In the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1574

In the Marriage of:

Stanislav Eduardovich Manchik, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

April Jeane Manchik,
Respondent,

County of Wright,
Intervenor.

Filed May 11, 2026
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Wright County District Court
File No. 86-FA-17-5052

Jack W. Hicks, Nicole Whitlock, Hellmuth & Johnson, PLLC, Edina, Minnesota (for
appellant)

April Jeane Manchik, Hanover, Minnesota (self-represented respondent)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M. , Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge;
and Smith, John, Judge.
∗

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
On appeal from the district court’s order denying his motion to modify parenting
time, appellant-father Stanislav Eduardovich Manchik argues that the district court abused
its discretion by (a) failing to maximize his parenting time and (b) failing to conduct an
adequate best-interests analysis. We affirm.
FACTS
Father challenges the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order
(the order) denying his motion to modify parenting time. Respondent -mother April Jeane
Manchik filed no brief on appeal, and this court ordered that the case be determined on the
merits as provided in Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 142.03.
In January 2018, the district court entered a stipulated judgment and decree of
marriage dissolution (J&D). The J&D awarded the parties joint legal and joint physical
custody of their two minor children. Father received parenting time every other weekend
and Wednesday overnights. He also received Monday overnights during the summer. The
parties stipulated that, when the youngest child began kindergarten in fall 2021, either party
could bring a motion for de novo review to increase parenting time under the best-interests
standard.
In February 2021, father moved to modify the arrangement to equal parenting time
during both the summer and the school year. The court granted the motion with respect to
summer parenting time but denied it for the school year, finding that the motion was “not
ripe” and that father had failed to address the best-interests factors. In September 2021,
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father again moved to modify, seeking equal parenting time during the school year. The
district court denied the motion.
In August 2024, mother filed a motion for contempt, seeking compensatory
parenting time to make up for father’s violations of parenting-time provisions in the J&D.
Father brought a third motion to modify parenting time to equal parenting time, requesting
a week-on/week-off schedule. Each party also sought conduct-based attorney fees from the
other. The district court held motion hearings across September and October 2024. Finally,
the district court filed the order denying father’s motion to modify parenting time.1
Father appeals.
DECISION
District courts have broad discretion when deciding parenting time. Hansen v.
Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). “A district court abuses its discretion by
making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or
delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Bender v. Bernhard, 971
N.W.2d 257, 262 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). There is “scant if any room for an
appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000).
“A district court’s findings of fact underlying a parenting- time decision will be
upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.” Dahl v. Dahl, 765 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Minn. App.

