Ricardo Daniel Peralta Gutierrez, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1512

Ricardo Daniel Peralta Gutierrez, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 4, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-5015

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Nicholas G. Kimball, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HARRIS, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order denying his petition for
postconviction relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that the district court

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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violated the terms of his plea agreement by imposing a sentence exceeding 120 months.
He alternatively argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the
circumstances surrounding the agreement rendered his plea unintelligent. Because we
conclude that appellant entered an unintelligent plea, and the district court therefore abused
its discretion by denying appellant’s postconviction petition, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
In February 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ricardo Daniel
Peralta Gutierrez with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota
Statutes sections 609.342, subdivision 1(a) and .343, subdivision 1(a) (2012). The
complaint alleged that a Hennepin County social worker received a report that Peralta
Gutierrez had engaged in criminal sexual conduct with his minor family member. Peralta
Gutierrez had touched the victim’s vagina with his hands, penis, and tongue, and forced
his penis into the victim’s mouth. These incidents occurred over the course of five years
when the victim was between five and ten years old.
In February 2023, Peralta Gutierrez appeared before the district court for a jury trial.
At that time, he entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. During the plea hearing, the state summarized the terms of the agreement
as follows:
. . . The state and defense have agreed on a plea in this
case to count 1 which is criminal sexual conduct in the first
degree. State is willing to dismiss count 2. All arguments
would occur at sentencing. No agreements on any conditions
or jail or prison time.
3
The mandatory minimum on a CSC-1 is 144 months to
the department of corrections. The state’s most recent offer in
this case was 120 – 1-2-0 months . . . .

. . . .

This agreement obviously by the state would likely not
be honored if the defendant fails to comply with the PSI
[presentence investigation], fails to return for sentencing, or
otherwise commits a new offense.

When the district court asked defense counsel whether there was anything to add
about the negotiated resolution, counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Peralta Gutierrez
submitted a petition in support of his guilty plea, which summarized the plea agreement as
follows:
19. I have been told by my attorney and I understand
that:
. . . .

b. The maximum penalty that the court could
impose for this crime (taking into consideration any prior
conviction or convictions) is imprisonment for 30 years per
count. If a minimum sentence is required by statute the
court may impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less
than 144 months for this crime per count.

20. I have been told by my attorney and I understand
that:
a. My attorney discussed this case with one of the
prosecuting attorneys, and my attorney and the prosecuting
attorney agree that if I enter a plea of guilty, the prosecutor
will do the following: Dismiss Count 2 and plea to Count
1, . . . cap sentence at 120 months, all arguments at
sentencing. Pre-Sentencing evaluation and a psychosexual
evaluation.

(Emphasis added.)
4
When the district court asked the state if it reviewed the plea petition, the prosecutor
said, “I did not, Your Honor, but I have no objection to its receipt. I know what our
discussion has been and also defendant’s work with counsel.” The district court accepted
the plea petition and entered it into the record. Towards the end of the hearing, the district
court summarized what it understood to be the plea agreement:
It is my understanding as the attorneys have laid
out . . . that the presumptive commit based on the criminal
record summary that was completed is 144 months
commitment to the department of corrections. The state’s last
offer was 120 months all with respect to count 1, and that
count 2 would be dismissed at sentencing along with
determining other conditions and what the sentence would
be in terms of a commit or not commit and other terms and
such that will be argued at sentencing, and the Court will
render its decision following those arguments and the receipt
of the documentation that I’ve laid out with you with the PSI
and the psychosexual evaluation.

(Emphasis added.)

After the plea hearing, the district court submitted a probation referral in which it
described the “proposed negotiation” as a “[s]traight plea so no negotiation, but state was
willing to dismiss count 2.”
According to the PSI, the plea negotiation was described as, “Dismiss Ct. 2 and plea
to Ct. 1, cap sentence at 120 months, all arguments at sentencing.” The PSI author cited a
lack of “mitigating factors” to support a departure and recommended that Peralta Gutierrez
5
be given a 144-month sentence of imprisonment.1 At the sentencing hearing, the district
court began by stating:
We are here set for sentencing on this matter following
what was termed a straight plea to the Court meaning that there
was a slight agreement between the defense and the state for a
plea to the top count which was criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree with the understanding that count 2 would be
dismissed.

