Frank R. Dropps, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1506

Frank R. Dropps,
Appellant,

vs.

Brunswick Township, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed June 1, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Ross, Judge

Kanabec County District Court
File No. 33-CV-24-231

Jared M. Goerlitz, Goerlitz Law, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Jason J. Kuboushek, Michael Conlin-Brandenburg, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
ROSS, Judge
Frank Dropps purchased two undeveloped lots in Brunswick Township and later
sought to subdivide each into two and build a house on all four resulting parcels. The

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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township at first denied Dropps’s subdivision application based on its housing-density
ordinance. The township later approved and certified the application but added handwritten
language before recording it. It later agreed to record the untainted and approved version
but denied Dropps’s application to build a house on each lot based on the density ordinance.
Dropps sought review of that denial in the district court and sued the township, alleging
slander of title, breach of contract, and regulatory taking. The district court granted
summary judgment favoring the township. We affirm in part and reverse in part,
concluding that Dropps’s slander-of-title claim survives summary judgment.
FACTS
Frank Dropps and his wife gained title to two undeveloped lots totaling about 54
acres in Brunswick Township in 2020. They sought to subdivide each of the lots in two,
leaving four parcels that the township, and now we, refer to as parcels G, H, I, and J. The
township at first denied Dropps’s effort to subdivide the lots based on the township’s
housing-density restriction, which limits the building of single-family homes as follows:
No more tha[n] three (3) [single-family] dwellings shall be
allowed per quarter of a quarter section of land, and shall only
be permitted if the lot or parcel of land upon which the dwelling
is located fronts an existing public road. Any existing lots of
record shall be considered buildable []regardless of this density
requirement.
The first lot that Dropps sought to subdivide (the one that became parcels G and H)
occupied the “Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter” of a township section, and two
of the remaining three lots in that quarter-of-a-quarter section each already contained a
dwelling. The second lot (the one that became parcels I and J) also sat in a quarter-of-a-
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quarter section with two parcels each already containing a dwelling. The township’s zoning
administrator therefore denied Dropps’s building applications.
But the Brunswick Township Board of Adjustment and Appeal reversed that
decision in October 2021 and allowed the subdivision after Dropps filed for review in this
court and sent the board a letter entitled “Description of Request.” The letter clarified that
Dropps was “not asking to build a dwelling” and assured the board that he intended only
“to divide each parcel allowing for one parcel to be sold as a dwelling site or other
permitted use [and] the remaining parcel to be used for farming or other permitted uses.”
His assurance continued, “If we were asking to build a fourth dwelling within a quarter of
a quarter section, we would agree with the Zoning Administrator’s denial of such request.”
And he added, “In the future, if we made such a dwelling permit request, the Zoning
Administrator would have a clear basis for denial” because the township could “enforce
[the density ordinance] when necessary, even after the approval of our minor subdivision
request.” The township approved the subdivision applications to create parcels G, H, I, and
J. It also amended its ordinance, adding to it that “no more than three . . . dwellings or no
more than three . . . parcels shall be allowed per quarter of a quarter section of land,” and
it amended its definition of “Lot of Record” to be “[a] parcel of land, whether subdivided
or otherwise legally described of record as of the effective date of this Ordinance.”
Dropps dismissed his pending appeal to this court. He executed four warranty deeds
transferring the parcels to himself and his wife as joint tenants and recorded the deeds and
subdivision-application certificates eight days later.
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In November 2021, the township recorded Dropps’s approved subdivision
applications, which included the following handwritten statements that were not written by
Dropps and that had not been on the applications when he signed them: “Only
one . . . parcel of I or J buildable for dwelling on a first come building permit” and “ Only
one . . . parcel of G or H buildable for dwelling on a first come building permit.” Two years
later, Dropps’s attorney wrote the township in April 2023 objecting to the added
handwritten statements on the executed and approved applications, and the township board
adopted a resolution to amend them by removing the statements.
Dropps submitted four applications to the township to build a residential structure
on each of the four parcels. The zoning administrator partially denied his applications,
reasoning that Dropps could build on only two of the parcels under the density ordinance
and asking Dropps to identify which of the two parcels he wanted to build on.