1 The order also denied mother’s motion for contempt, denied father’s motion for attorney
fees, and granted in part mother’s motion for attorney fees. The district court later filed an
order amending the findings and denying mother’s motion for attorney fees. The orders
regarding contempt and attorney fees are not challenged on appeal.
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2009). “A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. Appellate
courts must defer to a district court’s credibility determinations. Id. And appellate courts
cannot reweigh the evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in new fact-finding.
In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see also Ewald
v. Nedrebo, 999 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Minn. App. 2023) (citing Kenney in family-law appeal),
rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2024). In reviewing the district court’s findings, appellate
courts must view the evidence in a light favorable to the findings. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221.
The district court shall modify an order granting parenting time if modification
“would serve the best interests of the child” and “would not change the child ’s primary
residence.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5(b) (2024). “In evaluating the best interests of
the child for purposes of determining issues of custody and parenting time, the court must
consider and evaluate all relevant factors,” including 12 factors that are specifically
outlined in the statute. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a) (2024). The district court need not
make detailed findings on the best-interests factors, as long as it “made sufficient findings
on the issue of best interests and . . . the record adequately supports those findings.” Olson
v. Olson, 534 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1995).
Father argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
modify parenting time by failing to maximize his parenting time and failing to conduct an
adequate best-interests analysis. We address each argument in turn.
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Maximizing Parenting Time
Father appears to argue that the district court misapplied the law because factor (10)
in section 518.17, subdivision 1(a), when read together with section 518.17,
subdivision 1(b)(3) (2024), shows a legislative preference for maximizing parenting time.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. Cocchiarella v.
Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). “When the language of a statute is susceptible
to only one reasonable interpretation, it is unambiguous and [courts] must apply its plain
meaning.” Reetz v. City of St. Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238, 245 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted).
Section 518.17 provides that “the court must consider and evaluate all relevant
factors, including . . . (10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting time with both
parents and the detriment to the child in limiting parenting time with either parent.” Minn.
Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a). Section 518.17 further provides that “[t]he court shall consider
both parents as having the capacity to develop and sustain nurturing relationships with their
children unless there are substantial reasons to believe otherwise.” Id., subd. 1(b)(3).
Father argues that together these two provisions require the district court to
maximize his parenting time. As an initial matter, it appears that t his argument may not
properly be before us because it was not raised in father’s submissions to the district court,
the district court did not mention it in the order, and father did not supply transcripts that
would show whether it was raised orally in the motion hearing s. See Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (providing that issues generally cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal). Regardless, the plain language of these provisions creates no
preference for maximizing both parents’ time.
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Factor (10) requires the district court to weigh the benefits of maximizing parenting
time and the detriments of limiting one parent’s time. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(10).
Moreover, another provision in section 518.17 explicitly states that the district court “may
not use one factor to the exclusion of all others.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1) (2024). And the phrase
“consider both parents as having the capacity to develop and sustain nurturing relationships
with their children” in section 518.17, subdivision 1(b)(3), is not the same as requiring the
court to maximize both parents’ time. By their plain language, the provisions in section
518.17 do not create any requirement that the district court maximize a parent’s parenting
time.
The paramount consideration in determining parenting time is “the welfare and best
interests of the children.” Petersen v. Petersen, 206 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Minn. 1973)
(addressing custody). And, as the district court noted here, father’s proposed arrangement
would decrease the children’s time with mother and increase their time with father’s new
partner—resulting in an overall decrease in time spent with a parent.
For these reasons, in rejecting equal parenting time, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by failing to maximize father’s parenting time.
Best-Interests Analysis
Father argues that the district court erred in its best-interests analysis by “failing to
conduct an independent analysis and determining that a modification of parenting time was
in the children’s best interests.”
In the order, the district court recounted in detail the parties’ arguments for each of
the 12 statutory best-interests factors. But it did not make findings specific to each factor.
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Instead, it found facts that were significant to its analysis. First, the district court found that
father was “not spending all his parenting time with the children and they are, instead,
spending time with a non-parent.” Next, the district court expressed concern about the
parties’ “acrimony and distrust” and their ability to work together in establishing a new
parenting schedule. Finally, the district court found credible mother’s allegations that she
was sometimes unable to communicate with the children during father’s parenting time.
The district court stated that it “weighed all factors” and found that “modification of
parenting time would not be in the children’s best interests.” The district court did not
explicitly state which factors weighed against modification in its analysis, but such a
detailed explanation is not required. See Olson, 534 N.W.2d at 550.
Father argues that the district court focused too heavily on the fact that he was not
spending all his parenting time with the children. But this was not the only consideration
that the district court relied upon. It also considered both parties’ arguments for each of the
enumerated best-interests factors, its concern about the parties’ ability to coordinate a new
schedule, and the fact that mother was at times unable to reach the children. Father has not
demonstrated that this one fact was improperly weighed more heavily than others.
Father also appears to argue that this finding—that he was not spending all his
parenting time with the children—is erroneous. Mother filed an affidavit stating that father
would leave the children with grandparents, be home for only part of his weekends, and
leave the children with nonparents for entire weekends. She attached a text message
supporting an instance of this happening. Mother also described a time when father let his
new partner take the children out-of-state for a weekend without notifying mother. Father
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acknowledged letting the children stay with grandparents once but asserts that mother was
notified. In reviewing factual findings, we do not reconcile conflicting evidence, Kenney,
963 N.W2d at 222, and we defer to a district court’s credibility determinations, Vangness,
607 N.W.2d at 472. The district court’s decision to credit mother’s affidavit was not clearly
erroneous.
Father also argues that “[t]he district court did not address the children’s needs and
development” under factor (1) of the best-interests analysis. In the order, the district court
focused on the time that the children would spend with the parents under father’s proposed
arrangement and the ability of the children to communicate with mother during father’s
time. These considerations sufficiently address the “child[ren]’s physical, emotional,
cultural, spiritual, and other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
child[ren]’s needs and development” under factor (1). Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1).
And we must defer to the district court’s credibility findings, see Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at
472, and cannot reweigh the evidence regarding this factor, see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at
221.
Father also argues that the district court failed to address the parties’ abilities to
cooperate in the rearing of the children and father’s willingness to use other methods to
resolve disputes under factor (12). In the order, the district court found credible mother’s
allegations that father left the children with nonparents and prevented communication with
mother. These findings sufficiently address “the willingness and ability of parents to
cooperate in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information and minimize
exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to utilize methods for resolving disputes
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regarding any major decision concerning the life of the child” under factor (12). Minn. Stat.
§ 518.17, subd. 1(a)(12). And, again, we must defer to the district court’s credibility
findings, see Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472, and cannot reweigh the evidence for this factor,
see Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221.
The remainder of father’s arguments ask us to reweigh the evidence under the best-
interests factors or to reject the district court’s credibility determinations. That is not this
court’s role. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221; Vangness, 607 N.W.2d at 472. And we “need
not go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness
of the findings of the trial court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted).
For these reasons, father has failed to show that the district court erred in its best-
interests analysis. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying father’s motion
to modify parenting time.
Affirmed.