Approving the Findings of Fact and Record of Decision for Archer Datacenters Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW) and Negative Declaration Concerning the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1617

Approving the Findings of Fact and Record of Decision for Archer Datacenters
Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW) and Negative Declaration Concerning the
Need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

Filed June 8, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Bentley, Judge

City of Faribault
File No. 2025-191

Luke Norquist, Evan Mulholland, Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy)

Paul Donald Reuvers, Andrew A. Wolf, Emma M. Baker, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington,
Minnesota (for respondent City of Faribault)

Rob A. Stefonowicz, Bryan J. Huntington, Victoria M. Callander, Larkin Hoffman,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Archer Datacenters SPE2, LLC)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Beane, Judge; and Smith,
John, Judge.
∗
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BENTLEY, Judge
In this certiorari appeal, relator Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy
(MCEA) challenges respondent City of Faribault’s negative declaration concerning the

∗ Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
necessity of an environmental impact statement for a data center project proposed by
respondent Archer Datacenters SPE2, LLC. MCEA argues that the city violated the
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA), Minnesota Statutes sections 116D.01-.11
(2024 & Supp. 2025), in its review of the environmental assessment worksheet for the
project, resulting in a decision that is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported by substantial
evidence, and affected by errors of law. We conclude that the city’s negative declaration is
unsupported by substantial evidence, and we therefore reverse and remand.
FACTS
To provide helpful context for the facts and procedural history, we begin with an
overview of the relevant legal framework governing the environmental review process. We
then summarize the circumstances giving rise to this case.
A. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Background
Under MEPA, the Environmental Quality Board (EQB) adopts rules governing the
necessity for environmental review. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(b); see also Minn.
R. 4410.0200-.6500 (2023). Under those rules, the responsible governmental unit (RGU)—
here, the City of Faribault—determines the level of environmental review required for a
project. See Minn. R. 4410.0200, subps. 75-76 (defining “responsible governmental unit”
and “RGU”), .0400, subp. 2 (setting out the RGU’s role in decisions on the need for
environmental impact statements). MEPA identifies two types of environmental review for
proposed projects: an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW) and an environmental
impact statement (EIS). Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subds. 1a(c), 2a(a).
3
An EAW is “a brief document which is designed to set out the basic facts necessary
to determine whether an [EIS] is required for a proposed action.” Minn. Stat. § 116D.04,
subd. 1a(c). EAWs must be prepared for projects that meet certain criteria. Minn. R.
4410.4300, subp. 1, .1000, subp. 2. Relevant here, an EAW is required for the construction
of a new “industrial, commercial, or institutional facility” that is larger than 300,000 square
feet. Minn. R. 4410.4300, subp. 14(B). After an EAW is prepared, it must be published for
a 30-day public-review-and-comment period. Minn. R. 4410.1600.
An EIS is a more “exhaustive environmental review” than an EAW, and “the party
proposing the project must conduct [the EIS] at its own expense.” Citizens Advocating
Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 824 (Minn. 2006)
(CARD). An EIS provides “information for governmental units, the proposer of the project,
and other persons to evaluate proposed projects . . . , to consider alternatives to the
proposed projects, and to explore methods for reducing adverse environmental effects.”
Minn. R. 4410.2000, subp. 1. A project requires an EIS if the project has the “potential for
significant environmental effects.” Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(a).
The EQB has promulgated four criteria that an RGU must consider when reviewing
a proposed project and its EAW to determine whether an EIS is required: (1) the “type,
extent, and reversibility of environmental effects”; (2) the “cumulative potential effects”
of the project; (3) “the extent to which the environmental effects are subject to mitigation
by ongoing public regulatory authority”; and (4) “the extent to which environmental effects
can be anticipated and controlled as a result of other available environmental
studies . . . including other EISs.” Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7. In reviewing the EAW and
4
related record to determine whether an EIS is necessary, the RGU must consider and
balance all criteria. See CARD, 713 N.W.2d at 825, 838; Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 6 (“In
deciding whether a project has the potential for significant environmental effects the RGU
shall compare the impacts that may be reasonably expected to occur from the project with
the criteria in this part.”). During this process,“[t]he RGU shall maintain a record, including
specific findings of fact, supporting its decision. The record m ust include specific
responses to all substantive and timely comments on the EAW.” Minn. R. 4410.1700,
subp. 4.
B. Facts and Procedural History
Archer Datacenters purchased real property in Faribault on which it seeks to develop
a project known as the Archer Datacenters Faribault Campus. The project includes a
facility featuring “up to 500,000 square feet of data center buildings with associated
utilities and parking lot.” The City of Faribault is the RGU for the project. 1 Because the
planned data center is over 300,000 square feet, an EAW was required. Minn. R.
4410.4300, subp. 14( B). Archer Datacenters submitted a draft EAW to the city in May
2025, and the city council declared it complete for public review. During the 30-day public-
comment period, the city received comments from nine community members, Faribault’s
Environmental Commission, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, and the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency.

