State of Minnesota v. Liban Dahir Mohamed

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1455

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Liban Dahir Mohamed,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-24-557

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Liban Dahir Mohamed, Sartell, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;
and Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for domestic assault by
strangulation, and following a stay of the appeal and remand for postconviction
proceedings, appellant Liban Dahir Mohamed argues that (1) the district court erred by

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admitting photographs of the victim’s claimed injuries because they were not sufficiently
authenticated; (2) the district court erred by summarily denying Mohamed’s petition for
postconviction relief on his claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
to meaningfully question prospective jurors during voir dire; and (3) in the alternative, that
even without a n evidentiary hearing, the record demonstrates that Mohamed received
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his counsel’s performance during voir dire. We
affirm.
FACTS
In April 2022, the St. Cloud Police Department responded to a call from a woman,
M.G., who reported that she had been assaulted by her husband, Mohamed. While
discussing the immediate incident with the responding officer, M.G. reported that she had
also been choked and hit by Mohamed in June 2021. M.G. showed the officer photographs
on her cell phone that she said depicted her injuries from the June 2021 incident. The
photographs displayed a date of June 22, 2021, with times ranging from 10:27 p.m. to
10:31 p.m. The officer used his cell phone to take pictures of M.G.’s phone screen
displaying the photographs.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Mohamed with two counts related to the
June 2021 incident: domestic assault by strangulation in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.2247, subdivision 2 (2020), and misdemeanor domestic assault – intentional
infliction of bodily harm in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision
1(2) (2020).

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The case proceeded to a jury trial. During voir dire, numerous potential jurors
indicated connections to law enforcement. The district court judge followed up on these
comments to varying degrees. Mohamed’s counsel also asked follow-up questions to
several of these prospective jurors, focusing primarily on the jurors’ jobs and families. Five
of the prospective jurors who disclosed some connection to law enforcement were selected
to hear the case. Only four of those jurors actually deliberated because the fifth was an
alternate and was excused before deliberations.
At trial, M.G., M.G.’s father, and M.G.’s brother testified. The officer who
responded to M.G.’s 911 call in April 2022 also testified. Mohamed testified in his own
defense.
Through the responding officer, the state offered into evidence four of the officer’s
photographs of M.G.’s phone screen displaying photographs of her injuries. Mohamed
objected to the foundation laid for these exhibits. The district court overruled the objection,
and the photographs were admitted; the officer also provided testimony about the
photographs. During her testimony, M.G. referenced having taken the photograph s of her
injuries on her cell phone.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The district court sentenced
Mohamed to one year in prison, stayed for five years. Mohamed appealed, and we granted
his motion to stay the appeal and remand to the district court for postconviction
proceedings. On remand, Mohamed filed a postconviction petition alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, which t he district court denied without an evidentiary hearing We
granted Mohamed’s motion to lift the stay of his appeal, and this appeal follows.

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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs.
Mohamed argues that the challenged photographs were not properly admitted
because they were authenticated solely by the officer and not by M.G., who took the
photographs. Mohamed asserts that “the photographs were admitted without any testimony
that the images fairly and accurate[ly] depict[ed] the condition of M.G. on or about the date
of the alleged assault in June of 2021” and that the erroneous admission of the photographs
was not harmless because the photographs were highly prejudicial. The state responds that
the district court did not err because, “even though the officer did not have personal
knowledge of M.G.’s injuries, . . . the accuracy of M.G.’s pictures went to the weight of
the evidence instead of admissibility.”
“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the district court, and
[appellate courts] will not reverse an evidentiary ruling absent a clear abuse of discretion.”
State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when
its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). “[A]n appellant who alleges
an error in the admission of evidence that does not implicate a constitutional right must
prove that there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted evidence
significantly affected the verdict.” State v. Peltier, 874 N.W.2d 792, 802 (Minn. 2016)
(quotation omitted).
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication of evidence in civil and
criminal trials. See Minn. R. Evid. 1101(a). It provides that “[t]he requirement of

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authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(a). Authentication may occur via testimony of a witness with
knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Minn. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
The following foundation was laid by the officer prior to the introduction of the
photographs:
A: There were some photographs that I obtained eventually.
Q: And these were photographs of what?
A: Of injuries on [M.G.]’s neck.
Q: And these photographs you understood to be taken via
phone?
A: Correct.
Q: And was there any kind of time stamp or any information
to support what she was saying?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: And what was that?
A: It was in June of 2021.
Q: So the photographs that you observed on her phone that she
said were taken after the assault were consistent with the
timeframe that she indicated that it had happened?
A: Yes, they were.
Q: And you took photographs of those photographs?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: And again, you were looking at them on her phone; so it’s
a photograph of her phone screen?
A: Correct.
Q: [Officer], I have just handed you four pages, correct?
A: Correct.

