State of Minnesota v. Rajuan Marquice Jones

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1523

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rajuan Marquice Jones,
Appellant.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-25-1454

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Shannon M. Harmon, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict as a matter of law ,
that the charging statute violates the Second Amendment as applied in this case , that the

2
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm, and that the district court
erred by denying his race-based challenge to the state’s removal of a venire member .
Appellant also raises numerous issues in a supplemental pro se brief. We affirm.
FACTS
In January 2025, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Rajuan Marquice
Jones with unlawful possession of a firearm. The state alleged that Jones was ineligible to
possess a firearm because he had a prior conviction for a crime of violence, specifically,
two felony convictions under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1) (2016), for selling
marijuana in 2017. As alleged in the complaint, police officers attempted to arrest Jones
after they observed him loitering with another individual, who was engaging in behavior
typical of narcotics distribution. Jones physically resisted their efforts, and it took several
officers a couple of minutes to restrain him and prevent him from leaving the scene. Once
Jones was restrained, the police searched him and found a firearm.
Jones moved to suppress the firearm, and the district court denied that motion. The
case proceeded to a jury trial. Jones represented himself at trial, with advisory counsel
available to assist him . During jury selection, the state used a peremptory challenge to
remove a multiracial venire member. Jones challenged the state’s removal, arguing that it
was race-based. The district court rejected Jones’s challenge and permitted the state to
remove the venire member.
The jury found Jones guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to serve
60 months in prison.
Jones appeals.

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DECISION
I.

Jones contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict
as a matter of law. “When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on the meaning of the
statute under which a defendant has been convicted, we are presented with a qu estion of
statutory interpretation that we review de novo.” State v. Henderson , 907 N.W.2d 623,
625 (Minn. 2018). “The aim of statutory interpretation is to understand and effectuate the
Legislature’s intent.” Wocelka v. State, 9 N.W.3d 390, 394 (Minn. 2024).
“[T]he plain language of the statute controls when the meaning of the statute is
unambiguous.” Id. (quotation omitted). A statute is unambiguous “when there is only one
reasonable way to read the text.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine the plain meaning
of the statute, we look “to the text and textual context of the statute .” Id. And “we give
words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning.” State v. Vasko, 889 N.W.2d 551,
556 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Jones was found guilty of violating Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2024), which
provides that a person is ineligible to possess a firearm if the person has been “convicted
of . . . a crime of violence. ” A “crime of violence ” is defined and includes “felony
convictions of the following offenses : . . . chapter 152 (drugs, controlled substances) .”
Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2024). Jones has two felony convictions for fifth -degree
sale of marijuana under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1). Jones argues that—as a matter
of law —a violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), cannot be based on felony

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convictions under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), because—as explained next —that
offense no longer exists.
Prior to 2023, Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), provided that it was a crime to sell
one or more mixtures containing marijuana or tetrahydrocannabinols. 2023 Minn. Laws
ch. 63, art. 4, § 17, at 2831. In 2023, the legislature amended chapter 152 of the Minnesota
Statutes and removed the sale of marijuana under subdivision 1(1) from section 152.025.
Id. But the legislature did not amend the statutory definition of “crime of violence ” to
exclude felony convictions for a violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1). Th e
definition still includes any felony “conviction” based on an offense in chapter 152. Minn.
Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
A “conviction” is defined as “any of the following accepted and recorded by the
court: (1) a plea of guilty; or (2) a verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilty by the
court.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2024). Although section 152.025 no longer includes
a felony-level offense for selling marijuana , appellant’s felony convictions for selling
marijuana in violation of section 152.025—as previously defined—remain. And under the
plain language of the statutory definition of “crime of violence,” a felony “conviction” for
an offense under chapter 152 is a “crime of violence. ” Given the plain meaning of th e
crime-of-violence definition, there is only one reasonable way to read it: a “crime of
violence” includes any felony conviction for a violation of chapter 152, including a
conviction under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1).
To persuade us otherwise, Jones argues that because his felony convictions under
chapter 152 are based on a statutory provision that no longer exists, Minn. Stat. § 624.712,

5
subd. 5, cannot be interpreted to include those convictions as crime s of violence.
Essentially, he argues that we should read the statutory definition of “crime of violence” to
mean a felony conviction for an offense currently listed in chapter 152. “As a general rule,
we do not add words or phrases not supplied by the Legislature to an unambiguous statute.”
Underwood v. State , 25 N.W.3d 26, 36 (Minn. 2025). And if the legislature ’s intent is
clearly discernible from a statute ’s unambiguous language, we interpret the language
according to its plain meaning without resorting to other principles of statutory
construction. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Minn. 2004).
None of Jones’s arguments persuades us that our plain -language approach to the
definition of “crime of violence ” in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 , is incorrect . For
example, he argues that under caselaw “ the definition of crime of violence is fixed at the
time of the new firearm offense, not at the time the prior offenses were committed,” citing
Tapia v. Leslie , 950 N.W.2d 59 (Minn. 2020) , for support . Although Tapia supports
Jones’s argument that the relevant definition of “crime of violence” is the one in effect at
the time of his firearm offense, it does not support reversal. In that case, the supreme court
considered whether Tapia was ineligible to possess a firearm under section 624.713 based
on a “crime of violence,” albeit in a different context: issuance of a permit to carry.1 950
N.W.2d at 61; see Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(b)(4)(v) (2018) (providing that an

1 The contextual difference is immaterial because, as the supreme court noted, the same
statutes govern a criminal case involving ineligibility to possess a firearm based on a
“crime of violence” and a civil case involving denial of a permit to carry based on a “crime
of violence.” Tapia, 950 N.W.2d at 62 n.2.

