State of Minnesota v. Josiah Kyllonen Chavis

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1444

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Josiah Kyllonen Chavis,
Appellant.

Filed September 8, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-4651

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Annika K. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm, appellant Josiah Kyllonen Chavis argues that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress evidence because the trooper unlawfully (1) expanded the scope of

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the initial traffic stop, (2) pat-frisked Chavis , (3) seized the magazine and the attached
firearm from Chavis’s fanny pack, and (4) searched Chavis’s vehicle, all without a warrant.
Because we conclude that the police lawfully expanded the traffic stop under the Terry
exception to the warrant requirement, the pat-frisk was also lawful under Terry, the firearm
was lawfully seized pursuant to the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement, and
any error in searching the vehicle was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
The following recitation of the facts is derived from the evidence submitted at
Chavis’s contested omnibus hearing.
On August 8, 2023, at around 11:45 p.m., a State Patrol Trooper was on patrol and
observed a vehicle speed by him. Radar indicated that the car was traveling at 78 miles per
hour in the 60-mile-per-hour zone. The trooper activated his lights and initiated a traffic
stop. When the car pulled over, the trooper approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. The
driver, later determined to be Chavis, rolled down his window a few inches. Chavis was
wearing a black T-shirt and camouflage pants. Another male sat in the front passenger seat,
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, black pants, and a ski mask.
The trooper observed that Chavis was “ slightly nervous” and “slow and lethargic”
and that his eyes were “bloodshot, watery, glossy.” The trooper also felt “a very, very large
amount” of hot air emanate from the vehicle when Chavis rolled the window down, “[l]ike,
they just had it cranked on high heat.” The trooper thought the hot air and clothing were
strange because it was a warm day. B ased on his experience, he thought they may have
been trying to conceal an odor.

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Chavis provided his license and proof of insurance. When Chavis retrieved the
license from a fanny pack on his lap, the trooper observed what he believed to be the
magazine of a firearm in the fanny pack and asked Chavis, “Any weapons in the car or
anything like that?” Chavis did not audibly respond. Chavis appeared to have difficulty
pulling up his insurance information on his phone and took about a minute and a half to
find it. The trooper believed that Chavis may have been impaired by narcotics use , but he
did not notice the odor of alcohol or any other substance. The trooper asked Chavis if he
had consumed any alcohol or narcotics, “including marijuana.” Chavis stated that he had
smoked marijuana six hours earlier.
The trooper then asked Chavis a second time if he had a weapon. Chavis responded
“No, sir.” The trooper told Chavis to keep his hands on the steering wheel and radioed for
backup. The trooper instructed Chavis not to move and asked Chavis what was in his fanny
pack, saying, “It looks like a magazine.” The trooper could not hear Chavis’s response.
The trooper then again told Chavis to keep his hands on the steering wheel, opened
the front driver’s door, and asked Chavis to step out of the vehicle. As Chavis exited, his
fanny pack fell to the ground. The trooper placed Chavis’s hands behind his back and
placed him in handcuffs. The trooper patted Chavis down for weapons and asked, “What’s
in your bag that looks like the magazine of a weapon?” Chavis again denied having a
weapon.
The trooper then retrieved the fanny pack, which was already unzipped, and found
a loaded firearm inside. The trooper asked Chavis, “You got a permit?” Chavis indicated
that he did not. The trooper informed Chavis that he was under arrest for carrying a firearm

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without a permit. After removing the passenger, the trooper searched the vehicle. He found
a hatchet in the driver’s door compartment and about a pound of marijuana in some
shopping bags in the back seat.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Chavis with two counts— possession of a
firearm as an ineligible person and possession of ammunition as an ineligible person, both
under Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 2(b) (2022). Chavis moved to
suppress all evidence obtained from the stop. After a hearing, the district court denied
Chavis’s motion. Chavis then stipulated to the state’s case to obtain review of the order
denying his motion to suppress pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.01,
subdivision 4. The district court found him guilty of both counts but sentenced him on just
one count, imposing an executed prison term of 60 months.1
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Chavis challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress the
evidence from his traffic stop. “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress
evidence, [appellate courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. deLottinville, 890
N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn. 2017). Appellate courts “give great deference to a district court’s
findings of fact and will not set them aside unless” the court is “left with the definite and

1 Chavis does not assert that he was erroneously convicted of both possession counts.

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firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 334 (Minn.
2010).
Unlawfully obtained e vidence generally must be suppressed. State v. Harris, 590
N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999). The United States and Minnesota C onstitutions prohibit
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. A
warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable. State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d
243, 250 (Minn. 2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). But a
warrantless search or seizure may be lawful if it falls within one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. State v. Sargent , 968 N.W.2d 32, 37 (Minn. 2021). The state bears
the burden of showing that an exception applies. Id. When the facts are undisputed,
appellate courts review de novo whether an adequate basis for the search or seizure at issue
exists. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007).
Chavis challenges four determinations by the district court: (1) that the trooper did
not unlawfully expand the scope of the stop under the Terry exception to the warrant
requirement, (2) that the trooper lawfully pat -frisked Chavis under Terry, (3) that the
trooper lawfully seized the magazine and the attached firearm under the plain-view
exception to the warrant requirement, and (4) that the trooper lawfully searched the vehicle
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. We address each argument in
turn.