1 When discussing the respondents individually we refer to them as “Archer Datacenters”
or “the city.” In its brief, the city “adopts and incorporates by reference” the arguments set
forth in Archer Datacenters’ brief. We therefore refer to “respondents” when addressing
those joint arguments.
5
In response to the public comments, the city concluded that “additional data [was]
needed to provide a reasoned decision on the need for an Environmental Impact Statement”
and asked Archer Datacenters to provide more information about “potential emissions,
including emissions from either diesel or natural gas power generation,” water demand,
and “current and anticipated sound levels in the project area.” Discussing the need for more
information about potential emissions, the city explained, “This informatio n must be
provided to assess the potential for air quality impacts and confirm that the project does
not trigger the mandatory EAW category for air pollution.”2 To accommodate the need for
that additional information, the city extended its decision timeline by 30 days.
Archer Datacenters submitted a revised EAW in July 2025 that included an
appendix with the comments received and Archer Datacenters’ responses to the comments.
It also prepared a document, entitled “Findings of Fact and Record of Decision,” which
summarized the EAW, discussed the four regulatory criteria, and set out the conclusion
that an EIS is not required. With these documents in the record, the city’s Environmental
and Planning Commissions, Development Review Committee, and planning manager each
recommended the city council make a negative declaration as to the need for an EIS . The
city council subsequently passed a resolution titled, “Approving the Findings of Fact and
Record of Decision for Archer Datacenters Environmental Assessment Worksheet (EAW)

