This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1511

Troy Andre Amundson, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Lora Daly Amundson,
Respondent.

Filed August 17, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-FA-17-622

Troy Andre Amundson, Pensacola, Florida (self-represented appellant)

Michael G. Cain, Arnold & Cain, PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Rasmusson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

RASMUSSON, Judge

In this appeal from a judgment enforcing collection of spousal-maintenance arrears, appellant argues that the district court erred by violating his due-process rights, ordering garnishment in violation of federal law, failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, and making inadequate factual findings. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Troy Andre Amundson and respondent Lora Daly Amundson married in 1992. They have one joint child, born in 2000. In 2015, the parties commenced dissolution proceedings, formalized the terms of their divorce in a marital settlement agreement (MSA), and received a judgment of divorce from the Superior Court of Guam. The judgment provided that appellant would pay respondent $7,000 in monthly support. This amount included $4,000 in spousal maintenance and $3,000 in child support. After the child turned 18 years old, spousal maintenance increased to $7,000, leaving appellant's total monthly obligation unchanged. Beginning in early 2016, appellant failed to pay spousal maintenance as ordered.

In 2017, appellant, having relocated to Minnesota, filed the divorce judgment in Anoka County. Appellant subsequently moved to modify spousal maintenance, child support, and arrears. The district court dismissed the motion, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child support and spousal maintenance.

In February 2025, respondent filed a motion in Anoka County District Court requesting a money judgment against appellant in the amount of $411,891.82 for his spousal-maintenance arrears. Additionally, respondent sought an order for income withholding and an order directing Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to withhold or garnish appellant's "military retired pay."[1] Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion concluding

[1] Appellant was formerly in the United States military. DFAS administers appellant's military retired pay.

that, although it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify spousal maintenance based on Guam's continuing jurisdiction and respondent's consent for it to be modified in Minnesota, it had jurisdiction to enforce the foreign judgment. The parties then filed a series of motions, including respondent's request for an updated judgment in the amount of $427,694.50.

Following a hearing on all pending motions, the district court entered a money judgment against appellant in the amount of $427,694.50. The district court also granted respondent's motions for garnishment and income withholding of appellant's military retired pay and other income to satisfy arrears and his continuing maintenance obligation. In a subsequent garnishment order, the district court directed DFAS to withhold the maximum amount legally permitted from appellant's disposable military retired pay.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

We review a district court's judgment enforcing spousal-maintenance arrears for an abuse of discretion. *See Nelson v. Nelson*, 806 N.W.2d 870, 871 (Minn. App. 2011) (reviewing an order implementing or enforcing a dissolution judgment for an abuse of discretion). A district court abuses its discretion when it makes factual findings without evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or delivers a decision contrary to logic and the record. *Woolsey v. Woolsey*, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Appellate courts review de novo the district court's application of the law. *Harlow v. State, Dep't of Hum. Servs.*, 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).

I. The district court did not violate appellant's right to due process.

Appellant first argues that the district court's denial of his motion to modify his financial obligations, followed later by an enforcement order, created a "jurisdictional 'gap.'" Specifically, appellant contends that the district court "created a one-sided procedural outcome in which enforcement advanced while meaningful modification relief remained unavailable." We interpret appellant as raising a procedural-due-process challenge.[2]

"Procedural due process protections restrain government action which deprives individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution." *Sweet v. Comm'r of Hum. Servs.*, 702 N.W.2d 314, 319 (Minn. App. 2005) (quotations omitted), *rev. denied* (Minn. Nov. 15, 2005). Procedural due process concerns whether an individual had "reasonable notice of hearing and a reasonable opportunity to be heard." *Kletschka v. Le Sueur Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs*, 277 N.W.2d 404, 405 (Minn. 1979). In evaluating a procedural-due-process claim, appellate courts begin by considering whether the claimant has a protected liberty or property interest and then apply a balancing test to determine the appropriate amount of

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[2] Appellant does not dispute that Minnesota's version of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (MUIFSA) allows a responding tribunal to enforce a registered support order issued in another jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 518C.603(b) (2024). Rather, he focuses on whether the district court exercised its enforcement authority in a manner consistent with due process.

process due. *Sweet*, 702 N.W.2d at 319 (citing *Mathews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 335 (1976)).

As to the first part of a procedural-due-process analysis, appellant has a property interest in the money he pays for support. *See Machacek v. Voss*, 361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn. 1985) (discussing that parties have a "private interest in the money they pay for temporary support").

In considering the balancing test found in the second part of the analysis, appellate courts examine the following three factors: (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest, through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substantive procedural requirement would entail." *Sweet*, 702 N.W.2d at 314 (quotations omitted); *accord Mathews*, 424 U.S. at 335.

Here, appellant's spousal-maintenance obligation is significant; however, any risk of error in the enforcement process was reduced by adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. The record clearly demonstrates that appellant had notice of respondent's enforcement motion and responded both through written filings and participation at a motion hearing. Further, appellant fails to identify any available procedures providing additional safeguards to protect his interests. Finally, appellant's concerns about a "jurisdictional gap" are misplaced given that nothing in the district court's judgment precludes him from seeking modification of his support obligation in a court with appropriate jurisdiction. Appellant fails to demonstrate that the deprivation of his property interest constitutes a procedural-due-process violation within the meaning of the three-factor test. Accordingly, appellant's procedural-due-process argument fails.

