Rahel Bikila, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1409

Rahel Bikila,
Relator,

vs.

Morrison Management Specialists, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 8, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Bentley, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51081909-5

Samantha Kleiser, Brianna Boone, Russell Squire, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal
Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)

Morrison Management Specialists, Inc., Roseville, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
Relator, a person who speaks Amharic, participated in an evidentiary hearing before
an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) without the assistance of an interpreter. After the ULJ
determined that relator was ineligible for unemployment benefits, relator requested
reconsideration because her language challenges prevented her from meaningfully
participating in the hearing. The ULJ set aside the first decision and held an additional
evidentiary hearing, this time with an interpreter. Nevertheless, the first hearing remained
in the record and, despite hours of additional testimony during the additional hearing, the
ULJ’s subsequent decision denying benefits was a near duplicate of the initial one.
We conclude that these agency proceedings were significantly irregular, rendering
the ULJ’s decision arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for
additional proceedings.
FACTS
Relator Rahel Bikila, a native Amharic speaker, was discharged from her position
as a patient and dining associate with respondent-employer Morrison Management
Specialists, Inc. (MMSI ) on August 29, 2024. MMSI discharged Bikila after an incident
on August 22, 2024, in which her supervisor alleged that Bikila did not perform any work
tasks for approximately the first hour of her shift and, when confronted, was untruthful
about her whereabouts and took credit for the work of others. After MMSI discharged
Bikila, she applied for and was initially determined to be eligible to receive unemployment
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benefits by respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development (DEED). MMSI appealed that determination.
A ULJ held an evidentiary hearing on the appeal on December 9, 2024. Bikila did
not receive advance notice of the evidentiary hearing because her mailing address was
incomplete in DEED’s records, but she participated in the hearing because she happened
to answer the phone when the ULJ called. The hearing was conducted over the phone and
included testimony from both Bikila and her supervisor. Although Bikila speaks some
English, her understanding of English is limited. Bikila was not offered an interpreter
during the hearing, and she attempted to answer the ULJ’s que stions and cross-examine
the supervisor on her own.
In a decision dated December 11, 2024, the ULJ found that, during the August 22
shift, “Bikila was intentionally avoiding work” and “intentionally being dishonest” with
her supervisor, whom the ULJ found credible because his testimony was “detailed, specific,
and based on review of GPS information.” The ULJ therefore determined that Bikila was
discharged for employment misconduct, rendering her ineligible for unemployment
benefits. The order further required Bikila to return $7,836 in overpaid benefits.
Bikila obtained counsel and requested reconsideration of the decision, arguing that
she had been unable to participate meaningfully in the hearing without an interpreter, the
record was not adequately developed, and she was denied due process. The ULJ issued an
order to set aside the decision and hold an additional evidentiary hearing. But the order
noted that, “[a]ll of the testimony taken at the December 9, 2024 hearing . . . will remain
part of the record.”
4
The second evidentiary hearing was held on March 19, 2025. The ULJ began the
hearing by playing the entire recording of the first hearing with pauses to allow an Amharic
interpreter to translate for Bikila. After the recording concluded, the ULJ permitted Bikila
to give additional testimony, correct the record from the first hearing, and to cross-examine
her employer through her attorney.
The ULJ’s second decision, dated March 20, 2025, did not include any new factual
findings or legal conclusions that differed from the first decision. The only changes made
between the first and second decisions were the date of the hearing and a reference to
Bikila’s counsel— otherwise, the decisions were identical.
Bikila submitted another request for reconsideration, arguing that the decision was
a product of legal error because the ULJ failed to consider evidence from the second
hearing. The ULJ affirmed the decision , determining that “the parties did not provide
substantially new or different testimony in the second hearing.”
Bikila appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
Bikila argues that the ULJ’s determination that she is ineligible for unemployment
benefits was arbitrary or capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. She also
maintains that the proceedings violated state and federal law by depriving her of
meaningful access to the proceeding as a person with limited understanding of English and
that the proceedings violated her constitutional due-process rights. We begin with her
arguments under the arbitrary-or-capricious standard and, because we conclude that
reversal is appropriate on that basis, we do not reach her other arguments.
5
When reviewing ULJ decisions appealed by writ of certiorari, we may affirm or
remand the decision, or we may reverse or modify the decision “if the substantial rights of
the petitioner may have been prejudiced.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024). A
petitioner’s substantial rights are prejudiced if the decision was
(1) in violation of constitutional provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
the department;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
hearing record as submitted; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious.

