The holding in the court’s own words
Considering the four Souto factors together, we conclude that the district court had a substantial basis for determining the information supporting the search warrant was not stale and that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. Conclusion In sum, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances set forth in the search-warrant application established “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in the home where Deutsch resided.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Gauster 752 N.W.2d 496
- State v. Andersen 784 N.W.2d 320
- 995 N.W.2d 164 not in our corpus
- State v. Yarbrough 841 N.W.2d 619
- State v. Jannetta 355 N.W.2d 189
- State v. Souto 578 N.W.2d 744
- State v. King 690 N.W.2d 397
- State v. Yaritz 287 N.W.2d 13
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1427
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Adam Michael Deutsch,
Appellant.
Filed July 6, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge
Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-22-672
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brian M. Mortenson, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Assistant County
Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Davi E. Axelson, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bentley,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for possession of a
pornographic work involving a minor, appellant argues that, because the information in the
search-warrant application was stale by the time police searched his home, the district court
2
erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. We
affirm.
FACTS
Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Adam Michael Deutsch by
amended complaint with two counts of possession of a pornographic work involving a
minor1 in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a), with reference
to subdivision 4(b) (2020). Deutsch moved to suppress evidence discovered during the
search. The district court denied the motion and, following a bench trial, found Deutsch
guilty. We derive the following facts from evidence submitted at the hearing on Deutsch’s
pretrial motion to suppress.
Search-Warrant Application
On May 28, 2021, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) submitted a
search-warrant application to search a property in Faribault, any persons located on the
property, and a white 2013 Chevrolet Impala. The search warrant sought to collect
evidence related to possessing, or accessing with intent to view, a pornographic work
involving a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) and 2252A(a)(5)(B),
(b)(2) (2024). The search-warrant application specifically identified the following items
to be seized as evidence: computers or storage media; routers, modems, and network
1 At the time of Deutsch’s offense, the statute criminalized the possession of a
“pornographic work” involving a minor. Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subds. 2, 4 (2020). In
2025, the legislature amended the statute and changed “pornographic work” to “child
sexual abuse material.” Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 2, 4 (Supp. 2025).
3
equipment; pornographic work involving a minor; and records, information, and items
related to pornographic works involving minors.
The search-warrant application included a sworn affidavit from an FBI special
agent. The agent was assigned to the Minneapolis Division of the FBI and had experience
investigating federal crimes related to cybercrime, child exploitation, and crimes involving
pornographic works involving minors. The agent stated that, in June 2019, a foreign
law-enforcement agency seized a computer server hosting a bulletin board and website
containing pornographic works involving minors, identified as the “target website.” 2 In
August 2019, the foreign law-enforcement agency notified the FBI that, on May 17, 2019,
a specific IP address3 had accessed “online child sexual abuse and exploitation material”
via the target website. Through further investigation, the FBI learned that the IP address
was associated with the Faribault home where Deutsch resided. Based on this information,
the agent stated that “[a] user of the Internet account” at the home had “been linked to an
online community of individuals who regularly send and receive [pornographic works
involving minors] via a hidden service website.”
The agent noted that it is difficult to access such websites, which “made it extremely
unlikely that a user would accidentally access” the website without understanding its
2 The name of the target website is known to law enforcement. However, agents continue
to investigate individuals who access this website. Identifying the name of the website
could alert users and jeopardize the investigation. For that reason, the search-warrant
application did not disclose the name of the website.
3 An “Internet Protocol address,” or “IP address,” is a unique numeric or alphanumeric
string used by a computer or digital device to access the internet. Every device that
connects to the internet is assigned an IP address.
4
purpose and content.” Users were required to create an account to access the materials on
the site. It could not be accessed through the traditional internet and only a user who had
installed the appropriate “Tor software”4 on a computer and knew the correct web address
could find it. Additionally, after 2017, only individuals who were “contributors” could
gain admittance to the site, meaning that access was limited “only to those users who
uploaded [pornographic works involving minors] to the website.” Based on this
information, the agent averred there was probable cause to believe that “at a minimum,”
someone living at Deutsch’s address knowingly accessed the website on May 17, 2019,
“with intent to view [pornographic works involving minors], or attempted to do so.”