6
applicant for a permit to carry must not be “prohibited from possessing a firearm under . . .
section[] . . . 624.713”).
The issue in Tapia was whether the appellant, who was adjudicated delinquent for
theft of a motor vehicle in 1998 , was ineligible to possess a firearm in 2017 even though
the legislature had removed th eft of a motor vehicle from the definition of “crime of
violence” in 2014. 950 N.W.2d at 60-61. The amendment was effective August 1, 2014,
and applied to crimes committed on or after that date. Id. at 61.
The supreme court stated that the effective -date provision for the amendment was
unambiguous as it applied to Tapia: it took effect on August 1, 2014. Id. at 62. The
supreme court further stated that , because Tapia applied for a permit after th at effective
date, Tapia’s application for a permit to carry a firearm had to be reviewed under the
definition of “crime of violence” in effect when he applied. Id. Finally, the supreme court
stated that , because that definition did not include theft of a motor vehicle, Tapia was
entitled to a permit. Id.
If the legislature had removed felony convictions based on the sale of marijuana in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), from the statutory definition of “crime of
violence,” Tapia would support a conclusion that such a conviction could not be the basis
for a charge of unlawful firearm possession under section 624.713. See id. But the
legislature did not do so. 2 “[W]e presume that the Legislature acts with full knowledge of

2 Notably, at the time of the 2023 cannabis amendments, the legislature amended the
definition of “crime of violence” in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, to include carjacking,
but it did not limit the definition’s inclusion of any felony conviction for an offense in
chapter 152. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 20, § 31, at 1213.

7
existing law, including the common law.” State v. Woolridge Carter, 9 N.W.3d 839, 843
(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted) . We therefore presume that the legislature did not
remove Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), from the statutory definition of “crime of
violence” because it intended existing felony convictions for that offense to continue to be
treated as crime s of violence despite its repeal . See Tapia, 950 N.W.2d at 63 (applying
definition of “crime of violence” in effect when Tapia applied for a permit).
Moreover, the legislature did not take any other action that would prevent existing
felony convictions under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), from rendering a person
ineligible to possess a firearm. For example, the legislature did not provide for retroactive
application of the amendment that decriminalized the underlying conduct. Instead, the
legislation eliminating Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), was made effective August 1,
2023, and applied expressly to “crimes committed on or after that date.” 2023 Minn. Laws
ch. 63, art. 4, § 17, at 2831. Thus, the amendment to Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), did
not eliminate or modify Jones’s 2017 felony controlled-substance-sale convictions, and he
continues to have felony convictions for violating that statute.
Nor did the legislature include convictions under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1),
among those that are now eligible for automatic expungement. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.055
(2024 & Supp. 2025) (providing for automatic expungement of certain cannabis offenses).
Although such convictions may be eligible for expungement if certain circumstances exist,
it is undisputed that, at the time of the jury’s guilty verdict in this case, Jones’s convictions
had n ot been expunged. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.06, subd. 3 (Supp. 2025 ) (providing

8
eligibility for expungement if a person was convicted of a marijuana offense under section
152.025 and certain requirements are met).
Jones argues that reading the definition of “crime of violence” to include “not only
felony convictions of the version of chapter 152 in effect at the time of the current firearm
offense but also any version that previously existed” is inconsistent with the legislature’s
“extraordinary lengths” to “not only . . . legalize marijuana but to eliminate—or at the very
least mitigate—the impact of old convictions.” Jones notes that, in addition to eliminating
the crime of fifth -degree marijuana sale under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), the
legislature created an automatic review process for expungement of old convictions by a
newly formed Cannabis Expungement Board. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.06 (2024 & Supp.
2025) (creating board, setting forth eligibility criteria for expungement, and instituting
automatic-review process). The legislature also created a “social equity” category for
applicants seeking licenses to sell marijuana for people who had sale or possession
convictions prior to legalization. See Minn. Stat. § 342.17 (a)(1) (Supp. 2025 ) (“An
applicant qualifies as a social equity applicant if the applicant . . . was found delinquent
for, received a stay of adjudication for, or was convicted of an offense involving the
possession or sale of cannabis or marijuana prior to May 1, 2023.”) Jones argues that these
legislative acts clearly communicate the legislature’s intent to rem ove convictions under
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), from the statutory definition of “crime of violence.”
We disagree. None of those legislative acts plainly establishes its intent that a
person who was convicted of felony marijuana sale under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd.
1(1), is now entitled to possess a firearm. Again, expungement of such a conviction is not