Id. We review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the decision, and we
rely on findings substantially supported by the record. Fay v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev.,
860 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Minn. App. 2015).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has described the arbitrary-or-capricious standard as
a “catchall, picking up administrative misconduct not covered by the other more specific
paragraphs.” In re Denial of Contested Case Hearing Requests, 993 N.W.2d 627, 646
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted)). Under this standard, we consider whether a decision
contains “danger signals” that suggest the decisionmaker did not take a “hard look at the
salient problems” or did not “genuinely engage[] in reasoned decision-making.” Id. at 646-
47. The supreme court has stated that irregularities in procedure may constitute a “danger
signal.” Id. at 648 (quotation omitted).
Applying this standard, we conclude that the procedural irregularities in this case
constitute danger signals of arbitrary decision -making and warrant reversal. We identify
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three concerning irregularities in the agency proceedings: (1) the failure to follow
Minnesota Rule 3310.2911 (2025), by not continuing the first hearing to obtain an Amharic
interpreter; (2) the consideration of testimony from the first hearing, despite the significant
language barrier that affected Bikila’s ability to participate meaningfully in and understand
the proceeding; and (3) the absence of any additional facts or explanation in the ULJ’s
decision that followed the second hearing.
Failure to Continue the First Hearing
The first deviation from DEED’s norms that we identify is that the initial evidentiary
hearing was not continued, despite ongoing miscommunications that signaled that Bikila
would benefit from the assistance of an interpreter.
DEED’s rules require that an “unemployment law judge must continue any hearing
where a witness or party needs an interpreter in order to be understood or to understand the
proceedings.” Minn. R. 3310.2911. Here, the ULJ did not continue the hearing to acquire
an Amharic interpreter to assist Bikila. Based on our review of the hearing transcript, Bikila
consistently demonstrated that she did not understand the proceedings and that she was not
able to effectively communicate with the ULJ. A continuance to obtain an interpreter would
have been appropriate, and the ULJ’s failure to do so is an unexplained deviation from
DEED’s practices.
To illustrate the extent of miscommunications that occurred, we provide several
notable examples from the transcript.
From the beginning of the hearing, it was evident from Bikila’s responses that she
did not understand that she was participating in a hearing to determine her eligibility for
7
unemployment benefits. When answering the ULJ’s questions, Bikila’s answers were often
unresponsive to the question or responsive to only a single word in the question. For
example, in the following exchange early in the hearing, Bikila misunderstood the ULJ’s
question about whether she was planning to call witnesses, and she answered the question
as if the ULJ asked her if she was planning to find a new job.
ULJ: Well, is there anyone else you’re planning to have in the
hearing on your behalf? Any . . . representatives or witnesses
or just you today?
BIKILA: Okay. One (1) witness for the meeting.

ULJ: Oh, yeah. Do you have anyone else you’re planning to
have in the hearing?
BIKILA: Oh, the planning? Yes. I just want to find another
job, or I’m just trying. Yes, of course, I have planning.

ULJ: Oh, no, no. Do you . . . want me to call anyone for you
for the hearing or is it just you in the hearing?
BIKILA: Oh, okay. Fine. Okay. Yes. Yes.

