Marjorie Schroeder, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1452

Marjorie Schroeder,
Appellant,

vs.

North Star Mutual Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Filed May 18, 2026
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-CV-24-1367

Matthew J. Barber, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Matthew W. Moehrle, Troy A. Poetz, RGP Law, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
Smith, Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of her claims under Minnesota Rule of Civil
Procedure 12.02(e), arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her (A) breach -of-
contract claim and (B) constitutional challenge to Minnesota’s anti-stacking statute. We
affirm.
2
FACTS
The facts of this case are undisputed and, unless otherwise noted, are taken from the
complaint. In October 2023, Dean Edwin Schroeder (the decedent) was driving his tractor
truck when he was killed in an automobile accident caused by the negligence of another
driver. At the time of the accident, the decedent’s truck was insured under a policy issued
by respondent North Star Mutual Insurance Company, which provided underinsured
motorist (UIM) coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The decedent also had UIM
coverage through respondent for five other vehicles with a limit of $1,000,000 for each
vehicle.
The decedent’s wife, appellant Marjorie Schroeder , was appointed trustee for the
heirs and next of kin of the decedent. A fter appellant settled with the negligent driver’s
automobile-insurance carrier for the policy limits of $100,000 , r espondent settled with
appellant for the UIM policy limits of $1,000,000 related to the truck. But respondent
asserted that the following language from respondent’s insurance policy precludes different
vehicles from being added or “stacked” together to determine the applic able coverage
limits:
A. With respect to the Uninsured Motorists
Coverage/Underinsured Motorists Coverage indicated as
applicable in the Schedule or in the Declarations for
damages caused by an accident with an “uninsured motor
vehicle” or “underinsured motor vehicle” respectively:

1. The limit of Bodily Injury Liability shown in the
Schedule or in the Declarations for each person is our
maximum limit of liability for all damages, including
damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out
3
of “bodily injury” sustained by any one person in any
one accident.

2. Subject to this limit for each person, the limit of Bodily
Injury Liability shown in the Schedule or the
Declarations for each accident is our maximum limit of
liability for all damages for “bodily injury” resulting
from any one accident.

The limits of liability applicable to Uninsured Motorists
Coverage or Underinsured Motorists Coverage are the most we
will pay regardless of the number of:

1. “Insureds”;

2. Claims made;

3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Schedule or in
the Declarations; or

4. Vehicles involved in the accident.

Citing this language, respondent denied appellant’s claim of UIM benefits related to the
five remaining vehicles. The policy language relied upon by respondent in denying
appellant’s claim for additional UIM benefits is akin to Minnesota’s anti -stacking statute.
See Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(6) (2024).
In December 2024, appellant commenced this action against respondent alleging
that respondent’s “practice of charging separate premiums for different coverages on
separate vehicles insured under the same policy violates [appellant’s] reasonable
expectations, creates fraudulent and illusory coverage, and contradicts the ‘made whole’
doctrine.” Appellant also alleged that, “[t]o the extent” that respondent relied upon Minn.
Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(6), in denying her claim, that “statute is unconstitutional” because
4
it “violates the Minnesota Constitution, including Article I, § 2 (rights and privileges),
Article I, § 7 (substantive due process), and Article III, § 1 (separation of powers).”
Respondent moved to dismiss appellant’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(e). The district
court granted the motion, concluding that appellant’s complaint “fails to state a claim for
breach of contract. The [c]omplaint similarly fails to state a claim for a violation of the
reasonable expectation[s] doctrine, that the contract is fraudulent and illusory, and or that
the contract violates the full recovery doctrine.” With respect to appellant’s constitutional
challenge, the district court determined that appellant “does not allege any facts that rise to
the level of a violation of her constitutional rights. Instead, [ap pellant] merely cites to the
Minnesota Constitution and makes a legal conclusion in the [c]omplaint that Minn. Stat.
§ 65B.48, subd. 3a(6) is unconstitutional and such legal conclusions are not binding.” The
district court concluded that appellant’s “legal conclusions are insufficient to provide
[respondent] (or, indeed the Court) with [her] theory upon which her claim for relief is
based.” This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of her claims under rule 12.02(e),
arguing that the district court erred in dismissing her (A) breach-of-contract-related claims
and (B) constitutional challenge to the anti -stacking statute. A district court may grant a
motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e) if the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). To state a claim for relief, a complaint
need only “contain a short and plain statement of th e claim showing that the pleader is
5
entitled to relief.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. “A claim is sufficient against a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced,
consistent with the pleader ’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to
rule 12.02(e) , a district court must “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint,
accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonabl e inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.” Finn v. Alliance Bank, 860 N.W.2d 638, 653 (Minn. 2015) (quotation
omitted). “[A] court may consider documents referenced in a complaint without converting
the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Metro.
Council, 684 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 2004) (emphasis omitted).
In reviewing a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under rule 12.02(e), this
court “construe[s] the complaint to allow the claim to go forward unless there is no way to
construe the alleged facts —and the inferences drawn from those facts —in support of the
claim.” Demskie v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n , 7 N.W.3d 382, 386 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to rule 12.02(e)
de novo. DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019).
A. Breach-of-contract claim
Appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing her breach -of-contract-
related claims because (1) they “were not addressed by [respondent] in its memorandum
supporting its motion to dismiss nor its reply”; and (2) the “complaint provide[d] sufficient
notice to [respondent] of the crash givin g rise the [UIM] claim and all her claims against
[respondent].” We address these arguments in turn.
6
1. Appellant has not shown that respondent’s failure to address
appellant’s breach-of-contract-related claims in its memorandum
in support of the motion to dismiss is fatal to the district court’s
granting of respondent’s motion.

