State of Minnesota v. Sylvester Antione Townsend

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1520

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sylvester Antione Townsend,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-5396

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Beane, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgments of conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition, appellant Sylvester Antione Townsend argues that (1) the
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person whom

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police identified as “Shooter #2” in a shooting incident and (2) the district court erred by
adjudicating him guilty of both unlawfully possessing a firearm and unlawfully possessing
ammunition when Townsend was found guilty of having possessed only a single loaded
firearm. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
The following recitation of the facts is derived from the district court’s findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and order following Townsend’s bench trial as well as the
evidence submitted in the trial.
On July 29, 2023, at around 1:45 a.m., officers responded to a complaint related to
a nightclub at an address on Rice Street in Saint Paul. One officer’s body-worn camera
(BWC) video recorded “a Black man with glasses, a beard, a baseball-style cap with two
lighter front panels and a patch on the front, gold necklace, dark shirt with a muted and
swirling design on it, loose denim jeans that ended just below the knee, white socks and
dark shoes.” BWC footage also captured a “distinctive red van” that was parked on the
street near the nightclub. It had “darkened windows, and two stripes running horizontally
just below the windows, a thicker stripe on top and thinner stripe immediately beneath the
thicker stripe.” “The same van was parked in the same place leading up to” the following
incident.
At around 3:45 a.m. that same morning, surveillance cameras captured a man—
wearing all the same clothing and accessories as the man who was observed earlier —
walking in the same location. He pulled out a dark object and held it “like one would hold
a firearm.” This man was later identified as “Shooter #2” by the police. On the surveillance

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video, Shooter #2 then turned the corner and crossed the street with another person, later
referred to as “Shooter #1.” Around 3:50 a.m., Shooter #2, standing in the doorway of a
building, raised a dark object, and several flashes emitted from the object, corresponding
with the sound of gunshots. Shooter #2 then ran back along the sidewalk, unlocked and
opened the front passenger door of the above -described van, and then continued running
along the sidewalk and out of view.
Ten seconds later, Shooter #2 came back into view along with four other men, all
running toward the van. Shooter #2 approached the van from behind, running into the street
and out of the surveillance camera’s view; the video does not show whether he entered the
van from the driver’s side. The four other men entered the van through the doors on the
passenger’s side, and the van drove away. Officers responding to the gunfire were told that
suspects left in a red Dodge Ram van with the license plate XXXXXX.1 The van was not
registered to Townsend.
From still photos of the surveillance video, o fficers identified Shooter #1 as J.T.
They learned that J.T. had a brother—Townsend—and obtained a driver’s license photo of
Townsend. Officers compared Townsend’s driver’s license photo with a social media post
on an account with first and middle names similar to Townsend’s. Officers also compared
the driver’s license photo with the BWC footage and the surveillance video to identify
Townsend as the suspected Shooter #2.

1 We anonymize the license plate number by referring to it as XXXXXX.

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Following the July 29 incident, officers observed a red Dodge Ram van with the
license plate XXXXXX multiple times outside an address on DeSoto Street in Saint Paul.
On September 13, 2023, police arrested Townsend at the DeSoto Street address and
recovered several key pieces of evidence. First, the red Dodge Ram van with the license
plate XXXXXX was parked at the DeSoto Street address. Officers also found a cellphone
in Townsend’s possession (the phone). The phone belonged to M.T., who has an unknown
relationship to Townsend. The phone contained a “selfie” photograph, taken three days
before the July 29 incident, depicting Townsend and a red van consistent with the
description of the van used by the suspects. And finally, officers found a receipt in the van
listing Townsend’s name and the number of the recovered phone.
After Townsend’s arrest, officers interviewed Townsend. During the interview,
Townsend admitted that he drives a red van. An officer also showed Townsend a still shot
of Shooter #2 extracted from the BWC footage taken during the 1:45 a.m. police response.
Townsend said the person “looks like Reggie” but did not disagree when the officer said
that it was Townsend in the photo. The officer then showed him a still shot from around
the time of the shooting, telling him that the photo was also of him. Townsend denied that
that photo was of him. Townsend then compared the two photos and denied that he was
pictured in them.
Officers used cell-tower mapping to track the phone’s location around the time of
the incident on July 29. Several hours before the shooting, the phone was at the DeSoto
Street address. Then, between 1:45 a.m. (the initial police response ) and 3:50 a.m. (the