Although the ULJ seemed to recognize that Bikila’s answers were not responsive to
the questions, the ULJ confirmed only that Bikila was able to hear clearly. Yet, Bikila
continued to demonstrate that she was not understanding the proceedings, as shown by the
following exchange.
ULJ: So do you . . . have a representative or an attorney for
this hearing? Yes or no on that?
BIKILA: An attorney for what?

ULJ: Attorney. Lawyer. Attorney. Do you have an attorney or
lawyer or a representative for the hearing?
BIKILA: For what lawyer?

ULJ: Yeah. Ms. Bikila, is there a language barrier here? Are
you having a hard time understanding me?
8
BIKILA: Yes, I speak English too, but you asked me, you
called me for unemployment. That’s right?

The ULJ affirmed this was for unemployment benefits and moved on without inquiring
further. Still, Bikila did not demonstrate that she understood that she was testifying in an
administrative hearing.
ULJ: And do you have anyone else? Do you have anyone else
you were expecting to have present in the hearing? Did you
have any witnesses or attorneys for the hearing?
BIKILA: What kind of witnesses? For what?

ULJ: Yeah, for the unemployment hearing because there’s a
hearing right now—
BIKILA: Okay.

The transcript reflects that these communication problems continued throughout the
ULJ’s explanation of the hearing. After the ULJ explained that the hearing would include
testimony from both Bikila and her supervisor, the ULJ asked whether Bikila had any
questions about the hearing process, and Bikila asked the following questions.
BIKILA: Okay. Yes, then, what is this process? It’s like
unemployment for me or what?
ULJ: Yes, it’s an unemployment hearing regarding whether or
not you’re eligible based on your separation from Morrison
Management Specialists. So whether you’re eligible for
unemployment benefits. Do you have any other questions?
BIKILA: Okay.

ULJ: Do you have any other questions?
BIKILA: Mm-hmm.

ULJ: Oh, do you have any more questions?
BIKILA: Yes, so I have questions, too. Yes. So the Morrison,
if you close for unemployment or what?

ULJ: No, you may or may not be eligible based on your
separation. So that’s what this hearing is about, is whether—
9
BIKILA: Oh okay. Okay. Oh.
ULJ: —or not you get your benefits.

By this time in the exchange, the ULJ had told Bikila at least three times that he
called for her unemployment hearing. Despite Bikila’s repeated confusion about the
process, no additional inquiry was made into Bikila’s language proficiency or whether she
needed an interpreter.
At oral argument, DEED argued that Bikila’s understanding of the proceedings
improved as the hearing went on, and she was able to fully participate. We are not
persuaded. The transcript shows that the language problems persisted throughout the
hearing. For example, after Bikila’s supervisor testified, the ULJ explained to Bikila that
she had the opportunity for cross-examination.
ULJ: But do you have anything you want to ask [your
supervisor] before you explain to me?
BIKILA: Yes. I asked him. So my question is, still
misunderstand me, my supervisor. That’s it. This question,
they no change mind. That is true. But.

ULJ: So [ supervisor], . . . Do you think you misunderstood
her? Think that was the issue?
BIKILA: Yes. Yeah. A hundred percent. Because it’s.

ULJ: Oh, no, Ms. Bikila, let’s let him answer it now. So,
[supervisor], do you think you were just misunderstanding her
during this time?
BIKILA: That’s. Yes. I understand. Yeah.