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I. The district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully
expanded the scope of the stop.
Chavis argues that the district court erred by determining that the trooper lawfully
expanded the scope of the traffic stop by asking Chavis about weapons and alcohol or
narcotics use.
One exception to the warrant requirement is the Terry exception. Sargent, 968
N.W.2d at 37-38 ; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under Terry, an officer may
conduct a brief traffic stop without a warrant if there exists reasonable, articulable
suspicion of wrongdoing. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004).
“An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity
or scope.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[E]ach incremental intrusion during a traffic stop
[must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose
of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” Id.
at 365. Thus, “an intrusion not strictly tied to the circumstances that rendered the initiation
of the stop permissible must be supported by at least a reasonable suspicion of additional
illegal activity.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012). To be reasonable, the
basis for an officer’s suspicion must satisfy an “objective, totality- of-the-circumstances
test”: “whether ‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure [would]
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.’” Id. at 351-52 (quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 364). Appropriateness “is
based on a balancing of the government’s need to search or seize and the individual’s right

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to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 352 (quotation
omitted).
The district court found that the trooper credibly testified that he saw the magazine
of a firearm while talking with Chavis. The district court determined that the trooper
reasonably concluded based on his training and experience that the magazine that he saw
may have been attached to a weapon. The district court also found there to be several
additional circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, including
that Chavis physically appeared inebriated, that the heat was on in the car on a hot day, and
that Chavis was wearing a dark shirt and camouflage pants and the passenger was wearing
dark clothing and a ski mask. As a result, the district court concluded that “[i]t was
reasonable for [the trooper] to ask about firearms after he saw what he believed to be a
magazine attached to a firearm.”
Chavis argues that the stop was unlawfully expanded at three distinct points.
First, Chavis argues that the stop was unlawfully expanded when, within the first
ten seconds of engaging with Chavis, the trooper asked if Chavis had any weapons in the
car. Citing State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 2003), Chavis asserts that “[p]olice
are not permitted, during the course of a traffic stop, to inquire whether occupants of a
motor vehicle have a firearm or permit to carry without sufficient justification.” But Fort
is distinguishable. In Fort, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that officers unlawfully
expanded the scope of a traffic stop by asking the suspect about weapons and narcotics.
660 N.W.2d at 419. The court reasoned that “the officer never said he suspected any crime

8
other than the traffic violations” and “[i]nvestigation of the presence of narcotics and
weapons had no connection to the purpose for the stop.” Id. But that is not the case here.
In this case, the trooper observed the magazine of a firearm in the fanny pack when
Chavis retrieved his driver’s license. Based on that observation, the trooper reasonably
suspected that Chavis was carrying a weapon. Additionally, the trooper had already
observed that Chavis appeared inebriated, that Chavis and the passenger’s attire included
dark and camouflage clothes and a ski mask, and that Chavis and the passenger may have
been trying to conceal an odor by having the heat on in the vehicle. Under these
circumstances, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion of additional illegal activity beyond
the traffic violation and it was reasonable to ask whether Chavis had any weapons.
Chavis argues, though, that the district court clearly erred in its factual findings. He
asserts that the finding that the trooper “saw a magazine” in the first ten seconds of his
encounter with Chavis is unsupported because the trooper’s testimony was “not credible or
believable.” The trooper’s body-worn-camera (BWC) video does not capture whether the
magazine was visible or not. But the district court based its finding on the trooper’s
testimony, which it found credible. Chavis challenges that finding, arguing that the
trooper’s later reaction—giving forceful commands and radioing for backup—is what the
trooper would have done immediately had he truly seen the magazine within the first ten
seconds. But, at the hearing, the trooper explained his restrained reaction, testifying that he
started by trying “to determine whether [Chavis] was a permit holder and give him the
opportunity to inform [the trooper] of any weapons [he] needed to be aware of in the
vehicle.” The district court specifically found this testimony credible. We must defer to the