The district court then turned to the state for argument. The prosecutor stated:
As I explained to the Court, based on the defendant’s
willingness to plead guilty prior to trial and throughout the
pendency of this case always attempting to negotiate a plea, the
state did offer a departure of 120 months giving that courtesy
that he was willing to prevent the victim in this case from
having to go through a trial. However, based on the facts of
this case and also probation’s indication that there are not
mitigating factors, the state agrees with probation’s
recommendations and also a prison sentence in this case.

Defense counsel argued for a downward dispositional departure, asserting that
Peralta Gutierrez was particularly amenable to probation. The district court denied the
departure request, expressing concern over Peralta Gutierrez’s lack of accountability for
his “grooming” and “involvement” with the minor child, and “[his] commentary that she
started it . . . [o]r that it was mutual.” The district court sentenced Peralta Gutierrez to the
presumptive sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment, which was within the presumptive
term provided by the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. It also explained that:

1 To protect the confidentiality of nonpublic information, we only include information from
the PSI that was presented in Peralta Gutierrez’s publicly filed brief. Minn. R. Pub. Access
to Recs. of Jud. Branch 4, subds. 1(b), 4.
6
As a result of your plea and agreement of the
state, . . . count 2 will be dismissed because this is only with
respect to count 1. . . . [F]or purposes of the record and what
has been put in the sentencing form is that this was a straight
plea to the Court. You pled guilty to me. I am doing, in my
estimation, what I think is fair and just with the agreement of
the state to dismiss count 2, and it is a guideline sentence.