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shooting), the phone was at the nightclub address on Rice Street. The phone was back at
the DeSoto Street address by 5:23 a.m.
Townsend was charged with one count of possessing a firearm as an ineligible
person and one count of possessing ammunition as an ineligible person, both under
Minnesota Statutes section 624.713, subdivision 1(2) (2022). After the bench trial, the
district court filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. The district court
found that Townsend’s facial features, as observed in court, were “consistent with” the
BWC videos, still shots from BWC and surveillance videos, the selfie photo , and video
from the police interview. It ultimately determined that Townsend was Shooter #2 and
found him guilty of both counts. The district court then filed a warrant of commitment,
sentencing Townsend on only one count but convicting him of both counts.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
First, Townsend challenges his conviction s of possessing a firearm or ammunition
as an ineligible person because the evidence is insufficient to prove that he was Shooter #2
and therefore in possession of a gun or ammunition. Second, he argues in the alternative
that the district court erred by entering convictions for two offenses arising from the same
conduct. We address each issue in turn.
I. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Townsend was Shooter #2.
When a conviction rests on circumstantial evidence alone, courts apply the
circumstantial-evidence standard of review. State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn.
2026). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether

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the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” State v. Jones , 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn.
2024) (quotation omitted). Because Townsend’s identity as Shooter #2 requires an
inference from the state’s evidence, we agree with the parties that the circumstantial-
evidence standard of review applies.
The circumstantial-evidence standard has two steps. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. First,
the appellate court must “‘winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all
questions of fact in favor of the . . . verdict,’ which results in ‘a subset of facts that
constitute the circumstances proved. ’” Id. (quoting State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600
(Minn. 2017)). When, as here, the case was tried to the district court, we determine the
circumstances proved in a manner that “protect[s] the district court’s unique position to
determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence before it.” Id. at 482.
Second, the appellate court considers “whether the reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete, isolated facts,
‘are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis other than guilt.’” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 9 N.W.3d 543, 565 (Minn.
2024)) (other quotation omitted). At the second step, no deference is given to the inferences
drawn by the factfinder. Id. at 483.
The circumstantial-evidence standard is applied on an element-by -element basis.
State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39- 40 (Minn. 2016); see also Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478
(discussing the standard in terms of particular elements). The only element challenged by
Townsend here is identity—in other words, whether he was Shooter #2.

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Step One
Beginning with the first step, the circumstances proved regarding the identity of
Shooter #2 are the following:
• On July 29, 2023, at 1:45 a.m., officers responded to a complaint related to a
nightclub at a Rice Street address in St. Paul.
• BWC video captured “a Black man with glasses, a beard, a baseball -style cap
with two lighter front panels and a patch on the front, gold necklace, dark shirt with a muted
and swirling design on it, loose denim jeans that ended just below the knee, white socks
and dark shoes.”
• BWC video also captured a “distinctive red van” at the Rice Street address. The
van had “darkened windows, and two stripes running horizontally just below the windows,
a thicker stripe on top and thinner stripe immediately beneath the thicker stripe.”
• At around 3:45 a.m., the van was parked in the same place.
• Also at that time, surveillance video captured a male walking near the Rice Street
address, “wearing a chain necklace, dark T-shirt, loose denim jeans that end just below the
knee, a cap with a white/reflective panel in the front and white socks.” Officers later
identified the male as “Shooter #2.”
• While walking, Shooter #2 “pull[ed] a dark object from behind him and h[eld]
it like one would hold a firearm.”
• Shooter #2 crossed the street and stood in the alcove of a building.

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• Shooter #2 “raise[d] a dark object, and several flashes coincide[d] with the sound
of shots being fired from that alcove.”
• Shooter #2 ran back across the street and unlocked the same van seen earlier,
leaving the van with the front passenger door open.
• Shooter #2 then continued down the sidewalk and shortly thereafter returned to
the van with four other men. Shooter #2 approached the van from the street and then
disappeared behind the van.
• The other four men entered the van from the passenger side, and the van drove
off.
• Officers were notified that suspects were in a red Dodge Ram van with the
license plate XXXXXX.
• Officers eventually identified Shooter #1 as J.T.
• Officers learned that J.T. had a brother, whom they ultimately identified as
Townsend. They obtained a driver’s license photo of Townsend and compared it with still
photos from the video of the night of the July 29 incident.
• Following the shooting, officers saw a red Dodge Ram van with the license plate
XXXXXX multiple times at an address on DeSoto Street in St. Paul.
• Townsend was arrested on September 13, 2023, at the DeSoto Street address.
• The red van was present at the DeSoto address.
• In a police interview, Townsend was shown a still shot of BWC video depicting
a man seen at the Rice Street address at around 1:45 a.m. on July 29 (Exhibit 111).

