground
included in the petition—that mother failed to comply with the duties imposed on the
parent and child relationship—by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(2).
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specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that , it appears,
will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the
welfare of the child.” T.R., 750 N.W.2d at 661 (discussing the 2006 version of the statutory
provision at issue here); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3) (including similar
language).
Here, the district court determined that mother was palpably unfit due to “a pattern
of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent
and child relationship . . . .” In support of this conclusion, the district court made findings
on mother’s unwillingness to take the steps needed to stabilize her mental health and
findings regarding her ongoing issues with anger and emotional volatility.
As to mother’s mental health, the district court found that she had been diagnosed
with ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. The district court
noted that mother had previously been placed in treatment, but was asked to leave prior to
completion. The district court acknowledged that mother was currently participating in
remote therapy. But the court found that mother sometimes attended the remote therapy
sessions during her parenting time and “multi -tasked therapy and child care.” The court
found that this was “not an effective way of focusing on [therapy].”
The district court also found that mother had “ongoing issues with anger and
dysregulation that adversely affect her ability to care for and parent the child.” The district
court found that mother frequently became angry with the social worker, the GAL, and the
service providers, and “scream[ed] and yell[ed ] at providers.” The district court pointed
specifically to an incident in December 2024 when the social worker and the child’s
15
therapeutic providers visited mother in the home to observe a parenting-time visit. Mother
became angry during the visit, was not receptive to the provider’s advice, yelled and swore
at the provider, and ordered them to leave her home. The district court credited the
testimony that the provider felt she had to leave because mother “was out of control and
yelling,” and the provider “felt unsafe in the home.” The district court found that the child
was present during some of these incidents, including the December 2024 visit. The district
court also found that mother “ha[d] no insight into how her anger outbursts affect[] the
child.”
The district court determined that these conditions—including mother’s inability to
address her mental health, her emotional volatility, and her anger issues—were “of a
duration or nature” that rendered mother “unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to
care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child.”
These findings are amply supported by the record. Mother completed a diagnostic
assessment, which recommended in-person therapy services. The assessor recommended
that mother complete a course of dialectical behavioral therapy (DBT), which is a
specialized type of therapy for individuals with substance- abuse issues or issues with
emotional management. Mother’s mental-health provider testified that she was providing
therapy to mother at the time of trial. But the provider refused to speak with mother’s
social worker or GAL, or respond to their emails. Mother’s provider testified that some of
the therapy appointments were held during mother’s visitation with the child, and that
mother sometimes got distracted by the child during the sessions. These visits were held
remotely and mother did not have any in-person meetings with her provider. The social
16
worker testified that she had not noticed any changes in mother’s functioning or level of
volatility since beginning therapy.
The record also supports the district court’s findings that mother cannot control her
anger issues. The social worker testified to incidents where mother was “volatile” around
the child. The social worker testified about mother’s visit with the child’s providers, during
which mother “exploded and was yelling and screaming” at the social worker. The social
worker stated that the child, who was present, was “[v]ery, very, very upset” and crying.
The social worker was also concerned that mother’s outbursts could be directed at the child.
In sum, the district court’s palpable-unfitness determination is supported by clear and
convincing evidence.
Mother makes three arguments as to why the district court abused its discretion
when it determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that mother was palpably
unfit under section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(3). None of her arguments are persuasive.
First, mother claims that the district court’s order is conclusory and lacks
particularized findings. We disagree. The district court made multiple, specific findings
of fact to support its termination decision. T he order refutes mother’s contention that the
district court’s analysis is conclusory.
Second, mother argues that the district court erred as a matter of law when it ruled
that she is palpably unfit. In support of this argument, she notes that the district court
determined that the county did not prove one of the other statutory grounds for termination
included in its petition —that she “substantially, continuously, or repeatedly refused or
neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon [ her] by the parent and child
17
relationship.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (permitting termination based on
a parent’s inability to fulfill the duties imposed by the parent and child relationship). And
she claims that, because the district court found that this statutory ground had not been
satisfied, it reasonably follows that none of the other statutory grounds alleged in the
petition, including palpable unfitness, could be satisfied. Mother does not provide any
legal support for this argument, nor are we aware of any. Rather, caselaw instructs that a
parent’s parental rights may be terminated based on clear and convincing evidence that one
statutory ground, alone, has been satisfied. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385 (noting that an
appellate court will affirm a termination decision “when at least one statutory ground for
termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence”).