9
automatic, and the social -equity category for licensed marijuana sales does not address
firearm possession. See Minn. Stat. § 609A.055 (providing for automatic expungement of
certain cannabis offenses) ; Minn. Stat. § 342.10 (Supp. 2025) (setting forth the types of
licenses that may be issued).
We repeat: t he legislature knows how to remove an offense from the “crime of
violence” definition in Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 , and is on notice that doing so
removes a bar to legal firearm possession based on a preexisting conviction for that offense.
See Tapia , 950 N.W.2d at 60. The legislature did not do so here. And a lthough the
legislature may have gone to “extraordinary lengths” to eliminate the sale of marijuana as
a violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), it did not take any steps indicating a clear
intent to eliminate the firearm -possession bar that stems from a prior felony conviction
under that statute. In the absence of such intent, we apply the plain language of the
statutory definition of “crime of violence ,” presuming that it manifests legislative intent.
See Burkstrand v. Burkstrand , 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001) (“When the language
of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent and must
be given effect.”).
Finally, Jones argues that his interpretation of the statute follows the canon of
constitutional avoidance and “is the only one that avoids conflicts between section 624.713
and the Second Amendment.” “The constitutional avoidance canon requires that we avoid
constitutional confrontations ‘if it is possible to do so.’” State v. Irby , 848 N.W.2d 515,
522 n.5 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Gaiovnik , 794 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn. 2011) ).
However, “[i]f the Legislature ’s intent is clear from the statute ’s plain and unambiguous

10
language, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning without resorting to
the canons of statutory construction.” State v. Struzyk , 869 N.W.2d 280, 284 -85 (Minn.
2015) (quotation omitted). Because Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5, unambiguously defines
a “crime of violence ” as including a felony conviction for an offense in chapter 152, the
canon of constitutional avoidance is inapplicable. Regardless, as explained in section II of
this opinion, we do not discern a conflict between the Second Amendment and Jones’s
conviction under section 624.713.
In sum, Jones appears to collaterally attack his prior felony convictions under Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1 (1), based on a n amendment that the legislature did not make
retroactively applicable. Although the felony -level offense previously defined at Minn.
Stat. § 152.025, subd. 1(1), no longer exists, Jones’s felony convictions for violating that
statute remain. See Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (defining a “conviction”). And under the
plain language of the statutory definition of “crime of violence,” a felony “conviction” for
an offense under chapter 152 is a crime of violence. Thus, Jones is ineligible to possess a
firearm, and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict. See Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2); Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5.
II.
Jones contends that even if a felony conviction for a violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.025, subd. 1(1), is still included in the statutory definition of crime of violence, Minn.
Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), is unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues, in part, that
because the conduct underlying those convictions is no longer criminal, “section 624.713
impermissibly burdens [his] exercise of his Second Amendment rights.”

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We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Fitch , 884 N.W.2d
367, 373 (Minn. 2016). “We presume statutes to be constitutional and exercise the power
to declare a statute unconstitutional with extreme caution and only when absolutely
necessary.” State v. Craig , 826 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).
Accordingly, “we uphold a statute unless the challenging party demonstrates that the statute
is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. The United States Supreme Court has articulated a two-
step analysis for determining whether a statute regulating firearms violates the Second
Amendment. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2129-30
(2022); see also State v. Jones , 25 N.W.3d 732, 735 -38 (Minn. App. 2025) (applying
Bruen’s two-step analysis to an as -applied challenge). First, we determine whether “the
Second Amendment ’s plain text covers,” and thus “presumptively protects,” “an
individual’s conduct.” Bruen, 132 S. Ct. at 2129 -30. If the conduct is presumptively
protected, we next determine whether the regulating statute “is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation. ” Id. at 2130. To be constitutional, the statute
must be “relevantly similar to laws that our tradition is understood to permit, applying
faithfully the balance struck by the founding generation to modern circumstances.” United
States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, 1898 (2024) (quotations omitted).
In Craig, a pre-Bruen decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minn. Stat.
§ 624.713, subd. 1(2), was not unconstitutional as applied based on a felony conviction for

