Chad Wosmek, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1401

Chad Wosmek,
Relator,

vs.

City of Fifty Lakes,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed April 20, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51628497-3

Chad M. Wosmek, Emily, Minnesota (pro se relator)

City of Fifty Lakes, Fifty Lakes, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Relator challenges the decision of an unemployment -law judge (ULJ) that he was
ineligible for unemployment benefits because he was discharged for the employment
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misconduct of violating employer requests to stop bullying people. Relator argues that
(1) the ULJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence or (2) alternatively, the ULJ
should have ordered an additional hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
These facts are based on the findings of the ULJ, some of which are disputed, and
we address whether there is substantial evidence to support the ULJ’s findings in our
analysis below. Relator Chad Wosmek was employed by respondent City of Fifty Lakes
(the city) as a full-time maintenance supervisor from January 3, 2018 , until his discharge
on March 19, 2025. He earned $32.31 per hour. Wosmek is 6 feet and 5 inches tall and
weighs 300 pounds.
In early March 2025, Wosmek was asked by an employee at a municipal liquor store
to change out a sign. When the employee asked Wosmek the following day to restore the
original sign, Wosmek reacted negatively, entering into an intimidating body posture an d
tone that visibly frightened the employee. The mayor of the city intervened and directed
Wosmek to change the sign after observing that the employee appeared frightened by
Wosmek’s demeanor.
On March 6, 2025, Wosmek visited a hardware store and requested to speak with
the owner. One of the store’s employees told Wosmek that the owner was not available.
Wosmek then requested a discount for buying in bulk for the city. After the store employee
declined to authorize an additional discount beyond the typical 10%, Wosmek continued
to argue and began using his size to physically intimidate her. He concluded the
confrontation by threatening to plow snow to block the owner’s driveway and then left the
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store. The store employee reported the incident to the owner, who contacted the city to
complain.
On March 19, 2025, the city discharged Wosmek based on his continued pattern of
bullying behavior and use of his physical size to intimidate others. Respondent Department
of Employment and Economic Development ( DEED) initially determined Wosmek
eligible for unemployment benefits. Specifically, DEED determined that
[t]he employer discharged the applicant during the week
beginning 03/16/2025 because of an argument. The
applicant’s conduct was not a serious violation of the standards
of behavior that the employer had the right to reasonably
expect of the employee, or it was a single incident that had no
significant adverse effect on the employment.

The city appealed the initial determination, and a de novo hearing was held on May
28, 2025. At the hearing, when asked by the ULJ whether he had witnesses to call,
Wosmek stated that he did not. The ULJ also informed Wosmek of his right to request a
continuance to secure witnesses, which Wosmek declined to do.
Three witnesses testified for the city about instances in which Wosmek was accused
of using his physical stature to intimidate coworkers and third parties when he became
angry. Following the hearing, the ULJ found that Wosmek engaged in a pattern of bullying
and intimidating behavior. In making this determination, the ULJ specifically found that
the witnesses for the city testified credibly in a clear, consistent, and straightforward
manner, and that Wosmek’s testimony was not credible. The ULJ then concluded that
Wosmek was discharged for employment misconduct and was ineligible for
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unemployment benefits, resulting in a n overpayment of benefits. On reconsideration, the
ULJ affirmed the decision. This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
Wosmek challenges whether the ULJ’s determination that he is ineligible for
unemployment benefits because of employee misconduct is supported by substantial
evidence and whether the ULJ abused its discretion by declining to order an additional
hearing. This court reviews an unemployment -benefits determination to determine
whether a relator’s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are affected by an error of law or are unsupported by substantial
evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024).
I. The ULJ’s decision that Wosmek is ineligible for unemployment benefits
because of employee misconduct is supported by substantial evidence and not
based on legal error.

“Employment misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent
conduct, on the job or off the job, that displays a serious violation of the standards of
behavior the employer has the right to reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. St at.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2024). An employee discharged for employment misconduct is
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2024).
Whether an employee committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of
law and fact. Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). On appeal,
we defer to the ULJ’s credibility determinations and will uphold the ULJ’s findings of fact
if they are supported by substantial evidence. Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340,
344 (Minn. App. 2016) . Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers
Cmty. Action, Inc., 917 N.W.2d 813, 816 n.4 (Minn. App. 2018) (emphasis and quotation
omitted). But we review de novo whether the facts found by the ULJ constitute
employment misconduct. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. , 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn.
2002).
Wosmek contends that the ULJ erred in finding that he engaged in employment
misconduct because he did not engage in a pattern of bullying or intimidating behavior.
We disagree. A councilmember for the city testified that Wosmek was “mean and
belligerent” toward the hardware store employee. When asked about the liquor store
incident, the councilmember testified that Wosmek “kind of puffed up his chest. [He] is a
very large person to begin with. And he was just very intimidating to the person, to the
point that she actually addressed her manager on the subject.”
The mayor of the city testified that the hardware store employee was “very visibly
upset” during Wosmek’s outburst. When asked about whether there were any other
incidents that the ULJ should know about, the mayor testified:
[Wosmek] was always quite intimidating. He’s a large
guy when people would talk to him and employees, yeah, its
just. And his representation of the city, he, he, you know, in
’19, we had a problem. In ’25, we, we had a problem where it
was mentioned in write -ups. And there was a lot of them in
between those times that didn’t get write, written up or
mentioned. I know I witnessed it many times. Like I said, I
knew that in that one instance with the manager where I stayed.
I knew what was going to happen, so that’s why I kind of stuck
around for her because. I had witnessed it in the past that he
would kind of. Kind of get puffed up, maybe a little bullyish,
I guess.

