

*This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).*

**STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1585**

Marcus Anthony Baker, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

**Filed June 8, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge**

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-19-8403

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Rasmusson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

In this appeal from the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, appellant argues: (1) the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, (2) the postconviction court abused its discretion

by concluding his remaining claims are procedurally barred, and (3) the interests of justice require that this court grant appellant a new trial. We affirm.

FACTS

In November 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Marcus Anthony Baker with one count of second-degree murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.19, subdivision 1(1) (2018), and one count of attempted second-degree murder in violation of Minnesota Statutes sections 609.19, subdivision 1(1), .17, subdivision 1 (2018). The state later amended the charges to include accomplice liability for both murder and attempted murder.

The following summarizes the evidence presented at trial and the procedural background relevant to the issues raised in this appeal. A more detailed description of the facts is set forth in our earlier opinion following Baker's direct appeal. *State v. Baker*, No. A20-1607, 2022 WL 663355, at *1 (Minn. App. Mar. 7, 2022), *rev. denied* (Minn. May 31, 2022) (*Baker I*).

The Circumstances Leading to Baker's Arrest

On October 27, 2019, around 11:23 p.m., law enforcement responded to calls about a shooting near the intersection of Kent Street and Central Avenue in St. Paul. *Id.* at *1. When law enforcement arrived, they discovered a vehicle stopped in the nearby intersection of Dale Street and St. Anthony Avenue. *Id.* Law enforcement found S.J. inside the vehicle and nonresponsive due to a gunshot wound. *Id.* S.J. was transported to a hospital, where he later died. *Id.* At the scene, law enforcement also found a second stopped vehicle. *Id.* W.J. was inside the vehicle. *Id.* W.J. had also been injured in the

shooting but suffered non-life-threatening injuries. *Id.* Police recovered .40-caliber cartridge casings from a nearby area. *Id.* at *8. Police did not find any witnesses at the scene of the shooting other than W.J.

Surveillance videos obtained from a building near Kent Street and Central Avenue revealed that around 11:20 p.m., S.J.'s vehicle was stopped, facing W.J.'s vehicle, in the middle of the street. *Id.* at *1. While the two vehicles waited there, a white van approached, slowed down, and drove away. Believing the occupant of the white van to be the shooter, law enforcement obtained video footage of the white van from the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MNDOT). *Id.* The video footage showed the white van as it headed east on Interstate 94, north on Interstate 35E, and east on highway 36 before exiting the freeway. *Id.* Law enforcement also identified an apartment complex of interest on Geneva Avenue, a few blocks from where the van exited the freeway. *Id.*

Surveillance video from the apartment complex showed that, at around 11:34 p.m., the white van was at the complex. *Id.* The video shows the passenger door opening and an individual wearing a black hooded sweatshirt, grey pants, and lighter-colored shoes exiting the vehicle. *Id.* The video also showed the driver getting out of the vehicle. *Id.* The driver was wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt, dark pants, and brown shoes. *Id.* The footage was not clear enough for law enforcement to definitively identify either of the individuals. A separate camera from the apartment complex showed two individuals in similar clothing walking near the detached parking garages around 11:43 p.m. *Id.* The two individuals entered one of the garages. *Id.* Less than two minutes later, they exited the

garage and left the apartment complex in separate vehicles. *Id.* Law enforcement later learned that the garage was rented by a woman, D.H., with whom Baker has a child. *Id.*

Law enforcement also learned that Brandon Baker (appellant's brother) was the registered owner of a white van.¹ *Id.* at *1. Using license plate recognition software and video from closed-circuit surveillance cameras, law enforcement placed the vehicle at several locations within St. Paul on October 27, as well as at the apartment complex.

On October 30, a St. Paul police officer, who was investigating the October 27 shooting, observed a white van that resembled the description of the white van involved in the shooting. He observed the van while driving from Wisconsin to St. Paul for work. The van was parked at a restaurant in Hudson, Wisconsin. He saw the van again multiple days in a row that same week when he drove to work. On November 6, the officer stopped at the restaurant parking lot and learned that the license plate of the white van parked in Hudson matched the license plate of the white van registered to Brandon. Police later obtained surveillance footage from the restaurant that showed the white van entering the restaurant parking lot on October 28 around 8:44 a.m. In the footage, an individual exited the driver's side and entered a darker colored SUV that pulled up behind the white van. The SUV then left the area.