12
fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance . 826 N.W.2d at 799. And this court
determined—in a post-Bruen decision, State v. Gaal—that Craig is still binding authority.
See 21 N.W.3d 256, 265 (Minn. App. 2025) (stating that there was no reason to depart from
“our usual practice of applying supreme court precedent and leaving to the supreme court
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”) (quotations omitted)).
The Craig court explained that “the scope of the Second Amendment ’s protection
as historically understood did not extend to felons convicted of a crime of violence because
those individuals were traditionally disqualified from possessing a firearm .” 826 N.W.2d
at 797; see also Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 190 (stating that prohibitions on “possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, are presumptively lawful ” (quotations omitted)).
However, the Craig court stated that “a particular felon may assert an as -applied Second
Amendment challenge to a felon-dispossession statute by presenting facts that distinguish
his or her conviction from the convictions of other felons who are categorically unprotected
by the Second Amendment as historically understood.” 826 N.W.2d at 790.
Jones argues that Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), is unconstitutional as applied to
him because his felony convictions for fifth -degree sale of marijuana are sufficiently
distinguishable from the conviction in Craig. Specifically, Jones argues that , because
“[h]is prior felony convictions are no longer crimes, let alone felonies ,” they “do not fall
within the presumptively lawful felon -dispossession [exception].” For the reasons that
follow, we are not persuaded that Jones’s felony marijuana -sale convictions are
distinguishable from the fifth-degree felony controlled-substance conviction in Craig such
that the felon-dispossession exception to the Second Amendment does not apply.

13
In arguing that his conviction s for fifth -degree marijuana sale are sufficiently
distinguishable from the convictions of other felons who are categorically and historically
unprotected by the Second Amendment, Jones focuses on the conduct underlying his
convictions: the sale of a mixture containing marijuana. He reasons that , because the
conduct underlying his conviction s is no longer a crime, his conviction s are sufficiently
distinguished. But Jones’s singular focus on the conduct underlying his conviction s fails
to recognize an important aspect of the Craig court’s reasoning.
In holding that Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2), is constitutional as applied to a
person with a fifth-degree felony conviction for controlle d-substance possession under
chapter 152, the Craig court explained:
We conclude that the scope of the Second
Amendment’s protection as historically understood did not
extend to felons convicted of a crime of violence because those
individuals were traditionally disqualified from possessing a
firearm. Here, Craig has failed to establish that his felony
conviction of fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance
is sufficiently distinguishable from the convictions of felons
categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment as
historically understood. Several reasons support our
conclusion.

First, Craig’s predicate felony conviction of fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance is defined by statute as a
crime of violence. And a substantial nexus exists between
drugs and violence, and that nexus renders a prior felony drug
offender more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.

Second, felons convicted of a crime of violence are more
likely to reoffend and commit further crimes of violence that
threaten the public safety.

Craig relies on Heller to argue that the Second
Amendment elevates above all other interests the right of law-

14
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home. But the language upon which Craig relies assumes
that the individual exercising the right to possess a firearm is
a law-abiding, responsible citizen. A felony conviction of a
crime of violence renders the felon the opposite of the law -
abiding, responsible cit izen who can assert a Second
Amendment right. Because Craig has been convicted of a
crime of violence, he is not the type of law-abiding citizen who
retains the right to possess a handgun in the home for the
purpose of self-defense.

Accordingly, Craig has failed to present facts
distinguishing his conviction from the convictions of other
felons who are categorically unprotected by the Second
Amendment as historically understood. The Second
Amendment as understood at the time of its ratification
excluded those convicted of crimes of violence from exercising
the right to possess a firearm. Craig was convicted of a felony
offense categorized as a crime of violence by statute, and that
categorization is firmly rooted in the historical understanding
of the Second Amendment. Therefore, we conclude that Craig
is categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment and
Minnesota’s ineligible -person statute is constitutional as
applied to him.

Id. at 797-98 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quotations and citations omitted).
Although the conduct underlying Jones’s convictions may no longer be criminal, it
was a felony offense when he engaged in it —twice—in 2017. Under the Craig court’s
reasoning, a conviction stemming from the sale of marijuana when such conduct was
defined as a felony-level offense is comparable to the convictions of other felons who are
categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment as historically understood . In short,
a person who sold a mixture containing marijuana when doing so was still defined as a
felony-level offense is “the opposite of the law-abiding, responsible citizen who can assert
a Second Amendment right.” Id. at 798.

15
In sum, Jones “was convicted of a felony offense categorized as a crime of violence
by statute, and that categorization is firmly rooted in the historical understanding of the
Second Amendment.” Id. Based on Craig, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd.
1(2), does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Jones.
III.

Jones contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
firearm. “ In our review of pre -trial motions to suppress, we review the district court ’s
factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” State v. Zielinski, 10
N.W.3d 1, 13 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).
Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. But police may stop and
frisk a person if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect might be
engaged in criminal activity and they reasonably believe the suspect might be armed and
dangerous. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). In addition, the police may make a
warrantless arrest for criminal conduct based on probable cause . State v. Williams , 794
N.W.2d 867, 87 1 (Minn. 2011). An arrest is supported by probable cause if, under the
totality of the circumstances, a person of ordinary care would objectively believe a crime
has been committed. Id.
“In a criminal case, the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited
to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.” State v. Horst , 880 N.W.2d 24, 36
(Minn. 2016). This rule also applies to the “fruits of an illegal search or seizure.” Id.
(quotation omitted). To be admissible, the evidence must have been obtained by means

16
that were “sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” State v. Olson,
634 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 11,
2001).
We consider four factors when determining whether evidence is fruit of an illegal
search or seizure. Id. These are:
(1) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct; (2) the
presence of intervening circumstances; (3) whether it is likely
that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of
the illegality; and (4) the temporal proximity of the illegality
and the evidence alleged to be the fruit of the illegality.

