In the Marriage of: Robert Raymond Jackson (A26-0033) v. Kadi Beth Jackson (A25-1612)

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1612, A26-0033

In the Marriage of:

Robert Raymond Jackson, petitioner,
Respondent,
Appellant (A26-0033),

vs.

Kadi Beth Jackson,
Appellant (A25-1612),
Respondent.

Filed August 24, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion granted
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-FA-19-5499

Robert Raymond Jackson, Prior Lake, Minnesota (self-represented respondent, appellant
(A26-0033))

m boulette, boulette PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant (A25-1612),
respondent)

Considered and decided by Beane, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and
Schmidt, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
These two consolidated appeals arise out of a parenting dispute. In appellate file
No. A25-1612, mother Kadi Beth Jackson appealed from an order of the district court filed

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in August 2025, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by not granting her a
remedy for missed parenting time and erred by ruling that her motion to modify custody
was time-barred. In appellate file No. A25-0033, self-represented father Robert Raymond
Jackson appealed an order of the district court filed in December 2025, arguing that the
district court erred by limiting the development of the record and failing to properly
evaluate his arguments against mother’s motion to designate him as a frivolous litigant.
We conclude that (1) Mother’s arguments that, on the merits, the district court erred
by not granting her compensatory parenting time are not properly before us; (2) the district
court did not err by reserving mother’s motion for compensatory parenting time; (3) the
district court erred by denying, without explanation, mother’s request for other remedies
for interference with parenting time, making remand appropriate; (4) the district court erred
by concluding that that mother’s motion to modify custody was time-barred based on a
rationale that did not apply to her motion, making remand appropriate; (5) father’s
challenges to the August 2025 order are not properly before us because he did not file a
notice of related appeal with respect to that order; and (6) the district court did not
procedurally err when it designated father a frivolous litigant. We therefore affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand. We also grant mother’s motion to strike portions of father’s
reply brief.
FACTS
The parties have three minor children together: L.R.J. (born in 2010), B.P.J. (born
in 2012), and H.B.J. (born in 2015). In July 2020, the parties ’ marriage was dissolved via

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a stipulated judgment and decree (the J&D). The J&D awarded the parties joint legal and
joint physical custody of the three children and equal parenting time.
Since the J&D, both parties have brought multiple motions to modify custody or
parenting time. In December 2023, mother filed an ex parte motion seeking temporary sole
legal and sole physical custody of all three children. The district court denied the motion
but later granted mother temporary sole legal and sole physical custody and suspended
father’s parenting time after an incident in which father tried to drive with the children
while he was intoxicated. In March 2024, the district court vacated its suspension of
father’s parenting time. In April, father filed an affidavit asking the district court to grant
him sole legal and sole physical custody and to suspend mother’s parenting time. In June,
the district court filed an order directing the parties to resume the parenting-time schedule
agreed to in the J&D. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court, in a December 2024
order, denied father’s motion to grant him sole legal and sole physical custody and adopted
a reunification schedule agreed to by the parties.
In April 2025, father filed motions for sole physical custody and full parenting time
of L.R.J. and B.P.J. Father filed a supporting affidavit in which he alleged that L.R.J. and
B.P.J. had been living with him for the previous year because they were afraid of mother
and her new husband. Father also alleged that mother told L.R.J. and B.P.J. that they did
not need to live with her and that mother made no efforts to have them stay at her home.
In June 2025, mother filed a responsive motion and countermotion, asking the
district court to hold father in contempt and to award her permanent sole legal and sole
physical custody of all three children, temporary suspension of father’s parenting time,

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compensatory parenting time, a fine on father for interfering with parenting time, and
attorney fees and costs. She also filed a supporting affidavit in which she disputed father’s
allegations and alleged that father had been lying to L.R.J. and B.P.J. to turn them against
her. Mother also alleged that father refused to cooperate with the parenting-time schedule
or require the children to follow it.
In August, after a motion hearing, the district court filed its order on the parties’
motions (the August 2025 order). The district court denied both parties’ motions to modify
custody as time-barred. It denied father’s motion to modify parenting time and mother’s
motion for contempt and sanctions. And it reserved the issue of mother’s request for
compensatory parenting time.1 Mother appealed the August 2025 order.
In October 2025, father filed a motion for “clarification, correction and procedural
fairness” and an emergency motion for “temporary custody and immediate stay.” Mother
moved to designate father as a frivolous litigant. In December, after a motion hearing, the
district court filed an order finding father to be a frivolous litigant (the December 2025
order).
Father appealed the December 2025 order. We consolidated the two appeals.
DECISION
In her appeal, mother challenges the August 2025 order, arguing that the district
court erred by not granting her compensatory parenting time for father’s alleged