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The clerk of the city testified that Wosmek’s temper had made her cry on prior
occasions and that his behavior created anxiety in the workplace. Specifically, the clerk
testified that:
I’ve worked with [Wosmek] since he started. I’ve been
here since ’99. And just, you know, good days but bad days,
because of [Wosmek]’s, I would call it his temper. I’ve been a
victim of it. You know, he’s made me cry on occasion, which
is highly unusual for me. And it could, it just, it made,
workplace, it made it difficult. And I was there the day that he
puffed up to [the liquor store employee] and I took off. I
couldn’t even, it gave me anxiety because I just, it’s just too
much in the workplace.

The clerk also described an incident where she asked Wosmek to move a bandstand
and he “slammed his hand on the counter, yelling at me, and slammed both doors, leaving.”
The ULJ was entitled to credit this testimony. “Credibility determinations are the
exclusive province of the ULJ and will not be disturbed on appeal.” Bangston v. Allina
Med. Grp., 766 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. App. 2009) (quoting Skarhus at 345.) Appellate
courts defer to the ULJ’s credibility findings when supported by substantial evidence.
Ywswf v. Teleplan Wireless Servs., Inc ., 726 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 200 7). The
court “may not weigh that evidence on review.” Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Ca re
Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995).
The ULJ set forth detailed reasons why the testimony of the employer’s witnesses
was more credible than Wosmek’s testimony. The ULJ explicitly determined that “[f]or
Wosmek’s testimony to be true, it would require that everyone else was lying. There is no
clear reason everyone would lie about him. The most probable explanation of events is
that Wosmek behaved as alleged.” Furthermore, the ULJ found that witnesses for the city
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“all testified in a clear and straightforward manner without anything to suggest inaccuracy
or deception.” The ULJ also noted that their witness testimony was consistent with the
written submissions and “presented a logical sequence of events that culminated in
Wosmek being discharged.” Therefore, the ULJ’s credibility determination s and factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and should be accorded deference.
Because the ULJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the question
becomes whether Wosmek’s conduct constitutes disqualifying employment misconduct.
Wosmek argues that his conduct does not rise to the level of employment misconduct but
instead falls into the statutory exceptions for simple unsatisfactory conduct, conduct an
average reasonable employee would have engaged in under the circumstances, and good
faith errors in judgment if judgment is required. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(3),
(4), (6) (2024).
Wosmek first argues that his conduct fits into the “simple unsatisfactory conduct”
statutory exception of misconduct. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b)(3). This
argument fails. Wosmek reacted to work requests in an angry manner, using his size and
body posture to intimidate others, and threatened to plow snow to block a driveway of a
citizen of the city. He was discharged for conduct directed at coworkers and third parties.
This is not a circumstance where Wosmek “attempted to be a good employee bu t just
wasn’t up to the job and was unable to perform [his] duties to the satisfaction of the
employer.” Potter v. N. Empire Pizza, Inc ., 805 N.W.2d 872, 877 (Minn. App. 2004)
(quotation omitted) , rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 2011) . Instead, Wosmek initiated
threatening and intimidating behavior which is conduct that exceeds the “simple
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unsatisfactory” exception “reserved for failures to meet basic job performance standards.”
Id.
Wosmek argues that his behavior at the hardware store “falls under conduct an
average reasonable employee would have engaged in under the circumstances because it
was [his] job to follow the yearly budget and fit this extra purchase into it.” However,
Wosmek’s attempt to get a larger discount was not the behavior that was found to be
employment misconduct. It was Wosmek’s conduct o f arguing, intimidating, and
threatening to block the owner’s driveway that violated the city’s reasonable expectations.
In general, behavior that is aggressive, threatening, harassing, or disruptive is employment
misconduct. See Pitzel v. Packaged Furniture & Carpet, 362 N.W.2d 357, 357-58 (Minn.
App. 1965) (determining aggressive, offensive, erratic, and disruptive behavior constituted
misconduct); see also Rinne v. Concordia Univ., St. Paul , No. A22 -1096, 2023 WL
2359459, at *2-3 (Minn. App. Mar. 6, 2023) (determining that an employee that raised his
voice, waved his arms, invaded space, and pounded the table was discharged f or
employment misconduct). Therefore, the ULJ’s determination—that Wosmek’s behavior
was not what a reasonable employee would have engaged in under the circumstances —is
supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Wosmek argues his conduct was a good-faith error in judgment rather than
employment misconduct. The statutory definition of employment misconduct excludes
“good faith errors in judgment if judgment was required.” See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd.
6(b)(6). But no judgment was required of Wosmek as Wosmek knew he was not allowed
to physically intimidate coworkers and third parties. Moreover, there is no evidence to
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support a finding that Wosmek acted in good faith when choosing to engage in bullying,
intimidating behavior.
Alternatively, Wosmek argues that his conduct was a single incident that had no
significant adverse effect on the employment. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(d) (2024).
However, the record supports the ULJ’s factual finding that there were multiple instances
of Wosmek using threatening and intimidating behavior which adversely affected
coworkers and third parties.
Because the record evidence supports the findings of the ULJ and those findings
support the conclusion that Wosmek was properly discharged for employment misconduct,
and because none of the statutory exceptions to ineligibility based on employment
misconduct identified by Wosmek apply, the ULJ did not err by determining that Wosmek
was ineligible for unemployment benefits.
II. The ULJ did not abuse its discretion by declining to order an additional
hearing.