Id. Although we have stated that no one factor is dispositive, appellate courts have
repeatedly held that the “valid arrest of [a person] for obstructing legal process outweighs
the other factors and remove[s] the taint of the earlier unconstitutional arrest.” Id. at 229-
30.
In denying Jones’s motion to suppress the firearm, the district court found that the
police were investigating Jones and other individuals for loitering and distributing
narcotics. After observing one of the other individuals conduct a suspected hand-to-hand
narcotics transaction during surveillance, the police entered a store to stop and identify
Jones and that other individual. When one of the police officers entered the store, he saw
Jones and that other person at the end of a hallway in the store. The officer saw Jones look
at him, turn, and walk away. The officer walked up to Jones and the other person , put his
hands on their jackets and said, “Both of you are under arrest.” The other person complied,
but Jones tried to grab the officer’s hands, tried to get past him, and continued to move
towards the front of the store. Multiple officers attempted to restrain Jones , telling him

17
that he was under arrest and to stop resisting as Jones dragged them through the store. It
took three to four additional officers nearly two minutes to subdue and arrest Jones. When
the officers searched Jones after arresting him, they found a firearm.
Based on these findings, the district court concluded that, although the police had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity and, therefore, a basis to conduct an
investigative seizure, they did not have probable cause to arrest Jones when they advised
him that he was under arrest. But the district court concluded that Jones’s resistance to
arrest and attempt to get away from the police was an intervening circumstance that purged
the taint of the initial unlawful arrest. The district court therefore denied Jones’s motion
to suppress the firearm.
On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred by concluding that his resistance
was sufficient to purge the taint of the initial unlawful arrest . He argues that all of the
relevant factors weigh in favor of suppression. The state responds that this case is like
Olson and that Jones’s resistance outweighed other factors that might have supported
suppression.
In Olson, we held that “[o]bstructing legal process . . . is not a predictable response
to arrest, and is an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge earlier illegal police
conduct of its primary taint.” Id. at 226. However, we also stated that “[n]o one factor is
dispositive; rather courts must balance all of [the] factors.” Id. at 229. In our de novo
review, we consider all of the relevant factors.
In this case , the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s misconduct —initiating an
arrest and not merely an investigative seizure in the absence of probable cause —and the

18
temporal proximity of the illegality and discovery of the gun support suppression of the
evidence. And because the record does not establish that the police suspected that Jones
was armed and dangerous—which would have justified a pat frisk—we cannot say that it
is likely that the gun would have been discovered in the absence of the illegal arrest.
However, Jones’s resistance strongly supports admission of the evidence.
As the district court found and the record shows, Jones physically resisted several
police officers as they attempted to arrest him and to keep him from leaving the scene .
Jones dragged police officers across the store while attempting to leave and refused to
comply with their commands for approximately two minutes. Consistent with our
approach in Olson, we conclude that Jones’s ultimate arrest for obstructing legal process
outweighed the other factors and removed the taint of the earlier unconstitutional arrest.
Thus, the district did not err by denying the motion to suppress. See id. at 230.
IV.
Jones contends that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard when ruling
on his race-based challenge to the state’s removal of a venire member.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), “the United States Supreme Court held
that the exclusion of prospective jurors through peremptory challenges is subject to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
State v. Harvey, 932 N.W.2d 792, 810 (Minn. 2019). A peremptory challenge that is used
against a prospective juror based on the juror ’s race “denies equal protection both to the
prospective juror, because it denies her the right to participate in jury service, and to the

19
defendant, because it violates his right to be tried by a jury made up of members selected
by nondiscriminatory criteria.” Id. at 810-11 (quotation omitted).
Traditionally, “[t]o determine whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory, we
apply the three-step test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson.” State
v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Minn. 2012) . Under that test, a defendant must first
establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) that a member of a protected
racial group has been peremptorily excluded from the jury and (2) that circumstances of
the case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race.” State v. Blanche , 696
N.W.2d 351, 364-65 (Minn. 2005). Second, if the objecting party establishes a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, “the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike
to come forward with a race -neutral explanation.” Id. at 364 (quotation omitted). Third,
“[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the [district] court must then decide . . . whether
the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful discrimination.” Id. at 364-65 (quotation
omitted).
In State v. Lufkins, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted its concerns with the district
courts’ application of the longstanding Batson test. 963 N.W.2d 205, 214 n.6 (Minn. 2021).
The supreme court explained that Batson “sets a floor, not a ceiling, in the type of
prophylactic action that states can take to eliminate racial bias in the jury selection
process.” Id. The supreme court stated that “[t] he presence of conscious or unconscious
racial discrimination in a jury selection process is an affront to the integrity and dignity of
the court. ” Id. The supreme court therefore directed “ the Supreme Court Advisory
Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure to review the procedure laid out in Minn.

