In the Matter of the Application of DOB Properties, LLC, for a Conditional Use Permit.
The holding in the court’s own words
We conclude that the county board’s decision is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Zylka v. City of Crystal 167 N.W.2d 45
- RDNT, LLC v. City of Bloomington 861 N.W.2d 71
- Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Afton 323 N.W.2d 757
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1483
In the Matter of the Application of DOB Properties, LLC, for a Conditional Use Permit.
Filed July 20, 2026
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Douglas County Board of Commissioners
File No. CU-00185
Alicia N. Norby, Thorwaldsen & Malmstrom, P .L.L.P., Detroit Lakes, Minnesota (for
relator DOB Properties, LLC)
Kristin C. Nierengarten, Jordan R. Kleinschmidt, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Douglas County Board of Commissioners)
Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
DOB Properties LLC applied for a conditional-use permit so that it could build a
planned-unit development in a rural-residential zoning district. The Douglas County Board
of Commissioners denied the application. We conclude that the county board’s decision
is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
DOB Properties owns a parcel of property of approximately 25 acres in a rural-
residential zoning district in Carlos Township. The property is on the east side of county
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state aid highway 42 and the south side of Prairie Road Northeast. That portion of highway
42 is part of the Glacial Ridge Trail Scenic Byway, development of which is guided by a
“Corridor Management Plan.”
In early 2025, DOB Properties applied to the county for a conditional-use permit
(CUP) that would allow it to build a planned-unit development (PUD) consisting of 72
storage units. The county’s planning advisory commission reviewed the proposal and
expressed concerns related to “aesthetic appearance, additional traffic, and increased runoff
volume.” DOB Properties withdrew the application so that it could make revisions.
In June 2025, DOB Properties submitted a second CUP application with a revised
proposal for the construction of a PUD with 68 storage units that would be set back further
from highway 42. The storage units would be individually owned and could be used for
storage of personal, hobby, and recreational items as well as for light commercial uses.
The proposal called for storage units in “ pole-style” buildings of two different sizes, the
larger of which would be approximately 27 feet tall. DOB Properties proposed to install
trees and shrubs along the county road and to delay construction for three years to allow
the vegetation to grow taller.
County staff reviewed the application and issued a report , which stated that the
development would affect the aesthetics of the adjacent residential area and scenic byway
because the proposed vegetation buffer would provide only limited screening for a decade
or more, until the trees and shrubs were tall enough to completely screen the storage
buildings. The report also stated that the commercial appearance and number of the pole-
style buildings would differ from adjacent properties and might not be compatible with
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future residential development on adjacent properties. The report stated further that the
development would create additional traffic but that such traffic was not expected to impact
adjacent properties, cause congestion, or create traffic hazards. The staff report concluded
that the application could be either approved or denied but that, if it were approved, it
should be approved subject to specific conditions, including a limitation on the type of
items stored, a limitation on the type of uses to the “pursuit of hobbies,” specified outdoor
lighting, a 120-foot setback from highway 42 , and the planting of trees and shrubs along
the entire boundary between the development and highway 42.
The planning advisory commission considered DOB Properties’ application at a
public hearing in July 2025. The owner of DOB Properties, Dan O ’Brien, made remarks
in support of the proposal. O’Brien submitted nine photographs of other developments in
the area that did not have any buffers or screening. A commission member responded that
only one of the other developments is located in a residential or rural residential zone while
the seven other developments are located in commercial and industrial zones.
The commission received public comments on the application. Several persons who
live nearby testified in opposition to the application. The residents expressed concerns that
the proposed development would negatively affect their property values and the aesthetics
of the area ’s natural landscape. One resident criticized the staff report for relying on
outdated traffic data. Some residents commented that the development would increase
traffic and exacerbate the hazards of a blind spot at the intersection of highway 42 and
Prairie Road Northeast.
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The commission discussed the proposal. The county’s director of land and resource
development confirmed that the staff report used traffic data from a 2009 study and agreed
with public comments that traffic volume had increased since then. But he stated that
highway 42 could accommodate the increase in traffic. He also confirmed that there was
a four-foot increase in elevation when approaching the intersection from the east on Prairie
Road Northeast. But he also noted that the county did not receive “any comment from the
county engineer indicating that it’s a traffic hazard in regard to this application.”
The commission recommended the denial of the application by a vote of four to two.
The commission’s recommendation was based on four reasons: (1) the proposed use was
not compatible with the specific location, (2) the property is adjacent to a designated scenic
byway, (3) the proposed use does not provide adequate separation or screening to prevent
negative impacts to property values and future development, and (4) the proposed use
would add traffic to the area.
The county board considered the application one week later at a public meeting.
Before the meeting, the board was provided with the staff report, O’Brien’s photographs
of other nearby developments, written public comments, and the commission’s findings
and recommendation. At the public hearing, the director of land and resource development
summarized DOB Properties’ proposal, the comments received by the commission at the
public hearing, and the commission’s discussion. The county board voted unanimously to
deny the application. In August 2025, the county board approved a nine-page document
with findings of fact and a statement of the reasons for its decision, which were the same
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reasons stated by the county’s planning advisory commission. DOB Properties appeals by
way of a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
DOB Properties argues that the county board’s decision to deny its CUP application
is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
A county board has broad discretion to grant or deny a CUP application. Zylka v.