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Q: And are these pages something you’ve seen before?
A: Yes, they are.
Q: And in fact, just prior to court you got a chance to look at
them, correct?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Now the pages themselves are basically printed
photographs of a person, correct?
A: Yes, they are.
Q: And prior to today and in reviewing these photographs and
coming into court, you were already aware of these items,
correct?
A: Yes, I was.
Q: Is that because these were items that you photographed in
your response to [M.G.]’s face in the photographs she showed
you?
A: Yes, these are photographs that I had taken.
Q: Now if you are looking at these four pages of photographs,
are they an accurate depiction of what you saw at the time that
you were photographing them?
A: Yes, they are.
The district court overruled Mohamed’s lack -of-foundation objection and admitted the
photographs.
Mohamed’s attorney subsequently cross- examined the officer about the
photographs.
Q: [Officer], you did not take any formal statements about this
in 2022, is that correct?
A: In regards to this incident, I did not.
Q: Okay.
A: Just the information that was provided at that time.
Q: So the first statement that you took regarding the 2021
allegations were on June 6th of 2023?

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A: Yes.
Q: The photographs that you took -- or that you provided here
are not photographs that you took, is that correct?
A: Correct.
Q: Other than they are photos of photos, is that right?
A: They were photographs that I took of photos that were
previously taken on [M.G.]’s phone.
Q: When you first met with [M.G.] in 2022, obviously there
wouldn’t have been any marks visible by then. It was nearly a
year –
A: From this incident, there was not.
Q: And you were not called out in June of 2021, is that
correct?
A: I was not, no.
Q: So you wouldn’t have seen anything -- you can’t tell if
those pictures are accurately reflect what she looked like on the
June of 2021 date?
A: The photos that she showed me were the photos that she
told me that --
Q: You have no idea whether those -- what she looked like in
June of 2021?
A: I do not.
Q: You had never seen her at that point?
A: I didn’t see her in person, no.
Q: Okay. Do you know if it’s possible to manipulate phone
stamps -- or time stamps on a phone?
A: I’m not aware.
Q: You can’t testify with -- from personal knowledge that
these photos that you obtained were taken in June of 2021, is
that correct?
A: I cannot.
M.G. also referenced the photographs in her direct testimony.

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Q: And did you also share with [police] the earlier assault
from June of 2021?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you have any photographs from that June 21, 2021
assault?
A: Pictures that I have at the moment?
Q: No. After the June 20 -- 2021 assault, did you have any
photographs of your person?
A: Yes.
Q: And specifically, these were photographs of injuries?
A: Yes.
Q: And were you ultimately able to share them with law
enforcement?
A: Yes.
Q: And that was during that April of 2022 visit from law
enforcement?
A: Yes
In State v. Stone, an investigator took photos of a text message exchange on a phone
that belonged to a witness. 982 N.W.2d 500, 511 (Minn. App. 2022), aff’d, 995 N.W.2d
617 (Minn. 2023). To authenticate the photos, the investigator “testified that he took photos
of text messages on [the witness’s] phone and recognized the photos offered into evidence
as the photos that he took.” Id. This court concluded that the investigator’s testimony “was
sufficient to establish that the photos in question were what the state claimed them to be”
and that the appellant’s arguments about the state’s failure to establish the identity of the
contact who sent the messages or link the contact to the appellant was an argument about
the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence. Id. (citing State v. Coy, 200

