Theresa Johnson, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential, except as provided by
Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 136.01, subdivision 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1508

Theresa Johnson,
Relator,

vs.

Mentor Management Inc,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 22, 2026
Affirmed
Ede, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51618171-3

Theresa Johnson, Maplewood, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Annika Petty Storlie, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent
employer)

Rebecca Wittmer, Keri A. Phillips, Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
EDE, Judge
Relator challenges an order by an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) affirming as
modified a decision that respondent employer discharged her for employment misconduct
2
and she was therefore ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. In particular, relator
argues that the ULJ’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial evidence and that her
employer discharged her in retaliation for a complaint she made to the Department of
Human Services (DHS) regarding her employment at a group home for adults with
disabilities. We affirm.
FACTS
The following summary stems from the findings of fact set forth in the ULJ’s order
affirming as modified a decision that relator Theresa Johnson was discharged for
employment misconduct and thus ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. Consistent
with applicable law, we present the facts in the light most favorable to the ULJ’s decision.1
From June 2024 to March 2025, Johnson worked as a full-time program supervisor
for respondent Mentor Management Inc. d/b/a Sevita at Crestview (Sevita), a group home
that serves adults with disabilities.
On February 6, 2025, Johnson complained to Sevita’s management about how staff
members were treating residents, asserting: that a resident’s head was “nicked” several
times when staff used clippers to cut the resident’s hair; that there may have been an error
in medication passing; and that a resident was not receiving the correct food. Johnson later
found out that Sevita did not submit a report to DHS about these issues.

1 See Wilson v. Mortg. Res. Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016) (instructing that
appellate courts “review the ULJ’ s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the
decision” (quotation omitted)).
3
On February 21, Johnson submitted a complaint to DHS about Sevita. Sevita learned
about Johnson’s complaint that same day. On February 28, while in the workplace, Johnson
stated that other employees were using “voodoo” against her. She also accused her co-
workers of placing a laxative in a staff coffee maker.
On March 2, Johnson refused to complete a medication-passing retraining as
requested by Sevita’s program director. Johnson asserted that the program director was
retaliating against her based on her complaint to DHS.
On March 3, Johnson and her supervisor spoke via telephone. Johnson was upset
with the supervisor and accused the supervisor of defamation because Johnson believed
that the supervisor “had told a third person that Johnson was acting ‘crazy.’” The supervisor
denied making that statement. As the phone call ended, Johnson—who was in the presence
of subordinate employees during the call—referred to the supervisor by stating, “F --k that
b-tch.” One of the subordinate employees overheard Johnson’s statement and u nderstood
that Johnson was referring to the supervisor. That same day, Johnson told the subordinate
employee that the employee “would be ‘written up’ for a medication error and would need
to meet with the state.” The subordinate employee confirmed with the supervisor that these
disciplinary proceedings would not occur. Even so, the ULJ found that “Johnson’s conduct
toward [the employee] was disruptive.” Johnson also made statements to several
subordinate employees “that the state was going to ‘shutdown’ [Sevita].”
4
Sevita indefinitely suspended Johnson without pay on March 4. 2 At the time,
Johnson had no disciplinary history. Sevita discharged Johnson for engaging in
“inappropriate behavior”: “referring to her boss as a ‘b-tch’ in front of subordinates”;
“telling subordinates that the state would ‘shutdown’ [Sevita]”; and “making statements
believing employees placed laxatives in the staff coffee.” And “Johnson was not discharged
for any other reason,” including “complaining about Sevita to DHS” or violating the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) by submitting photographs she had
taken of residents’ medical records as part of her complaint to DHS. Indeed, at the time of
Johnson’s March 4 discharge, Sevita was unaware that Johnson had taken such
photographs.
On March 9, Johnson applied for unemployment benefits and established an account
with respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development
(DEED).
3 DEED later issued a determination of ineligibility to Johnson, informing her of
its decision that she was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because Sevita
discharged her based on employment misconduct . Johnson appealed DEED’s
determination, and a ULJ conducted a de novo hearing. Before the April 28 hearing, the
parties submitted exhibits that included written statements about why Johnson’s

2 An indefinite suspension is treated as a discharge for purposes of unemployment benefits,
and the ULJ determined that “this [was] a discharge.” The order underlying this appeal
states that Johnson’s indefinite suspension and discharge occurred on May 26. This appears
to have been a typographical error, and the parties do not dispute that Sevita discharged
Johnson on March 4.