Alternatively, Wosmek challenges the ULJ’s order denying reconsideration.
Wosmek argues that a new hearing should be ordered because he submitted a recorded
statement from the hardware store employee and letters from prior employers and
coworkers giving character evidence about him. These materials were not submitted to
DEED prior to the ULJ’s determination.
“A reviewing court accords deference to a ULJ’s decision not to hold an additional
hearing and will reverse that decision only for an abuse of discretion. ” Skarhus, 721
N.W.2d at 345. In deciding a request for reconsideration, the ULJ “must not consider any
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evidence that was not submitted at the hearing,” except to determine whether to order an
additional hearing. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2(c) (2024). The ULJ must order an
additional hearing if the party shows that the evidence which was not submitted at the
hearing:
(1) would likely change the outcome of the decision and
there was good cause for not having previously submitted that
evidence; or

(2) would show that the evidence that was submitted at
the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence
had an effect on the outcome of the decision.

Id.

Wosmek argues that he was unaware of his right to call witnesses and that newly
submitted written and recorded statements from coworkers would demonstrate that the
employer’s witnesses testified falsely. The ULJ rejected both arguments on
reconsideration, and the record supports that determination.
As to the first ground, having good cause for the prior omission, Wosmek admits
that a hearing packet was sent to him before the hearing that “contained [his] rights and
exhibits that would be discussed in the hearing.” The ULJ found that this hearing guide
“explicitly stated that Wosmek could have witnesses testify on his be half.” At the outset
of the hearing, the ULJ asked Wosmek whether he wished to call witnesses, and Wosmek
replied that he did not. At no point did Wosmek express surprise about the o pportunity to
call witnesses. The ULJ also informed Wosmek that he ha d “the right to request that the
hearing be rescheduled so that relevant documents or witnesses can be presented by
subpoena if necessary.” At no point in the hearing did Wosmek request a continuance to
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present witness testimony. On these facts, Wosmek cannot establish good cause for failing
to present witness testimony at the hearing.
Wosmek additionally argues that he “could not have known he would need
witnesses to dispute the new allegations the [city] made up at the hearing.” However,
Wosmek was informed that the incident at the hardware store was a contributing reason for
his discharge. Wosmek was also informed that he was discharged for past written
reprimands. This should have put Wosmek on notice about what allegations were going to
be discussed at the hearing. Therefore, the ULJ did not abuse its discretion by determining
that Wosmek ha d not established good cause for not having previously submitted the
evidence.
Further, the ULJ did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the information was
unlikely to affect the outcome of the decision or demonstrate that the evidence presented
at the hearing was false. The additional evidence included “[a] text from the City of Fifty
Lakes Bar Manager who [ Wosmek] worked with for 7 years at this job discussing that
[Wosmek] did not use [his] size to intimidate or lose [his] temper with her.” The evidence
also included an email from a previous employer stating “how respectful, kind, friendly
and helpful [Wosmek] always was”; a text from Wosmek’s supervisor at the city “stating
what kind of employee [ Wosmek] was”; and a letter from a former employee “who was
witness to how [ Wosmek] was treated at the city.” Wosmek’s position is that the new
evidence proves that the city’s testimony was false, and that, not only did Wosmek not
bully anyone, but that he was the victim of bullying by the three witnesses for the 15 months
prior to his discharge, and that the city’s fighting against Wosmek receiving benefits is a
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continuation of this bullying. However, the ULJ considered and expressly rejected the
suggestion that the city’s witnesses were dishonest. Introducing character evidence from
prior employers and coworkers likely does not provide probative evidence on the specific
incidents at issue in the case. Wosmek has not shown there was evidence that was not
submitted at the hearing that would change the outcome of the decision and that he had a
good reason for not previous ly submitting the evidence, or that the evi dence submitted at
the hearing was likely false and that the likely false evidence affected the outcome of the
decision. The ULJ did not abuse its discretion in declining to modify the decision or order
an additional hearing.
Affirmed.