The holding in the court’s own words
Because we conclude the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it determined Melina entered a constitutionally accurate guilty plea, we need not decide whether the postconviction petition was time-barred. 2 We conclude that Melina provided a sufficient factual basis at the plea hearing to demonstrate that he was “involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship” with victim.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 4 N.W.2d 417 not in our corpus
- Pearson v. State 891 N.W.2d 590
- Townsend v. State 834 N.W.2d 736
- 999 N.W.2d 103 not in our corpus
- Lussier v. State 821 N.W.2d 581
- Junious Taylor, Jr. v. State of Minnesota 887 N.W.2d 821
- State v. Mikulak 903 N.W.2d 600
- 921 N.W.2d 5 not in our corpus
- 955 N.W.2d 294 not in our corpus
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1488
John Kevin Melina, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-20-1280
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Michael J. Lieberg, Chief Deputy County
Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larson, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARSON, Judge
Appellant John Kevin Melina challenges the postconviction court’s decision to deny
his petition for postconviction relief. Melina argues the postconviction court abused its
discretion when it concluded that his petition was time-barred and that he entered a
2
constitutionally valid guilty plea. Because the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Melina’s postconviction petition, we affirm.
FACTS
Melina pleaded guilty to one count of felony domestic assault by strangulation under
Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2 (2018). At the plea hearing, Melina answered questions
from his attorney to establish a factual basis for his guilty plea. Melina described that, on
the day of the assault, A.N.J. (victim) was “upset” when “she arrived home” because he
failed to “pick her up from work.” An argument ensued that escalated when Melina
strangled victim, causing her to briefly lose consciousness. Melina also described his
relationship with victim:
COUNSEL: And on [the day of the offense] did you get into
a dispute by [sic] someone who is a domestic partner or was at
that time, a domestic partner to you?
DEFENDANT: Yes, she was my significant other at that time,
correct.
(Emphasis added.) And when asked whether certain sexual acts were “part of [his] intimate
relationship with [victim],” M elina replied, “[t]hat is correct.” The district court
determined that Melina provided a sufficient factual basis and concluded that Melina
entered a “knowing[], intelligent[], and voluntar[y] guilty plea.”
At an August 2021 sentencing hearing, the district court adjudicated Melina guilty
and stayed imposition of his sentence, placed him on probation for up to five years “subject
to the standard conditions,” and ordered that he complete at least thirty-six hours of
domestic-abuse counseling or educational programming.
3
In June 202 2, Melina appeared for a probation-violation hearing. Melina
acknowledged that he had failed to complete the domestic-abuse counseling or educational
programming. Melina then asked the district court to execute his sentence. The district
court agreed and vacated the stay of imposition and executed his sentence. Thereafter, the
parties jointly requested that the district court amend the sentencing order to vacate
Melina’s demand to execute his sentence, impose an eighteen-month prison term, s tay
execution for five years, give Melina credit for time served, and discharge Melina from
probation. The district court granted the request and issued an amended sentencing order
in January 2023, reflecting the joint request.
In October 2024, Melina filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Then, in
November 2024, Melina filed a self-represented postconviction petition. And in February
2025, after obtaining representation by the Office of the Appellate Public Defender, Melina
filed an amended postconviction petition, claiming that his plea was inaccurate.
In July 2025, the postconviction court denied Melina’s postconviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Melina’s claim was time-barred under
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2024), and, even if it was not time-barred, Melina entered
an accurate guilty plea.
Melina appeals.
DECISION
Melina argues the postconviction court abused its discretion when it summarily
denied his postconviction petition. “We review a postconviction court’s summary denial
of a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” Andersen v. State, 913
4
N.W.2d 417, 422 (Minn. 2018). A postconviction court “abuses its discretion when it has
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Pearson v. State,
891 N.W.2d 590, 596 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Melina challenges the postconviction court’s determinations that (1) his
postconviction petition was time-barred and (2) he entered a constitutionally accurate
guilty plea. Because we conclude the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion
when it determined Melina entered a constitutionally accurate guilty plea, we need not
decide whether the postconviction petition was time-barred. See Townsend v. State, 834
N.W.2d 736, 739 (Minn. 2013) (reaching the merits of a postconviction petition without
deciding timeliness).
After sentencing, a defendant may challenge the constitutional validity of their
guilty plea in a postconviction petition. State v. Arola Johnson, 999 N.W.2d 103, 108
(Minn. App. 2023); see also Lussier v. State , 821 N.W.2d 581, 586 n.2 (Minn. 2012)
(stating that motions to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing “must be raised in a petition
for postconviction relief”). To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).
Melina argues his plea was inaccurate. The accuracy requirement “protects the
defendant from pleading guilty to a charge more serious than he could have been convicted
of at trial.” State v. Mikulak, 903 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Minn. 2017). “For a guilty plea to be
accurate, a factual basis must be established showing that the defendant’s conduct meets
all elements of the offense to which he is pleading guilty.” State v. Jones, 921 N.W.2d
5
774, 779 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 2019). “Establishing a proper
factual basis is typically accomplished by asking the defendant to express in his own words
what happened.” Rosendahl v. State, 955 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn. App. 2021) (quotation
omitted).
Here, Melina pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault by strangulation under Minn.
Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2. Thus, for his plea to be accurate, Melina ’s factual basis needed
to establish that he “assault[ed ] a family or household member by strangulation.” See
Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 2. Melina argues he entered an inaccurate guilty plea
because he did not admit that victim was “a family or household member.”
1 Under the
statute, the phrase “family or household member” has the meaning given in Minn. Stat.
§ 518B.01, subd. 2 (2018). See Minn. Stat. § 609.2247, subd. 1(b). This definition
includes, in relevant part, “persons involved in a significant romantic or sexual
relationship.” Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b)(7).
We are not persuaded that Melina entered an inaccurate guilty plea on this element.
During his plea colloquy, Melina called victim his “significant other.” He also described
the location where the assault occurred as the parties’ “home,” allowing the district court
to infer that Melina and victim resided together. See Rosendahl, 955 N.W.2d at 299 (“Even
if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court may
nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant.”). And, Melina
1 In his postconviction petition, Melina also argued that his plea was inaccurate because he
lacked the requisite intent to commit the offense. The postconviction court rejected this
argument, and Melina does not challenge that decision on appeal.
6
admitted he had a sexual relationship with victim when he confirmed aspects of their
“intimate relationship.”2
We conclude that Melina provided a sufficient factual basis at the plea hearing to
demonstrate that he was “involved in a significant romantic or sexual relationship” with
victim. As such, Melina’s plea colloquy established that victim met the definition of
“family or household member.” Accordingly, the postconviction court did not abuse its
discretion when it summarily denied Melina’s postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
2 Melina also argues the postconviction court failed to consider the factors listed in Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2, to determine “whether the persons are or have been involved in a
significant romantic or sexual relationship.” But Melina cites no case law to support that
a postconviction court must expressly consider each of these factors, and we have found
none upon our own review. Moreover, the record supports that the postconviction court
did, in fact, consider the “type of relationship” between the parties.