The agent’s affidavit also discussed characteristics common to individuals who
access the internet with the intent to view a pornographic work involving a minor. The
agent stated that such individuals “almost always possess and maintain [such] material in
the privacy and security of their home or some other secure location” and “typically retain
those materials . . . for many years.” Additionally, the agent stated that individuals “will
often retain electronic devices and storage media used to access and store their collections
of [pornographic works involving minors] [from] years earlier.” The agent noted that
“evidence of child sexual exploitation material can be found on the electronic devices many
years after it had been acquired,” and even after it has been deleted. The agent believed an
individual living at the residence associated with the IP address “likely displays
4 A “Tor network” is a computer network specifically designed to facilitate anonymous
communication over the internet. It attempts to do this by “routing Tor user
communications through a globally distributed network of relay computers along a
randomly assigned path.”
5
characteristics common to individuals who access online child sexual abuse and
exploitation material via a website” and that it was “more likely than not that evidence of
this access will be found in his home.”
The agent’s affidavit also noted that the FBI learned, based on a subpoena issued to
the internet service provider, that t he IP address in question was registered to Deutsch’s
brother. A search of a public records database provided the names of others living at the
property, including Deutsch. According to the affidavit, Deutsch had a 2014 conviction
for possession of a pornographic work involving a minor and was required to register as a
predatory offender. Additionally, the Minnesota Predatory Offender Registration database
showed Deutsch’s self-reported address between July 2016 and August 2019 was the home
that law enforcement requested to search. The agent also stated that the Minnesota
Department of Motor Vehicles confirmed that Deutsch lived at the home as of
February 2021. And a representative of the U.S. Postal Service stated that Deutsch was
receiving mail at the home in February 2021. FBI agents also conducted surveillance at
the home on multiple occasions from February to May 2021. During the surveillance,
agents saw a 2013 white Chevrolet Impala vehicle at the home that was registered to
Deutsch.
A federal magistrate judge signed the search warrant on May 28, 2021. The search
warrant commanded that federal law enforcement execute the warrant on or before June 11,
2021.
6
Search and Resulting Criminal Complaint
On June 3, 2021, the FBI conducted a search of the home where Deutsch resided
pursuant to the search warrant. Officers seized cell phones, micro secure digital cards (SD
cards), and a USB drive. The seized items were processed by the FBI computer analysis
response team. One of the SD cards found in Deutsch’s bedroom contained a pornographic
work involving a minor. An FBI agent interviewed Deutsch the same day the home was
searched. Deutsch admitted that he received links to websites that contained pornographic
works involving minors and to being attracted to young girls. He also admitted that he
downloaded and viewed these materials on his phone in early May 2021.
The FBI shared information about their investigation with the Faribault Police
Department. In March 2022, following an investigation, the state filed a complaint
charging Deutsch with possession of a pornographic work involving a minor in violation
of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a). The complaint alleged that
Deutsch possessed a pornographic work involving a minor between May 1 and May 15,
2021, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a). Deutsch also
admitted to probation that he continued to view pornographic works involving minors after
his 2014 conviction.
Motion to Suppress
Deutsch moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his home. In
support of the motion, Deutsch argued that the affidavit accompanying the search-warrant
application lacked probable cause because the information was stale. He also argued that
the search-warrant application did not show a nexus between the evidence to be seized and
7
the location searched, and the affidavit did not contain sufficient evidence that Deutsch
possessed any data from the target website. The district court held a contested omnibus
hearing at which it considered the motion. It received five exhibits into evidence,
including: (1) the search-warrant application, affidavit in support, and attachments; (2) the
search warrant with a list of items seized; (3) a report from the FBI describing the contents
of the evidence; (4) a Faribault Police Department incident report; and (5) an email
regarding a request for information.