2 EQB rules provide that, if a project generates above a certain level of air pollutant
emissions, an EAW, with the Pollution Control Agency acting as the RGU, is mandatory.
Minn. R. 4410.4300, subp. 15. If an EAW is required on two or more bases for which
different RGUs are designated, the rules provide a process for determining which
governmental entity will be the RGU. Minn. R. 4410.0500, subp. 5(B).
6
and Negative Declaration Concerning the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS).” The council determined that, “[b]ased on the EAW and comments received,
adequate information has been received to determine that the project will not have
significant environmental impacts and development of an [EIS] is not required.”
MCEA appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
MCEA asserts that three aspects of the city’s EIS determination are unsupported by
substantial evidence, are arbitrary and capricious, or involve an error of law: (1) the air-
quality and noise-pollution analyses; (2) the greenhouse-gas-emission estimate; and (3) the
cumulative-potential-effects analysis. Respondents argue as a threshold matter that the
appeal should be dismissed because MCEA lacks standing. Then, on the merits,
respondents contend that the city’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, is
not arbitrary and capricious, and contains no errors of law because the city considered all
the necessary factors.
We first address standing and conclude that MCEA may challenge the city’s
determination on appeal. Then, turning to the merits, we analyze whether the city’s
determination is supported by substantial evidence. Because we determine that it is not, we
reverse and remand on that ground and do not decide whether it was arbitrary and
capricious or the product of an error of law.
I
MCEA must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Webster v.
Hennepin County, 910 N.W.2d 420, 433 (Minn. 2018) (“Standing to appeal is essential to
7
our jurisdiction.”). To have standing, MCEA “must have a sufficient stake” in the
controversy, “meaning it has suffered some injury in fact or is the beneficiary of some
legislative enactment granting standing.” Minn. Voters All. v. Hunt, 10 N.W.3d 163, 167
(Minn. 2024) (quotations omitted).
MCEA asserts it has statutory standing under MEPA, which provides that “[a]
person aggrieved by a final decision on the need for an environmental assessment
worksheet, the need for an environmental impact statement, or the adequacy of an
environmental impact statement is entitled to judicial review of the decision under sections
14.63 to 14.68.” Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 10. Because the statute requires that the party
seeking judicial review be “aggrieved” by the decision, the considerations in determining
whether the party has standing by legislative enactment “are similar to the considerations
of the ‘injury-in-fact’ test for standing.” Minn. Educ. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404 ,
287 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Minn. 1980). As a general matter, to be aggrieved, a “person must
be ‘injuriously or adversely affected by [a decision] when it . . . bears directly upon [their]
personal interest.’” Stansell v. City of Northfield, 618 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Minn. App. 2000)
(quoting In re Getsug, 186 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn. 1971)), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26,
2001).
Here, MCEA invokes the concept of “associational” or “organizational” standing to
establish that it is an aggrieved party and it submitted declarations in support of those
arguments in an addendum to its reply brief . “The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted
a liberal standard for organizational standing.” All. for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council,
671 N.W.2d 905, 913 (Minn. App. 2003) (citing Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. Minn. State
8
Bd. of Pharmacy, 221 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. 1974)). An entity may have organizational
standing by demonstrating an injury to itself or its members. Id. at 914-15. MCEA
maintains it has standing based on both types of injury.
Before turning to the merits of those arguments, we address two threshold matters
raised by respondents.
First, respondents argue MCEA forfeited any argument regarding its standing
because it did not address standing in its initial brief. Their argument misconstrues the
proper scope of a reply brief. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 128.02,
subdivision 3, provides that an appellant’s reply brief “must be confined to new matter
raised in the brief of the respondent.” Respondents did not bring a motion to dismiss the
appeal for lack of standing under Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 127, instead
raising the jurisdictional issue for the first time in their briefs. Comporting with rule 128.02,
subdivision 3, MCEA’s reply brief responded to the standing argument. In any event, “[a]n
essential element of jurisdiction is standing,” Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d at 167, such
that standing may be addressed on the court’s own initiative, In re Block, 727 N.W.2d 166,
174 (Minn. App. 2007).
Second, respondents assert that, in our standing determination, we may consider
only the record developed before the city, which does not include any information from or
about MCEA. Although neither the Minnesota Supreme Court nor this court has addressed
this precise issue, the supreme court has accepted a supplemental record in order to address
the related jurisdictional issue of mootness. See Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City
of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 2002). Separately,
9
federal courts have allowed parties to supplement the record in appeals under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to demonstrate Article III standing. See, e.g., Trenton
Threatened Skies, Inc v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 90 F.4th 122, 130 (3d Cir. 2024) (“It is well
established that petitioners challenging agency action may supplement the administrative
record for the purpose of establishing Article III standing, even though judicial review of
agency action is usually limited to the administrative record.” (quotation omitted)). The
Minnesota S upreme Court has relied on federal caselaw addressing NEPA when
interpreting MEPA. In re Minn. Power’s Petition for Approval of EnergyForward Res.
Package, 958 N.W.2d 339, 346 (Minn. 2021). Consistent with these authorities, we
conclude that it is appropriate to accept MCEA’s declarations as a supplemental record
solely for the purpose of determining whether MCEA has standing to bring this certiorari
appeal.
Having addressed those threshold issues, we turn to MCEA’s argument that the
organization itself has suffered an injury. To establish an injury to its own interests, an
organization must assert something more concrete than a “mere ‘interest’ in the problem.”
In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm. , 488 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1992). “[I]mpediments
to an organization’s activities and mission” are injuries “sufficient for standing.” Rukavina
v. Pawlenty, 684 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 2004).
The declaration of MCEA’s executive director explains that a core part of MCEA’s
mission is ensuring that “state and local governmental units comply with [MEPA]” and
that MCEA “has had to dedicate considerable resources of the entire organization to
respond to data center proposals, including the Faribault proposal.” Going further, the
10
declaration asserts that MCEA’s staff have had to devote time and resources to
communicating with and educating the public on the environmental risks of data centers,
which has “diverted substantial organizational resources” to the data center proposal that
would have been “devoted to other aspects of MCEA’s environmental advocacy work”
such as “educating the public and policy-makers on carbon-free energy policy.” MCEA
also “has members who reside in Faribault . . . in the vicinity of the proposed Archer
Datacenter project.”
These assertions are sufficient to meet Minnesota’s liberal organizational standing
requirement. In Alliance for Metropolitan Stability, this court concluded that three
organizations’ allegations that “their resources have been diverted and that their
educational, advocacy, and placement efforts are impeded” by the respondent’s actions
were sufficient to establish associational or organizational standing. 671 N.W.2d at 913-
14. Here, MCEA has similarly alleged that they have had to divert resources to address the
environmental risks of the proposed Faribault data center at the expense of their other
educational or policy goals. Those allegations amount to an injury beyond a simple
“interest” in the outcome. Sandy Pappas, 488 N.W.2d at 798. Archer Datacenters argues
that, to be “aggrieved” within the meaning of the statute, MCEA was required to participate
in the proceedings below, but there is no such requirement in Minnesota law. Moreover,
MCEA has demonstrated that at least one of their members did participate in the public-
comment process. MCEA has thus demonstrated an injury to itself.
We next consider MCEA ’s argument that it also has standing on behalf of its
members. An organization has standing to sue based on an injury to its members when:
11
“(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests
it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
lawsuit.” Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d at 170 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)).
MCEA asserts that it has members residing in Faribault near the proposed datacenter
site who “would be directly affected by any . . . environmental effects from the data
center,” and it submitted a declaration from one such member. That member’s declaration
expresses concern that the data center could cause respiratory problems for themself or
their neighbors, mentions enjoying “traveling through the part of Faribault where this data
center site is being proposed because it is quiet,” and believes that “a new and uncontrolled
source of industrial noise will be disruptive and harmful.” Considering the standard
articulated in Minnesota Voters Alliance, MCEA has satisfied the first prong. The member
who lives in Faribault would constitute an “aggrieved party” and “otherwise have standing
to sue in their own right,” Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 10; Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d
at 170 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343), because environmental harm that “affects the
recreation or even the mere esthetic interests” of an individual is sufficient to establish
standing. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 494 (2009).3 As to the second prong,

