Andrew Schaffhausen, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1530

Andrew Schaffhausen,
Relator,

vs.

Barnett Chrysler-Plymouth,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Rasmusson, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 51665390-3

Andrew Schaffhausen, Minneapolis, Minnesota (self-represented relator)

Barnett Chrysler-Plymouth, White Bear Lake, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Melannie M. Markham, Keri A. Phillips, Katrina Gulstad, Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent
department)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Rasmusson, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
RASMUSSON, Judge
Relator-employee challenges the determination of an unemployment-law judge
(ULJ) that he is ineligible for unemployment benefits, arguing that the ULJ erred by
concluding that his absences constituted employment misconduct and by failing to support
the decision with substantial evidence. We affirm.
FACTS
In October 2024, relator-employee Andrew Schaffhausen began working for
respondent-employer Barnett Chrysler-Plymouth (BCP) as a full-time service advisor. His
duties included answering customer calls, writing repair orders, submitting paperwork for
insurance claims, and providing customer service.
BCP’s employee handbook included an absenteeism policy under which employees
were expected to report for work as scheduled and to request and receive advance approval
from their supervisor for any anticipated absence. Before his employment began,
Schaffhausen received a copy of BCP’s employee handbook and signed paperwork
confirming that he read it.
In the five months that Schaffhausen worked at BCP, he was absent from, tardy for,
or left early from 12 shifts. For most of these absences, Schaffhausen either failed to notify
BCP before his scheduled shift or notified his direct supervisor immediately before his
scheduled start time.
Schaffhausen arrived at work late on November 5, 2024, after attempting to vote.
He had not arranged to be late or given advance notice to his direct supervisor about the
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possibility of being late that morning. On various days between December 2024 and March
2025, Schaffhausen either arrived late or left early to care for his children. These
unapproved absences stemmed from illnesses, daycare closures, or scheduled doctor’s
appointments. On March 24, 2025, Schaffhausen was absent from work the entire day
without approval due to his own doctor’s appointment. Although Schaffhausen
acknowledged that he could have notified BCP of the scheduled doctor’s appointments and
arranged for time off, he did not do so. On March 28, Schaffhausen left work early to
attend to his wife’s ailing grandmother. BCP discharged Schaffhausen on March 31.
Schaffhausen applied for unemployment benefits, but respondent Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) issued a determination that he was
ineligible for benefits because the reason for his discharge was employment misconduct.
Schaffhausen appealed DEED’s determination of ineligibility. A ULJ held a
hearing on the issue of whether Schaffhausen was discharged for employment misconduct.
At the hearing, the ULJ heard testimony from Schaffhausen, BCP’s human-resources
manager, and Schaffhausen’s direct supervisor. The ULJ admitted six exhibits into
evidence.
The ULJ determined that Schaffhausen had been discharged for employment
misconduct and, therefore, was ineligible for unemployment benefits. The ULJ reasoned
that “Schaffhausen’s failure to plan and his last-minute communication showed
indifference to the employer’s reasonable standards. The violation was serious because the
employer had little chance to plan for Schaffhausen’s absences and tardy arrivals.”
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Schaffhausen requested reconsideration of the ULJ’s decision, arguing that he
“showed up and worked hard,” any absenteeism or tardiness was attributable to
“unavoidable attendance issues,” and the employer had provided insufficient evidence of
his absenteeism or tardiness. In an order of affirmation, the ULJ upheld Schaffhausen’s
disqualification from receiving unemployment benefits. The ULJ explained that
Schaffhausen had “provided no new information or arguments that would likely change
the outcome or show the testimony from the hearing was false or likely false.” The ULJ
further explained that BCP “discharged Schaffhausen because of his attendance record—
and not work performance.” The ULJ affirmed that “Schaffhausen failed to plan and
communicated poorly, resulting in unexpected absences and tardy arrivals” such that “[h]is
conduct was indifferent and impacted the workplace” and constituted employment
misconduct.
This certiorari appeal follows.
DECISION
When a ULJ has denied an applicant unemployment benefits, this court—on
review—may affirm the decision, remand it for further proceedings, or reverse or modify
it “if the substantial rights of the [relator] may have been prejudiced because the findings,
inferences, conclusion, or decision” were, as relevant here, unsupported by substantial
evidence, affected by an error of law, or otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2024).
An applicant is ineligible for unemployment benefits if they are discharged due to
employment misconduct. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (2024). “Employment
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misconduct” is defined as “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct . . . that is a
serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to reasonably
expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2024). The statutory
definition of employment misconduct specifically exempts certain conduct and
circumstances. See id., subd. 6(b) (2024) (exempting, for example, “absence, with proper
notice to the employer, in order to provide necessary care because of the illness, injury, or
disability of an immediate family member of the applicant”).
In this case, the ULJ determined that BCP discharged Schaffhausen due to
employment misconduct and that Schaffhausen was, therefore, ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Schaffhausen challenges the ULJ’s decision, and he articulates
the question on appeal as “[w]hether the employer met its burden of proving that the
applicant committed employment misconduct under Minn. Stat. § 268.095 based on
alleged tardiness.”1 However, “[a]n applicant’s entitlement to unemployment benefits
must be determined based upon that information available without regard to a burden of
proof.” Minn. Stat. § 268.069, subd. 2 (2024). We thus understand Schaffhausen to argue
that the ULJ erred in concluding that his conduct constituted employment misconduct and
that this conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence.