We begin our analysis by noting that, on appeal, the appellant has the burden to
show error and prejudice. Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App.
1993), rev. denied (Minn. June 28, 1993). With this principle in mind, we turn to
appellant’s claim of error. She contends that the district court erred in dismissing her
breach-of-contract-related claims because, according to appellant, respondent never
addressed these claims in its memorandum of law supporting its motion to dismiss.
To support her position, appellant relies on Shoat v. Pham, No. A23-1690, 2024 WL
3250456, at *3 (Minn. App. July 1, 2024), in which this court determined that the district
court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint because the defendant never filed a
motion to dismiss. But Shoat is not dispositive for three reasons: First, Shoat is a
nonprecedential case with only persuasive value at best. See Skyline Vill. Park Ass’n v.
Skyline Vill. L.P. , 786 N.W.2d 304, 309 -10 (Minn. App. 2010) (recognizing that
nonprecedential opinions from this court “are of persuasive value at best and not
precedential” (quotation omitted)). Second, the reasoning in Shoat on which appellant
relies is dicta because the court first determined that the plaintiff’s claim was sufficiently
pleaded. See Shoat, 2024 WL 3250456, at *3; see also Sheehy Lee v. Kalis , 19 N.W.3d
186, 193 n.9 (Minn. 2025) (explaining that “obiter dicta” is generally “considered to be
expressions in a court’s opinion which go beyond the facts before the court and therefore
are the individual views of the author of the opinion and not bin ding in subsequent cases”
7
(quotations omitted)). Third, Shoat is readily distinguishable from this case because, unlike
in Shoat, where the district court dismissed the action despite the defendant never moving
to dismiss, respondent here filed a motion to dismiss. And Shoat contains no discussion of
the relevant issue here: whether the district court erred in dismissing appellant’s claims
when there was no argument in the moving party’s memorandum of law pertaining to those
claims.
Appellant also contends that Minnesota Rule of General Practice 115.03(a) supports
her position that the district court erred in dismissing her breach-of-contract-related claims
where respondent did not address these claims in the memorandum supporting the motion
to dismiss. We disagree. Rule 115.03(a) provides:
No motion shall be heard until the moving party pays
any required motion filing fee, serves the following documents
on all opposing counsel and self-represented litigants, and files
the documents with the court administrator at least 28 days
before the hearing:
(1) Notice of motion and motion;
(2) Proposed order;
(3) Any affidavits and exhibits to be submitted in
conjunction with the motion; and
(4) Memorandum of law.

Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 115.03(a). Although the rule requires a “ memorandum of law” to be
filed in conjunction with a motion to dismiss, the rule provides no requirements as to the
contents of such a memorandum. See id. Respondent here filed a memorandum of law in
support of its motion to dismiss, and respondent’s motion sought dismissal of the entire
complaint. Because respondent filed the required memorandum of law, appellant has not
shown that the district court err ed in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss ap pellant’s
8
breach-of-contract-related claims despite respondent’s failure to brief all liability claims in
its memorandum of law supporting the motion to dismiss based on rule 115.03(a).
2. Appellant’s complaint with respect to her breach -of-contract-
related claims do not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.

“Minnesota is a notice -pleading state.” Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs. , 953
N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). It allows plaintiffs to plead their case
“by way of a broad general statement which may express conclusions rather than . . . a
statement of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” N. States Power Co. v.
Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). A claim survives a rule 12.02(e) motion “if it
is possible, on any evidence that might be produced, to grant the relief demanded.” Halva,
953 N.W.2d at 501 (quotation omitted). But the claim must give “fair notice to the adverse
party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader’s
theory upon which his claim for relief is based.” Id. at 503 (quotation omitted).
Appellant argues that the district court erred in determining that her complaint failed
to state a claim based on (i) the reasonable expectations doctrine, (ii) fraudulent coverage,
(iii) illusory coverage, and (iv) the made-whole doctrine. Although respondent argues that
the district court properly dismissed appellant’s breach -of-contract-related claims on the
“merits,” respondent argues that, “in the alternative, . . . Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5)
[(2024)] defeats [a]ppellant’s claim for damages regardless of whether she would
ultimately prevail in the district court on any or all of [her breach -of-contract-related]
claims seeking to invalidate policy provisions.”