City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 49 (Minn. 1969). But a county board’s decision to grant
or deny a CUP application cannot be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. RDNT, LLC
v. City of Bloomington, 861 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 2015). Courts apply a two-step inquiry
to determine whether a county board’s denial is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious:
“First, we must determine if the reasons given by the [county board] were legally sufficient.
Second, if the reasons given are legally sufficient, we must determine if the reasons had a
factual basis in the record.” Id. at 75-76 (citations omitted). A county board’s decision to
grant or deny a CUP application is proper and will be affirmed if at least one of the reasons
given for the denial is both legally sufficient and has a factual basis. See Hubbard
Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 765 n.4 (Minn. 1982).
A county board may deny a CUP application “if the proposed use endangers ‘the
public health or safety or the general welfare of the area affected or the community as a
whole.’” RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting Zylka, 167 N.W.2d at 49). The “absence of
more express standards” may make denial of an application “more, not less, vulnerable to
a finding of arbitrariness,” thereby warranting closer scrutiny. Id. (quotation omitted).
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In this case, a county ordinance provides:
In granting a conditional use permit, the Douglas
County Board shall consider the advice and recommendations
of the Planning Advisory Commission and the effect of the
proposed use upon the health, safety, and general welfare of
occupants or surrounding lands. Among other things, the
following findings may be considered:
(1) The use will not create an excessive burden on
existing parks, schools, streets and other public facilities and
utilities which serve or are proposed to serve the area.
(2) The use will be sufficiently compatible or
separated by distance or screening from adjacent agricultural
or residentially zoned or used land so that existing homes will
not be depreciated in value and there will be no deterrence to
development of vacant land.
(3) The structure and site shall have an appearance
that will not have an adverse effect upon adjacent residential
properties.
(4) The use in the opinion of the County Board of
Commissioners is reasonably related to the overall needs of the
County and to the existing land use.
(5) The use is consistent with the purposes of the
Zoning Ordinance and the purposes of the zoning district in
which the applicant intends to locate the proposed use.
(6) The use is in conformance with the Land Use
Plan of the County.
(7) The use will not create a traffic hazard or
congestion.
Douglas County, Minn., Zoning Ordinance (DCZO) § VII.G.1.a. (2021). This ordinance
requires consideration of the “health, safety, and general welfare of occupants or
surrounding lands” and, in addition, contains “more express standards” in the enumerated
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list of seven specific factors. DCZO § VII.G.1.a.; cf. RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76 (stating
that ordinance referencing only health, safety, and welfare was “legally sufficient” but
lacked “more express standards”).
In its written findings, the county board referred to section VII.G.1.a. of the zoning
ordinance and stated that it had considered “the effect of the proposed use on the public
health, safety, and welfare.” The board based its denial on four findings: (1) the proposed
use is not compatible with the residential and agricultural location, (2) the property is
located adjacent to a designated scenic byway, (3) the proposed use does not provide
adequate screening and may deter future development in the area, and (4) the proposed use
would increase traffic and enhance existing traffic hazards. We address each of the county
board’s reasons in turn to determine whether any of the county board’s reasons are legally
sufficient and supported by a factual basis in the record. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76;
Hubbard Broadcasting, 323 N.W.2d at 765 n.4.
A. Compatibility with Location
The county board’s first reason for its decision is that “[t]he proposed use is not
compatible with the specific location, which is residential and agricultural in nature.” The
county board specifically noted that “[t]he proposed development is in close proximity to
existing residential development and in an area where future residential development is
likely.” This reason is legally sufficient because the ordinance specifically provides that
the county board may consider whether the proposed use “will be sufficiently compatible
or separated by distance or screening from adjacent agricultural or residentially zoned or
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used land” and whether “[t]he structure and site shall have an appearance that will not have
an adverse effect upon adjacent residential properties.” DCZO § VII.G.1.a.(2), (3).
DOB Properties argues that the county board did not explain why the proposed
development would be incompatible with the location. To the contrary, the county board’s
first finding describes the development’s structures as “pole-style buildings” and states that
“the clustering of this type of structure within a single development can present the
appearance of a commercial use and would be a significant departure from current uses.”
This is an adequate explanation of why the proposed development would be incompatible
with the location.
DOB Properties also argues that the county board did not evaluate the project
according to the appearance standard in the ordinance. To the contrary, the county board’s
first finding states that the clustering of pole-style buildings “can present the appearance
of a commercial use.” (Emphasis added.) The county board’s first finding also states that
the project, including lighting during nighttime use, likely would “create a visual impact.”
These statements are directly related to the provision of the ordinance allowing
consideration of whether the property would “have an appearance that will not have an
adverse effect upon adjacent residential properties.” See DCZO § VII.G.1.a.(3).