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Townsend at first did not dispute the officer’s statement that he was the man pictured in
the photo. The officer then showed Townsend an image from surveillance video of Shooter
#2 at around 3:45 a.m. that day. After comparing the two photos, Townsend repeatedly
denied that he was the person in the photos.
• In the interview, Townsend admitted that he drives a red van.
• Townsend had a cellphone on him when he was arrested.
• A receipt dated August 4, 2023 (less than a week after the July 29 incident) was
found in the van, listing Townsend’s name and the number of the phone that was found in
his possession.
• The phone contained a selfie photograph that was taken on July 26, 2023, and
depicts Townsend and a red van.
• Cell-tower mapping placed the phone at the DeSoto Street address several hours
before the shooting, at the Rice Street address between 1:45 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. on July 29,
2023, and back at the DeSoto Street address by 5:23 a.m. on that day.
• Townsend’s facial features, as found by the district court, were “consistent with”
the BWC videos, still shots from videos, video from the police interview, and the selfie
photo on the phone.
In his identification of the circumstances proved, Townsend challenges two of the
district court’s findings: first, that, during the police interview, Townsend “did not dispute
that it was him when an officer identified the person in [Exhibit 111] as [Townsend],” and
second, that the selfie photo on the phone is consistent with Townsend’s appearance. He

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argues that those findings should not be included in the circumstances proved because they
are not supported by the evidence. In determining the circumstances proved, we are
required to winnow down the evidence presented at trial by resolving all questions of fact
in favor of the verdict to protect the fact-finder’s unique position to weigh the evidence
before it. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478. Doing so here, we conclude that the circumstances
proved include that Townsend initially did not dispute that he was the person pictured in
Exhibit 111 and that the selfie photo is consistent with Townsend’s appearance.
Step Two
We now turn to step two—the examination of the reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances proved. Townsend states that he does not concede that the
circumstances proved are consistent with the reasonable inference that he was Shooter #2,
but he acknowledges that the inference “may be reasonable.” W e conclude that the
inference is, in fact, reasonable. Townsend is connected to Shooter #2 through his physical
resemblance to Shooter #2 as demonstrated in the BWC footage during the 1:45 a.m. police
response to the nightclub and the photo of Shooter #2 with identical clothing during the
later shooting, his possession of the red van matching the one present at the July 29
incident, and his possession of the cell phone tracked to the location of the incident. The
selfie photograph recovered from the phone depicts Townsend with the red van three days
before the incident. Additionally, the receipt recovered from Townsend’s van listed his
name and the number of the cell phone that was found in his possession. Viewing all these
circumstances together, we conclude that they are consistent with a reasonable inference
that Townsend is Shooter #2.

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Townsend contends, however, that the circumstances proved do not exclude the
reasonable hypothesis that Townsend was not Shooter #2. He makes six arguments in
support of this alternative hypothesis. We find none of them persuasive.
First, Townsend notes that no one, including the responding officers, identified
Townsend as being at the shooting. But the district court found that Townsend’s
appearance at trial was consistent with images of Shooter #2 from the shooting. Townsend
does not challenge this finding, and, even if he did, we must resolve this question of fact
in favor of the verdict. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478.
Second, Townsend argues that the surveillance video of the shooting does not show
Shooter #2’s face. But other videos do, including the BWC video from the 1:45 a.m.
response and two other surveillance videos leading up to the shooting. And, again, the
district court found that Townsend’s appearance at trial was consistent with images of
Shooter #2.
Third, Townsend points out that he did not own the red van. But ownership of the
van is irrelevant considering the evidence showing that Townsend controlled and used the
van. The red van found at the scene of Townsend’s arrest matched the BWC and
surveillance videos from the July 29 incident. The license plate matched the one associated
with the suspects of the shooting. Townsend admitted to driving a red van. There was a
receipt in the van listing Townsend’s name and the number of the phone he possessed. And
the selfie photo from the phone depicts Townsend with the red van. Given the totality of
the circumstances proved, the fact that Townsend did not legally own the van does not
create a reasonable hypothesis that he was not Shooter #2.