3 Though we cite federal caselaw here, we are persuaded that these harms are also sufficient
to establish standing under Minnesota law, which is not constrained by the limitations of
Article III of the United States Constitution. See Growe v. Simon, 2 N.W.3d 490, 499
(Minn. 2024) (holding that Minnesota courts are “not bound by the standing constraints of
Article III of the United States Constitution”); see also N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New
12
as we have explained, the interests MCEA seeks to protect here are central to its purpose
as an organization. Minn. Voters All., 10 N.W.3d at 170 (quoting Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343).
Regarding the third prong, neither the claim nor the relief requested require individual
participation. Id. MCEA seeks a reversal and remand of the city’s negative declaration,
which does not require the intervention of any individual aggrieved person.
MCEA has standing to appeal the city’s decision under Minnesota Statutes
section 116D.04, subdivision 10.
II
On appeal from an RGU’s decision about whether an EIS is statutorily required,
appellate courts “evaluate whether the RGU took a ‘hard look’ at the salient issues, but
defer to the RGU’s decision unless the decision reflects an error of law, is arbitrary and
capricious, or is unsupported by substantial evidence.” Friends of Twin Lakes v. City of
Roseville, 764 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing CARD, 713 N.W.2d at 832).
When conducting a substantial-evidence review, appellate courts must determine
“whether the agency has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion and whether
that conclusion is reasonable on the basis of the record.” In re NorthMet Project Permit to
Mine Application, 959 N.W.2d 731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). The relator has
the burden of proving that the RGU’s findings are unsupported by substantial evidence. In
re Env’t Impact Statement, 849 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. App. 2014) (citing CARD, 713
N.W.2d at 833).

York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988) (“[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution
imposes on the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts.”).
13
MCEA maintains that three aspects of the city’s negative declaration are
unsupported by substantial evidence: the air -quality and noise-pollution analyses; the
greenhouse-gas-emissions estimate; and the cumulative-potential- effects analysis. We
address each issue in turn.
A. Air Quality and Noise Pollution
MCEA asserts that the city’s determination that there will not be significant
environmental effects on air quality and operational noise pollution is unsupported by
substantial evidence. It maintains that the city did not adequately explain how it reached
this determination, and the record does not support that the determination is reasonable.
We agree.
MEPA and its implementing rules establish that an RGU’s EIS decision “must be
based on the [EAW] and the comments received during the comment period,” Minn. Stat.
§ 116D.04, subd. 2a(d), and that the record must include “specific responses to all
substantive and timely comments on the EAW.” Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 4. Conclusory
responses to comments or responses that do not explain the RGU’s reasoning may reveal
that the determination is unsupported by substantial evidence. See In re City of Cohasset’s
Decision on Need for an Env’t Impact Statement for Proposed Frontier Project, 985
N.W.2d 370, 382-83 (Minn. App. 2023) (holding an RGU’s decision was unsupported by
substantial evidence when responses to public comments were conclusory and did not
include “scientific analysis supporting [its] proclamation”) ; see also Pope Cnty. Mothers
v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 594 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. App. 1999) (reversing a
negative EIS declaration based, in part, on the fact that the RGU did not adequately respond
14
to comments, suggesting that the determination “was premature and based on inadequate
information,” and the RGU did not take steps to obtain missing information before making
a negative declaration).
The city received comments highlighting the lack of information in the EAW with
respect to both the air- quality and noise-pollution impacts, and yet, the record shows that
neither the city nor Archer Datacenters meaningfully responded to those comments or
otherwise supplemented the record to address missing information.
On the subject of air quality, the draft EAW stated in the section on emissions from
“stationary sources such as boilers or exhaust stacks” that “[t]his item is not applicable
because any stationary air emissions source large enough to merit environmental review
requires individual review.” During the public-comment period, t he Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency (MPCA) commented that this discussion was inadequate and that the
“section is still required to be answered for projects that do not trigger the mandatory air
pollution EAW category.” Elaborating further, MPCA expressed, “The Project Proposer
should add material information regarding the nature of the project. Other sections of the
EAW suggest the Project will include power generation in the form of either diesel or
natural gas. These emission units, their emissions, and the impacts of those emissions
should be discussed.” The response to the comment states:
Comment Noted. The EAW has been updated.
Stationary source air emissions for the proposed buildings are
anticipated to be minimal based on the anticipated mechanical
equipment that will be installed. The proposed project will
employ back-up emergency generation to provide power to the
critical infrastructure of the facility during power outages. It is
not known at this time what size, type, and quantity of back up
15
emergency generators will be utilized by the project; therefore,
two technologies were analyzed for the greenhouse gas
emissions section. Once more information is known for the
site, a full air quality analysis will be completed, coordination
with the [MPCA] will occur, and any anticipated permits will
be obtained from the MPCA. If the emissions exceed a
mandatory EAW threshold, an additional environmental
review will be completed.