We further note that the statutory grounds for termination based on palpable
unfitness and neglect focus on separate and distinct parenting concerns. Palpable unfitness
requires a showing that the parent is unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship
due to a consistent pattern of specific conduct that is of such a duration or nature that
renders the parent unable to appropriately care for the child’s physical, mental, or
emotional needs. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4). Neglect of parental duties, on the
other hand, requires proof that a parent has substantially, continuously, or repeatedly
refused or neglected to comply with duties imposed by the parent and child relationship.
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Here, the findings of the district court in support of
palpable unfitness do not arise from neglect of the child but rather from mother’s ongoing
inability to control her anger or demonstrate stable mental health. For these reasons, this
argument is not persuasive.
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Third, mother asserts that the district court did not base its decision on the conditions
that existed at the time of trial. She claims that the district court instead “relied heavily”
on mother’s prior child-protection history. We are unpersuaded. In a termination
proceeding, the district court must address the conditions as they exist at the time of trial
and consider whether the current conditions “will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate
period.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901-02 (Minn. App. 2011)
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). The district court followed that
instruction here. At trial, the social worker testified about mother’s “outbursts and
inappropriate behavior” with the child. The social worker testified that she did not believe
mother could meet the child’s needs on a full-time basis. The GAL also indicated that she
had “concerns” about mother’s ability to parent the child “now or in the foreseeable future.”
The district court credited this testimony, finding that mother’s “mental health remains
unpredictable and dysregulated.” The district court concluded that mother was “unable,
for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care appropriately for the ongoing physical,
mental, or emotional needs of the child.” Based on the record, mother’s argument that the
district court did not consider the conditions at the time of trial is not compelling.
Because the record amply supports the district court’s findings, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that clear and convincing
evidence supports termination of mother’s parental rights based on palpable unfitness. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(3).
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III. The district court did not abuse its discretion in its best-interests ruling.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
terminating her parental rights is in the best interests of the child. We are not persuaded.
A child’s best interests are the “paramount consideration” in termination
proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a)
(2024). A district court may not terminate parental rights unless doing so is in the child’s
best interests. See In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D., 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn.
App. 2009). Courts evaluate three factors when making this determination regarding a
child who is not an Indian child: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent and child
relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the parent and child relationship; and
(3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). The
competing interests of the child “include such things as a stable environment, health
considerations and the child’s preferences.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905 (quotation
omitted). Any “conflicts between the rights of the child and rights of the parents are
resolved in favor of the child.” Id. at 902.
On appeal, we review the district court’s best-interests determination for an abuse
of discretion. Id. at 905. “Because the best-interests analysis involves credibility
determinations and is generally not susceptible to an appellate court ’s global review of a
record, we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” In re Welfare of
Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 92 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted).
The district court made findings of fact on each of the best-interests factors . In
considering the first factor, the district court found that the child is “doing well in foster
20
care.” As to mother’s interest in preserving her relationship with the child, the district court
acknowledged that mother has “an apparent desire to make changes.” Yet the district court
found that she is “simply unable to make the necessary changes that would allow her to
safely parent the child.” Finally, the district court found that the child’s best interests would
not be served “by delaying her availability for permanent placement.” On balance, the
district court determined that termination was in the child’s best interests because the child
“requires and deserves a safe and stable environment” that mother is “unable to provide.”
Mother does not directly challenge the district court’s best- interests findings on
appeal. Instead, she broadly asserts that adoption may have negative effects on children.
She further contends that the district court’s ultimate determination based on the
best-interests factors is “speculative, short-sighted, and potentially dangerous” for the
child. We are not persuaded that these arguments entitle mother to relief. Rather, the
evidence and testimony presented at trial support the district court’s findings on the best-
interests factors. And on review, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the district court. See Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607
N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that in the context of child-custody matters,
the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s
balancing of best-interests considerations”).
We are satisfied that the district court carefully weighed the competing interests of
mother and the child in making its best-interests findings, and those findings are supported
by clear and convincing evidence in the record. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the district court’s determination that the child’s best interests favor termination.
21
In sum, mother has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in
terminating her parental rights. The record supports the district court’s determination that
the county made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify the family, at least
one statutory ground supports termination, and termination is in the best interests of the
child. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
terminating mother’s parental rights.
Affirmed.