As another example, during Bikila’s testimony, she referenced a coworker who
could verify her version of events. When the ULJ asked for more information, Bikila
responded, “I write him the name for, for my union. I give you everything information.”
The ULJ then clarified, “I’m not part of the union.” We are particularly concerned that, at
10
this late point in the hearing, Bikila still did not appear to be fully aware that she was in an
administrative hearing and testifying before a ULJ.
Even though Bikila stated that she “speak[s] English too,” the transcript is clear—
she did not understand the proceedings during the first hearing and was unable to fully
participate. Under rule 3310.2911, the hearing should have been continued to find an
Amharic interpreter. It was irregular for the ULJ to proceed with the hearing without any
additional inquiry into the evident language barrier or to offer Bikila an interpreter. See
Denial of Contested Case Hearing Requests , 993 N.W.2d at 648 (stating that an irregular
procedure, even if it “does not rise to the level of an unlawful procedure,” may still
“constitute a danger signal” of an arbitrary or capricious decision (quotation omitted)). The
decision to proceed with the hearing creates the appearance of a failure to take a “hard look
at the salient problems”—namely, whether Bikila understood the stakes and purpose of the
hearing. Id. at 646-47 (quotation omitted).
Reliance on Testimony from the First Hearing
The second procedural irregularity that occurred was the ULJ’s continued reliance
on testimony from the first hearing, despite Bikila explaining in her request for
reconsideration that her language barrier prevented her full participation. We again
emphasize that the DEED rules mandate that a ULJ “must continue any hearing where a
witness or party needs an interpreter in order to be understood or to understand the
proceedings.” Minn. R. 3310.2911 (emphasis added). This means that the ULJ must pause
the hearing, i.e., stop taking testimony, when an interpreter is needed. The rule
demonstrates a practice of not considering the testimony of a witness without the presence
11
of an interpreter. Nevertheless, in this case, the testimony admitted in the first hearing
remained in the record following the second hearing and, as evident from the lack of
additional or new findings after the second hearing, the testimony from the first hearing
still formed the basis of the ULJ’s decision.
Bikila stated in her request for reconsideration that she “did not understand that a
hearing was taking place,” she “did not understand the proceeding,” she “could not
understand [her supervisor] well enough to be able to think of any cross-examination
questions,” and she “did not know what [she] should add to [her] testimony because there
was so much of the hearing that [she] did not understand.” We view the continued reliance
on Bikila’s testimony from the first hearing as another danger signal of arbitrary decision-
making because it is inconsistent with DEED’s rules, and the inconsistency is not explained
in the record.
Failure to Make New Findings in Second Decision
The third irregular procedure we identify is that the decision rendered after the
second hearing was nearly identical to the first decision. The similarity of the decisions is
striking because the second hearing included a full translation of the first hearing and
almost two-and-a -half hours of additional t estimony aided by an Amharic interpreter.
Given the volume of additional evidence at this hearing, as well as Bikila’s ability to give
clearer and more detailed testimony, the unexplained absence of any new findings of fact
in the second decision is an irregularity signaling arbitrary decision -making. To illustrate
this irregularity, we begin by drawing some comparisons between Bikila’s testimony at the
12
first hearing and her testimony through an interpreter at the second hearing. We then
address several pertinent details developed in the second hearing.
During the first hearing, Bikila’s supervisor asserted that Bikila spent approximately
the first 20 minutes of her shift on August 22 avoiding her assigned tasks. Bikila’s
explanation of those 20 minutes during the first hearing was:
And then, supervisor, he writing the board, my name, where
you go, [the hospital building], 7th floor. And then, I clock
another, the pager. That is different. After 15 minutes, he
writing my name. Like, that means it’s 6:20. He writing the
name. 6:20, I clock in my pager. And then, I take my card. I go
to watch [sic] soiled trays.

In comparison, in the second hearing, Bikila explained that she would “always” consult an
assignment board at the start of her shift that listed her name and told her “which room
[she] should go to clean.” But, on this day, Bikila explained that the board had not been
updated when she clocked in.
BIKILA’S ATTORNEY: Okay, so for that first 20 minutes,
you didn’t have a specific assignment, is that right?
. . . .
BIKILA: There was none, I was just waiting for my name to
appear on the board.

BIKILA’S ATTORNEY: And so did you try to find work to
do?
. . . .
BIKILA: Yes, I tried to seek other, other positions, other place
to work.

