In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Kevin Boyd Nelson.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1608

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Kevin Boyd Nelson.

Filed July 13, 2026
Affirmed
Florey, Judge*

Freeborn County District Court
File No. 24-PX-05-000527

Kevin Boyd Nelson, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Jones, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

David Walker, Freeborn County Attorney, Albert Lea, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In 2005, Kevin Boyd Nelson was civilly committed by the Freeborn County District
Court to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. In 2025, Nelson brought a motion for relief
from the district court’s commitment order pursuant to rule 60.02 of the Minnesota Rules

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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of Civil Procedure. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying the motion. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
In April 2005, Freeborn County petitioned the district court to civilly commit
Nelson as a sexually dangerous person and a sexual psychopathic personality. The district
court appointed counsel to represent Nelson during his commitment proceedings. Nelson
did not object to the appointment of counsel or request to represent himself at any point
during the commitment proceedings. In December 2005, the district court granted the
county’s petition and civilly committed Nelson to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program.
In March 2025, Nelson filed a motion for relief from his commitment order pursuant
to rule 60.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. Nelson relied on
In re Civil Commitment of Benson, in which the supreme court held that a committed
person may move the commitment appeal panel to be allowed to waive his or her statutory
right to counsel. 12 N.W.3d 711, 720-21 (Minn. 2024). Nelson argued that because he
was denied an opportunity to represent himself in his commitment proceedings, the
commitment order is void and no longer equitable. Nelson requested that the district court
order a new civil-commitment hearing at which he could have the opportunity to waive his
right to counsel. The district court denied the motion.
Nelson filed a timely appeal in which he challenged the district court’s decision.
This court affirmed. See In re Civ. Commitment of Nelson , No. A25-1608, 2026 WL
654072 (Minn. App. Mar. 3, 2026) (order). Nelson petitioned for further review. The
supreme court granted his petition in part, vacated this court’s opinion, and remanded for
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reconsideration in light of its decision in In re Civ. Commitment of Urbanek, A25-0808,
2026 WL 858492 (Minn. Mar. 25, 2026) (order). In re Civ. Commitment of Nelson, No.
A25-1608, 2026 WL 1550026 (Minn. May 27, 2026) (order). This court reinstated
Nelson’s appeal.
DECISION
Nelson argues that the district court erred by denying his rule 60.02 motion for relief.
The party seeking relief under rule 60.02 has the burden of proof.
City of Barnum v. Sabri, 657 N.W.2d 201, 205 (Minn. App. 2003). “This court reviews a
district court’s denial of a rule 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion.”
In re Civ. Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied
(Minn. Sept. 17, 2019).
Nelson first contends that the commitment order is void because it violated his right
to due process. A party may be entitled to relief from a final judgment or order if such
judgment or order is “void.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(d). “A judgment is void if the issuing
court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter, lacked personal jurisdiction over the
parties through a failure of service that has not been waived, or acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process.” Bode v. Minnesota Dep’t of Nat. Res., 594 N.W.2d 257,
261 (Minn. App. 1999), aff’d, 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000).
In this case, Nelson was represented by counsel throughout his commitment
proceedings and he does not contend that his attorney’s representation was deficient in any
way. Additionally, Nelson provided no evidence that he requested to represent himself at
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his commitment proceedings and was denied the opportunity to do so. Thus, Nelson cannot
show that he was denied due process of law at his commitment proceedings.
Nelson also contends that the purported deprivation of his statutory right to self-
representation at his commitment proceedings was a structural error. “Structural error is a
very limited class of error, which generally requires automatic reversal” of a criminal
defendant’s conviction. State v. Bey, 975 N.W.2d 511, 520 (Minn. 2022). But Nelson cites
no binding authority for the proposition that the structural-error analysis arising in criminal
cases applies to the deprivation of the statutory right to se lf-representation in a civil-
commitment proceeding. Thus, Nelson has not established that his commitment order
should be automatically reversed based on structural error.
Nelson also contends that the commitment order is no longer equitable on the
grounds that Benson was a significant change in circumstances. A district court may grant
a party relief if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(e). When deciding a rule 60.02(e) motion, the district
court must “determine whether changed circumstances exist and, if so, whether they render
it inequitable for the judgment to have prospective application,” which “must be
determined on a case- by-case basis.” Sabri, 657 N.W.2d at 207. To prevail on a rule
60.02(e) motion, “a moving party must show that a present challenge to an underlying order
would have merit.” Id. at 206.
In this case, Nelson has provided no evidence that he objected to the appointment
of counsel or that he requested to represent himself during his civil-commitment
proceedings. Nor does Nelson contend that he would have represented himself differently
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during the proceedings. Thus, even if Benson was a significant change in circumstances,
Nelson has not shown that it is no longer equitable for the commitment order to have
prospective effect.
In sum, the district court did not err by denying Nelson’s rule 60.02 motion for relief
from his commitment order.
Affirmed.