The county board’s stated reasons are supported by the record. DOB Properties’
property is in a rural-residential zoning district and is adjacent to a residential development.
Several residents of that development expressed concerns that the proposed use would
negatively impact their property values. The director of land and resource development
stated that county employees had reviewed the impact of similar planned-unit
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developments on adjacent properties over time and had determined that such developments
could cause property values to increase at a slower rate than they would without the
developments. Nearby residents also stated that they valued the scenic views and natural
landscape of the area and were concerned that the landscape would be negatively affected
by the commercial appearance of the storage units.
Thus, the county board ’s first reason for its decision is legally sufficient and has a
factual basis in the record.
B. Scenic Byway
The county board’s second reason for its decision is that “the subject property is
located adjacent to a designated Scenic Byway.” The county board’s second finding states
that the size, number, and commercial appearance of the proposed storage units would
conflict with the goals of the scenic byway, which are to “promote, preserve, enhance, and
interpret the rich cultural and historic resources, scenic beauty and recreational resources
of the region.”
DOB Properties argues that the county board’s second reason is legally insufficient
on the ground that the county board relied on “a non-codified planning concept.” DOB
Properties refers to the Glacial Ridge Trail Scenic Byway Corridor Management Plan,
which is not part of the county’s zoning ordinances. But the county’s zoning ordinance
allows the county board to consider whether the proposed use “will be sufficiently
compatible [with] adjacent agricultural or residentially zoned or used land. ” DCZO
§ VII.G.1.a.(2). That factor is broad enough to encompass the features of the scenic byway.
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The county board’s finding that DOB Properties’ proposed use would be
incompatible with the scenic-byway designation is supported by the record. DOB
Properties’ site design indicates that approximately half of the storage units would be
located along the side of highway 42. The staff report indicates that the proposed pole-
style buildings would have a commercial appearance that would cause “a significant
change in the viewshed of the area.” The staff report also indicated that some storage units
would be 27 feet tall and that the proposed tree-and-shrub buffer would take a decade or
longer to grow before it would be tall enough to screen the buildings.
Thus, the board’s second reason for its decision is legally sufficient and has a factual
basis in the record.
C. Inadequate Screening
The county board’s third reason for its decision is that the proposed use “does not
provide adequate separation or screening from adjacent agricultural or residential zoned or
used land such that a deterrence to development will not occur.” This reason is justified
by the provision in the zoning ordinance that allows the county board to consider whether
a proposed use “will be sufficiently compatible or separated by distance or screening from
adjacent agricultural or residentially zoned or used land.” DCZO § VII.G.1.a.(2) (emphasis
added).
DOB contends that the county board’s third reason is legally insufficient on the
ground that it imposed “a timing requirement found nowhere in the ordinance” by
considering the length of time it would take for the vegetation screening to grow. But the
ordinance does not preclude the county board from considering how long it would take
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screening to become effective, nor does it expressly give a property owner a period of time
to comply with the ordinance. See DCZO § VII.G.1.a.(2). Thus, the county board’s third
reason is legally sufficient.
DOB Properties argues that the record supports the conclusion that the proposed
screening would have been adequate to mitigate any negative effects on adjacent land. The
proposal indicated that some storage units would consist of 27-foot-tall, pole-style
buildings with a commercial appearance. The staff report found that the proposed tree-
and-shrub buffer would take a decade or longer to reach a height sufficient to screen the
storage units. The staff also determined that planned-unit developments similar to the
proposal have caused the property values of adjacent land to increase at a slower rate. In
light of these statements, the county board’s conclusion that the proposed screening would
be inadequate has a factual basis in the record.
Thus, the county board’s third reason for its decision is legally sufficient and has a
factual basis in the record.
D. Traffic Concerns
The county board’s fourth reason for its decision is that “the use would add traffic
to the area, specifically the intersection of [highway 42] and Prairie Road.” This reason is
legally sufficient because the ordinance provides that the county board may consider
whether a conditional use will create a traffic hazard or congestion. DCZO § VII.G.1.a.(7).
DOB Properties argues that the county’s traffic-related findings do not have a
sufficient factual basis because the record contains only the generalized concerns of nearby
residents. DOB Properties contends that the county board improperly disregarded the only
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technical evidence in the record: the county engineer’s determination that the proposed use
would not create a traffic hazard.
The record indicates that residents’ opposition was based on concrete observations.
One resident submitted a written comment that included an aerial photograph of the 45-
degree-angle intersection between highway 42 and Prairie Road Northeast. Other residents
who are familiar with the intersection commented that they have reduced visibility when
turning left from either direction. The director corroborated the comments of residents by
noting that the intersection has a four-foot increase in elevation. T he county board was
permitted to rely on the testimony of residents who had personally observed a blind spot at
the intersection. See RDNT, 861 N.W.2d at 76-77.
Thus, the county board’s fourth reason for its decision is legally sufficient and
supported by a factual basis in the record.
In sum, the county board did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously by
denying DOB Properties’ CUP application because each of the county’s four reasons for
its decision is legally sufficient and supported by a factual basis in the record.
Affirmed.