As part of the investigation, law enforcement also executed a search warrant at Brandon's residence. They found the title for the white van, .40-caliber ammunition, and a loaded magazine. That same day, police executed a search warrant for an address

¹ We refer to Brandon Baker by his first name because he shares a last name with appellant.

associated with Baker. They recovered a grey hooded sweatshirt, black pants, a pair of brown boots, a driver's license photo of Baker, a business card for Baker's business, and a used shooting range target. Later that day, Baker and Brandon were taken into custody following a traffic stop.

Trial and First Appeal

After Baker was charged, the matter proceeded to trial. A jury found Baker guilty of both second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder. Baker challenged his convictions in a direct appeal. He argued the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, certain evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of discretion, and prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial. *Id.* at *1. We affirmed, concluding the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdicts and the other asserted errors were harmless. *Id.* at *6-8.

Postconviction Petition

In October 2024, Baker filed a petition for postconviction relief. He raised several grounds for relief including: (1) newly discovered evidence, (2) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, (3) a *Brady*² violation arising from the district court's refusal to compel disclosure of the identity of a confidential reliable informant, (4) denial of his due process right to adequate notice when the state amended the complaint prior to trial to include aiding-and-abetting liability, (5) denial of his Confrontation Clause rights when the

² Under *Brady v. Maryland*, "suppression by the [s]tate of material evidence favorable to the defendant violates the constitutional guarantee of due process." *Allwine v. State*, 994 N.W.2d 528, 541 (Minn. 2023) (citing *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).

district court permitted an officer to testify at trial about W.J.’s alleged fear of Baker, and (6) that the interests of justice require a new trial. The petition was accompanied by several supporting affidavits.

In July 2025, the postconviction court denied Baker’s petition for postconviction relief. It concluded, in relevant part, that (1) Baker was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence as alleged because the “purported newly-discovered evidence” did not meet the applicable legal standard for a new trial;³ (2) Baker was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel; (3) Baker’s remaining claims were procedurally barred; and (4) the interests of justice did not require an evidentiary hearing or a new trial.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Baker raises several challenges to the denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Baker argues (1) the postconviction court abused its discretion by summarily denying his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, (2) the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that Baker’s remaining claims are procedurally barred and argues that the claims have merit, and (3) the interests of justice require that this court order a new trial.

³ In January 2025, Baker amended his petition to add another newly-discovered-evidence claim based on an affidavit from Brandon. Brandon stated that another person, not Baker, was in the van with him at the time of the October 27 shooting and the other person fired the shots. Baker later withdrew his claim based on Brandon’s affidavit. Brandon had previously entered an *Alford* plea in connection with S.J.’s shooting death.

Baker does not challenge the postconviction court’s rejection of his claim based on newly discovered evidence.

A person convicted of a crime may seek postconviction relief by filing a petition alleging that the conviction “violated the person’s rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2024). The postconviction court must hold a hearing on a timely postconviction petition “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). “In determining whether an evidentiary hearing is required,” the postconviction court must “consider[] the facts alleged in the petition as true and construe[] them in the light most favorable to the petitioner.” *Andersen v. State*, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018). A postconviction court may deny an evidentiary hearing on a claim if it is procedurally barred. *See, e.g., State v. Knaffla*, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (holding “that where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”). If the postconviction court determines that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the court may summarily deny the petition. *See Andersen*, 913 N.W.2d at 422.

We review a summary denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. *Id.* “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” *Id.* (quotation omitted).

I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying Baker’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

Baker first argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He contends that the facts alleged in his petition, taken as true, demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed to call key witnesses and conduct an adequate investigation. He further argues that he was prejudiced as a result. On this basis, he contends that he was also denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel. The state responds that the postconviction court properly denied Baker’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because the challenged decisions constitute unreviewable trial strategy.⁴ Because we agree with the state, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the postconviction court.

As discussed, “[w]e generally review a summary denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion.” *State v. Sardina-Padilla*, 7 N.W.3d 585, 602 (Minn. 2024). “But we review the denial of postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo because such claims involve mixed questions of law and facts.” *Id.*; see also *Opsahl v. State*, 677 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004) (“Because claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact, our review of decisions by the postconviction court is de novo.”). “Although doubts about whether to conduct an

⁴ On appeal, the state also asserts for the first time that Baker’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is *Knaffla*-barred. Because we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining the challenged decisions are unreviewable trial strategy, we need not reach the state’s alternative argument.

evidentiary hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner, a [postconviction] court need not hold a hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.” *Sardina-Padilla*, 7 N.W.3d at 602-03 (quotation omitted).