With the assistance of an interpreter, Bikila’s testimony became demonstrably more
responsive and easier to understand.
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Bikila went on to explain that, in lieu of having an assigned task for the first
20 minutes, she instead helped a coworker set up his station in the kitchen. In the first
hearing, Bikila’s supervisor stated that Bikila could not have been helping her coworker
for the first 20 minutes of her shift because Bikila’s coworker “did not actually start doing
his job until after 6:30.” Bikila attempted to explain, “I know [coworker] is starting ready
for patients at 6:30 but before 6:30 is he setup to his, his area. He has to bring everyone
food.” In the second hearing, Bikila clarified this explanation, stating that her coworker
“starts his job at 5 o’clock and he continues until 6:30 with the setup,” and so she was
helping her coworker “with the setup for the first twenty minutes .” Specifically, she said
that she helped her coworker by “trying to warm up the . . . plates because the patients used
these warmed up plates.”
Bikila’s additional explanation of what she was doing and why during the first
20 minutes of her shift expanded on the testimony from the first hearing with more precise
details. But despite that additional explanation, in the decision issued following the hearing,
the ULJ issued the same finding as the first hearing: “Bikila was not performing any work
tasks between 6:00 a.m. and 6:20 a.m.”
The second hearing also included detailed testimony by both Bikila and her
supervisor on the impact of her language barrier on the conversations leading up to her
discharge. During the original testimony, Bikila’s supervisor testified that, in his meeting
with Bikila where he asked her to explain her whereabouts, he “felt [he] understood her
and that she was not being truthful.” But during the second hearing, both parties testified
about the conversation in more detail. Bikila testified, “[W]hen they called me to the office,
14
I told them the truth but there was some misunderstanding. I was crying because they
couldn’t understand what I was saying, but I’ve never told any . . . lie.” Bikila also testified
that her supervisor had to help her write a statement because she does not “know how to
write or read” in English. She emphasized that “[t]hey didn’t actually give [her] the option
to speak in [her] own language.” Her supervisor then testified that he “did not feel that
[Bikila] was misunderstanding” him during their conversation. He also stated that he
attempted to explain things to her in multiple different ways and he had two other
individuals with him to ensure he transcribed Bikila’s written statement accurately.
In the second decision, there is no mention of any language barrier between the
parties. The ULJ instead repeated the finding from the first decision that Bikila “was
intentionally being dishonest” during that conversation.
Although we review a ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the
decision, Fay, 860 N.W.2d at 387, it strains credulity that a hearing of this length and
involving this level of minute-by-minute detail resulted in no new factual findings or legal
conclusions. Without additional explanation of what evidence the ULJ considered from the
second hearing and why it was or was not convincing, the second decision fails to reflect
that the ULJ took a “hard look” at the evidence. See Denial of Contested Case Hearing
Requests, 993 N.W.2d at 646 (defining arbitrary-or-capricious standard). We are left with
the impression that the only evidence considered by the ULJ was the testimony from the
first hearing, which, as we discussed, was significantly impeded by communication
challenges.
15
We are also unpersuaded by the explanation offered for the identical orders in the
order of affirmation. The order stated that the ULJ’s findings of fact “remained
substantially the same” because “[t]he parties did not provide substantially new or different
testimony in the second hearing,” and so “by extension, the reasons for decision remained
the same.” This assertion is at odds with the transcript of the second hearing which, as we
have explained, included more detailed and different testimony on topics relevant to the
circumstances surrounding Bikila’s discharge. The order of affirmation thus does not
dissuade us from concluding that the ULJ’s decision-making was arbitrary and capricious.
In sum, we conclude that the procedural irregularities that occurred throughout these
agency proceedings—including unexplained departures from DEED’s rules and a decision
that was not revised after an additional lengthy evidentiary hearing— do not reflect a “hard
look at the salient problems” and render the ULJ’s decision arbitrary or capricious. Id.
(quotation omitted). We reverse and remand for additional proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.