On April 19, 2023, the district court denied Deutsch’s suppression motion in a
written order. The district court determined that the application and affidavit provided a
sufficient basis for the issuing magistrate judge to reasonably determine that probable cause
existed to issue the search warrant. The district court further determined that: (1) the
information in the application was not stale; (2) there was a clear nexus between the
evidence sought and the location searched; and (3) the alleged crime did not require that
Deutsch download a pornographic work involving a minor from the target website in order
for a violation of the statute to occur.
Trial
On December 11, 2023, the state filed an amended complaint. The complaint set
forth two charges under section 617.247, subdivision 4(a), for possession of a pornographic
work involving a minor. The district court held a bench trial on March 12-13, 2025. After
the state’s presentation of evidence, the state dismissed count II.
On March 14, the district court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
order, finding Deutsch guilty of count I. The district court sentenced Deutsch to 25 months’
8
imprisonment, stayed execution of the sentence and placed Deutsch on probation for five
years.
Deutsch appeals.
DECISION
Deutsch raises one argument on appeal. He argues the district court erred by
denying his motion to suppress because the search warrant was based on stale information
and therefore lacked probable cause. We are not persuaded.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
(Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We give great deference to a district court’s findings
of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Andersen,
784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A search warrant must be
supported by probable cause. Id. Probable cause requires “more than mere suspicion but
less than the evidence necessary for conviction.” State v. Torgerson, 995 N.W.2d 164, 169
(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and
circumstances show that there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place.” Id. (quotation omitted).
9
The judge issuing the search warrant must “make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the court
that] . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.” State v. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d 138, 145 (Minn. 2024) (quotations
omitted). An issuing judge considers “the type of crime, the nature of the items sought,
the extent of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and the normal inferences as to
where the defendant would usually keep the items.” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619,
623 (Minn. 2014).
When a defendant challenges the issuance of a search warrant on appeal, “[w]e
review only the warrant application and supporting affidavits to determine if the issuing
judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.” Wiggins,
4 N.W.3d at 145 (quotations omitted). In so doing, we consider “whether the totality of
the circumstances alleged in the search warrant application established a ‘fair probability’
that evidence of a crime would be found” at the place to be searched. Id. at 146.
Additionally, the supreme court has instructed “that doubtful or marginal cases should be
largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” Id. at 145-46 (quotation
omitted).
On appeal, Deutsch argues that because the information provided by the FBI to
support the search was approximately two years old when the search-warrant application
was made and executed, the information was stale and therefore the search warrant lacked
10
probable cause.5 For this reason, he contends the district court erred in denying his motion
to suppress. In response, the state argues that under the totality of the circumstances
presented, the information in the search-warrant application and affidavit were not stale.
We agree with the state.
To satisfy the United States and Minnesota Constitutions, probable cause must exist
at the time the warrant is issued and when the search is conducted. See State v. Jannetta,
355 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 14, 1985). Stale
information cannot establish probable cause. Id. A search-warrant affidavit must contain
proof “of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding
of probable cause at that time.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Minn. 1998) (quoting
Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932)). But there is no bright-line rule for
determining when information has become stale. State v. King, 690 N.W.2d 397, 401
(Minn. App. 2005), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 29, 2005). Rather, staleness “must be
determined by the circumstances of each case,” and the court’s “approach should be one
of flexibility and common sense.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Factors relating to staleness
include whether there is any indication of ongoing criminal activity, whether the articles
sought are innocuous or incriminating, whether the property sought is easily disposable or
transferable, and whether the items sought are of enduring utility.” Souto, 578 N.W.2d at
750; see also Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d at 193-94.
5 On appeal, Deutsch challenges only the district court’s determination that the evidence in
the search warrant was not stale. He does not challenge the other determinations made by
the district court in denying the motion to suppress.