The right to counsel in criminal trials is guaranteed under both the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. The right to counsel includes “the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” *Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (quotation omitted). When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Minnesota courts apply the two-prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in *Strickland*. *Gates v. State*, 398 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. 1987). To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must “allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence,” would satisfy the two-prong test set forth in *Strickland*. *Chavez-Nelson v. State*, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

Under the *Strickland* test, an appellant must show that (1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” *Strickland*, 466 U.S. at 688; *Gates*, 398 N.W.2d at 561. “We may analyze the *Strickland* requirements in either order and may dispose of a claim on one prong without considering the other.” *Lussier v. State*, 853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn. 2014).

We focus our analysis on the first prong—the “performance” prong—because it is dispositive. “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” *State v. King*, 990 N.W.2d 406, 417 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). Appellant has the

burden to show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. *Pierson v. State*, 637 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Minn. 2002). "That objective standard is defined as 'representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.'" *Opsahl*, 677 N.W.2d at 421 (quoting *State v. Gassler*, 505 N.W.2d 62, 70 (Minn. 1993)).

Baker claims that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because (1) trial counsel's decision to not call potential alibi witnesses was unreasonable, (2) trial counsel's failure to investigate several key pieces of evidence was unreasonable, and (3) appellate counsel's failure to raise ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims was unreasonable. We consider each claim in turn and conclude none merit an evidentiary hearing.

A. Trial counsel's decision not to call potential alibi witnesses is unreviewable trial strategy.

Matters of trial strategy "lie within the discretion of trial counsel and will not be second-guessed by appellate courts." *Leake v. State*, 737 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. 2007); *see also Zumberge v. State*, 937 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn. 2019). Matters of trial strategy include which witnesses to call at trial and what information to present to the jury. *Allwine v. State*, 994 N.W.2d at 538-39. The Minnesota Supreme Court has "cautioned against second-guessing decisions of trial counsel in hindsight simply because of an unfavorable result to a defendant." *Id.* at 538.

In his postconviction petition, Baker alleged that trial counsel's performance was unreasonable because counsel failed to call S.W. and B.W. as alibi witnesses. S.W. is the mother of two of Baker's children, and B.W. is her sister. Baker included affidavits from both S.W. and B.W. with his petition for postconviction relief. In their affidavits, they both state that Baker was with them at S.W.'s home on the night of the October 27 shooting and did not leave the house. The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel's decision not to call these potential alibi witnesses was a matter of unreviewable trial strategy.

The postconviction court's conclusion is supported by the files, record, and proceedings below, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Baker. The files, record, and proceedings below reflect that Baker's counsel investigated and considered the possible alibi testimony of S.W. and B.W. Baker's trial counsel filed a notice of an alibi defense. That notice stated that Baker would call S.W., B.W., and N.H. to testify that Baker was not at the location of the shooting on October 27, 2019. At trial, Baker's counsel decided against calling these potential alibi witnesses.

In his postconviction petition, Baker does not allege any facts that would demonstrate that this decision was not a matter of unreviewable trial strategy or that the decision constituted objectively unreasonable representation. Nor is there any other factual basis upon which to conclude that the decision was not a strategic choice by trial counsel or that the choice did not reflect the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances. *See Swaney v. State*, 882 N.W.2d 207, 220 n.9 (Minn. 2016). We therefore discern no abuse of discretion in the postconviction

court's determination that counsel's decision not to call these potential alibi witnesses was unreviewable trial strategy.

Baker's reliance on federal caselaw to persuade us otherwise is unavailing. For instance, Baker cites to *Chambers v. Armontrout*, 907 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that "failure to interview and failure to call at trial a witness who had material exculpatory evidence is ineffective assistance of counsel." But in *Chambers*, appellant's counsel failed to interview *or* call as a witness "the only eyewitness to the events occurring just before the shooting." *Id.* at 827. In this case, there were no eyewitnesses of the shooting identified other than W.J., the victim who survived. Baker does not directly argue that his attorney failed to interview W.J. or should have called W.J. as a witness. Moreover, there is only one precedential Minnesota appellate decision referencing *Chambers*—*Reed v. State*. 793 N.W.2d 725, 736 (Minn. 2010). In *Reed*, the supreme court declined to apply *Chambers*, as well as other Eighth Circuit cases, because "none of the omissions [of trial counsel] were as crucial as those in the Eighth Circuit cases." *Id.* The same is true here.

