State of Minnesota v. Andreas Jeffrey Joyner

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1619

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Andreas Jeffrey Joyner,
Appellant.

Filed August 10, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Meeker County District Court
File No. 47-CR-24-794

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Brandi Schiefelbein, Meeker County Attorney, Litchfield, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for misdemeanor assault, argu ing that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict and that the district court
abused its discretion by admitting the victim’s recorded out-of-court statements. Because

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the direct evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict and the alleged evidentiary error
was harmless, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Andreas
Jeffrey Joyner with one count of felony domestic assault by strangulation, one count of
misdemeanor domestic assault based on intent to cause fear (domestic assault-fear), and
one count of misdemeanor domestic assault based on infliction of, or an attempt to inflect,
bodily harm (domestic assault-harm).
According to the allegations in the complaint, a police officer was dispatched to a
residence based on a report of domestic assault. Specifically, the caller reported that he
heard screaming coming from outside and inside the residence. Upon arrival, the
responding officer overheard a raised female voice coming from an open window stating,
“you hurt me,” “ [y]ou beat the hell out of me tonight,” and “[y]ou almost choked me
tonight.” These statements were recorded by the officer’s body-worn camera. During the
ensuing investigation, the officer determined that it was the victim’s voice and that she was
yelling at Joyner.
The officer spoke with Joyner separately. The officer’s body-worn camera recorded
the conversation. During that conversation, Joyner admitted that he and the victim had
been arguing, that he was trying to get the victim to quiet down, that he pushed the victim
onto a bed, that he attempted to restrain the victim by grabbing her shoulders, that he tried
to push a “pressure point” on her back, and that he would do it again. The recording also
showed Joyner demonstrate how he tried to restrain the victim and his intended effect.

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Joyner pleaded not guilty to the charges , and the matter was set for trial. Before
trial, the state moved to admit the victim’s recorded out -of-court statements that the
responding officer heard through the open window. Joyner opposed the motion , but the
district court ruled that the statements were admissible.
At the ensuing jury trial, the state called two witnesses: the responding officer and
the neighbor who reported the incident. Both testified that they heard screaming coming
from the residence where Joyner and the victim lived. The officer also testified that, when
he interviewed the victim at the scene, he observed a mark on her neck. The state
introduced the recording of the victim’s out-of-court statements over Joyner’s objection.
The state also introduced the recording of Joyner’s statements to the police and his
demonstration of how he tried to restrain the victim.
The jury acquitted Joyner of felony domestic assault by strangulation and
misdemeanor domestic assault-fear. But the jury found Joyner guilty of misdemeanor
domestic assault-harm. The district court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced
Joyner to 90 days in jail with credit for time served and the remaining sentence stayed for
two years.
Joyner appeals.
DECISION
I.
Joyner contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding of
guilt. Traditionally, when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence , we
“must ascertain whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can

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be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
of the offense charged.” State v. Jones , 4 N.W.3d 495, 501-02 (Minn. 2024) (quotation
omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume the
fact-finder disbelieved evidence that conflicted with the verdict. State v. Griffin , 887
N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016). We defer to the jury’s credibility determinations and will
not reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v. Franks , 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009);
State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 2002). We will not disturb a guilty
verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have concluded that the state proved
the defendant’s guilt. Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 502.
But if the state relied on circumstantial evidence to prove an element of an offense,
we apply a heightened standard of review. See State v. Harris , 895 N.W.2d 592, 601 -03
(Minn. 2017) (applying heightened standard to individual element of criminal offense that
was proved by circumstantial evidence); State v. Firkus, 31 N.W.3d 468, 478 (Minn. 2026)
(reiterating our long -standing circumstantial -evidence test). Circumstantial evidence is
“evidence from which the [fact-finder] can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did
not exist.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation omitted).
The parties disagree regarding which standard of review applies here. Joyner argues
that the heightened standard applies because the case was proved with circumstantial
evidence. He provides a cursory application of that standard and does not alternatively
apply the traditional standard, even though the state argues that all the elements of the
offense were proved with direct evidence. Because the direct evidence was sufficient to