II. The garnishment order does not conflict with federal law.

Appellant contends that the district court's garnishment order violates federal law relating to both his disability benefits and retirement pay. We address each argument below.

A. Disability Benefits

Appellant suggests that the garnishment order may conflict with a federal prohibition against collection from disability benefits administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. We are not persuaded. We do not presume error on appeal, and appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error. *White v. Minn. Dep't of Nat. Res.*, 567 N.W.2d 724, 734 (Minn. App. 1997), *rev. denied* (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997). The arrears judgment and corresponding garnishment order do not include language that expressly authorizes respondent to seek garnishment of appellant's disability benefits. Rather, DFAS is directed to withhold funds from appellant's "disposable military retired pay" in the "maximum amount legally permitted." Appellant accordingly fails to demonstrate that the district court ordered garnishment from his disability benefits. Because appellant failed to meet this threshold requirement, we decline to address whether it would have been lawful for the district court to allow garnishment from appellant's disability benefits.

B. Retirement Pay

Appellant next argues that the district court erred by failing to specify that "enforcement is confined to disposable retired pay within federal limits and does not acknowledge that [his] retirement pay is already divided to the maximum extent permitted under federal law." We disagree.

Federal law places a ceiling on the amount of disposable military retired pay that a court may order garnished for support purposes broadly. Specifically, the amount subject to garnishment shall not exceed 50% of an individual's disposable earnings. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1) (2024); *see also* 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2024) (referring to "the support of any person").

Contrary to appellant's argument, the district court did specify the limits for garnishing his military retired pay. The judgment recognized the limitations that 10 U.S.C. § 1408 and 15 U.S.C. § 1673 place on garnishment of military retired earnings. The accompanying garnishment order specifies that "[f]rom all uniformed services retired pay received after August 1, 2025, [appellant] shall pay Respondent additional funds each month towards [appellant's] support arrears owed to Respondent to the *maximum amount legally permitted*." (Emphasis added.) It similarly provides that "[DFAS] is directed to withhold from the disposable military retired pay of [appellant] the *maximum amount legally permitted* towards [appellant's] monthly support obligation and support arrears." (Emphasis added.) As the district court's order recognized the federal limitations on garnishing military retired pay, appellant's argument that the district court's order is defective accordingly fails.

III. The district court did not err by entering the judgment without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant contends that the district court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of arrears. As an initial matter, we conclude that appellant forfeits this argument by failing to present it to the district court. Upon careful review of the record, we discern no request for an evidentiary hearing. Although appellant, as a self-represented party, "is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules," he still has the burden of "adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom." *Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc.*, 400 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). Because he did not present this issue to the district court, it is beyond the scope of appellate review. *See Thiele v. Stich*, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) ("A reviewing court must generally consider only those issues that the record shows were presented [to] and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it." (quotation omitted)).

Even if not forfeited, we conclude appellant's argument also fails on the merits. We review a district court's decision regarding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. *Thompson v. Thompson*, 739 N.W.2d 424, 429-30 (Minn. App. 2007). "Under the Minnesota Rules of General Practice, it is presumed that a motion in family law, other than a motion for contempt, will be decided without an evidentiary hearing, unless the district court determines that there is good cause for a hearing." *Id.* at 430 (citing Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 303.03(d)). We have previously applied the summary-judgment standard in evaluating whether good cause existed to grant an evidentiary hearing, which "requires a determination of whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the movant is entitled to the requested relief as a matter of law." *Id.*

Although appellant made passing reference to other payments, he did not offer the requisite "specific, admissible facts" to create good cause for granting an evidentiary hearing. *Cf. Beecroft v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.*, 798 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Minn. App. 2011) (emphasis and quotation omitted) (applying summary-judgment standard), *rev. denied* (Minn. July 19, 2011).

As appellant's argument both fails on the merits and is forfeited, we find no error by the district court in denying an evidentiary hearing.

IV. The district court made sufficient findings.

Appellant last argues that the district court made insufficient findings for appellate review by failing to demonstrate how it "calculated arrears and resolved contested payments." A district court is required to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law" in actions tried without a jury or advisory jury. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. Put differently, an order or judgment must "identify the facts that the district court has determined to be true and the facts on which the district court's decision is based." *In re Civ. Commitment of Spicer*, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014). This court has determined findings to be insufficient for appellate review when, for example, a district court determines that claims are frivolous in denying a fee-waiver application without articulating a basis for this determination. *Nelson v. Arroyo Ins. Servs., Inc.*, 23 N.W.3d 415, 419 (Minn. App. 2025).

Here, the district court noted that respondent requested a judgment of $427,694.50 based upon her affidavit specifically setting forth her calculations for this exact amount. The district court then found that appellant owes $427,694.50 in support arrears after calculating the total support payments due, the total amount that appellant paid, the total amount respondent received from DFAS, and subtracting the latter two from the first to derive the amount owing. Even if appellant offered facts supporting certain "contested payments," implicit in the district court's calculation is that it found respondent's submissions credible. The district court accordingly made sufficient findings for appellate review.

Affirmed.