1 The August 2025 order also resolved other motions regarding child support, payment of
therapy costs, a vocational assessment, dependent status for taxes, and a change in
therapists. None of these decisions are at issue on appeal.

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interference with her parenting time; by reserving the issue of compensatory parenting
time; by denying her requests for costs, fees, and sanctions for father’s alleged repeated
and intentional interference with her parenting time; and by determining that her motion to
modify custody was time-barred. In his response, father raises several arguments
challenging the August 2025 order. In his appeal, father challenges the December 2025
order, arguing that the district court limited the development of the record and thereby
prevented full evaluation of his arguments. In father’s appeal, mother filed a motion with
this court to strike portions of father’s reply brief. We address the issues in turn.
I. Mother’s arguments that, on the merits, the district court erred by not granting
her compensatory parenting time are not properly before us.
Mother argues that the district court erred by not granting her compensatory
parenting time under Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 6 (2024).
Section 518.175, subdivision 6, sets out remedies for failure to follow a court’s
orders regarding parenting time. It states, “If the court finds that a person has been deprived
of court-ordered parenting time . . . , the court shall order the parent who has interfered to
allow compensatory parenting time to the other parent.” Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 6(d).
If the district court finds that the denial or interference has been done “repeatedly and
intentionally,” the statute provides for other harsher remedies, including reimbursement of
costs, attorney fees, and a sanction of up to $500. Id., subd. 6(e).
The district court here did not address whether mother had been deprived of
parenting time. Instead, it stated in its order that the issue of compensatory parenting time
was reserved. “A reviewing court generally must consider only those issues that the record

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shows were presented and considered by the trial court in deciding the matter before it.”
Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). Because the district
court reserved, and therefore did not address, mother’s request for compensatory parenting
time, mother’s arguments that the district court should have found that father interfered
with her parenting time and that she is entitled to compensatory parenting time are not
properly before us.
Arguing otherwise, mother asserts that the district court’s reservation of the
compensatory-parenting-time issue was effectively a denial of her request because the
district court gave no indication as to when it would rule. In support of her argument,
mother cites Wingad v. Wingad, a nonprecedential special-term order by this court.
No. A24-0137, 2024 WL 886620, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2024). 2 But that order held
that the district court’s reservation of the issue of attorney fees in an order did not make
the rest of the order unappealable. Id. Mother cites no cases for the proposition that a district
court’s reservation of an issue makes the merits of that issue reviewable.
Mother also argues that the district court’s reservation of the issue was akin to
“silence,” which can be treated as an implicit denial. See Palladium Holdings, LLC v. Zuni
Mortg. Loan Tr . 2006-OA1, 775 N.W.2d 168, 177-78 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied
(Minn. Jan. 27, 2010). But the district court was not silent on the issue. Rather, it explicitly
acknowledged the issue and stated that it was “reserved.”

2 We cite this case only to discuss its potential persuasive value because orders of the
special term panel “have no precedential value.” State v. Russell, 481 N.W.2d 148, 150
(Minn. App. 1992).

