In re the Matter of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1489

In re the Matter of:

Lawanna Latrice Payton, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Cavaris Valdez Mills,
Respondent,

Otesha Payton,
Respondent Below.

Filed June 29, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-25-2941

Lawanna Payton, Houston, Texas ( self-represented appellant)

Cavaris Mills, Columbus, Ohio ( self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bond, Judge; and Rasmusson,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it dismissed her petition for
third-party custody without an evidentiary hearing. Because appellant failed to
demonstrate reversible error in the district court’s order, we affirm.
FACTS
This case concerns the custody of C.M., born in 2015. C.M. is the son of O tesha
Payton (mother) and respondent Cavaris Valdez Mills ( father). Mother and father lived
together in Texas until C.M. was about seven years old. After the parents separated, f ather
moved to Ohio while mother remained in Texas with C.M. Appellant Lawanna Latrice
Payton, C.M.’s maternal aunt, also lived in Texas and assisted in caring for C .M. The
record suggests that Payton lived with m other and C.M. after f ather moved to Ohio.
Around the middle of 2023, m other and C.M. relocated to Minnesota to care for an
elderly relative while Payton remained in Texas. Mother died in April 2025 after living in
Minnesota with C.M. for approximately one year and ten months. In a separate file, the
district court granted f ather sole legal and sole physical custody of C.M. over Payton’s
objection. Although the district court orally awarded father sole legal and sole physical
custody on April 28, C.M. was allowed to remain in Minnesota to complet e the school
year.
Nearly a month later, Payton filed a petition for third -party custody as an interested
third party. The petition claimed that father has “abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
shown a disregard for [C.M.’s] wellbeing and that [C.M.] would be harmed by living with
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[father]” because he “was absent for over two years of [C.M.’s life],” did not initiate visits
or communication, and lacks understanding of C.M.’s special needs. Payton also stated
that she helped raise C.M. in Texas and “continued to support them from afar after they
relocated to Minnesota. ” She additionally argued that award ing custody to her was in
C.M.’s best interests.
The parties appeared for a n initial, nonevidentiary hearing on the petition.
Following the hearing, the district court denied Payton’s request for an evidentiary hearing
and dismissed her third -party petition for custody for failure to allege a prima facie case.
Payton appeals.1
DECISION
I. Legal Background
Individuals who are not the parent of a particular child are authorized by statute to
petition for third -party custody as either a de facto custodian or an interested third party.
See Minn. Stat. §§ 257C.01- .05 (2024); Lewis-Miller v. Ross , 710 N.W.2d 565, 568- 70
(Minn. 2006). Payton petitioned as an interested third party. To succeed in a custody
action as an interested third party , and relevant to this appeal, Payton must establish “by
clear and convincing evidence” one of three child -endangerment fact ors in Minn. Stat.
§ 257C.03, subd. 7(a)(1) , and “by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best
interests of the child” to be in her custody. Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a).

1 Father did not file a response brief. We t herefore decide this case on the merits as
provided in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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Third-party custody cases proceed in two stages. Lewis-Miller, 710 N.W.2d at
569-70. First, a petitioner must allege a prima facie case, stating facts which, if true,
establish that the person is an interested third party as defined in section 257C.03,
subdivision 7(a). Id. at 570. If the petitioner fails to allege a prima facie case, then the
district court may dismiss the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id.; see also
Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 8. But if the petitioner alleges suff icient facts, “ which, if
prove[d], would satisfy the statutory criteria, the court would then schedule an evidentiary
hearing.” Lewis-Miller, 710 N.W.2d at 569.
In evaluating whether a petitioner alleges a prima facie case for third-party custody,
a district court is required to accept the petitioner’s allegations as true and disregard
contrary allegations. See Boland v. Murtha, 800 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011)
(applying a prima facie case analysis to a motion to restrict parenting time). However, a
district court may consider submissions from the opposing party to contextualize the
moving party’s assertions. See id. Conclusory allegations are insufficient to create a prima
facie case. See Szarzynski v. Szarzynski , 732 N.W.2d 285, 292 (Minn. App. 2007)
(considering whether a party made a prima facie case to modify custody based on an
endangerment allegation).
II. Standard of Review
We use a three -part process to review the dismissal of a petition for third -party
custody without an evidentiary hearing. We review (1) de novo whether the district court
properly viewed the moving party’s allegations , as set forth in the petition and
accompanying affidavit, as true ; (2) for an abuse of discretion the district court ’s
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determination as to whether the moving party alleged a prima face case for third -party
custody; and (3) de novo whether an evidentiary hearing is required. See Boland, 800
N.W.2d at 185.
III. Analysis