Dropps appealed that denial to the Board of Adjustment and Appeal, which affirmed
the zoning administrator’s decision based on the township’s zoning regulations as they
existed in October 2021 when the township approved Dropps’s subdivision applications.
The board concluded that Dropps had not created “lots of record” so as to exempt any
parcel from the density ordinance. It emphasized Dropps’s assurances in his Description
of Request letter and applied the density ordinance to the four parcels. Because each parcel
G and H, and separately I and J, sat in a quarter-of-a-quarter section with two existing
dwellings, the board agreed with the zoning administrator that Dropps could build only a
single dwelling in each pair.
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Dropps sued the township in district court. He sought a writ of mandamus and a writ
of certiorari compelling the township to approve his building applications. He also alleged
slander of title over his recorded subdivision applications and breach of contract, claiming
that the township had agreed to allow him to build dwellings on all four lots in exchange
for his dismissing the 2021 certiorari appeal. Dropps also sought judgment declaring that
a new 2022 ordinance defining a “non-buildable parcel” constituted an unconstitutional
regulatory taking. The township moved for summary judgment. Before responding to that
motion, Dropps moved the district court for leave to amend his complaint to add a claim
for punitive damages.
The district court entered summary judgment favoring the township. It interpreted
Dropps’s mandamus and certiorari requests as a demand for a declaratory judgment that
the density ordinance did not apply to his parcels, and it upheld the board’s decision as not
arbitrary or capricious. Regarding the slander-of-title claim, the district court held that
Dropps failed to create a fact dispute as to whether the township published a false statement
or whether it did so maliciously. Regarding the breach-of-contract claim, the district court
saw no fact dispute as to whether a contract existed between him and the township. And it
held that Dropps’s regulatory-taking claim failed as a matter of law under a Penn Central
analysis. The district court deemed Dropps’s motion to amend the pleadings moot.
Dropps appeals.
DECISION
Dropps raises various challenges on appeal. He argues that the district court
erroneously concluded that the township properly denied his building application because
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it misinterpreted its zoning ordinances. He argues also that the district court erroneously
entered summary judgment against his claim s of slander of title, breach of contract, and
regulatory taking. And he argues that the district court improperly refused to allow him to
add a claim for punitive damages to his complaint. We address each argument in turn.
I
Dropps does not challenge the district court’s recharacterization of his claims for
writs of mandamus and certiorari as a request for declaratory judgment. See Mendota Golf,
LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 179 (Minn. 2006) (analyzing a
plaintiff’s inappropriate writ-of-mandamus request as a declaratory-judgment request). He
argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his claim for a declaratory judgment
because it misconstrued the township’s density ordinance. We review the district court’s
interpretation of the township’s zoning ordinances de novo, and we review the Brunswick
Board of Adjustment and Appeal’s factual determinations and quasi- legislative decisions
for reasonableness. Meleyco P’ship No. 2 v. City of West St. Paul, 874 N.W.2d 440, 442–
43 (Minn. App. 2016). Applying these standards of review to the circumstances before us,
we affirm the district court’s summary-judgment decision.
Dropps urges us to apply a less deferential standard of review, maintaining that the
board’s proceeding was not “clear and complete” under Swanson v. City of Bloomington,
which entitled him to a new and full trial on this issue in district court and results in de
novo rather than deferential appellate review. 421 N.W.2d 307, 313–14 (Minn. 1988). But
we generally do not consider issues that were not presented to and decided by the district
court, Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) , and Dropps presents the issue
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for the first time in his reply brief on appeal, never having raised it in the district court .
Dropps maintains that we should nevertheless apply his proposed review standard because
the district court allowed for discovery of evidence beyond what the board considered. But
the district court proceedings addressed not only Dropps’s review of the board’s decision
but also new claims and the discovery related to those claims. And despite the availability
of new evidence, the district court properly limited its review of the board’s decision to the
materials in the board’s record. S ee S wanson, 421 N.W.2d at 311 (explaining that the
typical scope of review for zoning appeals is “the record made before the local zoning
body”). We proceed with our review standard as we have outlined it.