9
i. Reasonable expectations doctrine
“The doctrine of ‘reasonable expectations’ protects the ‘objectively reasonable
expectations’ of insureds ‘even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would
have negated those expectations.’” Jostens, Inc. v. Northfield Ins. Co. , 527 N.W.2d 116,
118 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting Atwater Creamery v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins., 366 N.W.2d 271,
277 (Minn. 1985)), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995) . The supreme court adopted this
doctrine in Atwater, but has since limited its scope. Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 27 7; see
Carlson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 749 N.W.2d 41, 48-49 (Minn. 2008). In Carlson, the supreme
court held that it was unwilling to expand the doctrine beyond “its current use,” which is
“for resolving ambiguity and for correcting extreme situations like that in Atwater, where
a party’s coverage is significantly different from what the party reasonably believes it has
paid for and where the only notice the party has of that difference is in an obscure and
unexpected provision.” 749 N.W.2d at 49. In so ho lding, the supreme court reaffirmed
that the reasonable expectations doctrine “does not excuse an insured from reading the
policy. . . . [T]he insurer must communicate coverage and exclusions accurately and
clearly, and the insured’s expectations must be r easonable under the circumstances.” Id.
at 48.
Appellant argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claim under the
doctrine of reasonable expectations because her “complaint sufficiently notified
[respondent] of the crash giving rise to the [UIM] benefits claim, that [she and the decedent]
paid premiums for $6,000,000 in [UIM] benefits, [she] substantiated a claim justifying
payment of those benefits, [respondent] failed to pay those benefits,” and the reasonable
10
expectations doctrine requires respondent “to pay those benefits.” But although appellant’s
complaint appears to give fair notice to respondent of the incident giving rise to her suit,
the complaint lacks sufficient clarity to disclose her theory upon which her claim for relief
is based. See Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503 (stating that a claim must give “fair notice to the
adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the
pleader’s theory upon which his claim for reli ef is based” (quotation omitted)). As the
district court concluded, appellant’s complaint “does not contain any allegations about
[her] understanding of the policy, does not identify or assert ambiguity, does not contain
any reference to what the insured or [appellant] was told about the contract, and does not
contain an y assertion about the general public knowledge of the provision.” And
appellant’s complaint contains no assertion that respondent’s policy misled her or the
decedent. Th is lack of allegat ions or assertions fail s to provide clarity concerning
appellant’s theory upon which her claim for relief is based.
Even if appellant’s theory was stated with sufficient clarity in her complaint, there
is no evidence that could be introduced that would support appellant’s theory. Appellant’s
complaint does not assert, nor does she argue on appeal, that the policy is ambiguous. And
even if she did argue that the policy is ambiguous, the plain language of the policy indicates
otherwise. Respondent’s insurance policy clearly states that the $1,000,000 per person and
per accident UIM limits listed under each vehicle are the coverage limits regardless of how
many vehicles are listed in the schedule.
Moreover, there is no evidence that could be produced to support a theory that the
coverage paid for is significantly different than that which was paid for by appellant and
11
the decedent. The challenged policy language is listed in the “Limit Of Liability” section
of the policy , demonstrating that the language is not obscure or hidden. Because the
relevant language is listed in the “Limit Of Liability” section of respondent’s policy,
appellant could reasonably expect the relevant clause to limit liability to $1,000,000.
Indeed, an insured is deemed responsible for reading the policy. See Carlson, 749 N.W.2d
at 48. Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing this claim under rule 12.02(e)
based on this theory of liability.
ii. Fraudulent coverage
Appellant also contends that the district court erred in dismissing her claim based
upon fraudulent insurance coverage. We disagree. “In all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularit y.” Minn.
R. Civ. P. 9.02. And the supreme court has recognized that the “heightened pleading
standard” under rule 9.02 requires a party to “plead[] facts underlying each element of the
fraud claim.” Hardin Cnty. Sav. Bank v. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth., 821 N.W.2d 184,
191 (Minn. 2012).
Here, appellant’s complaint does not contain any circumstances supporting a claim
of fraud. Rather, appellant’s complaint simply asserts that respondent’s “practice of
charging separate premiums for different coverages on separate vehicles insured under the
same policy . . . creates fraudulent . . . coverage.” Because appellant’s compla int fails to
identify how respondent’s coverage is fraudulent and does not plead each element of a
fraud claim, the district court did not err by concluding that appellant ’s complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to this theory of liability.
12
iii. Illusory coverage
In dismissing appellant’s claim based upon illusory insurance coverage, the district
court determined that “Minnesota does not recognize a cause of action for breach of an