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R. Crim. P. 26.02,” which was then directed at combatting purposeful discrimination, “and
make recommendations to [the supreme] court on appropriate and necessary amendments
to it.” Id.
Rule 26.02, subd. 7, was subsequently amended and became effective March 1,
2025. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure ,
No. ADM10-8049 (Minn. Dec. 20, 2024). The rule now provides the following framework
for assessing an alleged race-based peremptory challenge:
Subd. 7. Objections to Peremptory Challenges.

(1) Rule Purpose. The purpose of this rule is to eliminate the
unfair exclusion of potential jurors based on race, ethnicity, or
gender.

(2) Procedure. Any party, or the court, at any time before the
jury is sworn, may object to a peremptory challenge on the
ground of appearance of bias based on race, ethnicity, or
gender. The objection and all arguments must be made out of
the hearing of all prospective or selected jurors. All
proceedings on the objection must be on the record. The
objection must be determined by the court as promptly as
possible, and must be decided before the jury is sworn. The
court must explain its decision on the record.

(3) Process and Determination.

(a) Upon objection to the exercise of a peremptory
challenge under this rule, the party exercising the peremptory
challenge must articulate the reasons that the peremptory
challenge has been exercised.

(b) The court must give the objecting party an opportunity
to respond.

(c) The court must then evaluate the reasons given to
justify the peremptory challenge based on the totality of the

21
circumstances. In making its determination, the court must
consider the following:
(i) the number and types of questions posed to the
prospective juror, which may include consideration of whether
the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed to
question the prospective juror about the alleged concern or the
types of questions asked about it;
(ii) whether the party exercising the peremptory
challenge asked significantly more questions or different
questions of the potential juror against whom the peremptory
challenge was used in contrast to other jurors;
(iii) whether other prospective jurors provided similar
answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by
that party;
(iv) [whether] the reason articulated by the party is
commonly associated with the disproportionate exclusion of a
particular race, ethnicity, or gender, such as:
(a) having prior contact with or a distrust of law
enforcement;
(b) living in a high-crime area;
(c) not being a native English speaker; or
(d) having a close relationship with people who
have been stopped, arrested, charged, or convicted of a
crime; and
(v) whether the party has used peremptory challenges
disproportionately against a particular race, ethnicity, or
gender in the present case or in past cases.

The court may consider other circumstances it deems
relevant in evaluating the reasons given to justify the
peremptory challenge.

(d) If the court determines that race, ethnicity, or gender
could reasonably be viewed as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge, then the court must sustain the objection
and deny the peremptory challenge.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7 (emphasis added).
“Because the existence of racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge
is a factual determination, we give great deference to the district court ’s ruling and will

22
uphold the ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. ” State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 355
(Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “But when a district court’s finding or analysis is based
on the wrong legal standard, we examine the record without deferring to the district court’s
analysis.” Lufkins, 963 N.W.2d at 213.
In this case, the parties agree that Jones’s trial occurred after rule 26.02 was
amended, that the new rule was applicable, and that the district court failed to apply the
new rule. As the state notes, “[i]t is clear from the record that . . . neither the court nor the
parties mentioned the new rule” and , “[b]ecause the new rule was in effect at the time of
the trial, the State agrees the district court erred by not applying it.” The state
acknowledges, and we agree, that the district court did not satisfy the third step of the new
rule “because the court did not indicate that it conducted a totality of the circumstances
analysis, considered the enumerated factors, or determined whether race could reasonably
be viewed a s a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Quotation omitted.)
Because the district court applied the wrong legal standard, we review the district court’s
ruling without deferring to its analysis. See id.
In explaining the contested peremptory challenge, the prosecutor stated:
I struck [the venire member] because she stated during
questioning that in terms of her prior cases back in 1998, 1997
for drug sale in the first degree and felon in possession, that she
was disappointed in the process. She was young. Felt nothing
was explained well. And in hindsight, she probably would not
have taken the plea.

When Your Honor asked if she could be fair and
impartial, she hesitated. She has strong feelings about not
being advised and counseled properly on her cases from 1998
and 1997.

23

Given the case that we are here today for . . . Mr. Jones
and given his -- his right and his choice to proceed without
counsel, I felt that her strong feelings about not being properly
advised, not being counseled properly, and her hesitancy when
asked if she could be fair and impartial gave rise to the reason
that I struck her.

The district court had questioned the venire member regarding the circumstances
that the state cited as the basis for its peremptory strike: the venire member’s belief that
she did not receive adequate explanations or advi ce from her attorney when she was
charged with and convicted of narcotics and weapons offenses at the age of 17, pleaded
guilty, and served time at a Minnesota Correctional Facility. The district court asked the
venire member about that experience and whether anything about it would influence her
decision if selected as a juror in the case as follows:
THE COURT: Extended juvenile jurisdiction. There you go.
This is a very long time ago. You were very young. So you
went through it. You know, you went through some court
proceedings. You interacted with law enforcement officers, I
assume?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah.