Dropps maintains that the district court erroneously interpreted the term “quarter of
a quarter” in the township’s density ordinance, which allows for no more than three single-
family homes in any “quarter of a quarter section of land.” According to Dropps, the word
“section” in this ordinance is a 40-acre landmass. We review de novo a district court’s
interpretation of a municipality’s zoning ordinances. Frank’s Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of
Roseville, 295 N.W.2d 604, 608 (Minn. 1980). Our de novo review supports the dist rict
court’s rejection of Dropps’s argument.
The district court properly interpreted the density ordinance to include Dropps’s
parcels because it correctly gave the phrase “quarter of a quarter section” its intended
technical meaning. See Jaeger v. Palladium Holdings, LLC, 884 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Minn.
2016). The record eliminates any uncertainty. It informs us that Brunswick Township is
organized based on land surveys marked by sections that are divided into quarters, which
are themselves further divided into quarters. The phrase, “quarter of a quarter section of
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land” carries an unambiguous technical meaning that tracks the marked surveys with its
predetermined sections: quarters, and quarter of quarters. By contrast, Dropps bases his 40-
acre definition on out-of-context deposition testimony by township officials and
miscellaneous minutes of township meetings that refer to the density ordinance colloquially
as a “three per 40” rule. We are confident that language used officially in the township’s
ordinance follows the township’s official mapping rather than the informal idiom that was
adopted by several township members for reasons that neither Dropps nor the record
explains. The district court correctly interpreted the term.
Dropps next argues that even if his parcels are subject to the density ordinance, they
qualify for its “lot of record” exception. The density ordinance includes the caveat, “Any
existing lots of record shall be considered buildable []regardless of this density
requirement.” And the township’s ordinances define a “lot of record” as follows:
A parcel of land, whether subdivided or otherwise legally
described of record as of the effective date of this Ordinance,
or approved by the Town as a lot subsequent to such date and
which is occupied by or intended for occupancy by one (1)
principal building or principal use together with any accessory
buildings and such open spaces as required by this Ordinance
and having its principal frontage on a street, or a proposed
street approved by the Board.
According to Dropps, the board misinterpreted the ordinance to require an intended
“principal use” to be accompanied by an “accessory building” for a subdivided parcel to
become a lot of record because “any accessory building” could mean no accessory
building. The township’s reading of the ordinance to require at least one accessory building
is more contextually plausible. It gives “any” its ordinary meaning as an adjective. The
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American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 83 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “any”
as, “One, some, every, or all without specification”); see also Christianson v. Henke, 831
N.W.2d 532, 536–37 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that words in a statute are generally to be
given their ordinary meaning). And it gives effect to the broader phrase of “together with
any accessory buildings.” By contrast, Dropps’s definition would render the entire phrase
superfluous, conflicting with our presumption that every statutory provision has effect. In
re Khan, 804 N.W.2d 132, 142–43 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying the precept that every
statutory provision has meaning to a local ordinance). The township correctly read “lot of
record” to involve a principal use and an accessory building.
This leads us to Dropps’s argument that fact issues remain over whether he intended
to occupy his parcels with a principal building or use and therefore qualified for the “lot of
record” exception. After a clear and complete municipal-ordinance proceeding, this court
reviews the municipal record and will set aside the municipality’s zoning decision only if
it was unreasonable. Swanson, 421 N.W.2 d at 313. A municipality’s zoning decision is
reasonable if it gives at least one legally sufficient reason for its decision and the reason
finds support in the record. St. Croix Dev., Inc. v. City of Apple Valley, 446 N.W.2d 392,
398 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). The township board acted
reasonably by concluding that Dropps lacked the requisite intent to create “lots of record”
by subdividing his lots. The board’s denial states that it considered all materials that Dropps
submitted with the application before reaching its decision. It observed that Dropps’s
subdivision application said that the subdivided parcels would continue to be leased for
farming and that his Description of Request stated that he did not seek to build a dwelling
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on each parcel. It observed that his submissions expressed an intent to commit the parcels
only to some permitted use, not to any specific principal use. Given the clearly reasoned
approach the board took when deciding the matter, we hold that its decision passes our
review for reasonableness.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Dropps’s counterarguments that the record
includes facts that could lead to a different result and that the board should not have relied
on his Description of Request letter because it was written by his legal counsel as an
argument rather than as a statement of fact. The arguments fail under our standard of
review, which calls us to assess the decision for reasonableness rather than consider
whether the record might support some different result. We affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment to the township on Dropps’s declaratory-judgment claim.
