State of Minnesota, Appellant,
The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the district court abused its discretion because the reasons it provided for the departure were insufficient and the record does not otherwise justify it.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Walker 913 N.W.2d 463
- State of Minnesota v. Jose Arriage Soto, Jr. 855 N.W.2d 303
- State v. Trog 323 N.W.2d 28
- State v. Misquadace 644 N.W.2d 65
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1476
State of Minnesota,
Appellant,
vs.
Kenneth James Holcomb,
Respondent.
Filed April 13, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Wheelock, Judge
Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CR-20-699
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark Metz, Carver County Attorney, Kevin A. Hill, Assistant County Attorney, Chaska,
Minnesota (for appellant)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for
respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Wheelock, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota appeals from the district court’s grant of a downward
dispositional sentencing departure, contending that the district court abused its discretion
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because respondent failed to establish that he was particularly amenable to probation. We
reverse and remand for imposition of a presumptive sentence.
FACTS
On August 4, 2020, officers from the Chaska Police Department responded to a
report of a vehicle that was driving erratically, eventually crashing into a gas- station
building before departing at a high rate of speed . An officer observed broken glass and
other damage at the scene of the crash. While the vehicle was driving near Highway 41, a
different officer identified it as the vehicle involved in the crash and initiated a traffic stop.
Respondent Kenneth James Holcomb, who was driving, and a passenger both exited the
vehicle. The officer checked Holcomb’s driving record and determined that Holcomb’s
driver’s license was cancelled. Holcomb informed officers that the reason for his irregular
driving was that he was attempting to evade a white car that had been following him and
that its occupants had been firing shots at his vehicle. An officer spoke to the white car’s
occupants, who witnessed Holcomb crash into the gas station and confirmed that they had
been following Holcomb but only to document and report his dangerous driving conduct
because they suspected that he was intoxicated. The officers determined that the white
car’s occupants did not have any guns and did not appear to have been shooting at
Holcomb’s vehicle.
After noticing that Holcomb’s eyes were bloodshot and detecting the odor of
alcohol, one of the officers asked Holcomb to take field sobriety tests. Holcomb initially
complied and underwent various tests but then refused to take a preliminary breath test.
Police arrested Holcomb and transported him to jail, where Holcomb continued to refuse a
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breath test without first talking to an attorney. After failing to successfully contact an
attorney within the time provided, Holcomb was charged with felony first-degree driving
while impaired (DWI) pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2020), felony
first-degree DWI test refusal pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2020),
gross-misdemeanor driving after cancellation pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5
(2020), and misdemeanor failure to stop for a collision pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169.09,
subd. 2 (2020).
In May 2025, Holcomb entered into a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to
the test-refusal charge and the state dismissed the remaining charges. Holcomb has a
criminal-history score of seven that includes an additional DWI-related felony for which
he was on conditional release when he committed the underlying offense in this case as
well as a domestic-a buse-no-contact-order (DANCO) violation for which he was on
supervised release at the time of the offense.
At Holcomb’s sentencing hearing, the state requested that Holcomb receive the
presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines of “at least 75 months[’
imprisonment].” The state’s attorney highlighted Holcomb’s history of DWI- and
driving-related offenses. The state’s attorney also noted multiple instances in which
Holcomb failed to comply with pretrial-release conditions in this case, including failing to
timely arrange for required alcohol monitoring, failing to appear at hearings, testing
positive for alcohol, and missing alcohol tests. He further stated that Holcomb had required
extradition from Wyoming after being arrested there and was recently arrested again for
driving after cancellation.
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Holcomb moved the district court for a downward dispositional sentencing
departure, requesting a stayed sentence and placement on probation. Holcomb’s attorney
described Holcomb as a good employee with a steady job and mentioned that Holcomb
had undergone a year- long treatment program while in custody and had been sober for
several years. He also noted that Holcomb had written a book on character development
and was seeking a publisher. He further illustrated Holcomb’s commitment to his family,
highlighting how he cared for his mother with health issues and was excited to spend time
with his recently born grandson. Holcomb also addressed the district court, stating, “I can
guarantee you you will never see me in court again for no type of crimes . . . . I’m 45 years
old. All this stuff is just so far behind me, it’s not even funny. I can guarantee you will
never see me again as far as criminal.”