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district court’s factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous, Andersen,
784 N.W.2d at 334, and Chavis has not shown that here.
Second, Chavis argues that the trooper unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop
“when he asked [Chavis] if he had consumed alcohol or used narcotics.” 2 Chavis argues
that his conduct during the stop did not indicate impairment. But the district court found
that Chavis physically appeared inebriated and “struggled to pull up his insurance
information on his phone.” Chavis argues that these findings are clearly erroneous because
the BWC video shows that Chavis was “coherent and calm” and he provided his insurance
“without trouble.” But the BWC video does not illustrate clear error in the district court’s
findings about Chavis’s demeanor and conduct. And the findings are supported by the
trooper’s testimony. Chavis has not shown that the district court clearly erred in accepting
the trooper’s testimony regarding his conduct.
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances includes other facts that support a
reasonable suspicion of impairment: Chavis physically appeared inebriated, rolled the
window down only a few inches, and apparently had the heat on in the vehicle on a warm
summer day. The trooper testified that, based on his observations, training, and experience,
he began “asking questions towards expanding of an impaired driving stop.” Cf. Fort, 660
N.W.2d at 419 (holding the officer’s question about narcotics unlawful because the officer
never said that he suspected any additional crime). Under the totality of the circumstances,

2 Though the district court did not directly discuss this argument, Chavis raised it in his
motion to suppress and the district court concluded that the trooper did not unlawfully
expand the scope of the stop.

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the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that Chavis was driving under the influence or trying
to hide the smell of narcotics. Therefore, the trooper did not unreasonably expand the scope
of the stop by asking if Chavis had consumed alcohol or narcotics.
Third, Chavis argues that the trooper unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop
“when he again asked [Chavis] if he had a weapon in the vehicle, . . . opened the door,
[and] removed and cuffed [Chavis] some twenty seconds later.” Chavis argues that
observing only the magazine, rather than a firearm, is “insufficient to support expanding
the traffic stop into a criminal investigation.”3 While possession of a magazine may not be
illegal, it is a crime to, without a permit, possess a firearm in a vehicle. Minn. Stat.
§ 624.714, subd. 1a (2022). And, at the time that the trooper asked about weapons for the
second time, he had observed the magazine and Chavis had not responded when asked
about it. These facts —in addition to those noted above—contributed to a reasonable
suspicion that Chavis was carrying a firearm without a permit. Under the totality of the
circumstances, the trooper had a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity and
was justified in asking Chavis about weapons for a second time.
In sum, the district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully
expanded the scope of the traffic stop.

3 Chavis argues that there is clear error in the district court’s statement that, “[e]ven though
[the trooper] could see the firearm, [Chavis] denied having it,” because the trooper had
seen only a magazine at that point in the stop. But the rest of the district court’s findings
and analysis properly reflect that the trooper had seen a magazine and only hypothesized
that it may be attached to a weapon. Any error in that one misstatement is harmless. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (requiring us to disregard “error that does not affect substantial
rights”).

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II. The district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully pat-
frisked Chavis.
Chavis argues that the district court erred by determining that he was lawfully pat-
frisked under Terry. In his brief to this court, it appears that he makes this argument as part
of his challenge to the search of his vehicle, but it is unclear. In any event, the district court
found the pat-frisk to be constitutionally valid, and we see no error in that determination.
The Terry exception to the warrant requirement for investigative stops also “allows
a police officer to conduct a pat-frisk of a person, meaning a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons, when the officer has a reasonable
articulable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous and criminal activity may be
afoot.” In re Welfare of C.T.B., 24 N.W.3d 651, 656 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court noted that Chavis denied having a weapon despite the fact
that the trooper had observed the magazine. The district court determined that it was not
unreasonable for the trooper to suspect that Chavis illegal ly possessed a firearm or other
weapons. As a result, the district court concluded that the pat-frisk of Chavis’s person was
justified by safety concerns.
Chavis argues that there was “no particularized and objective basis for suspecting
that [Chavis] was engaged in criminal activity.” But, at the time of the pat-frisk, the trooper
had observed the magazine and Chavis had denied having any weapons. These facts
support a reasonable suspicion that Chavis was unlawfully carrying a firearm. And this is
in addition to the facts described above that contributed to a reasonable suspicion that
Chavis was driving under the influence or trying to hide the smell of narcotics. Together,

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these facts created a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Chavis was involved in criminal
activity.
Chavis also argues that these facts do not indicate that the trooper was in danger.
But the trooper had observed a magazine, and it was reasonable for the trooper to suspect
that the magazine was attached to a firearm or that Chavis was carrying the firearm. The
trooper therefore had a reasonable suspicion that Chavis was armed and dangerous.
The district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully pat-frisked
Chavis because the trooper had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Chavis was involved
in criminal activity and was armed and dangerous.
III. The district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully seized
the magazine and the attached firearm under the plain-view exception.
Chavis argues that the plain-view exception does not support the seizure of the
magazine and the attached firearm.
Police may conduct a warrantless seizure of an object under the plain- view
exception. State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Minn. 2015). To satisfy the exception,
three criteria must be met. Id. “First, the police must be lawfully in the position from which
they have a view of the object.” Id. “Second, the officer must have a lawful right of access
to the object.” Id. “And finally, the object’s incriminating nature must be immediately
apparent.” Id. (quotation omitted). Regarding the third prong, the “police must have
probable cause to believe the item seized is of an incriminating nature in order to support
a warrantless seizure under the plain-view exception.” Id. Probable cause exists “if the facts
available to the officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that