II
Dropps’s slander-of-title claim fares better against the township’s summary-
judgment effort. We review de novo whether any genuine issues of material fact preclude
summary judgment. Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC , 790 N.W.2d
167, 170 (Minn. 2010). The nonmoving party can prevent summary judgment by
presenting evidence from which a reasonable person could draw conclusions that defeat
the moving party’s legal argument. Schroeder v. St. Louis County , 708 N.W.2d 497, 507
(Minn. 2006). A successful slander-of-title claim requires proof of a false statement
concerning real property owned by the claimant, the publication of the false statement,
malice in its publication, and pecuniary losses that constitute special damages. Paidar v.
Hughes, 615 N.W.2d 276, 279–80 (Minn. 2000). Dropps argues persuasively that genuine
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issues exist as to the falsity of the handwritten inscription that, according to Dropps, some
township official maliciously included on the approved subdivision documents recorded
with Kanabec County.
Summary judgment is improper here. Although the added handwritten statements
on the recorded documents were substantively correct—Dropps could build only one
dwelling on either parcel G or H and only one on either parcel I or J because of the density
ordinance— a plaintiff can satisfy the falsity element in a slander-of-title claim by proving
that the defendant filed “for record an instrument known to be inoperative.” Kelly v. First
State Bank of Rothsay, 177 N.W. 347, 347 (Minn. 1920). Inoperative legal instruments are
those with no effect. See, e.g., Paidar, 615 N.W.2d at 278, 280; Brickner v. One Land Dev.
Co., 742 N.W.2d 706, 709, 711 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 18, 2008).
Dropps argues on appeal that the altered, recorded subdivision documents had no legal
effect and were therefore inoperable. The township does not directly respond to this
contention and the district court’s decision does not directly address it, only reiterating that
the added language is accurate. We offer no opinion on the merit to the argument and hold
only that a fact issue therefore remains on this element. And the parties do not contest the
district court’s conclusion that a genuine fact issue also exists on the second element of
whether the township published the false statement to others by recording the documents.
The record also reveals a genuine fact issue as to maliciousness. A defendant
publishes a false statement maliciously if he publishes a statement aware of a strong
probability that it is false. Brickner, 742 N.W.2d at 711–12. The record includes evidence
that Dropps communicated to the township that he would not execute the version of the
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application with the added language, that he executed the versions without the added
language, and that the township recorded versions that bore Dropps’s signature and
included the added language. These circumstances reasonably imply the township’s
awareness of the documents’ falsity-based inoperability. The township’s willingness to
eventually remove the altered documents for replacement by unaltered ones does not defeat
a potential finding that the township official who allegedly recorded the documents knew
them to be false when they were published.
The district court correctly concluded that a fact issue exists as to whether Dropps
incurred special damages. The township maintains that the conclusion is wrong, asserting
that only Dropps’s company, Brunswick Development Properties LLC, incurred attorney
fees and that Dropps himself did not. Attorney fees spent on clearing a slandered title
qualify as special damages. Paidar, 615 N.W.2d at 281. The record includes Dropps’s
attorney’s billing statement for researching and writing the demand letter to the township
and indicates that the attorney billed Dropps and his wife personally and not Brunswick
Development. And when Dropps was litigating this issue in March 2023, he had not yet
registered Brunswick Development with the state. A fact dispute remains as to the issue of
special damages, and Dropps’s slander-of-title claim survives summary judgment.