The section on air quality in the revised EAW then adopted that language nearly verbatim,
except it was altered to express with less certainty: “[t]he proposed project may consist of
some type of back up emergency generator to provide power to the critical infrastructure of
the facility during power outages.” (Emphasis added.)
The comment responses and revised EAW lack important details. They do not
identify the type of mechanical equipment that will be installed or explain how it supports
the conclusion that the anticipated air emissions are minimal. The record does not indicate
whether backup generators will be used or, if so, the extent of air emissions such generators
may create during monthly testing or power outages. The most that can be deduced from
the revised EAW is that the city does not yet know the extent to which the project will
generate air emissions. The city has not “adequately explained how it derived its
conclusion” that the project’s air emissions are not likely to have a significant
environmental impact, and its determination is not “reasonable on the basis of the record.”
NorthMet, 959 N.W.2d at 749 (quotations omitted).
On the subject of operational noise pollution, the draft EAW stated that “the main
sources of noise include ventilation systems, industrial traffic and the use of generators
tested once a month and in the case of emergency. Sensitive receptors within the project
16
site vicinity include adjacent residential houses, and businesses.” The draft EAW explained
that further noise evaluation will be done “as design progresses,” noting that best practices
for noise reduction will be implemented in order “to ensure compliance with local and state
noise regulations” and that “[n]oise attenuation measures such as sound walls or increased
buffering from the property line (i.e. physical distance, berms, or dense landscaping) may
be incorporated into project design to ensure that MPCA noise rules and City noise
ordinances are followed.” (Emphasis added.)
During the public-comment period, members of the public expressed concern about
the potential for noise, and MPCA commented:
The Noise section of the EAW does not provide enough
detail regarding current and anticipated sounds levels in the
project area to determine whether an immediate violation of
the state noise standards would occur if the project were
approved.

Members of the public often have noise concerns
related to data center operations. MPCA notes statements in the
Noise section of the EAW indicate further noise evaluation will
be completed, and noise mitigations may be incorporated into
project design.