In sum, we agree with the postconviction court that Baker's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's decision not to call certain witnesses is an unreviewable matter of trial strategy. Accordingly, the postconviction court properly concluded that these allegations were insufficient to meet the first *Strickland* prong.

B. Trial counsel's decision not to investigate certain evidence is also unreviewable trial strategy.

Baker also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel allegedly failed to investigate certain evidence used by the state to connect Baker to the shooting. In particular, Baker points to trial counsel's alleged (1) failure to investigate E.J., whose fingerprints were on the white van; (2) failure to conduct an investigation that would have allowed Baker to make the jury aware that the clothes seized by police belonged to two of his sons—M.B. and J.B.; (3) failure to conduct an investigation that would have allowed Baker to make the jury aware that the paystub offered as evidence by the state belonged to one of Baker's sons, not Baker; and (4) failure to conduct an investigation that would have allowed Baker to make the jury aware that the white van was in the process of being repossessed.

Counsel is not required to pursue leads that are not reasonably likely to produce favorable evidence. *Gustafson v. State*, 477 N.W.2d 709, 713 (Minn. 1991) (“It is within trial counsel’s discretion to forgo investigation of leads not reasonably likely to produce favorable evidence.”). Like the postconviction court, we are not persuaded that any of the potential evidence at issue would have been exculpatory. With respect to trial counsel’s purported failure to investigate E.J., E.J. was on the state’s witness list, and, according to E.J.’s own affidavit, he did work on Brandon’s van earlier in the day on October 27, 2019—tinting the windows. Consequently, we are unpersuaded that further investigation of E.J. was reasonably likely to produce favorable evidence.

Nor are we convinced that Baker's counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he failed to investigate the fact that the grey sweatshirt, black pants, and brown boots used as evidence by the prosecution belonged to Baker's sons; it is plausible that Baker shared these clothes with his sons. And given that the paystub was a relatively minor piece of evidence in the trial, we conclude that counsel's decision not to investigate the paystub was unreviewable trial strategy. Finally, we conclude that the potential repossession of the van does not diminish the weight of evidence presented at trial regarding the ownership and location of the van during the relevant time periods, and therefore that counsel's failure to investigate the matter did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

In sum, Baker's arguments regarding a purported lack of investigation into certain evidence fail to demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. And, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the postconviction court properly denied Baker's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because Baker failed to meet the first *Strickland* prong.

C. Baker's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on trial counsel's strategic decisions was properly denied.

Baker also seems to argue that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal. "Appellate counsel does not have a duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on appeal." *Zumberge*, 937 N.W.2d at 413 (quotation omitted). "A defendant alleging a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must overcome

the strong presumption that appellate counsel has exercised reasonable professional judgment in selecting the issues to raise on appeal.” *Id.* Because Baker’s underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel fail to satisfy the first *Strickland* prong and therefore were properly denied by the postconviction court without an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that Baker’s related claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was also properly denied.

II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Baker’s remaining claims are procedurally barred.

On appeal, Baker argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that his *Brady*-violation claim, Confrontation Clause claim, and due-process claims for postconviction relief were procedurally barred. We discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the postconviction court.

“When . . . a criminal defendant has had a direct appeal, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known *or should have been known* but were not raised in the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” *Ezeka v. State*, 16 N.W.3d 768, 776 (Minn. 2025) (quotation omitted). “This principle is often referred to as the *Knaffla* rule.” *Id.*; *see also Knaffla*, 243 N.W.2d at 741. The *Knaffla* rule applies when the petitioner’s claims are “based on evidence in the trial record.” *Wright v. State*, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 2009). For claims that were not raised on direct appeal, there exist two exceptions to the *Knaffla* rule: “(1) an issue so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal, or (2) in the interests of justice—when fairness so requires

and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” *Davis v. State*, 880 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