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Mother’s arguments that, on the merits, the district court erred by not granting her
compensatory parenting time are not properly before us, and we decline to address them.
II. The district court did not err by reserving mother’s request for compensatory
parenting time.
Mother argues that the district court erred by reserving the issue of compensatory
parenting time because it did not “fully consider” her request based on “all relevant
evidence,” as required by section 518.175, subdivision 6(c). That provision states:
The court shall fully consider providing compensatory
parenting time when a parent has intentionally made a
substantial amount of court-ordered parenting time unavailable
to the other parent unless providing the compensatory
parenting time is not consistent with the child ’s best interests.
The court must consider all relevant evidence to determine
whether a parent has made a substantial amount of court-
ordered parenting time unavailable to the other parent.
A district court’s application of law is a question that appellate courts review de
novo. Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016). Section
518.175, subdivision 6(c), only requires the district court to “fully consider providing
compensatory parenting time when a parent has intentionally made a substantial amount of
court-ordered parenting time unavailable to the other parent.” Thus, compensatory
parenting time is a remedy that the court must consider after finding that a parent has
intentionally interfered with parenting time. The district court has not yet addressed this
issue or made such a finding. Mother’s argument that the district court failed to follow the
statute is therefore unavailing.
Mother also notes that Minnesota Statutes section 518.175, subdivision 6(d)(2),
requires a parent that is awarded compensatory parenting time to take the compensatory

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time within one year of the deprivation, which she asserts makes the district court’s
indefinite reservation of the issue “problematic.” But mother points to no part of the statute
or caselaw that require s the district court to decide the issue rather than reserve it. We
conclude that the district court had discretion to reserve the issue of compensatory
parenting time, and we presume that it will appropriately address it in the future. See Prahl
v. Prahl, 627 N.W.2d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (noting that whether to reserve
jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance is within the district court’s discretion); Olson v.
Olson, 392 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986) (affirming the district court’s reservation
of issues related to property division).
Mother has not shown error in the district court’s decision to reserve the issue.
III. The August 2025 order does not permit meaningful appellate review of the
denial of mother’s requests for costs, fees, and sanctions for interference with
parenting time.
Mother argues that the district court erred by denying her request for costs, fees, and
sanctions for repeated and intentional interference with her parenting time.
As explained above, section 518.175, subdivision 6, provides for the award of costs,
attorney fees, and sanctions if the district court finds that a person’s denial of or interference
with parenting time has been done “repeatedly and intentionally.” Mother moved for those
remedies, alleging repeated and intentional interference. Unlike mother’s request for
compensatory parenting time, the district court did not reserve this issue; instead, it denied
her requests.3 The issue is therefore properly before us.

3 In the order, the district court stated that “Mother’s motion for contempt and/or other
sanctions against Father is DENIED.” The district court did not expressly address the

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Although the issue is properly before us, the August 2025 order does not permit
meaningful appellate review because the district court did not provide the reasons for
denying the requested remedies. A district court “must identify both its decision” and “the
underlying reason(s) for that decision.” Hagen v. Schirmers, 783 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn.
App. 2010). A district court’s failure to address the reasoning for its decision is error. Id.
at 218. And, if an order “does not identify the facts that the district court has determined to
be true and the facts on which the district court’s decision is based,” the order does not
permit meaningful appellate review and is subject to reversal. In re Civ. Commitment of
Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52,
53 (Minn. 1989) (reversing because the district court’s findings were “insufficient to enable
an appellate court to determine whether the trial court properly considered the [statutory]
requirements”). The August 2025 order contains no findings regarding whether father
interfered with mother’s parenting time or whether he did so repeatedly and intentionally
and provides no reasons for denying mother’s requests for costs, attorney fees, and
sanctions.
Because the August 2025 order does not permit meaningful appellate review, we
reverse the denial of mother’s requests for costs, fees, and sanctions and remand for the
district court to either explain the denial or reserve the issue. The district court may reopen
the record in its discretion.

requested fees or costs but stated that “[a]ny other relief not expressly granted herein is
DENIED.”

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IV. The district court abused its discretion by determining that mother’s custody-
modification motion was time-barred.
Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining that her
motion to modify custody under Minnesota Statutes section 518.18 (2024) was time-
barred.
Appellate courts review the denial of a custody-modification motion for an abuse of
discretion. Medvedovski v. Medvedovski, 903 N.W.2d 646, 649 (Minn. App. 2017). “A
district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the
evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts
on record.” Woolsey v. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).
Minnesota Statutes section 518.18(b) provides a time bar against subsequent
motions to modify custody in certain circumstances, stating:
If a motion for modification [of a custody order or parenting
plan] has been heard, whether or not it was granted, unless
agreed to in writing by the parties no subsequent motion may
be filed within two years after disposition of the prior motion
on its merits, except in accordance with paragraph (c).
Paragraph (c) of section 518.18 provides an exception to this rule when the district court
(1) “finds that there is persistent and willful denial or interference with parenting time” or
(2) “has reason to believe that the child’s present environment may endanger the child’s
physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development. ” For an
otherwise time-barred custody-modification motion to proceed, “the accompanying
affidavit must allege facts showing that [the] respondent persistently denied visitation or

