State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1467

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kelsey Marie Rutland,
Appellant.

Filed July 27, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CR-24-527

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Benjamin T. Lindstrom, Cass County Attorney, Walker, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and
Harris, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant Kelsey Marie Rutland challenges the district court’s denial of her motion
for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
because it failed to consider all the Trog factors, including six letters of support. Because
we discern no abuse of discretion by the district court, we affirm.
2
FACTS
In October 2021, Rutland was employed as a cashier at a sporting goods store. Part
of Rutland’s job was “zeroing out” any remaining balances on gift cards used by the store’s
customers and then throwing the gift cards away. After a while, Rutland began using the
gift cards herself because she believed that no one would notice them being used again.
Between October 2021 and November 2023, Rutland used the gift cards to purchase seven
firearms for herself from the store.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Rutland with one count of felony theft by
swindle, one count of felony racketeering, 18 counts of felony theft of a firearm, two counts
of attempted theft of a firearm, three counts of theft of $1,000 or more, and one count of
theft of $5,000 or more under Minnesota Statutes sections 609.52, subdivisions 2(a)(1)
and (4), and .903, subdivision 1(3) (2020). Rutland pleaded guilty to seven counts of
felony theft of a firearm, and the state dismissed the remaining charges.
Rutland filed a motion for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that she was
particularly amenable to probation because of her lack of criminal history, her young age,
acceptance of responsibility, remorse, post-offense rehabilitation, and need for mental-
health treatment.
1 Rutland’s attorney included a March 2025 psychological evaluation 2
and six letters of support from family, friends, and former coworkers.

1 Rutland’s attorney argued at sentencing that Rutland had been physically and emotionally
abused from a young age, which affected how she viewed her self-worth later in life. As a
result, her attorney argued that Rutland viewed her worth as what she could get for others;
and here, that included “discounts” for friends and family.

2 The psychological evaluation is confidential. To protect the confidentiality of nonpublic
information, we include only the information contained in Rutland’s departure motion and
3
At sentencing, Rutland’s attorney argued that this was “sort of a routine theft case.”
The attorney argued that Rutland was not violent and that “ she did not use [the] firearms
for the commission of any [] violent crime.” Rutland’s attorney also informed the court
that she completed a mental-health assessment and had begun individualized treatment.
The state opposed Rutland’s departure motion, arguing that Rutland’s remorse was not
sincere and pointing out that the psychological evaluation was completed after she pleaded
guilty and prior to sentencing.
The district court also heard three victim impact statements. Rutland apologized to
the victims and acknowledged that her actions were wrong. The district court denied
Rutland’s departure and imposed stayed presumptive guidelines sentences for counts 3, 5,
7, 9, and 11, and executed guidelines sentences of 27 months’ imprisonment for count 15,
and 26 months’ imprisonment for count 19.
3
Rutland appeals.
DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a sentence or a range of sentences
that is “presumed to be appropriate.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014)
(quoting Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.A (2012)). The purpose of the guidelines is to
promote uniformity, proportionality, and predictability in sentencing. Minn. Stat.
§ 244.09, subd. 5 (2020); see also State v. Hicks, 864 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2015). Thus,

in the sentencing hearing transcripts. Both are designated as publicly available. See Minn.
R. Pub. Access to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subds. 1(b), 4.