Payton argues that her petition and supporting affidavit present a prima facie case
sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. 2 We disagree.
First, we review de novo whether the district court properly considered Payton’s
allegations, as set forth in the petition and supporting affidavit , as true. Payton’s specific
allegations are detailed below. The district court accepted those allegations as true before
examining the sufficiency of Payton’s claims. Therefore, the district court did not err in
that portion of its analysis.
Second, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion in determining
that Payton failed to allege a prima facie case for third-party custody because she did not
plead facts sufficient to prove any of the child-endangerment factors . The three
child-endangerment factors are:

2 As a threshold issue, Payton contends that vacatur of the district court’s order is required
because orders are void when issued with a deceased party’s name absent proper
substitution. Payton, as the party alleging error, bears the burden of demonstrating error in
the district court’s decision. White v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 567 N.W.2d 724, 734
(Minn. App. 1997).
In making this argument, Payton relies on Minn. R. Civ. P. 25.01(a). Payton’s
reliance on this rule is misguided because it merely establishes a mechanism for
substituting another party to take the place of a decedent in a lawsuit. See Minn. R. Civ.
P. 25.01(a). Critically, none of the cases Payton relies upon state that an action becomes
void under the circumstances alleged in this case, nor do they address rule 25.01. See Chan
v. Katzenmeyer, 391 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Minn. App. 1986) ; Hengel v. Hyatt , 252 N.W.2d
105, 106 (Minn. 1977).
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(i) the parent has abandoned, neglected, or otherwise
exhibited disregard for the child’s well-being to the extent that
the child will be harmed by living with the parent;
(ii) placement of the child with the individual takes
priority over preserving the day- to-day parent -child
relationship because of the presence of physical or emotional
danger to the child, or both; or
(iii) other extraordinary circumstances [exist] .

Minn. Stat. § 257C.03, subd. 7(a )(1).3

In her petition and accompanying affidavit , Payton alleged the following: (1) father
was absent for two years and all visits and communication were facilitated by m other;
(2) father rejected the idea that C.M. has special needs and this rejection would cause C.M.
emotional harm; (3) removing C.M. from his “stable and secure caregiving
environment . . . would pose serious emotional and developmental harm”; and (4) C.M.
was injured in father’s care in 2021. The district court determined that , even if accepted as
true, Payton’s allegations were insufficient to prove child endangerment. We agree.
Payton’s initial allegation acknowledges that father remained in contact with C.M.,
contrary to her assertion of abandonment. Payton’s second and third allegations are
conclusory and unsupported by specific information. Finally, Payton’s assertion that C.M.
was injured in an accident in father’s care does not allege sufficient facts that C.M. will
suffer ongoing harm by living with father, that this incident overcomes the priority of
preserving the parent -child relationship, or any other extraordinary cir cumstances. In

3 Minn. Stat. § 257C.01, subd. 3, defines an “interested third party” as one who “can prove
that at least one of the factors in section 257C.03, subdivision 7, paragraph (a) , is met.”
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short, on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination
that Payton failed to allege a prima facie case for third -party custody.
Finally, we review de novo whether an evidentiary hearing is required. Payton is
only entitled to an evidentiary hearing if she alleges a prima facie case for third-party
custody, which did not occur. Thus, the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary
hearing was not an abuse of its discretion.
Because we conclude that the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary
hearing and dismissing Payton’s custody petition for failure to allege a prima facie case of
child endangerment, we need not address Payton’s assertion that the district court failed to
individually address each best -interest factor. 4
Affirmed.

4 Payton additionally alleges that (1) the record contradicts certain provisions in the order,
(2) the district court failed to grant her request for a guardian ad litem, and (3) the district
court improperly gave weight to certain submissions. Because Payton fails to demonstrate
how these allegations are relevant to whether she alleged a prima facie case for third -party
custody or that she was otherwise prejudiced by them, we decline to address them.