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N.W.2d 40, 44 ( Minn. 1972) (“Except when foundation and probative value are entirely
absent, they bear on the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility”)).
Mohamed argues that this case is distinguishable from Stone “based on the presence
of other circumstantial evidence of accuracy in that case.” That circumstantial evidence,
according to Mohamed , is the fact that in Stone the photographs were taken on the same
day that the text messages were sent and the same day that the defendant committed the
criminal conduct and also that the text messages were on the witness’s phone under a name
used by the defendant. But circumstantial evidence of accuracy similarly exists in this case:
the photographs on M.G.’s phone display a date and the pictures were of M.G. herself and
were shown to the officer on a phone in M.G.’s possession. These circumstances, though
not exactly analogous to those in Stone, are still sufficient to support “that the photos in
question were what the state claimed them to be.” Id.
The state also points out that M.G. testified about taking the photos, including the
date that they were taken. Mohamed argues that the officer’s failure “to properly
authenticate the photographs is not saved by the testimony of M.G.” because “M.G. only
testified that she provided photographs to [the officer]” but was not shown the photographs
or asked whether they accurately depicted her injuries from the June 2021 incident.
To support their arguments, both parties cite State v. Newsome, a nonprecedential
opinion in which we saw no abuse of discretion in the admission of photographs taken by
a police officer of text messages on the victim’s cell phone when the photographs were
introduced into evidence via the officer. No. A13-0206, 2013 WL 6223458, at *6 (Minn.
App. Dec. 2, 2013). In Newsome, we reasoned that, because there was no evidence that the

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text messages were altered and both the officer and the recipient of the text messages
testified to their authenticity, the photographs were properly authenticated. Id. Mohamed
contends that, because M.G. was not shown the photographs and was never asked whether
the photographs accurately depicted her injuries after the June 2021 incident, this case is
materially different from Newsome. We are not convinced.
In Newsome, the officer testified that he viewed the text messages on the victim’s
phone and then called the appellant (the sender) at the number from which the messages
were sent. Id. at *2. This authentication testimony differs from what was provided in this
case, but the factual scenarios are also different. In Newsome, the officer could call a
number on a victim’s phone, whereas, here, the officer could see the date stamps of the
photos on M.G.’s phone. In addition, M.G.’s testimony about taking the photographs and
showing them to the officer further corroborated the authenticity of the images , even
though the images were not shown to M.G. during her testimony.
Again, under Rule 901, the authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence that
“a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Minn R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Here, the officer testified
that the photographs that were introduced were taken by him of images on M.G.’s cell
phone, which bore a date stamp consistent with M.G.’s report of Mohamed’s abuse of her
in June 2021, and that the photographs were accurate depictions of what he saw on M.G.’s
phone when he photographed them. The officer acknowledged that he could not “testify
. . . from personal knowledge that these photos that [he] obtained were taken in June of
2021.” But because the officer testified that he took the pictures of M.G.’s phone in April
2022—not that the pictures were taken in June 2021—Mohamed’s argument here is a

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“weight and not an admissibility argument.” See Stone, 982 N.W.2d at 511. In other words,
the fact that time had passed between when M.G. took the photos and when the officer took
a picture of those photos is an argument about how much weight the jury should give that
evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
photographs.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying
Mohamed’s petition for postconviction relief on Mohamed’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims.
In his petition for postconviction relief, Mohamed alleged that his trial counsel was
ineffective for several reasons . He pursues only one of those reasons on appeal—
specifically, that his counsel failed to conduct reasonable voir dire of jurors who indicated
that they or their close friends or acquaintances worked in law enforcement. The district
court determined that, even taking the allegations in Mohamed’s petition as true, Mohamed
failed to establish that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and it denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Under the postconviction statute, a court must set an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless
the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner
is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). “Although doubts about
whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner, a district
court need not hold a hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally
insufficient to grant the requested relief.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 602-03
(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts review a summary denial of
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 602.

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“When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [appellate courts]
apply the two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington.” Fields v. State, 733
N.W.2d 465, 468 (Minn. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and State v.
Lahue, 585 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn.1998) (applying Strickland to claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel)). To succeed, an appellant must prove both prongs: first, that
“counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and, second,
that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotation omitted).
With respect to the first prong, “[t]here is a strong presumption that a counsel’s
performance falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id.
(quotation omitted). To rebut the presumption that counsel provided effective assistance
during jury selection, an appellant must show:
(1) that defense counsel was so inattentive or indifferent during
the jury selection process that the failure to remove a
prospective juror was not the product of a conscious choice or
preference; (2) that a prospective juror expressed bias so strong
or unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective
preference could justify failure to remove that juror; or (3) that
there is some other specific evidence clearly demonstrating
that counsel’s choice was not plausibly justifiable.

