In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Hollis Larson.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1451

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Hollis Larson.

Filed March 16, 2026
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP)
File No. AP24-9129

Hollis J. Larson, Moose Lake, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Anthony R. Noss, Mara Sybesma, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Direct Care and Treatment Executive Board)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Schmidt,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
This appeal stems from a decision of the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP),
dismissing appellant’s petition for discharge from commitment after a phase-one
evidentiary hearing. Appellant primarily argues that the CAP erred because his diagnoses
do not justify his continued commitment. Appellant also contends that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel at the Special Review Board (SRB) hearing that preceded
the CAP’s de novo consideration of his petition. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Larson was civilly committed in 2008 and has resided at the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) since that time. He was committed after serving prison
sentences stemming from 1992 and 1993 convictions for multiple counts of first- and
second-degree criminal sexual conduct. 1 In the order for Larson’s initial commitment, the
district court credited expert testimony that Larson suffered from antisocial personality
disorder, among other mental-health conditions, and that his “personality disorders, mood
states, and sexual deviancy are intertwined and co-existent in his inability to adequately
control his sexual behaviors.”
While at MSOP, Larson has had consistent behavioral problems resulting in
frequent disciplinary action. Larson also has refused to participate in sex-offender
treatment because he does not believe he needs it. As the CAP explained, the most recent
mental-health assessment in the record identified that Larson has the following mental-
health diagnoses: “encounter for mental health services for perpetrator of nonparental child
sexual abuse,” “posttraumatic stress disorder,” “persistent depressive disorder
(dysthymia),” “antisocial personality disorder,” mild alcohol and cannabis use disorders
that are in sustained remission in his controlled environment , and “problems related to

1 Larson’s background and offense history are summarized in In re Civ. Commitment of
Larson, No. A08-1188, 2009 WL 1049171, at *1-2 (Minn. App. Apr. 21, 2009), rev. denied
(Minn. June 30, 2009).
3
other legal circumstances (civil commitment).” Previous assessments also diagnosed him
with “paraphilia not otherwise specified.”2
Larson filed a petition for discharge in October 2022 and was appointed counsel to
represent him before the SRB.3 After the SRB recommended denial of the petition, Larson
filed a petition for rehearing and reconsideration of that recommendation with the CAP .
He waived his right to counsel before the CAP and represented himself in the proceedings.
The CAP held an evidentiary hearing on Larson’s petition for rehearing and
reconsideration in May 2025. Larson presented multiple exhibits for the CAP’s
consideration, including psychological evaluations, records of head injuries, and
documents related to his underlying offenses and initial commitment. Larson also called
seven witnesses to testify: a business associate; a friend; two of his sisters ; a treating
psychologist at MSOP , Dr. Gary Ankarlo; a sexual violence risk assessor, Dr. Jessica
Scharf; and the SRB treatment report author. At the end of the hearing, respondent

2 Some documents in the record are not accessible to the public. See Minn. R. Pub. Access
to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 1(f)(1). But “we are not precluded ‘from mentioning the
contents’ of confidential or sealed documents when the information is ‘relevant to the
particular issues or legal argument being addressed in the proceeding.’” Life Time, Inc. v.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 25 N.W.3d 901, 904 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025), (quoting Minn. R. Pub.
Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subd. 4), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2025). We also are
not “constrained from disclosing information contained in the publicly filed briefs.” Id.
Any reference to confidential documents herein is based on the parties’ publicly filed
briefs, other public records, or is relevant to our determination of the issues on appeal.

3 Larson has previously filed other appeals seeking a reduction in custody. See Larson v.
Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. App. 2014); In re Civ. Commitment of Larson, No. A14-
0662, 2014 WL 6090699 (Minn. App. Nov. 17, 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2015);
Larson, 2009 WL 1049171.
4
Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) and respondent Goodhue County moved
to dismiss Larson’s discharge petition.4
After the hearing, the CAP granted the motion to dismiss and denied the petition. In
a memorandum accompanying its order, the CAP stated that Larson did not present “prima
facie evidence to support moving to a further hearing on discharge, under either the
statutory criteria for discharge or due process considerations.” It also stated that
[Larson] did not produce competent evidence that, if true,
could show he is capable of making an acceptable adjustment
to open society, is no longer dangerous to the public, and no
longer in need of treatment and supervision. [Larson] is not
participating in sex offender treatment and he has an Antisocial
Personality Disorder that drove his sexual offending.

Larson appeals.
DECISION
A person who is civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person may seek a
reduction in custody by petitioning for transfer, provisional discharge, or full discharge.
Minn. Stat. §§ 253D.29-.31 (2024 & Supp. 2025). The committed person may file a
petition with the SRB, which then conducts a hearing and issues a recommendation to the
CAP. Minn. Stat. § 253D.27, subds. 2, 4 (2024). If the SRB recommends denial of the
petition, the committed person may submit a request with the CAP for rehearing and
reconsideration of the SRB’s recommendation. Minn. Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 1(a) (2024).
The CAP proceeding then advances in two phases.