The postconviction court concluded that Baker’s remaining claims for postconviction relief were all procedurally barred. The postconviction court concluded that Baker’s *Brady*-violation and due-process claims were procedurally barred under the *Knaffla* rule because both matters “were fully litigated at trial and were not raised on appeal.” The postconviction court further concluded Baker’s Confrontation Clause claim was barred under the law of the case doctrine because, in *Baker I*, this court already determined that any “erroneous admission of general testimony regarding reluctant witnesses” was harmless.⁵ *Baker I*, 2022 WL 663355, at *7; *see also Smith v. State*, 974 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Minn. 2022) (“The law of the case doctrine functions to bar issues that were previously considered and denied in the same case.”). In other words, the postconviction court concluded that the Confrontation Clause claim was already decided in Baker’s direct appeal.

Baker argues that the postconviction court should not have concluded that these three claims for relief were procedurally barred because he raised these claims as part of his postconviction claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. The postconviction petition does not support this argument on appeal.

⁵ In *Baker I*, this court considered whether the admission of an officer’s testimony that W.J. was “reluctant to tell what happened” warranted vacating Baker’s convictions. 2022 WL 663355, at *7. We concluded that, “[g]iven the manner of presentation and the lack of emphasis by the state, these statements are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.*

In his petition, Baker discussed each of these claims (his *Brady*-violation claim, Confrontation Clause claim, and due-process claims) separately from his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, and he made little reference to the *Strickland* factors in his discussion of these claims. He also failed to explain in his postconviction petition why Baker's previous appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness for failing to raise those specific claims in his direct appeal. Consequently, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing these claims as procedurally barred. And, to the extent that Baker is asking this court to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as it relates to these claims, his argument is not properly before us for the first time on appeal. *Azure v. State*, 700 N.W.2d 443, 446-47 (Minn. 2005).

Baker further argues that, even if these claims are procedurally barred, we should still consider their merits. But Baker does not identify any exception that would permit this court to consider the merits of these procedurally-barred claims. As discussed above, there are two exceptions to the *Knaffla*-procedural bar: (1) the claim "is so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available at the time of the direct appeal," or (2) "hearing the claim is in the interest of justice because fairness so requires and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal." *Crow v. State*, 923 N.W.2d 2, 9-10 (Minn. 2019) (quotations omitted). The postconviction court determined that Baker "made no attempt to show that either of the *Knaffla* exceptions apply." On appeal, Baker does not challenge this determination. Consequently, we decline his invitation to address the merits of these claims.

In sum, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Baker's *Brady*-, Confrontation Clause, and due-process claims were procedurally barred.

III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Baker's request for a new trial.

Lastly, Baker argues that due to the cumulative error in the case, he is entitled to a new trial. His assertion is unavailing.

"We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion." *State v. Green*, 747 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. 2008). Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.04, subdivision 1, provides that a district court may grant a new trial based on the interests of justice, irregularity in the proceedings that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, prosecutorial misconduct, or errors of law, among other reasons. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.04.

Baker requested the postconviction court grant him a new trial in the interests of justice, but the postconviction court denied his request. In denying his request, the postconviction court explained that "Baker is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing or a new trial in the interests of justice." On appeal, Baker does not argue that the postconviction court abused its discretion in denying his request for a new trial. Instead, Baker requests that this court grant him "a new trial in the interests of justice based upon a showing of actual innocence, or in the alternative, to ensure the fair administration of justice."

Baker relies on supreme court cases such as *Beecroft* and *Cabrera* to argue that he should be granted a new trial in the interests of justice. *State v. Beecroft*, 813 N.W.2d 814,

846 (Minn. 2012); *State v. Cabrera*, 700 N.W.2d 469, 475 (Minn. 2005). In those cases, the supreme court held that, under exceptional circumstances, it may exercise its supervisory powers and grant a new trial in the interests of justice even when there is no showing of actual prejudice. *Beecroft*, 813 N.W.2d at 846; *Cabrera*, 700 N.W.2d at 475. We do not hold the same authority to grant such relief. *State v. Ramey*, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 n.6 (Minn. 2006) (“The court of appeals does not exercise supervisory powers that are reserved to [the supreme] court.”). And we do not discern any cumulative errors supporting such relief as argued by Baker. Accordingly, we deny Baker’s request that we grant a new trial in the interests of justice.

Affirmed.