The district court granted Holcomb’s motion for a downward dispositional
departure, staying execution of his sentence and placing him on probation for seven years.
The entirety of the district court’s discussion of its reasons for granting a departure
consisted of the following:
Well, and we’ll see if the court regrets this, but the court is
going to take a chance on you. The court is going to make a
finding that there are substantial and compelling reasons to find
that you are particularly amenable to treatment and particularly
amenable to probation. The court is going to note that you have
expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for this by
pleading guilty to this charge. The court will note that this is
an offense that happened back in I believe 2020 . . . . So it has
been five years since this happened.
The state appeals.
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DECISION
The state argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting a downward
dispositional departure because its findings were insufficient to establish that Holcomb was
particularly amenable to probation. We agree that the district court’s findings were
deficient in this regard, and we further note that we do not discern any record support for
a finding of particular amenability to probation here. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for the district court to impose a presumptive sentence.
We review the district court’s grant of a downward dispositional departure for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Walker, 913 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018) . “A
sentencing court must pronounce a sentence within the applicable range unless there exist
identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances that distinguish a case and
overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence.” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d
303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted). “[A] defendant’s particular amenability to
individualized treatment in a probationary setting will justify departure in the form of a
stay of execution of a presumptively executed sentence.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28,
31 (Minn. 1982). To determine whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation,
district courts weigh the various factors enumerated in Trog, “including the defendant’s
age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the
support of friends and/or family.” Id. A dispositional departure based on particular
amenability to probation is proper only when the district court’s findings support the
conclusion that a defendant displays particular amenability to probation, not mere
amenability to probation. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308-09. The supreme court in Soto clarified
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the distinction between amenability to probation and particular amenability to probation,
stating:
Our consistent use of the words “particular” and
“particularly” in this context is not accidental. “Particular”
means exceptional or distinctive among others of the same
group, and “particularly” means especially or specifically. By
requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation,
therefore, we ensure that the defendant ’s amenability to
probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and
truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances
that are necessary to justify a departure.
Id. at 309 (quotations and citation omitted). And “a departure is an abuse of discretion if
the court’s reasons are improper or insufficient and there is insufficient evidence of record
to justify the departure.” Id. at 308 (quotations omitted).
Here, the only Trog factor the district court referenced was remorse. It also
mentioned that five years had passed since the offense, but it cited no other considerations
or analysis of any factors to support its finding. Its discussion of Holcomb’s remorse is
minimal, noting only that he “expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for this by
pleading guilty to this charge.” But a guilty plea alone is insufficient to establish that a
defendant is particularly amenable to probation. Id. at 312; cf. State v. Misquadace,
644 N.W.2d 65, 72 (Minn. 2002) (“[A] plea agreement —standing alone—is not a
sufficient basis to depart from the sentencing guidelines.”). And most concerningly, the
district court did not address Holcomb’s extensive criminal history, that he was already on
conditional release for a DWI-related felony when he committed the DWI offense in this
case, that he also violated his conditions of pretrial release after committing this offense ,
or that he absconded for a year and a half and was found in another state.
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In sum, the district court did not identify anything that “distinguishes the defendant
from most others”—which is necessary to support a finding of particular amenability to
probation. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309. By the district court’s stated rationale, any defendant
who pleads guilty would form the requisite remorse to support a departure. This is contrary
to the standard set forth in Soto. And our own review of the record reveals no “substantial
and compelling circumstances” that sufficiently set Holcomb apart from most other
defendants to support a finding of particular amenability. Id. (quotation omitted). To the
contrary, Holcomb’s multiple DWI-related offenses and repeated failure to comply with
conditions of release, including testing positive for alcohol, persuade us that a presumptive
guidelines sentence is appropriate here. We conclude that the district court abused its
discretion because the reasons it provided for the departure were insufficient and the record
does not otherwise justify it. See id. at 308. We therefore reverse and remand for the
district court to impose a presumptive guidelines sentence.
Reversed and remanded.