11
Here, the district court considered the relevant factors outlined in Souto and
determined that the information in the search warrant was not stale. It noted that, although
two years had passed between the time the target website was accessed and the FBI’s
execution of the search warrant, the information was not stale “given the known common
characteristics of individuals who view [pornographic works involving minors] and the
technology used in their activity.” The district court credited the statements in the agent’s
affidavit reflecting that such material has enduring utility, that “it is common practice for
users of [these materials] to retain such material for many years,” and that such materials
often remain on digital devices even after deleted by the user. “ Based on all of the
information in the search warrant,” the district court determined “ it was probable that
evidence related to the [possession of a pornographic work involving a minor] would be
found in [Deutsch’s] home.” Therefore, despite the passage of time, the district court
concluded that “there was probable cause to believe that the evidence being sought would
be found at the time of the search.” Based on our review of the district court’s analysis of
the Souto factors, we discern no basis to reverse the district court’s probable-cause
determination.
Ongoing Criminal Activity
The first factor to be considered is whether the warrant application provided any
indication of ongoing criminal activity. Souto , 578 N.W.2d at 750. “[T]he continuity of
the crime is the most important factor in determining the staleness issue.” State v. Yaritz,
287 N.W.2d 13, 17 (Minn. 1979) (citation omitted). Possession of a pornographic work
involving a minor is frequently an ongoing, rather than a fleeting, crime. United
12
States v. Lemon, 590 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 2010). It customarily occurs in secret. United
States v. Frechette, 583 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2009). Because such a crime is “not a
fleeting crime and it is a crime that is generally carried out in the secrecy of the home and
over a long period . . . , the time limitations applied to more fleeting crimes do not control.”
United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Information
related to these crimes generally is not stale even after the passage of some time. See
Lemon, 590 F.3d at 614-15 (affirming search warrant in case when evidence to support
warrant was 18 months old); Jannetta, 355 N.W.2d at 194 (determining warrant was not
stale after two years); United States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 70 4 (7th Cir. 2014)
(concluding that search warrant was not stale after five years because “staleness inquiry
must be grounded in an understanding of both the behavior of child pornography collectors
and of modern technology”).
Deutsch argues that the district court erred in its analysis of this factor because there
was no evidence in the warrant application of ongoing criminal activity. This argument is
not persuasive.
As the district court noted in its order, “the information in the search warrant cannot
be considered stale given the known common characteristics of individuals who view [a
pornographic work involving a minor] and the technology used in their activity.” In the
search-warrant application, the FBI agent discussed those common characteristics. The
agent stated that such individuals “almost always possess and maintain [such] material in
the privacy and security of their home or some other secure location” and “typically retain
those materials . . . for many years.” The agent also stated that individuals “will often
13
retain electronic devices and storage media used to access and store their collections of
[pornographic works involving minors] [from] years earlier.” And the agent provided
specific evidence showing that, in May 2019, an internet user at Deutsch’s residence
accessed a website using Tor software that contained pornographic works include minors.
Considering the totality of these circumstances and given the nature of the crime alleged,
we agree with the district court that it was reasonable for the issuing magistrate judge to
infer that there likely was evidence of an ongoing crime at Deutsch’s residence in
June 2021.
To persuade us otherwise, Deutsch argues that the affidavit focused on whether a
person living at his address “access[ed]” a website containing a pornographic work
involving a minor but failed to establish that someone at the residence downloaded the
material or maintained it on an electronic device in the home. Again, we are not persuaded.