illusory contract.” Appellant challenges this decision, arguing that she “did not allege the
contract between [her and the decedent] and [respondent] was an illusory contract,” but
instead claimed that “the contract exists, but the coverages for which [appellant and the
decedent] paid premiums is illusory under the anti -stacking statute and [respondent’s]
policy language authorized by that statute.” Thus, appellant argues that the district court
erred in dismissing this claim “[a]t this very early stage of the action.”
We are not persuaded. Although the district court appeared to misconstrue
appellant’s claim as an action for breach of an illusory contract, there is no evidence that
could be introduced that would support appellant’s illusory-coverage theory. The illusory
coverage doctrine is “an independent means to avoid an unreasonable result when a literal
reading of a policy unfairly denies coverage.” Jostens, 527 N.W.2d at 118. The doctrine
applies “where part of the premium is specifically allocated to a partic ular type or period
of coverage and that coverage turns out to be functionally nonexistent.” Id. at 119. But
absent “extra-contractual evidence” that the insured reasonably thought a “specific part of
its premium was allocated” toward the particular coverage, the court bases its decision “on
a reading of the policy language under the usual rule of insurance contract interpretation—
an insurer ’s liability is governed by the parties ’ contract and the court ’s function is to
enforce that agreement.” Id. In o ther words, “[t]he illusory coverage doctrine, like
reasonable expectations, operates to qualify the general rule that courts will enforce an
13
insurance contract as written” because an insured “cannot avoid the literal language of the
policy.” Id. at 118.
Here, the coverage is not illusory because there can be no claim that the premiums
paid for UIM coverage on appellant and the decedent’s other five vehicles were for nothing.
As respondent points out, “[c]laims for UIM benefits could have arisen later in the same
policy period for accidents involving any of those other vehicles.” Under the plain and
literal language of the policy, respondent still carried the risk of such a loss in exchange
for payment on the policy premiums. As such, the district court did not err in rejecting this
theory because UIM coverage for appellant’s five other vehicles was not functionally
nonexistent.
iv. Made-whole doctrine
Appellant argues that the district court erred in “dismissing [her] claim based upon
the made -whole doctrine because the complaint alleges” that the decedent’s “survivors
substantiated a claim for [UIM] benefits for their loss of [the decedent] that is at least as
great as the total [UIM] benefits for which [appellant and the decedent] paid premiums,
meaning they have not been made whole for their losses by earlier settlements.” But
appellant cites no legal authority to support her claim for relief , nor h ave we found any
Minnesota legal authority recognizing the existence of a “made-whole doctrine.” Without
any legal authority substantiating a claim under a “made -whole doctrine,” appellant has
not shown that she has established a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Buscher
v. Montag Dev., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that claims based
on “mere assertion of error” that are unsupported by argument or legal authority are
14
waived), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). Therefore, the district court did not err in
dismissing this claim.1
B. Constitutionality of Minnesota’s anti-stacking statute
Appellant also contends that the district court erred in dismissing her challenges to
the constitutionality of Minnesota’s anti-stacking statute. But it is well settled that “parties
are free to contract as they desire, and so long as coverage required by law is not omitted
and policy provisions do not contravene applicable statutes, the extent of the insurer’s
liability is governed by the contract entered into.” Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co. , 641
N.W.2d 877, 882 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113,
115 (Minn. 1983)). Here, respondent’s insurance policy, which was agreed upon by the
parties and has the same operative effect of the anti -stacking statute, do es not allow
appellant to claim that her UIM benefits limits for the accident at issue are higher than the
$1,000,000 she already recovered under the policy. As a result, it is respondent’s insurance
policy, not the anti-stacking statute, that controls the outcome of appellant’s action. Indeed,
the following language fro m appellant’s complaint indicates an acknowledgment that the
insurance policy controls: “ To the extent that [respondent] relies upon Minnesota Statute
§ 65B.49, Subdivision 3a(6), Minnesota’s anti -stacking law, to justify” denial of
appellant’s claims, appellant “contends that this statute is unconstitutional.” (Emphasis
added.) Because the district court did not rely on the anti -stacking statute in denying

1 Because the district court did not err in dismissing appellant’s breach-of-contract-related
claims for failure to state a claim, we need not address respondent’s alternative argument
for dismissal of appellant’s claims under Minn. Stat. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5).
15
appellant’s claims and instead denied appellant’s claims based on the plain language of the
insurance policy, the constitutionality of that statute is not relevant to appellant’s claims,
and we decline to address it. Therefore, appellant has not shown that the district court erred
in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.