4 Both parties moved to dismiss, but the county did not file a responsive brief on appeal.
5
At a phase-one hearing on a petition for discharge, the petitioner bears the burden
of production to make a prima facie case by producing “sufficient, competent evidence
that, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief.” Coker v. Jesson, 831 N.W.2d 483,
485-86 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). If the petitioner satisfies their burden of
production during the phase-one hearing, the CAP holds a phase-two hearing at which the
party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving “by clear and convincing evidence
that the discharge . . . should be denied.” Id. at 486 (quotation omitted).
After the phase-one hearing, the party opposing the petition may move to dismiss it
under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02(b) on the basis that the petitioner did not
meet their burden to establish a prima facie case for discharge. See id. at 488 (explaining
the applicability of the rule to CAP proceedings). When considering a motion to dismiss
under rule 41.02(b), the CAP may not weigh evidence or make credibility assessments and
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Id. at 490-91. If the
CAP determines that the petitioner failed to present a prima facie case, it will dismiss the
petition and forgo the phase-two hearing. See Larson v. Jesson, 847 N.W.2d 531, 535
(Minn. App. 2014).
This court reviews the CAP’s dismissal of a discharge petition under rule 41.02(b)
de novo. Id. at 534.
5 In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

5 The CAP also denied Larson’s petition on the merits. Typically, appellate courts review
the CAP’s denial of a petition absent a rule 41.02(b) dismissal for clear error. Larson, 847
N.W.2d at 534. Here, we apply the de novo standard of review because, even under that
greater level of scrutiny, we conclude that Larson has not established a basis to reverse the
CAP’s decision.
6
petitioner without weighing evidence or assessing credibility. See Foster v. Jesson, 857
N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn. App. 2014).
We first consider Larson’s arguments that the CAP erred in dismissing his petition.
We then address his alternative argument that he is entitled to relief because he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during his SRB hearing.
I
A petitioner who is civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person “shall not be
discharged unless it appears to the satisfaction of the [CAP] . . . that the committed person
is capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous to
the public, and is no longer in need of treatment and supervision.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.31.
The CAP also must consider “whether specific conditions exist to provide a reasonable
degree of protection to the public and to assist the committed perso n in adjusting to the
community.” Id.
Larson does not directly address the statutory factors relevant to a discharge
determination and instead broadly argues that he no longer suffers from a mental-health
condition that justifies his commitment. We first consider his arguments within the
statutory framework and construe them as a challenge to the CAP’s determination that he
did not make a prima facie case that he “is no longer dangerous to the public” and “is no
longer in need of treatment and supervision.” Id. We then address the due-process issue he
raises.
The only evidence Larson presented at the phase-one hearing that supported his
position that he does not suffer from a mental-health condition that justifies his
7
commitment were his own assertions. We already have rejected the premise that, “by
themselves, conclusory assertions by a committed person are sufficient to avoid dismissal
of a petition for discharge from MSOP.” In re Civ. Commitment of Poole, 921 N.W.2d 62,
69 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 2019).
The other evidence Larson presented, even viewed in the light most favorable to
him, does not make a prima facie case for discharge. That is, it does not possibly show that
he no longer needs treatment and supervision, or that he is not a danger to the public. To
the contrary, the record shows that Larson has participated in minimal treatment during his
commitment and continues to suffer from antisocial personality disorder. 6 Dr. Scharf
testified that there is a correlation between antisocial personality disorder and sexual
offending and that treatment is beneficial towards risk reduction. She also averred that low
motivation for treatment, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, and certain hostile
behaviors are all related to the risk of recidivism.7

6 Larson disputes that he suffers from antisocial personality disorder and maintains instead
that he suffers from posttraumatic stress disorder and “organic brain damage” that
“mimic[s] the symptoms of [antisocial personality disorder].” His position is not reflected
in the record.