3 Rutland demanded execution of the stayed sentences after being sentenced to an executed
sentence on counts 15 and 19.
4
departures from the sentencing guidelines “are discouraged and are intended to apply to a
small number of cases.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016).
The sentencing guidelines provide for two types of departures: dispositional
departures and durational departures. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.a-b. A durational
departure “is a sentence that departs in length from the presumptive guidelines range.”
Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623. Durational departures are appropriate when “the defendant’s
conduct was significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the
offense.” Id. (quotation omitted). A dispositional departure, on the other hand, “places the
offender in a different setting than that called for by the presumptive guidelines sentence.”
Id. Dispositional departures generally focus on the defendant’s characteristics “that show
whether the defendant is particularly suitable for individualized treatment in a probationary
setting.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A district court may depart from the presumptive range when there are substantial
and compelling circumstances. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2020). “Substantial and
compelling circumstances are those circumstances that make the facts of a particular case
different from a typical case.” State v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985).
In determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation so as to
justify a downward dispositional departure, the district court considers, among other things,
the defendant’s age, criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude while in court, and the
support of family and friends (Trog factors). See State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn.
1982). If the district court departs from the presumptive sentence, it must provide written
reasons to justify the departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1.c (2020). But the district
court is not required to state its reasons for denying a defendant’s request for a downward
5
dispositional departure and imposing the presumptive guidelines sentence. State v. Van
Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985). And even when the Trog factors may
support particular amenability, we generally will not disturb the district court’s imposition
of the presumptive sentence. State v. Evenson, 554 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Minn. App. 1996),
rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 1996); see State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App.
2011) (stating that the presence of a mitigating factor “does not obligate the [district] court
to place defendant on probation or impose a shorter term than the presumptive term”)
(quotation omitted)).
“We review a district court’s decision to depart from the presumptive guidelines
sentence for an abuse of discretion.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 . District courts are
afforded “great discretion in the imposition of sentences.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 307. “A
district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Fortner, 989 N.W.2d 368, 374
(Minn. App. 2023) (quotation omitted). Only in a “rare case” will an appellate court
reverse a district court’s imposition of a presumptive sentence. State v. Bertsch, 707
N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981)).
Rutland argues that the district court’s decision not to grant a dispositional departure
was an abuse of discretion because it was “against logic and the facts in the record .” See
State v. Guzman, 892 N.W.2d 801, 810 (Minn. 2017). Specifically, Rutland argues that
the district court: (1) failed to consider all of the Trog factors, and the factors that it did
consider weighed in favor of departure, and (2) failed to consider the six letters of support
from friends and family. We address each argument in turn.
6
Rutland first argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to
consider all of the Trog factors, and the factors that it did consider weighed in favor of
departure. Specifically, Rutland argues the district court only considered whether she was
remorseful. Her argument is unavailing.
First, in denying a dispositional departure, the district court need not discuss every
Trog factor. Pegel , 795 N.W.2d at 254. Nor are specific findings required. State v.
Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 926 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013)
(noting that the district court is “not required to state its reasons for not departing on the
record”). Here, although the district court did not explicitly address all Trog factors in its
sentencing decision, the district court expressed concerns that went beyond just the lack of
remorse and weighed directly on Rutland’s amenability to probation. Of the Trog factors
that the district court did consider, it acknowledged that Rutland expressed remorse,
accepted responsibility for her actions, and had no prior criminal history, which weighed
in her favor. The district court also noted that Rutland was present in court, on time, did
not have warrants, cooperated with the investigation, communicated with her attorney, and
pleaded guilty. Still, the district court did not find that Rutland was particularly amenable
to probation. For example, despite Rutland’s expression of remorse, the district court
indicated that it was not entirely convinced that Rutland’s remorse was genuine. When it
reviewed the psychological evaluation, it stated that the reason for the visit listed on the
evaluation was “because your attorney told you to.” It also noted that the evaluation was
completed prior to sentencing and after Rutland pleaded guilty. Thus, rather than complete
a psychological evaluation out of a genuine desire to attain a “particular insight” into her
mental health, the district court viewed the evaluation as part of Rutland’s sentencing
7
strategy. The district court’s explanation to Rutland shows that it carefully considered its
sentencing decision.
The district court additionally discussed the nature of the crimes: that the thefts
occurred over a period of 36 months; and that Rutland had plenty of opportunities to stop
what she was doing, but she did not. The district court also considered the victim impact
statements and said, “these folks were helping you and creating an environment of support
for you [and that] did not trigger the remorse at that time. It didn’t trigger the insight that
maybe there was a need for you to address mental health issues at any time on those days
that you woke up.” On this record, the district court considered and balanced the Trog
factors that favored and disfavored a departure.
Next, Rutland contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
consider the six letters of support from friends and family. It is true that the district court
did not acknowledge reading or receiving the letters of support on the record, but they were
sent to the district court as exhibits attached to Rutland’s departure motion.
While the record does not clearly indicate whether the district court read the letters
of support, we are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion. The letters were
submitted in support of the departure motion, and the district court’s failure to specifically
reference them when denying that motion does not establish that it failed to consider them.
District courts are not required to discuss every Trog factor or explain their reasons for
denying a departure on the record. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 254; Van Ruler, 795 N.W.2d at
80 (stating that a district court need not explain its reasons for denying departure when it
“considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence”). And
even if the district court explicitly stated that it reviewed the letters of support, “the
8
presence of mitigating factors” does not require a departure. Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d
755, 781 (Minn. App. 2013), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014); Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at
668 (stating that appellate courts will not disturb the district court’s sentence “even if there
are grounds that would justify departure”).
In short, the record reflects that the district court adequately considered all of the
testimony presented at the sentencing hearing before denying Rutland’s motion for a
dispositional departure. The record reflects that the district court was engaged during the
sentencing hearing. The district court heard from three victims, Rutland’s attorney, and
Rutland herself, regarding their arguments for and against departure. The district court was
additionally presented with the psychological evaluation, Rutland’s written motion
requesting a downward dispositional departure which contained the letters of support, and
the presentence investigation (PSI) report.
4 While Rutland may disagree with the district
court’s discussion or weighing of the Trog factors, that does not constitute an abuse of
discretion.
We therefore determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Rutland’s request for a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive sentence.
Affirmed.

4 Although the district court did not explicitly cite the PSI report before it pronounced a
sentence, the record shows that the district court received and reviewed the PSI report.