Jama v. State, 756 N.W.2d 107, 114 (Minn. App. 2008).
In denying postconviction relief, the district court determined that the record
conclusively established that Mohamed failed to meet the first Strickland prong. The
district court focused its analysis on the four jurors who were selected and actually
deliberated in the case. It reasoned that Mohamed’s allegations failed because “three of the

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jurors [D.C., K.U., and A.K.] were asked by the Court if these relationships would affect
their ability to be fair, and all three indicated that the relationships would not impact their
ability to be fair” and the fourth juror, Juror L.H., while not asked this question by defense
counsel, had reported that he had only spoke n one time to his neighbor who was in law
enforcement. The district court concluded that Mohamed “failed to establish any of the
three prongs outlined in Jama as it relates to these four jurors.” See id.
Mohamed argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by “grossly
understating the number of jurors with connections to law enforcement” when it focused
on the four selected jurors with connections to law enforcement rather than the total of ten
prospective jurors who reported such connections. But even reviewing the questioning of
all ten prospective jurors, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling.
Eight of the prospective jurors with law enforcement connections were asked
whether they could be fair or impartial despite their connection to law enforcement, and
they all affirmed that they could. Mohamed does not argue what additional inquiry his
counsel should have made. Rather, Mohamed specifically references only the two
remaining prospective jurors, Juror L.H. and Juror M.S., pointing out that neither of them
was individually asked whether they could be fair and impartial despite their connections
to law enforcement. As noted above, however, L.H.—who was selected for and served on
the jury—had spoken only one time with his neighbor who was a law enforcement officer.
Mohamed does not explain how his counsel’s performance was deficient given Juror L.H.’s
very tangential connection to law enforcement.

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As for Juror M.S., she stated that her husband is a sergeant for the Sherburne County
Sheriff’s Department and her brother and brother-in-law and his wife all work for the
sheriff’s department in either Sherburne or Wright County. During voir dire, Mohamed’s
counsel followed up with Juror M.S. as follows:
COUNSEL: And I believe you said your husband works for
Sherburne County. He’s a patrol sergeant?
JUROR M.S.: Correct.
COUNSEL: Okay, how long has he been with Sherburne
County?
JUROR M.S.: I think like around twenty or twenty two years.
COUNSEL: And what do you do when you’re not working?
JUROR M.S.: For my kids, their activities. And then I like to
read. And we go camping a lot. And then also for a part of my
job, I do part of the Stearns County drug treatment court team
for them.
COUNSEL: Okay, how long have you been doing that?
JUROR M.S.: That I have been doing for about a year and a
half.
COUNSEL: Okay. I have no further questions for the panel,
Your Honor.
Mohamed emphasizes that Juror M.S. was never asked whether she could be fair
and unbiased despite her extensive connection to law enforcement. But Mohamed does not
explain how his trial counsel acted deficiently with respect to Juror M.S. under Jama. His
allegations do not demonstrate inattentiveness or indifference on his counsel’s part or a
bias on Juror M.S.’s part that is so strong that there could be no countervailing reason not
to remove the juror, nor do they assert any other evidence that would demonstrate that his
counsel’s performance was unjustifiable. See Jama, 756 N.W.2d at 114. Moreover, even if

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Mohamed’s allegations could satisfy the first Strickland prong, his ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claims fail under the second Strickland prong because there is no probability
that the results of the proceeding would have been different—Juror M.S. was an alternate
juror and was excused prior to deliberation.
As a result, under Minnesota Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 1, the
postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Mohamed was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he did not allege facts that, if true, were legally
sufficient to grant his requested relief of a new trial. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 602-03.
III. The record does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mohamed argues, in the alternative, that if we find that the district court was not
required to hold an evidentiary hearing on Mohamed’s claim, we should conclude that the
record actually establishes that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in
questioning prospective jurors and reverse his conviction. But Mohamed relies on the same
arguments analyzed above, focusing particularly on alternate Juror M.S., and his arguments
fail for the same reasons already given.
Affirmed.