3 DEED “is the primary responding party to any judicial action involving an unemployment
law judge’s decision.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(e) (2024).
5
employment with Sevita had ended. Johnson participated in that hearing but Sevita did not.
The ULJ held another hearing on May 21, at which Sevita participated and the supervisor
testified. In findings of fact and a decision issued on May 27, the ULJ determined that
Sevita discharged Johnson based on employment misconduct and that Johnson was
therefore ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
After Johnson requested reconsideration, the ULJ issued an August 8 order
affirming as modified the May 27 decision. 4 The ULJ reasoned that “Sevita had the right
to expect that Johnson would not disparage her supervisor as a ‘b-tch’ in the workplace in
the presence of [her] subordinates” and to expect that Johnson would not “make comments
to [her] subordinates that the state would be shutting down [Sevita].” And the ULJ
determined that Johnson’s conduct “was a serious violation of the standards of behavior
[Sevita] ha[d] the right to reasonably expect of [Johnson]” because: her “comments were
insubordinate” by “undermin[ing] management’s authority”; her comments were
“intentional because she made conscious choices in making these statements”; and Sevita’s
expectation that Johnson would not behave as she did was “reasonable because it was
common sense and [the conduct] was easily avoided.”
The ULJ also decided that the program director’s conduct in requesting that Johnson
complete a medication-passing retraining “was not retaliation” for Johnson’s complaint to
DHS. More specifically, the ULJ determined that, although “Sevita [had] investigated

4 Although the ULJ’s August 8 order modified the May 27 decision “to better explain the
reasoning and to correct some non- substantive typographical errors,” the “result
remain[ed] the same.”
6
Johnson in part because of [her] DHS complaint,” that investigation did “not relieve
[Johnson] from her own responsibilities toward [Sevita] for purposes of analyzing whether
[she was] eligible to receive unemployment benefits.” Thus, the ULJ decided that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, “Johnson was discharged for employment misconduct, and
she is ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.”
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
Johnson challenges the ULJ’s August 8, 2025 order affirming the May 27, 2025
decision that Sevita discharged Johnson based on employment misconduct and that
Johnson was therefore ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. In particular, Johnson
asserts that the ULJ’s “findings of misconduct [are not] supported by the evidence” and
that Sevita discharged her in retaliation for her complaint to DHS. DEED counters that “the
findings of fact regarding the reasons for the discharge are supported by substantial
evidence.” We agree with DEED.
“The Minnesota Court of Appeals must, by writ of certiorari to . . . [DEED], review
the unemployment law judge’s decision on reconsideration . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 268.105,
subd. 7(a) (2024). When reviewing a ULJ’s decision, we may affirm, remand for further
proceedings, or reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the relator have
been prejudiced because, among other things, the decision is unsupported by substantial
evidence in the hearing record. Id., subd. 7(d) (2024); see also Icenhower v. Total Auto.,
Inc., 845 N.W.2d 849, 855 (Minn. App. 2014) (“We may reverse or modify a ULJ’s
decision if the relator’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced because the findings
7
or decision are unsupported by substantial evidence . . . .”), rev. denied (Minn. July 15,
2014).
“The question of whether an employee engaged in conduct that
disqualifies . . . [them] from unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.”
Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 460. “Whether a particular act constitutes disqualifying conduct is
a question of law [that appellate courts] review de novo.” Id. And whether the reason for
an employee’s discharge was retaliation is a question of fact for the ULJ. Scheunemann v.
Radisson S. Hotel, 562 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn. App. 1997) (considering the reason an
employee was discharged a question of fact and holding, “When the reason for the
discharge is disputed, the hearing process must allow evidence on the competing reasons
and provide factual findings on the cause of discharge.”).5 As noted above, appellate courts
“review the ULJ’s findings of fact in the light most favorable to the decision and will not
disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that reasonably tends to
sustain them.” Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 460 (quotations omitted).
An employee who is discharged for employment misconduct is ineligible to receive
unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2024). “Employment
misconduct means any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct, on the job or off the
job, that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to
reasonably expect of the employee.” Id., subd. 6(a) (2024).