7 Larson argues that the CAP erred by not holding a hearing to establish the admissibility
of expert testimony from Dr. Scharf and that the CAP acted improperly by making
credibility determinations, weighing the evidence, and not viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to him . Regarding his argument about the admissibility of Dr. Scharf’s
testimony, we note that Larson called her as his witness and then moved to strike her
testimony after it was unfavorable to his position. We are not persuaded by his arguments
that her testimony was inadmissible. That said, we would reach the same conclusion even
if we were to set aside her testimony. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Larson in our de novo review, including his mental-health assessments, medical records,
Dr. Ankarlo’s testimony, and the testimony of his personal witnesses, the record still does
8
Larson disputes that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is sufficient to
justify his continued civil commitment because it does not necessarily mean he is sexually
dangerous. But we have already implicitly rejected that position on review of Larson’s
prior challenges to his commitment. See In re Civ. Commitment of Larson, No. A14-0662,
2014 WL 6090699, at *3 (Minn. App. Nov. 17, 2014) (citing expert testimony that
Larson’s “more prominent and primary diagnosis” is “his antisocial personality disorder”
and upholding his commitment even assuming any paraphilic disorder diagnoses are
inaccurate), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 20, 2015); In re Civ. Commitment of Larson, No. A08-
1188, 2009 WL 1049171, at *4 (Minn. App. Apr. 21, 2009) (crediting that two experts
“testified that Larson’s antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders were significant
factors in their determination” that Larson meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually
dangerous person), rev. denied (Minn. June 30, 2009) . Other caselaw supports that
antisocial personality disorder may be a basis to justify civil commitment. See, e.g., In re
Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 877-78 (Minn. 1999) (affirming Linehan’s commitment as a
sexually dangerous person based in part on a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder).
In his present petition, Larson has not offered evidence, aside from his own assertions, that
he no longer needs treatment and supervision relating to his antisocial personality disorder
or that he is no longer a danger to the public. Rather, the record supports the CAP’s
conclusion that Larson “is not participating in sex offender treatment” and that he still
suffers from the antisocial personality disorder “that drove his sexual offending.”

not establish a prima facie case that he no longer needs treatment and supervision relating
to his antisocial personality disorder.
9
We acknowledge that Larson presented several nonexpert witnesses who testified
that they do not believe Larson is dangerous and believe that he could adjust to life in the
community. Their testimony may have been relevant to the CAP’s consideration of
“whether specific conditions exist to provide a reasonable degree of protection to the public
and to assist the committed person in adjusting to the community.” Minn. Stat. § 253D.31.
But their testimony is not relevant to whether Larson has ongoing treatment and
supervision needs, or whether Larson’s treatment needs reveal a risk to the community. Cf.
Fryklind v. Jackson, 252 N.W. 232, 234 (Minn. 1933) (“It is settled that a lay witness may
state facts within his own knowledge and observation as to another’ s health, but may not
express mere opinion.”).
Because Larson did not present competent evidence that, if true, could establish that
he no longer needs treatment and supervision and that he is not a danger to the public, he
has not made a prima facie case for discharge under the statute. See Minn. Stat. § 253D.31.
For similar reasons, we also conclude that he has not established that his continued
commitment amounts to a due-process violation. To satisfy due process, an individual’s
continued commitment must generally “bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.” Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1994)
(quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). In Lidberg, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded that requiring an individual to follow statutory discharge
provisions satisfied that reasonable-relationship demand. Id.; see also Call v. Gomez, 535
N.W.2d 312, 319 (Minn. 1995) (holding that the reasonable-relationship requirement is
satisfied if the committed person “is confined for only so long as he or she continues both
10
to need further inpatient treatment and supervision for his . . . disorder and to pose a danger
to the public”). As discussed, when Larson was committed in 2008, his central diagnosis
was antisocial personality disorder. The record indicates that Larson still meets the criteria
for that diagnosis and that he has not actively participated in treatment to address it.
Because that evidence shows he is still in need of treatment and the record does not support
that he is no longer a danger to the public, his continued commitment is reasonably related
to his original commitment. See Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319. Accordingly, due process does
not require Larson’s discharge from commitment.
II
Larson alternatively argues that his appointed counsel at the SRB hearing was
ineffective and violated his right to counsel under Minnesota S tatutes section 253D.20
(2024). Larson contends that the attorney appointed to represent him during his 2024 SRB
hearing failed “to be a vigorous advocate,” because he “refused to present, or file, any of
Larson’s motions or other documents” and “failed to rebut or object to and/or failed to offer
conflicting evidence” against the offered expert testimony. He further argues that if his
attorney had done those things, the result of his SRB hearing would have been different.
We analyze ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claims in civil commitment cases
under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See In re
Civ. Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 17, 2019). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a person
seeking discharge must show both that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
11
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694). The burden is on the person raising the
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim to show error and resulting prejudice. Id. at 659.
Even assuming without deciding that Larson’s counsel for the SRB hearing fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, Larson is not entitled to relief because he
has not alleged any resulting prejudice. The CAP reviewed his petition de novo. See Minn.
Stat. § 253D.28, subd. 3 (2024) (“The panel shall consider the petition de novo.”). Before
the CAP, Larson chose to represent himself, waived his right to counsel, and was able to
present his case as he desired. H e had control over the strategy, the evidence presented,
and the questioning of witnesses. The CAP then took all of the evidence and his arguments
into consideration and made an independent decision on his discharge petition. He has not
explained how his counsel’s strategy at the SRB affected the CAP’s de novo consideration
of his petition.
As a result, Larson cannot show he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffective
assistance of counsel he received before the SRB, and he is not entitled to relief.
Affirmed.