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Fourth, Townsend argues that the van is not necessarily linked to Shooter #2
because the surveillance video shows that other men got in the van but not Shooter #2.
BWC video shows the red van near the Rice Street address at around 1:45 a.m. when
Shooter #2 was there. Surveillance video also shows Shooter #2 walk up to the van after
the 3:50 a.m. shooting, unlock the front passenger door, leave it open, and go away and
immediately return with four other men. The four other men entered from the passenger
side while Townsend went around the van to the other side. While the surveillance video
does not capture whether Shooter #2 entered the van, Shooter #2 did disappear around the
driver’s side of the van moments before it drove off. And there were reports that suspects
left in a red Dodge Ram van. Regardless of whether Shooter #2 was in the van when it was
driven away, the evidence shows that Shooter #2 exercised some control over the van and
was connected to it in some way.
Fifth, Townsend argues that no one can know who was using the phone on July 29
because officers established only that Townsend had the phone three days before and six
weeks after the incident. He also notes that the phone is owned by someone else, not
Townsend. Three days before the July 29 incident, Townsend used the phone to take a
selfie photo of himself and the van. The phone was also tracked to Townsend’s home
several hours before the shooting . It was then tracked to the Rice Street address between
the time of the initial nightclub call and the time of the shooting. Finally, it was tracked
back to Townsend’s home a few hours after the shooting . The number for the phone was
listed along with Townsend’s name on a receipt issued six days after the incident. Based

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on all the circumstances proved, it is unreasonable to infer that M.T. or anyone other than
Townsend possessed the phone on July 29.
Finally, Townsend notes that the phone-location analysis could only pinpoint a
location within 78 meters, therefore the phone could have been at a location near the Rice
Street address, rather than at the shooting. While it is possible that the person carrying the
phone could have been somewhere within 78 meters of the Rice Street address, rather than
at the shooting, again, this inference is not reasonable when viewed in the context of the
rest of the evidence.
The ultimate question under step two is “whether the reasonable inferences that can
be drawn from the circumstances proved, when viewed as a whole and not as discrete,
isolated facts, ‘are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent
with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.’” Firkus, 31 N.W.3d at 478 (quoting Smith,
9 N.W.3d at 565). Here, viewing all the circumstances proved as a whole, they support
only one reasonable hypothesis— that Townsend was Shooter #2. Townsend’s appearance
was consistent with Shooter #2, he had the same red van as Shooter #2, and he had a phone
tracked to the shooting. Additionally, the selfie photo and the receipt connect Townsend to
the van and the phone. No reasonable inference other than that Townsend was Shooter #2
can be drawn from these circumstances proved.
The evidence is therefore sufficient to support Townsend’s convictions.
II. The district court erred by entering convictions on both counts.
Townsend argues that the district court erred by entering convictions on both the
first count for unlawful possession of a firearm and the second count for unlawful

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possession of ammunition because they both arose from the same act. The state agrees that
the district court erred by entering convictions on both counts. We, too, agree.
Whether a district court erred by entering multiple convictions is a question of law
reviewed de novo. State v. Cox, 820 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2012). Under Minnesota law,
a criminal defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense,
but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1 (2024). “[W]hen the defendant is convicted on
more than one charge for the same act” the district court should “adjudicate formally and
impose sentence on one count only.” State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn.
1984). Claims of multiple convictions cannot be waived by failing to raise the issue at
sentencing. Spann v. State, 740 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. 2007).
Here, Townsend was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
and one count of unlawful possession of ammunition, both under Minnesota Statutes
section 624.713, subdivision 1(2). In State v. Nowels, we held that a person cannot be
convicted of both possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition when the offenses
arose from the same course of conduct. 941 N.W.2d 430, 442 n.8 (Minn. App. 2020), rev.
denied (Minn. June 16, 2020). Townsend’s convictions arose out of one course of
conduct—his possession of a single loaded firearm. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
for the district court to correct the warrant of commitment to vacate the conviction for one
of the two counts.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.