1 In other sections of his brief, Schaffhausen cites Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1(d) (2024),
for the proposition that “[t]he employer bears the burden of proving that the applicant is
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.” There is no subparagraph (d) under
subdivision 1 of Minnesota Statutes section 268.105, and no other provision within the
cited statute supports that proposition.
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“Whether an employee engaged in conduct that disqualifies the employee from
unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law.” Stagg v. Vintage Place Inc.,
796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted). “Determining whether a particular
act constitutes disqualifying misconduct is a question of law that [appellate courts] review
de novo.” Id. Whether the employee committed a particular act is a question of fact. See
id. Appellate courts review the ULJ’s “factual findings in the light most favorable to the
decision and should not disturb those findings as long as there is evidence in the record that
reasonably tends to sustain them.” Id. (quotation omitted).
A. Schaffhausen’s absenteeism and tardiness constituted employment
misconduct.
Schaffhausen first argues that the ULJ erred in determining that his absenteeism and
tardiness constituted employment misconduct.
Whether an applicant’s absenteeism and tardiness constitute employment
misconduct is a case-specific inquiry. Id. at 316; see also Ress v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., Inc.,
448 N.W.2d 519, 524 (Minn. 1989) (listing examples of employment misconduct). But
“[a]s a general rule, refusing to abide by an employer’s reasonable policies and requests
amounts to disqualifying misconduct.” Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801,
804 (Minn. 2002). For example, the supreme court has held that an employee’s absences
constituted employment misconduct where the employer “had an absenteeism and
tardiness policy of which [the employee] was aware” and where the employee “was aware
that he was expected to follow that policy.” Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 317.
Here, like in Stagg, BCP had a policy that required employees to report for work as
scheduled and to request and receive advance approval from their supervisor for any
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anticipated absence. As the ULJ noted, “[i]f employees knew about scheduling conflicts
in advance or wanted to pre-arrange time off, BCP’s attendance policy allowed requests
for excused absences from work.” The ULJ found that this policy was reasonable and that
“Schaffhausen knew BCP’s attendance practices.” The ULJ determined that, therefore,
“Schaffhausen’s failure to plan and his last-minute communication showed indifference to
the employer’s reasonable standards. The violation was serious because the employer had
little chance to plan for Schaffhausen’s absences and tardy arrivals.”
Schaffhausen does not argue that any of the statutory exemptions apply here.
Instead, he relies on Stagg for the proposition that “[m]inor or isolated tardiness,
particularly where notice is given, does not constitute misconduct.” This argument fails
for two reasons. First, Stagg does not support this proposition. There, the supreme court
concluded that an employee was discharged for employment misconduct where the
employer “had an absenteeism and tardiness policy of which [the employee] was aware,”
the employee “was aware that he was expected to follow that policy,” and the employee
“failed to follow that policy on at least five occasions.” Id. The court’s opinion says
nothing about “minor or isolated tardiness.” Second, even if Stagg supported this
proposition, the ULJ found that Schaffhausen was absent, tardy, or left work early 12 times
within the course of five months. To the extent Schaffhausen means to argue that his
absenteeism and tardiness was “minor or isolated” such that it did not constitute