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that the children are endangered by placement with [the] respondent.” Smith v. Smith, 508
N.W.2d 222, 227 (Minn. App. 1993); see also Medvedovski, 903 N.W.2d at 650.4
Here, within two years of the district court’s December 2024 order denying father’s
motion to modify custody, mother moved to modify custody. In the August 2025 order
denying mother’s motion as time-barred, the district court began by discussing father’s
argument that his pending motion to modify custody met the time-bar exception. Father
contended that the time-bar exception for a “denial of parenting time” under section
518.18(c) applied because mother had failed to exercise her parenting time, resulting in a
“denial of parenting time.” The district court rejected that argument, concluding that the
“denial of parenting time” does not mean a failure to exercise one’s own parenting t ime
but instead “refers to one parent’s refusal to allow the other parent to exercise their
parenting time.” The district court then stated, “Mother’s motion to modify custody is also
time-barred for the reasons discussed above.” It did not discuss mother’s motion any
further.
Mother argues that the district court erred by determining that her request was time-
barred because she adequately alleged both exceptions to the time bar—willful denial or
interference with parenting time as well as endangerment. See Minn. Stat. § 518.18(c). But
we need not address the adequacy of mother’s allegations because the district court never

4 The requirement here is distinct from the requirement that a movant allege facts showing
a prima facie case for custody modification. If the motion meets the exception to the time-
bar, then the district court can consider whether there is a prima facie case on the merits.
See Davis v. Davis, 418 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Minn. App. 1988) (concluding that a motion
showed a prima facie case in order to meet the time-bar exception but leaving for the trial
court the issue of “[w]hether the underlying facts justify a modification in custody”).

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reached that question. Instead, it determined that mother’s motion was time-barred for the
same reasons as father’s motion. That was error. The district court rejected father’s motion
because he did not allege “one parent’s refusal to allow the other parent to exercise their
parenting time.” But mother did make such an allegation. Thus, mother’s motion could not
fail for the same reasons as father’s, and the district erred by denying her motion on that
basis.
As a result, we reverse the denial of mother’s motion to modify custody as time-
barred and remand for the district court to consider whether mother’s motion meets either
of the exceptions to the time bar under section 518.18(c) and to proceed accordingly. The
district court may reopen the record in its discretion.
V. Father’s challenges to the August 2025 order are not properly before this court
because he did not file a notice of related appeal.
Father challenges the denial of his motion to modify parenting time in the August
2025 order, arguing that the district court erred by (1) failing to make findings sufficient
for meaningful appellate review, (2) relying on expert testimony despite other conflicting
testimony, (3) failing to analyze the children’s current living arrangement in more detail,
and (4) modifying custody without addressing the statutory framework.
Father’s challenges to the August 2025 order are not properly before us because he
neither appealed that order nor filed a notice of related appeal in mother’s appeal of the
order. To preserve his arguments as a respondent in mother’s appeal, father was required
under Rules 106 and 103.02, subdivision 2, of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure to file a notice of related appeal. “[A] notice of related appeal is required to

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‘obtain review of a judgment or order entered in the same underlying action that may
adversely affect respondent.’” City of Rochester v. Kottschade, 896 N.W.2d 541, 545 n.3
(Minn. 2017) (quoting Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 106). “Although some accommodations may
be made for pro se litigants, we have repeatedly emphasized that pro se litigants are
generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.”
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).
Because father’s challenges to the August 2025 order are not properly before us, we
decline to address them.
VI. The district court did not err by limiting the development of the record
regarding whether father is a frivolous litigant.
In his appeal from the December 2025 order, father challenges the district court’s
designation of him as a frivolous litigant. He argues that the district court erred by limiting
the development of the record and thus preventing full evaluation of his arguments. 5
Rule 9 of the Minnesota General Rules of Practice provides for the designation of a
party as a frivolous litigant. At a hearing on a frivolous-litigant motion, the district court
“shall consider such evidence, written or oral, by witnesses or affidavit, as may be material
to the ground of the motion.” Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 9.02(a). In determining whether to
require security from, or impose sanctions on, a frivolous litigant, the district court must
consider seven factors:

5 For the first time in his reply brief, father makes additional arguments challenging the
finding that he is a frivolous litigant. As discussed below, we grant mother’s motion to
strike these portions of the brief and decline to consider arguments from father that he did
not raise in his principal brief.

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(1) the frequency and number of claims pursued by the
frivolous litigant with an adverse result;
(2) whether there is a reasonable probability that the
frivolous litigant will prevail on the claim, motion, or request;
(3) whether the claim, motion, or request was made for
purposes of harassment, delay, or vexatiousness, or otherwise
in bad faith;
(4) injury incurred by other litigants prevailing against
the frivolous litigant and to the efficient administration of
justice as a result of the claim, motion, or request in question;
(5) effectiveness of prior sanctions in deterring the
frivolous litigant from pursuing frivolous claims;
(6) the likelihood that requiring security or imposing
sanctions will ensure adequate safeguards and provide means
to compensate the adverse party;
(7) whether less severe sanctions will sufficiently
protect the rights of other litigants, the public, or the courts.
Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 9.02(b).
Mother moved the district court to designate father as a frivolous litigant. On
November 12, 2025, the district court held a motion hearing in which mother’s counsel and
self-represented father argued the motion. The district court then filed the December 2025
order finding father to be a frivolous litigant.
Father maintains that his arguments and evidence on this issue were not fully
developed because he never received the chance to argue about the seven factors. But father
had ample time to argue his case and spent significant time during the hearing discussing
the merits of his filings and disputing that he is a frivolous litigant. At the conclusion of
his argument, father asked the district court, “Would you like me quickly to go through the
frivolous criteria, or did I do that sufficiently?” The district court responded that father had
sufficiently covered it, and father did not object or request additional time. Moreover, the

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district court’s December 2025 order contains detailed findings on father’s submissions
and a thorough discussion of the seven factors.
Father has not shown that that the district court procedurally erred in connection
with the frivolous-litigant motion hearing.
VII. Mother’s motion to strike sections of father’s reply brief is granted.
Finally, we address mother’s motion to strike certain sections of father’s reply brief
in his appeal because they contain discussion of issues beyond those in father’s principal
brief.
Generally, issues not raised or argued in appellant’s principal brief cannot be raised
in a reply brief. Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 887 (Minn. 2010).
Rule 128.02 confines a reply brief to “new matter raised in the brief of the respondent.”
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 3 . Arguments raised in a reply brief that were not
raised in the appellant’s principal brief and exceed the scope of the respondent’s brief “may
be stricken from the reply brief.” Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 654 N.W.2d
704, 707 (Minn. App. 2002), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2003).
In father’s reply brief, he raises several issues regarding the merits of the frivolous-
litigant determination in the December 2025 order, including the district court’s failure to
make certain findings, the sufficiency of the findings to sustain the decision, and the
availability of less severe sanctions. These issues were not discussed in father’s principal
brief, nor did mother discuss any such issue in her respondent’s brief.
Accordingly, we grant mother’s motion to strike sections II through IV of father’s
reply brief in his appeal.

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* * *
To summarize the dispositions in these appeals, in mother’s appeal challenging the
August 2025 order, No. A25-1612, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Specifically, we do not address mother’s challenge regarding compensatory parenting time
because it is not properly before us; we reverse and remand the issue of the denial of other
remedies for alleged interference with parenting time because the order does not permit
meaningful appellate review; we reverse and remand the issue of the rejection of mother’s
motion to modify custody as time-barred because the district court erred and did not
properly address whether an exception applies; and we decline to consider father’s
challenges to the order because he did not file a notice of related appeal. In father’s appeal
challenging the December 2025 order, No. A26-0033, we affirm, and we grant mother’s
motion to strike portions of father’s reply brief.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded; motion granted.