THE COURT: Do you have any feelings -- strong feelings one
way or another -- about the incident itself?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, no. Not about the process or,
you know, just what I went through. Learned a lot. But I guess
what I could say is that I -- I was hanging around the wrong
people and would not hang out with those people again if I
could change it.

THE COURT: Okay. So, I mean, those are very unpleasant
circumstances for you. That’s an understatement, I recognize
that. And it’s -- again, a lot of time has passed, and you gain
wisdom from the incident itself and from the experience.

24

But, again, the same question I’m going to ask
everybody is anything about that incident -- the process; your
treatment within the system; your interactions with the various
players, so to speak, in the system, from law enforcement up to
the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel, if any -- anything about
that that you would take into this trial for any reason?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you think that you -- I think similar
question I asked [another juror], you think you can come into
this with a clean slate? In other words, assuming Mr. Jones is
incident -- is innocent, sorry, and holding the State to its burden
of proof?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I think I could.

THE COURT: Okay. You hesitate. You -- you seem --

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No, I just, I guess, you know, the
experience I went through is, you know, probably totally
different than anybody else. But I don’t know. I just -- the
process itself, I was disappointed because I was so young. And
I don’t think things were clearly explained to me the way they
were.

And I think if I were to change that, I would probably
have -- would have probably had more of an advocate or
somebody to kind of explain the process to me. And I probably
wouldn’t have taken the plea -- plea bargain.

THE COURT: Okay. Did you have a lawyer representing you
back then?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Did I have anybody representing
me?

THE COURT: A lawyer, yeah.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yes, I did.

25
THE COURT: Okay. So I’ve introduced the parties here,
right? Mr. Jones is representing himself, but I do have two
lawyers that are going to be participating in the trial. Advisory
counsel, the prosecutor.

Is there anything about -- given the regret that you’ve
expressed, is there anything about your feelings that you would
bring into this trial and take out, so to speak -- and I realize --
kind of jump to conclusions here. But I do need to make a clear
record.

Anything about the feelings that you have about perhaps
not being advised sufficiently, not being counselled properly,
that you would bring into this trial against the lawyers that are
participating here?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Oh, no.

THE COURT: Okay. You seem sure of that, right?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah.

THE COURT: So having established that, is there anything
else that you would bring into this trial from that incident?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No.

THE COURT: You seem more sure now.

PROSPECTIVE JUROR: Yeah, no, no. I . . . think just the --
the process I went through, like I said, it was different and
being so young. So I would not, I guess, you know, hold those
feelings against what is going on with this case.

In rejecting Jones’s Batson challenge, the district court indicated that the reasons
offered by the state had “nothing to do with the race of the [venire member] and more to
do with her experience in the past in the system and the particulars of this case.”
Jones argues that the district court was required to consider the mandatory factors
listed in the new peremptory-strike rule, and that it therefore should have considered “the

26
fact that the prosecutor did not ask any follow -up questions about [ the venire member’s]
experience and ability to remain impartial,” whether the prosecutor’s explanation “is
commonly associated with the disproportionate exclusion of a particular race” such as
“having a close relationship with people who have been stopped, arr ested, charged, or
convicted of a crime,” and whether the prosecutor used peremptory challenges
“disproportionately against a particular race.” Jones also argues that “a pattern had
emerged of the prosecutor eliminating Black prospective jurors,” noting that the challenged
venire member was one of three Black venire members and that the district court granted
the state’s motion to strike one of the other two Black venire members for cause.
Finally, Jones argues that he has demonstrated, at the very least, that race could
reasonably be viewed as a factor in the prosecutor’s decision to strike the venire member,
arguing:
[T]he experience of being treated unfairly by the criminal
justice system is uncontroversially associated with race. If
prosecutors can exclude potential jurors because of a bad
experience with the criminal justice system —an experience
that they, under oa th, state that they are able to set aside to
render an unbiased verdict —then the supreme court’s attempt
to modify the Batson process to get at implicit bias will be
toothless.

Jones’s argument is compelling. However, our decision must be based on the
totality of the circumstances. Indeed, the supreme court’s order adopting the new
peremptory-challenge rule noted that a minority of the Advisory Committee requested that
reasons commonly associated with the disproportionate exclusion of a particular race , as
set forth in subdivisions 7(3)(c)(iv), be deemed presumptively invalid “because they are