employment misconduct, he offers no authority supporting such a conclusion, and the
record does not support it. Accordingly, we conclude that the ULJ did not err in
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determining that Schaffhausen’s absenteeism and tardiness constituted employment
misconduct.
B. The ULJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Schaffhausen next argues that the ULJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence.
“[S]ubstantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers
Cmty. Action, Inc. , 917 N.W.2d 813, 816 n.4 (Minn. App. 2018) (emphasis omitted)
(quotation omitted). When the record contains conflicting evidence, we must defer to the
ULJ’s weighing of that evidence and “may not weigh [the] evidence on review.”
Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn. App. 1995). We
review “factual findings in the light most favorable to the decision.” Dourney v. CMAK
Corp., 796 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. App. 2011).
“When the credibility of a witness . . . has a significant effect on the outcome of a
decision, the [ULJ] must set out the reason for crediting or discrediting [the witness’s]
testimony.” Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2024). We must then defer to the ULJ’s
credibility determinations. Dourney, 796 N.W.2d at 539.
Much of the evidence in the record is consistent with the ULJ’s decision. The ULJ
found that Schaffhausen’s direct supervisor’s testimony was credible and that
Schaffhausen’s testimony about the unavoidability of his absences or tardy arrivals was
not credible. And, as required by statute, the ULJ explained the reasons for these credibility
determinations. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a). The ULJ reasoned that
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Schaffhausen’s direct supervisor “was clear and direct about the reasons for Schaffhausen’s
discharge” and “was also consistent with the employer’s written submissions” to DEED,
“indicating that Schaffhausen was discharged for attendance problems.” The ULJ credited
the direct supervisor with providing “first-hand information about texting with
Schaffhausen when Schaffhausen was absent or late” and describing “reasonable
workplace practices.” In contrast, the ULJ found Schaffhausen’s “testimony about his
absences or tardy arrivals being [un]avoidable” 2 to be “not credible” because it was
“inconsistent with the other specific information he provided about why he missed work.”
Given that the ULJ provided the reasons for these credibility determinations, we defer to
them. Dourney, 796 N.W.2d at 539. And because the witness testimony supports the
ULJ’s decision, we conclude that the ULJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. See Gonzalez Diaz, 917 N.W.2d at 816 n.4.3
Affirmed.

2 Based on Schaffhausen’s testimony during the hearing and the arguments he presents to
our court, it is clear that the ULJ intended to state “unavoidable” rather than “avoidable.”

3 Schaffhausen notes that “[o]ne date cited by the employer involved [his] lawful right to
vote.” He argues that “[t]his date cannot legally support a misconduct finding” because
“Minnesota law expressly protects employees from penalty or discipline for time taken to
vote.”
Minnesota employees have “the right to be absent from work for the time necessary
to appear at the employee’s polling place, cast a ballot, and return to work on the day of
that election . . . without penalty . . . because of the absence.” Minn. Stat. § 204C.04,
subd. 1 (2024). The statutory language does not state whether an employee needs to give
their employer notice of their intent to exercise this right, and no Minnesota appellate court
has had the occasion to decide this issue. But, even assuming that the ULJ erred by
including Schaffhausen’s November 5 absence in its employment-misconduct
determination, the other dates discussed in the ULJ’s order provide substantial evidence to
support the determination.