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certain items may be useful as evidence of crime.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation
omitted).
Chavis argues that the first and second prongs of the exception are not satisfied
because the trooper had unlawfully expanded the scope of the stop at the point when he
saw the magazine. But, as discussed above, the district court did not err by determining
that the trooper lawfully expanded the scope of the stop. Furthermore, the trooper observed
the magazine before any of the points at which Chavis argues the stop was unlawfully
expanded. There was accordingly no error in the district court’s conclusion that the trooper
was in a lawful position and had a lawful right of access when he viewed the magazine.
As for the third prong, Chavis argues that the magazine’s incriminating nature was
not immediately apparent because the trooper did not see a firearm and, even if he had seen
a firearm, there was not probable cause that the firearm was contraband.
The district court determined that the officer had probable cause to believe the
magazine was of an incriminating nature. It reasoned that, “[g]iven the circumstances of
the stop, and especially that [Chavis] denied having a weapon multiple times, it was not
unreasonable for [the trooper] to conclude that the magazine and any attached firearm were
contraband or connected to another crime.” It also determined that it was “not unreasonable
for [the trooper] to conclude that the gun was incriminating simply because [of] the nature
of the object, and that nature was immediately apparent upon seeing the gun.” Accordingly,
the district court concluded that the plain-view exception applied to the trooper’s seizure
of the magazine and the attached firearm.

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The district court cited State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2012), in support of
its decision. In Milton, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that “it would not be
unreasonable for [the officer] to have believed that the shell casings that she found
discarded near a multifamily residence within city limits were by their very nature
‘incriminating.’” 821 N.W.2d at 802 (citing United States v. Brooks, 645 F.3d 971, 976
(8th Cir. 2011) (“Hidden guns, even badly hidden guns, are by their nature
incriminating.”)). Accordingly, the court held that the officer “had probable cause to
believe that the shell casings may have been useful as evidence of a crime and thus that the
incriminating nature of the shell casings was immediately apparent.” Id. Under Milton, the
magazine in Chavis’s fanny pack alone may have been incriminating by its nature.
But we need not decide whether that is the case because all the facts available to the
trooper—in addition to the magazine’s nature as an instrument of a firearm—justified
probable cause that the magazine may have been tied to criminal activity. Chavis was
nervous and denied having a weapon, even though the trooper had seen the magazine .
Chavis’s and the passenger’s attire included dark and camouflage clothes and a ski mask.
And the two men may have been trying to conceal an odor by rolling the window down
only a few inches and having the heat on in the car. Together, these facts would justify a
reasonable person in believing that the magazine may be useful as evidence of crime. See
Holland, 865 N.W.2d at 671.
4

4 Chavis also asserts that the trooper was unable to articulate why the object’s incriminating
nature was immediately apparent to him. But probable cause is an objective standard. See
Holland, 865 N.W.2d at 671. The trooper’s subjective explanation of whether the object
was incriminating is irrelevant.

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In sum, the district court did not err by determining that the trooper lawfully seized
the magazine and the attached firearm under the plain-view exception.
IV. Any error by the district court regarding the search of the vehicle is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chavis argues that the district court erred by determining that the trooper lawfully
searched the vehicle under the automobile exception. We need not evaluate this argument
because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
“Any error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Minn. R.
Crim. P. 31.01. “When an error implicates a constitutional right, [appellate courts] will
award a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis,
820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012). The error alleged here— failure to suppress evidence
obtained from an unlawful search —implicates a constitutional right, so the harmless-
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies. See State v. McInnis, 962 N.W.2d 874, 886
(Minn. 2021) (applying the harmless- beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to the district
court’s failure to suppress a confession that violated the Fifth Amendment). “An error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the . . . verdict was surely unattributable to the
error.” Id. (quotations omitted). To determine whether error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, courts “look to the basis on which the factfinder rested its verdict and
determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Chavis was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. The
evidence supporting these convictions was the firearm and ammunition retrieved from the
fanny pack that fell on the ground. And the trooper seized this evidence before search ing

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the vehicle. No evidence found or seized as a result of the trooper’s search of the vehicle
was ever submitted to the district court. Accordingly, even if the district court erred by
determining that the trooper lawfully searched the vehicle under the automobile exception,
Chavis’s convictions were “surely unattributable to the error.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Affirmed.