The search warrant sought to collect evidence related to possessing and accessing
with intent to view a pornographic work involving a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) and 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). These sections criminalize both
possession and accessing with intent to view such materials. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (providing that any person who knowingly possesses, or knowingly
accesses with intent to view, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct, is guilty of a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2)
(providing that any person who knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to
view, material containing an image of pornographic materials involving a minor is guilty
of a felony). The Eighth Circuit has held that “knowingly accessing a child-pornography
14
website with the intent to view illegal materials is itself a criminal act.” United
States v. Croghan, 973 F.3d 809, 828 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). As such,
deliberately viewing a pornographic work involving a minor online is a federal crime even
without possession. And, as the agent noted in his affidavit, individuals who access the
internet with the intent to view a pornographic work involving a minor generally keep the
material in their homes for many years. The agent further noted that evidence of such
crimes could be retrieved from electronic devices “many years after it had been acquired.”
Moreover, the search-warrant application reflects that Deutsch had a prior
conviction for possession of a pornographic work involving a minor. And Deutsch
admitted to probation that he continued to view such materials after his 2014 conviction.
Based on the totality of these facts and circumstances, we agree with the district court that
this factor favors a determination that the search-warrant application provided a sufficient
basis for the issuing magistrate judge to infer there was likely ongoing criminal activity at
the location to be searched. This factor weighs strongly in favor of a conclusion that the
information in the search-warrant application was not stale.
Innocuous Nature and Transferability of Articles Sought
The second and third factors consider “whether the articles sought are innocuous or
incriminating” and “whether the property sought is easily disposable or transferable .”
Souto, 578 N.W.2d at 750. The search-warrant application sought “computers and storage
media” at the home where Deutsch resided. Computers and storage devices are not
inherently incriminating and they are easily disposable or transportable. See, e.g., United
States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 690 (4th Cir. 2015) (determining that there were
15
innocuous explanations for tablet computers found in defendant’s vehicle); Waypoint
Aviation Servs. Inc. v. Sandel Avionics, Inc., 469 F.3d 1071, 1072 (7th Cir. 2006)
(characterizing personal computers as a “ubiquitous” consumer good). Therefore, the se
factors weigh in favor of a staleness finding.
Enduring Utility
Lastly, we consider whether the evidence sought was of “enduring utility.” Souto,
578 N.W.2d at 750. In his affidavit, the agent provided information showing the material
sought was of enduring utility. The agent explained that these images “are valued highly”
by individuals who access and download a pornographic work involving a minor, and, as
a result, “are often maintained for several years.” Additionally, such images “are kept close
by, usually at the possessor’s residence . . . to enable the individual to view the
[pornographic] images.” The agent also stated that individuals who access such materials
“prefer not to be without their [pornographic works involving minors] for any prolonged
time period.” Consequently, we agree with the district court’s determination that the
evidence sought by the search warrant was of enduring utility. This factor weighs strongly
in favor of a determination that the information supporting the search warrant was not stale.
Considering the four Souto factors together, we conclude that the district court had
a substantial basis for determining the information supporting the search warrant was not
stale and that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.
16
Case Relied on by Deutsch
To convince us otherwise, Deutsch relies on Jannetta. This argument is unavailing.
In Jannetta, we considered whether information included in a search warrant was stale due
to a two-year time delay between the observation of photographs depicting a pornographic
work involving a minor and the execution of the search warrant. 355 N.W.2d at 193-94.
As Deutsch correctly notes, we stated in Jannetta that “a gap of two years from the source
of the information to the application for a warrant is of great concern.” Id. at 194. But we
held the information in the search-warrant application at issue was not stale, even after the
passage of two years, because such material “might be expected to be retained by a person
engaged in ongoing criminal sexual conduct.” Id. We recognized that such images “would
likely have enduring utility to the perpetrator for his own sexual gratification.” Id. And,
given circumstances of the case and the nature of the crime, we concluded that “the gap is
less critical than it might be.” Id. Here, we are similarly persuaded that, for the reasons
discussed above, the information in the search-warrant application was not stale and
probable cause supported the warrant.
Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances set forth in the
search-warrant application established “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found” in the home where Deutsch resided. Wiggins, 4 N.W.3d at 145.
Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Deutsch’s pretrial motion to suppress
the evidence seized under the search warrant.
Affirmed.