The responses to comments provide, “Comment noted. As noted in the EAW, further noise
analysis will be completed once design progresses for the proposed project and equipment
is selected for project design. The project will be required to meet the state noise standards
during operations.” The only material change to the operational noise section between the
draft EAW and the revised EAW involved the backup generators. The revised EAW says,
“The proposed facility may also include back-up emergency generators that would be
17
tested once a month and would be used in the event of a critical loss of power.” (Emphasis
added.)
Again here, the record lacks sufficient detail with respect to anticipated noise
pollution. The record provides almost no insight into what sort of operational noise can be
expected from the proposed project, much less enough information to know the extent of
any environmental effects it will cause. The city does not explain why it determined ,
contrary to the MPCA’s comment, that it had sufficient information to make a negative
declaration. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04 subd. 2a(d); NorthMet, 959 N.W.2d at 749. The
response to MPCA’s comment merely noted the comment and reiterated the information
provided in the draft EAW. We question whether that constitutes a “specific response,” as
required by the governing regulations. Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 4. And the revised EAW
included less specificity on sources of noise than the draft EAW. These shortcomings
persuade us that the city failed to take a “hard look” at the salient issue of noise pollution
and failed to “genuinely engage[] in reasoned decision- making.” CARD, 713 N.W.2d at
832 (quotations omitted). Because the city did not adequately explain “how it derived its
conclusion” that noise pollution is unlikely to have a significant environmental impact and
because that determination is not “reasonable on the basis of the record,” NorthMet, 959
N.W.2d at 749 (quotations omitted), the city’s negative declaration in this respect is not
supported by substantial evidence.
With respect to both air quality and noise pollution, respondents maintain that the
lack of detail in the revised EAW is not a basis on which to reverse the city’s negative
declaration because the record shows that “the Project is early in its timeline and further
18
analysis [will] be conducted in the future if necessary.” In other words, respondents express
an intent to rely on subsequent permit and regulatory processes to keep any environmental
impacts below levels necessitating an EIS. The supreme court has already rejected this
approach.
In CARD, the supreme court noted that “ mitigation by an ongoing regulatory
authority is a required consideration in a project-specific EIS determination review,” but it
emphasized that “an RGU may not rest its EIS determination decision on mitigation that
amounts to only vague statements of good intentions.” 713 N.W.2d at 834 (quotations
omitted). The supreme court continued, “Under MEPA, an RGU must determine whether
a given project has the potential for significant environmental effects before approving the
project.” Id. at 835. The city’s determination runs afoul of this directive. Instead of
investigating the environmental effects of the project before approving it, the city’s
negative declaration is based on “vague statements of good intentions” to work with
regulatory authorities down the line. Id. at 834. That does not comport with the requirement
that the city’s determination be supported by substantial evidence.
Respondents attempt to distinguish the circumstances here from those in CARD,
arguing that they are not impermissibly stating an intent to use regulations to remedy
environmental impacts after they occur, like the agency in CARD. Id. at 834-35. Rather,
respondents maintain that down-the-line permitting requirements and regulatory oversight
will prevent any impacts before they occur. That is a distinction without a difference. The
point in CARD is that, before making a negative declaration on an EIS, the RGU “must
have some concrete idea of what problems may arise and how they may specifically be
19
addressed by ongoing regulatory authority.” Id. at 835. If the RGU does not understand the
potential for problems because it has not genuinely investigated the potential for significant
environmental effects, it cannot know how ongoing regulatory oversight will address the
problems.
Indeed, “MEPA’s purpose is ‘to force agencies to make their own impartial
evaluation of environmental considerations before reaching their decisions.’” Iron Rangers
for Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Minn. App. 1995)
(quoting No Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Env’t Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 327 (Minn.
1977)), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1995). Consistent with that purpose, MEPA requires
that the environmental-review process take its course before a final decision may be made
“to grant a permit, approve a project, or begin a project.” See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd.
2b (“If an [EAW] or an [EIS] is required for a governmental action under subdivision 2a,
a project may not be started and a final governmental decision may not be made to grant a
permit, approve a project, or begin a project, until: . . . a negative declaration has been
issued on the need for an environmental impact statement[.]”). Moreover, the scope of an
EAW is different from the permitting process. The rules require an RGU to balance many
factors in determining the potential for significant environmental effects, only one of which
is “mitigation by ongoing public regulatory authority.” Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7(C).
Respondents invoke a separate rule provision, rule 4410.1000, subpart 5, to support
their view that, even if some details are lacking at this point in the process, a negative
declaration is reasonable at this stage because the “regulations specifically contemplate
that subsequent EAWs may be necessary as the project becomes more defined .” This
20
changed-circumstances provision states that, after a negative declaration is made, if “the
RGU determines that a substantial change has been made in the proposed project or has
occurred in the project’s circumstances, which change may affect the potential for
significant adverse environmental effects that were not addressed in the existing EAW, a
new EAW is required. ” Minn. R. 4410.1000, subp. 5. Respondents assert that this rule
allows the city to make its negative declaration now and require additional EAWs as
necessary later.
This argument overstates the significance of the changed-circumstances provision.
The rules elsewhere offer an RGU only two choices if it determines that information is
lacking in assessing the necessity of an EIS —and issuing a negative declaration with
insufficient information to determine potential environment effects is not one of them. The
pertinent rule states:
If the RGU determines that information necessary to a
reasoned decision about the potential for, or significance of,
one or more possible environmental impacts is lacking, but
could be reasonably obtained, the RGU shall either:

A. make a positive declaration and include
within the scope of the EIS appropriate studies to obtain the
lacking information; or

B. postpone the decision on the need for an EIS
for not more than 30 days or such other period of time as agreed
upon by the RGU and proposer, in order to obtain the lacking
information.

Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a; see also Pope Cnty. Mothers, 594 N.W.2d at 238 (discussing
prior version of same rule). The changed-circumstances provision, in contrast, applies after
an RGU has rendered a negative declaration that is reasoned and supported in the record.
21
Rule 4410.1000, subp. 5. Reading these provisions together, the process makes sense. An
RGU cannot know whether a change in the process “may affect the potential for significant
adverse environmental effects” if it has not determined what those effects are in the first
place.
The city has not “adequately explained how it derived its conclusion” and based on
our review, its conclusion is not “reasonable on the basis of the record.” NorthMet , 959
N.W.2d at 749 (quotations omitted). The negative declaration with respect to air quality
and noise pollution is therefore unsupported by substantial evidence.
B. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
MCEA also argues that the city’s negative EIS declaration is unsupported by
substantial evidence as it relates to greenhouse gas emissions 4 because the estimated
emissions dropped by 98 percent between the draft and revised EAWs with scant
explanation. Our review is, again, focused on “whether the agency has adequately
explained how it derived its conclusion and whether that conclusion is reasonable on the
basis of the record.” NorthMet, 959 N.W.2d at 749 (quotation omitted).
The EAW worksheet provided by the EQB requires quantification of greenhouse
gas emissions. Those completing the EAW are instructed to “provide quantification and
discussion of project [greenhouse gas] emissions” and to “[d]escribe the methods used to

4 The revised EAW describes greenhouse gases as “[c]ertain gases in the earth’s
atmosphere” that “play a critical role in determining the earth’s surface temperature.” It
notes that “[h]uman -caused emissions of [greenhouse gases] exceeding natural ambient
concentrations are believed to be responsible for . . . leading to a trend of unnatural
warming of the earth’s climate, known as global climate change or global warming.”

22
quantify emissions.” It further instructs, “If calculation methods are not readily available
to quantify [greenhouse gas] emissions for a source, describe the process used to come to
that conclusion.”
The draft EAW here provided an estimate of the carbon dioxide emissions 5 from
the project. According to the tables included in the draft EAW, the vast majority of the
emissions were projected to come from offsite electricity. The draft EAW includes an
appendix containing the “EPA simplified greenhouse gas emissions calculator,” evidently
used to calculate possible emissions. That calculator lists an input of 1,050,000,000
kilowatt hours (kWh) of purchased electricity used to calculate the emissions estimate.
After the draft EAW was published, members of the public and the city’s
Environmental Commission submitted comments expressing concern and confusion about
the high level of emissions and power usage. Some comments pointed out comparisons
with other local industry and data center projects. Responses to those comments explained
that “[t]here was an error in the [emissions] calculation provided; this has been updated in
the EAW,” and noted that the proposer “has worked extensively” with energy and
electricity companies “on power procurement and availability.”
The revised EAW included a different greenhouse-gas-emissions estimate, altering
the proposed carbon dioxide emissions to 9,924 tons of carbon dioxide emissions if diesel
generators are used or 9,753 tons from natural gas as compared to the original estimates of
529,803 tons and 529,632 tons, respectively. The attached appendix again included the

5 The revised EAW describes carbon dioxide as one of the “primary [greenhouse gases]
contributing to the greenhouse effect.”
23
EPA calculator used by respondents, which showed that the source area input was
increased from 500,000 square feet to 700,000 square feet between the draft and revised
EAWs. Despite that increase in size, the electricity purchased was reduced from
1,050,000,000 kWh to 14,140,000 kWh.
We agree with MCEA that the city did not adequately explain on the record how it
concluded that the project will not have significant environmental effects in the form of
greenhouse gas emissions. See NorthMet, 959 N.W.2d at 749. There is nothing in the record
explaining the figures used in the emissions calculation, most notably the necessary
electricity. Nor is there anything in the record explaining the stark differences between the
figures and calculations in the draft EAW and the revised EAW, aside from the comment
response that “[t ]here was an error in the calculation.” This is significant because the
substantial gap between the two estimates suggests different magnitudes of potential
environmental effects, and the city does not explain why it credits the estimates from the
revised EAW over the draft EAW. Because of that lack of explanation and the mixed
evidence in the record between the two EAWs and the comments, we cannot conclude that
the city’s determination on this issue was “reasonable on the basis of the record.” 6 Id.
(quotation omitted).