5 Cf. Ward v. Delta Airlines, 973 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Minn. App. 2022) (stating that it is a
question of fact for the ULJ to consider whether an employee quit), rev. denied (Minn. June
21, 2022).
8
Viewed in the light most favorable to the decision, there is evidence in the record
that reasonably tends to sustain the ULJ’s determination that Sevita discharged Johnson for
employment misconduct, i.e., intentionally committing a serious violation of the standards
of behavior that Sevita had the right to reasonably expect of Johnson. See Wilson, 888
N.W.2d at 460; see also Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a). That is to say, there is substantial
evidence in the record that Johnson intentionally and seriously violated Sevita’s reasonable
expectations that Johnson would not disparage her supervisor as a “b- tch” in the presence
of subordinate employees and would not tell those employees that the state would shut
down Sevita. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d). And the record evidence sustains the
ULJ’s determination that this conduct was “insubordinate” by “undermin[ing]
management’s authority” and “intentional” as “conscious choices,” as well as the ULJ’s
decision that Sevita’s expectation as to Johnson’s behavior was “reasonable because it was
common sense and [the conduct] was easily avoided.”
It is undisputed that Johnson made disparaging statements about her supervisor in
the presence of subordinate employees. At the de novo hearing before the ULJ, Johnson
admitted that she referred to her supervisor when she said, “F -ck that b-tch.” It is also
uncontroverted that Johnson told subordinate employees that Sevita would be shut down
by the state. These statements were an intentional and serious violation of the standards of
behavior that Sevita had a right to reasonably expect of Johnson. See Minn. Stat. § 268.095,
subd. 6(a). We have held that an employee’s rude behavior toward fellow employees and
supervisors can constitute employee misconduct. Montgomery v. F & M Marquette Nat’ l
Bank, 384 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. June 13, 1986); see
9
also Pitzel v. Packaged Furniture & Carpet, 362 N.W.2d 357, 357–58 (Minn. App. 1985)
(concluding that “aggressive and offensive” behavior with customers is employment
misconduct).
We are mindful that, when “the conduct for which the applicant was discharged
involve[s] only a single incident, that is an important fact that must be considered in
deciding whether the conduct rises to the level of employment misconduct.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.095, subd. 6(d) (2024). Here, however, the record establishes that Johnson’s conduct
was not limited to a single isolated incident. Instead, the ULJ’s determination that Sevita
discharged Johnson for employment misconduct was based on two instances: (1) Johnson’s
profane disparagement of her supervisor; and (2) Johnson’s statement to subordinate
employees that Sevita would be shut down by the state. Given the record before us, we
conclude that the ULJ’s employment- misconduct determination is supported by the law
and the undisputed facts. See Goede v. Astra Zeneca Pharms., LP, 992 N.W.2d 700, 711
(Minn. App. 2023) (determining that the ULJ’s decision that appellant engaged in
employee misconduct was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or
capricious), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 19, 2023).
The record evidence also reasonably supports the ULJ’s determinations that the
program director’s conduct in requesting that Johnson complete a medication-passing
retraining “was not retaliation” for Johnson’s complaint to DHS and that Johnson was not
discharged for complaining about Sevita to DHS or violating HIPAA by submitting
photographs she had taken of residents’ medical records as part of her DHS complaint.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ’s finding that, at the time of Johnson’s
10
March 4 discharge, Sevita was unaware that Johnson had taken such photographs. The
supervisor testified at the de novo hearing that it was only after March 4 that Sevita learned
Johnson had taken the photographs. Johnson presented no evidence to the contrary.
Lastly, the ULJ did not err in deciding that, while “Sevita [had] investigated Johnson
in part because of [her] DHS complaint,” that investigation did “not relieve [Johnson] from
her own responsibilities toward [Sevita] for purposes of analyzing whether [she was]
eligible to receive unemployment benefits.” Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
instructed that, in considering employment misconduct, “the focus of the inquiry is the
employee’s conduct, not that of the employer .” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d
312, 316 (Minn. 2011).
Thus, we discern no reversible error in the ULJ’s determination that Sevita
discharged Johnson based on employment misconduct and that Johnson was thus ineligible
to receive unemployment benefits.
Affirmed.