When the district court asked Peralta Gutierrez if there was anything that it failed to
include as to sentencing, defense counsel answered, “No, Your Honor.”
In March 2025, Peralta Gutierrez filed a petition for postconviction relief asking the
district court to enforce the plea agreement capping his sentence at 120 months. He argued
that the “guilty plea clearly contemplated a sentence of no more than 120 months in prison.”
The state opposed the petition, arguing that Peralta Gutierrez and his attorney knew that
sentencing would be left to the district court’s discretion when he pleaded guilty. The
district court denied Peralta Gutierrez’s petition. It concluded that the state “mentioned a
prior offer to resolve the case outside of trial at 120 months of incarceration but only using
past tense language.”
Peralta Gutierrez appeals.
DECISION
Peralta Gutierrez challenges the district court’s denial of his petition for
postconviction relief to modify or correct his sentence, asserting that the terms of the plea
agreement unambiguously capped his sentence at 120 months. Alternatively, he argues
that his guilty plea was unintelligent.
To begin, the parties disagree as to whether Peralta Gutierrez entered a “straight
plea” with no cap on sentencing or whether he was accepting the state’s “prior offer” to no
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more than the 120 months. A “straight plea” means that the defendant “pleaded guilty to
the offense but did not enter into any agreement regarding sentencing.” State v. Sanchez-
Sanchez, 879 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 2016).
Here, the record suggests that there was no straight plea because the parties reached
some agreement regarding Peralta Gutierrez’s sentence. However, we need not decide
whether the agreement constituted a straight plea or the acceptance of a prior offer because
the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement call into question whether the guilty plea
was constitutionally valid.
Although we generally review the district court’s denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion, the question of whether Peralta Gutierrez
entered a constitutionally valid guilty plea is a question of law that we review de novo.
Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Minn. 2017).
A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. Perkins v.
State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 685 (Minn. 1997). But a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea at
any time if “withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Minn. R. Crim.
P. 15.05, subd. 1. “A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” State v. Raleigh,
778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). “To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be
accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. The only contested aspect of Peralta Gutierrez’s
plea is whether it was intelligent.
“To be intelligent, a guilty plea must represent a knowing and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action available.” Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877 (quotation
omitted). Whether the defendant made an intelligent plea depends on what he knew at the
8
time he entered the plea. Id. More specifically, we look to whether the defendant
understood the charges against him, the rights he waived , and the direct consequences of
his plea. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d at 96. “A direct consequence is one that has a definite,
immediate and automatic effect on the range of a defendant’s punishment.” State v.
Crawford, 13 N.W.3d 693, 697 (Minn. App. 2004) (quoting Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d
900, 904 n.6 (Minn. 2002)).
Here, Peralta Gutierrez did not enter an intelligent plea because the terms and
circumstances surrounding his sentence were unclear. According to the plea petition,
Peralta Gutierrez expressed his understanding that if he pleaded guilty to count 1, then “the
prosecutor will” dismiss count 2, cap his sentence at 120 months, with all arguments to be
made at sentencing. (Emphasis added.) This language did not say that the state “may” cap
his sentence at 120 months; it stated that it “ will” cap his sentence at 120 months. The
district court then accepted the petition and entered it into the record.
The state additionally made clear that the agreement would be honored so long as
Peralta Gutierrez complied with the PSI, returned for sentencing, and committed no new
offenses. Peralta Gutierrez fully complied with these conditions. And the prosecutor
explained at the sentencing hearing that it did offer Peralta Gutierrez a 120-month sentence
based on his willingness to plead guilty, which would obviate the need for the victim to
testify during a jury trial. These circumstances, we believe, rendered Peralta Gutierrez’s
guilty plea unintelligent by leading him to reasonably understand that his sentence would
be capped at 120 months.
9
The state insists that there are other facts in the record indicating that Peralta
Gutierrez understood the state’s offer as merely a prior offer. For example, the plea
petition also stated that a 144-month sentence may be imposed “if a minimum sentence
[was] required by statute.” And att the plea hearing, the prosecutor informed the district
court that no agreements were made “on any conditions or jail or prison time.” Then, at
sentencing, despite acknowledging that it offered a 120-month sentence, the prosecutor
still argued for a 144-month executed sentence as recommended by the PSI. Lastly, after
the district court imposed the sentence of 144 month’s imprisonment, it asked Peralta
Gutierrez if it missed anything regarding the sentencing order; defense counsel responded,
“No, Your Honor.”
To support its claim, the state relies on State v. Rhodes, 675 N.W.2d 323, 324-27
(Minn. 2004), which involved a petition for postconviction relief that sought to withdraw
a guilty plea. In that case, Rhodes pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct
and agreed to a maximum executed sentence of 105 months. Id. at 325. There was no
mention of whether Rhodes would be subject to a mandatory conditional-release period
either in the written plea petition or at his plea hearing. Id. But the mandatory conditional
release persion was mentioned in the PSI and in the state’s argument at his sentencing
hearing. Id. Notably, neither Rhodes nor his defense counsel objected. Id. After
pronouncing his sentence and the conditional-release period, the district court asked
Rhodes if he had any questions or if it missed anything else. Id. Defense counsel answered,
“No, Your Honor.” Id.
10
Rhodes petitioned for postconviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was not
intelligent because he was not informed about the mandatory conditional-release period
when he entered his guilty plea. Id. The district court denied his petition because the
conditional-release term—despite its absence in the plea petition— was incorporated into
Rhodes’s sentence at the sentencing hearing. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the district court’s decision, concluding that Rhodes was “on notice” both at the time of his
plea and at sentencing “that the conditional release term for sex offenders was mandatory.”
Id. at 327. The supreme court also concluded that Rhodes’s “failure to object” to the PSI’s
recommendation, the state’s request at sentencing, and the district court’s imposition of the
sentence allowed a reasonable inference that he “understood from the beginning that the
conditional release term would be a mandatory addition to his plea bargain.” Id.
The state’s reliance on Rhodes is not persuasive. Unlike the plea petition in Rhodes,
Peralta Gutierrez’s plea petition contained an express promise that the state would cap his
sentence at 120 months. Peralta Gutierrez’s PSI also mentioned the state’s offer of a 120-
month cap, which further evidences his understanding of his agreement to a capped
sentence. Notable, too, is the fact that Peralta Gutierrez never confirmed on the record that
he understood the consequences of his guilty plea. We observe that this was likely due to
defense counsel’s failure to mention the 120-month capped sentence during the plea
colloquy, as well as the prosecutor’s admission that they did not review the petition
beforehand. And while reviewing the plea petition “line- by-line” on the record is not a
requirement, it is a best practice. See State v. Epps, 977 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. 2022)
(observing that, despite a district court’s heavy caseload, a defendant’s plea colloquy could
11
have been improved by including questions about the defendant’s past criminal
convictions).
In sum, because the terms and consequences surrounding Peralta Gutierrez’s guilty
plea were less than clear, we conclude that his guilty plea was unintelligent. Accordingly,
the district court abused its discretion by denying Peralta Gutierrez’s postconviction
petition, and we therefore reverse and remand for the court to allow him to withdraw his
guilty plea.
Reversed and remanded.