III
Dropps argues that his breach-of-contract claim should also have survived summary
judgment. A breach-of-contract claim requires proof that a contract existed. Park Nicollet
Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Minn. 2011). The alleged contract, according to
Dropps, is his agreement with the township to dismiss his appeal that was pending in this
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court in 2021 in exchange for his right to build a house on each of the four parcels. Dropps
identifies no evidence in the record on which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that
this alleged agreement existed. Dropps cites offhand remarks by township officials and
isolated resolution language as evidence of the supposed contract. But this constitutes
neither direct nor reasonable circumstantial evidence that the township and Dropps
mutually assented to any binding agreement. It is, at most, a collecti on of unrelated
circumstances that would require a series of attenuated and highly speculative inferences
to find that the parties intended to and did form a contract. These dubious inferences offer,
perhaps, scant, metaphysical support for the necessary ultimate finding. But “there is no
genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving party presents evidence which
merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue and which is not sufficiently
probative with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case to permit
reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71
(Minn. 1997). Dropps’s contract-breach claim fails for lack of evidence.
IV
Dropps argues that the district court improperly granted the township summary
judgment on his regulatory-taking claim. In Minnesota, “P rivate property shall not be
taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation.” Minn. Const. art.
I, § 13. Regulations that unfairly diminish the value of private property may constitute
takings. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 632 (Minn. 2007).
Minnesota follows the federal, multi-factor test for a regulatory taking, established in Penn
Central Transportation Company v. New York City. Id. (citing 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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The Penn Central analysis considers the extent of the regulation’s economic impact on the
claimant, the extent of its interference with his “investment-backed expectations,” and the
character of the government action. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 124; accord
Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 632 –33. The question of whether a regulation
amounts to a taking is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Alevizos v. Metro. Airports
Comm’n, 216 N.W.2d 651, 660–61 (Minn. 1974). Our review leads us to affirm.
The allegedly violative provision is the township’s 2022 amendment to section 2 of
its zoning ordinances, which added a provision defining a “non-buildable parcel” as
follows:
A parcel of land which, because of size and/or location, and
classified as Agriculture Cropland, shall have no buildings. A
non-buildable parcel cannot be developed with any permanent
structures or other, similar improvements. A non-buildable
parcel may not have a water-well, an on-site sewer system, or
electric service provided to it. No camping vehicles are
allowed to be located on property for overnight use. Hunting is
allowed on non-buildable parcels.
We doubt that Dropps has shown that his parcels are subject to this ordinance, but we will
assume otherwise for the sake of his argument.
Our de novo assessment follows the district court’s reasoning. The first Penn
Central factor cuts against Dropps’s takings claim because he did not introduce evidence
of any economic detriment, relying instead on the assertion that the ordinance would have
“an obvious negative impact.” This is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment. See
Wensmann Realty, Inc., 734 N.W.2d at 634 n.7 (discussing the ways litigants typically
demonstrate a regulation’s economic damage upon their property). Dropps also had no
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investment-backed expectations in the parcels, as the record shows that he purchased them
not expecting to develop them but that he bid on them only to inflate their auction price.
Dropps may have later planned to develop the parcels for profit, but his investment
occurred beforehand. An owner’s reasonable expectation of eventual use absent investment
is insufficient to score this factor in Dropps’s favor. See id. at 639. The third Penn Central
factor also weighs against Dropps because he has not shown that the nature of the
regulation disproportionally encumbers his property rights in comparison to the burden that
falls on other township property owners subject to the same restriction. The district court
correctly determined summary judgment on Dropps’s regulatory-taking claim.
V
Dropps argues that we must require the district court to rule on his motion for leave
to amend his complaint to add punitive damages to his slander-of-title claim. Although our
decision revives Dropps’s slander-of-title claim against the township and municipalities
are liable for their torts and those of their officers, Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2024), “[n]o award
for damages on any such claim shall include punitive damage s,” Minn. Stat. § 466.04,
subd. 1(b) (2024). Because Dropps cannot successfully claim punitive damages against the
township on his slander-of-title claim, we will not instruct the district court to allow the
requested amendment.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.