27
frequently used as pretext for race -based peremptory challenges” and that during the
ensuing public comment period, the Office of the Minnesota Appellate Public Defender
made the same request. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure, No. ADM10-8049, at 2 (Minn. Dec. 20, 2024). The supreme court
rejected that request, concluding “that a less categorical approach would allow the district
court to weigh all relevant arguments and circumstances when coming to its decision.” Id.
at 2 -3. Thus, a lthough the factor in subdivision 7(3)(c)(iv) may favor Jones, it is not
dispositive.
In our de novo totality -of-the-circumstances analysis under the new preemptory -
challenge rule, we have considered that the entire venire panel was questioned as a group,
that all of the venire members were generally asked the same questions with similar follow-
up questions, that the challenged venire member was asked the same questions as the other
venire members, that the venire member’s strong feelings about not being properly advised
in a prior criminal case were apparent, that the venire member ultimately assured the
district court that her experience would not affect her decision if selected as a juror, and
that although the state excused another Black venire member, it did so for cause. Based on
all of the circumstances, we cannot say that “race, ethnicity, or gender could reasonably be
viewed as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd.
7(3)(d). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by rejecting Jones’s Batson
challenge. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 7(3)(c), (d).
However, we remind the district court that it must apply the new peremptory-
challenge rule and comply with its requirements. If the district court fails to do so, this

28
court will not defer to its analysis on a Batson ruling, and the district court risks reversal
and a remand for a new trial.
V.

Jones raises ten issues in a supplemental pro se brief, some of which include
multiple assertions of error. When considering pro se arguments on appeal, several
principles govern our review. Courts have a duty to reasonably accommodate pro se
litigants, so long as there is no prejudice to the adverse party. Kasson State Bank v.
Haugen, 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn. App. 1987). But “[a]lthough some accommodations
may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants
are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.”
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
“Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or
citation to legal authority are forfeited.” State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). “Such arguments will not [be] considered unless prejudicial
error is obvious on mere inspection.” Id. at 650-51. In addition, we do not presume error
on appeal, and “the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Midway
Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975) (quotation omitted).
In his supplemental pro se brief, Jones asserts that reversal is warranted for the
following reasons: (1) his initial unlawful seizure required suppression of the firearm; (2)
the officers provoked his flight, and the flight therefore could not be an intervening
circumstance; (3) he was denied the right to present a complete defense and confront a
witness; (4) a juror had prejudicial contact with a state witness, a juror made racially biased

29
comments about Jones being “lawless,” and the state’s exercise of the peremptory
challenge was racially biased ; (5) “the seizure, use of force, and resistance theory were
unlawful as a matter of law” ; (6) the amelioration doctrine and Bruen preclude the use of
Jones’s prior felony convictions of fifth-degree sale of marijuana as a predicate felony for
his conviction; (7) he was denied his right to a speedy trial ; (8) his repeated prosecution
violates double jeopardy ; (9) the district court was not impartial because the judge
repeatedly interrupted him while he was cross-examining state witnesses; and (10) he was
denied a probable -cause hearing, the district court failed to resolve his jurisdictional
challenge, and he was denied access to legal materials.
Many of these issues are duplicative of arguments raised in Jones’s principal brief.
As to those issues, we have already determined that relief is not warranted, and Jones’s
arguments in his pro se brief do not persuade us otherwise. See Midway Ctr. Assocs., 237
N.W.2d at 78.
As to the remaining issues, Jones has not shown that any of the alleged errors
necessitates reversal. For example, Jones does not explain why the alleged violation of his
right to present a complete defense was not harmless. See State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114,
123 (Minn. 2024) (stating that even “if a [district] court’s evidentiary ruling is determined
to be erroneous, and the error reaches the level of a constitutional error, such as denying
the defendant the right to present a defense, our standard of review is whether the exclusion
of evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)).
Jones also does not explain how the underlying prosecution resulted in a double -
jeopardy violation, and prejudicial error is not obvious on mere inspection. That claim is

30
therefore forfeited. See Montano, 956 N.W.2d at 650-51. And Jones’s assertion that the
district court was biased and his supporting examples do not overcome the presumption
“that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly. ” State v. Romine , 757
N.W.2d 884, 89 4 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 17,
2009). Our review of the record reveals no judicial bias.
As to Jones’s argument that his right to speedy trial was violated, we have applied
the four-factor balancing test that is used to assess such a claim, as set forth by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Given the short
length of the delay, which was prompted by Jones’s request for an evidentiary hearing on
his suppression motion, we conclude that his right to speedy trial was not violated. See
State v. Hahn , 799 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[W]hen the overall delay in
bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant ’s actions, there is no speedy trial
violation.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011).
Finally, Jones ’s assertions that he was denied a probable -cause hearing, that the
district court failed to address his jurisdictional challenge, and that he was forced to go to
trial without adequate legal materials are similarly unpersuasive . The record shows that
the district court found probable cause for the charged offense based on the complaint. The
record also shows that the district court addressed Jones’s jurisdictional challenges in its
pretrial order denying Jones’s motion to suppress the firearm. As to the assertion that Jones
was forced to proceed without legal materials at trial , Jones does not ex plain how the
absence of any legal materials prejudiced him when he had advisory counsel available to
assist him throughout the trial.

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In sum, Jones fails to persuade us that any of the claims in his pro se brief warrant
a new trial.
Affirmed.