6 On appeal, the city provided an explanation that they followed a method provided by the
EPA calculator “for estimating energy usage by utilizing data from the Energy Information
Administration, specifically the Commercial Building Energy Consumption Survey, which
provides average annual energy intensity (per square foot) by building type.” But
“[c]ertioari is, by its nature, a review based solely upon the record.” Amdahl v. County of
Fillmore, 258 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Minn. 1977). The city’s explanation and the tool cited are
not in the record on appeal, so they are not properly within the scope of our review. Thiele
v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 -83 (Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base its
24
C. Cumulative Potential Effects
As a final matter, MCEA contends that the record lacks a sufficient explanation for
the city’s determination that there will be no cumulative potential effects and that it instead
relied on “bare assertions” on that issue. We agree.
The term “cumulative potential effects” is defined as the “effect on the environment
that results from the incremental effects of a project in addition to other projects in the
environmentally relevant area that might reasonably be expected to affect the same
environmental resources, including future projects actually planned or for which a basis of
expectation has been laid.” Minn. R. 4410.0200, subp. 11a. When determining “whether a
project has the potential for significant environmental effects,” an RGU must specifically
consider cumulative potential effects, including
whether the cumulative potential effect is significant; whether
the contribution from the project is significant when viewed in
connection with other contributions to the cumulative potential
effect; the degree to which the project complies with approved
mitigation measures specifically designed to address the
cumulative potential effect; and the efforts of the proposer to
minimize the contributions from the project[.]

Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 7.
Here, the cumulative-potential-effects discussion did not change between the draft
and revised EAW. In the relevant section, the revised EAW included the above regulatory
definition of cumulative potential effects and explained that “[t]he geographic areas
considered for cumulative effects are those areas adjacent to the EAW study area, and the

decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may not consider matters not
produced and received in evidence below.”).
25
timeframe considered includes projects that would be constructed in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” In the section requiring a description of “reasonably foreseeable future
projects,” the revised EAW states that “[f]uture private development projects may result in
impacts to transportation, water resources, and utilities. These impacts will be addressed
via the regulatory permitting and approval processes and will be individually mitigated to
ensure minimal cumulative impacts occur.” When asked to “[d]iscuss the nature of the
cumulative potential effects and summarize any other available information relevant to
determining whether there is potential for significant environmental effects due to these
cumulative effects,” the revised EAW lists that the provision was “Not Applicable.”
Multiple comments on the draft EAW identified other projects or entities that draw
on water and energy resources in the area. For example, they mentioned other proposed
data centers and other industrial facilities such as a bottling company, with one comment
expressing concern about the combined impact of water use on a shared aquifer. The
responses to comments expressed Archer Datacenters’ intent to work with the city and
other permitting entities on the issues of electricity and water consumption. The fi ndings
of fact adopted by the city in its resolution on this topic do no more than restate the
definition of cumulative potential effects: “Cumulative effects result from the incremental
impact of the proposed project when added to other past, present, and reasonably
foreseeable future actions, regardless of what agency or person undertakes such other
actions.”
Again, looking at the record and the city’s decision relative to this factor, we cannot
identify evidence that the city adequately considered the cumulative potential effects of the
26
proposed project. The city does not explain what it considered in any such analysis, beyond
that it looked to “areas adjacent to the EAW study area.” The record, including the public
comments, establishes that there are other proposed data centers and industrial or
commercial facilities using natural resources in the area, but there is no evidence that the
city looked at those entities, even if only to determine that they are not within the
environmentally relevant area or are irrelevant to a cumulative-potential-effects analysis.
We are left to guess how the city defined the “environmentally relevant area,” and what
past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions it considered, if any at all. Minn. R.
4410.0200, subp. 11a.
7
We conclude that the city’s determination that there would be no cumulative
potential effects was not supported by substantial evidence. NorthMet, 959 N.W.2d at 749;
see also CARD, 713 N.W.2d at 838 (concluding that “there is simply not enough evidence
in the record before us to show that the county actually took a hard look at the question of
cumulative potential effects during the EIS determination as required by Minn. R.
4410.1700, subp. 1, and our case law” (quotation omitted)).
In conclusion, when reviewing the record and the city’s decision as a whole and
considering the deficiencies on multiple issues salient to the potential environmental effects
of this project, we cannot conclude that the city took a “hard look” and “genuinely engaged

7 Respondents explain on appeal that other data centers were not considered in the negative-
declaration analysis because they are only “speculative.” But the underlying record
contains no such explanation, so we do not consider it. Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582-83 (“An
appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal, and may
not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”); see also Amdahl, 258
N.W.2d at 874 (“Certiorari is, by its nature, a review based solely upon the record.”).
27
in reasoned decision- making.” CARD, 713 N.W.2d at 832 (quotations omitted). To the
contrary, we see a “combination of danger signals” suggesting it has not. Rsrv. Mining Co.
v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 825 (Minn. 1977). We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Given the insufficient information and lack
of evidence in the current record, the city must, on remand, act consistently with rule
4410.1700, subp. 2a, and either make a positive declaration requiring an EIS that includes
appropriate studies to obtain the lacking information or postpone its decision “for not more
than 30 days or such other period of time as agreed upon by” the city and Archer
Datacenters, “in order to obtain the lacking information.”
Reversed and Remanded.