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support the jury’s guilty verdict —specifically, Joyner’s recorded statements to the
responding officer and the responding officer’s observation of a mark on the victim’s
neck—we apply the traditional standard of review. See Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 500 (stating
that “when a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone it is the
traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial -evidence standard, that governs”)
(quotation omitted)).
Joyner was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault-harm under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(2) (2024). Under that statute, a person is guilty of a domestic assault-
harm if that person “intentionally inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily harm upon another.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(2). Bodily harm “means physical pain or injury, illness,
or any impairment of physical condition.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 7 (2024).
“Assault-harm is a general intent crime.” State v. Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d 280, 291
(Minn. 2023). It requires “an intent to do the prohibited physical act of committing a
battery.” State v. Dorn , 887 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted) .
Although the state must prove that the defendant intended to do the prohibited physical act,
the state “does not need to prove that he meant to or knew that he would violate the law or
cause a particular result.” Lampkin, 994 N.W.2d at 291 (quotation omitted). Th us, the
state can satisfy the mens rea element of the assault -harm statute by proving that the
defendant’s “application of force to [the victim] was not done accidentally or
involuntarily.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The supreme court has stated that the state can satisfy the actus reus element of the
assault-harm statute by showing that “ the defendant engaged in nonconsensual physical

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contact.” Dorn, 887 N.W.2d at 831 -32. Again, t he assault -harm statute requires the
“infliction” of bodily harm . The Dorn court, relying on dictionary definitions, defined
“inflict” as “to lay (a blow) on or cause (something damaging or painful) to be endured ,”
and as “[t]he act or process of imposing or meting out something unpleasant.” Id. at 832
(quotations omitted).
Joyner agrees that the state had to prove that he “committed a nonconsensual
physical contact, inflicting some minimal physical pain or injury, illness or any
impairment” of the victim’s physical condition. But he asserts that “[t]here was no direct
evidence of any assault.” As support, Joyner argues that the responding officer did not
observe signs that he “beat the hell out of” the victim and that because the victim was
intoxicated and angry with Joyner, it is possible that “she was exaggerating, or describing
a different incident, or saying false things with the intent to wound Joyner emotionally or
a combination of motives.” For the reasons that follow, we are not persuaded.
At trial, Joyner’s neighbor testified that he heard a woman yelling for approximately
30 minutes before calling the police. The responding officer similarly testified that he
heard a woman —later identified as the victim —yelling inside the residence when he
arrived. The officer also testified that when the victim answered the door, he observed a
mark on her neck. In addition, the video recording from the officer’s body -worn camera
showed Joyner’s admission that he pushed the victim onto the bed, that he attempted to
restrain the victim by grabbing her shoulders, and that he tried to push a “pressure point”
on her back. The recording also showed Joyner demonstrating how he tried to restrain the
victim and his intended effect. Finally, when the responding officer asked Joyner about

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that mark on the victim’s neck and what caused it, Joyner linked it to his attempt to restrain
the victim saying, “I might have been trying to hit a pressure point.”
This direct evidence clearly showed that Joyner engaged in nonconsensual physical
contact with the victim which caused an impairment of her physical condition —the mark
on her neck. Based on that direct evidence , a reasonable jury could conclude —beyond a
reasonable doubt —that Joyner was guilty of domestic assault -harm under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.2242, subd. 1(2). See id. (holding that the defendant’s conduct—pushing the victim
twice in the chest hard enough to cause the victim to lose his balance —was sufficient
evidence of the actus reus element of assault-harm). We therefore do not disturb the
verdict. See Jones, 4 N.W.3d at 501-02.
II.
Joyner contends that the district court erred by admitting the victim’s out -of-court
statements under the excited-utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. See Minn. R.
Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted”); Minn. R. Evid. 802 (providing that hearsay is inadmissible unless an exception
to the hearsay rule applies ); Minn. R. Evid. 803(2) (allowing admission of a “statement
relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition”).
“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State
v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023). To obtain a new trial based on an erroneous
evidentiary ruling, a challenger must establish both error and prejudice resulting from the

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error. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203 (Minn. 2003). If the error does not implicate a
constitutional right, as is the case here, the harmless -error standard controls and the
appellant “must prove there is a reasonable possibility that the wrongfully admitted
evidence sig nificantly affected the verdict.” State v. Matthews , 800 N.W.2d 629, 633
(Minn. 2011) (quotations omitted). We need not decide whether the district court abused
its discretion in admitting the victim’s out -of-court statements in this case because, as
explained below, the alleged error was harmless.
When conducting harmless-error review, we consider a non-exclusive list of factors
“to determine whether a reasonable possibility exists that the erroneously admitted
evidence significantly affected the jury ’s verdict.” State v. Bigbear , 10 N.W.3d 48, 54
(Minn. 2024). These factors include: “(1) the manner in which the party presented the
evidence, (2) whether the evidence was highly persuasive, (3) whether the party who
offered the evidence used it in closing argument, and (4) whether the defense effectively
countered the evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). Additionally, “strong evidence of guilt
undermines the persuasive value of wrongly admitted evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The analysis is a fact -specific determination, “and not all the factors are relevant or
persuasive in every case.” Id. at 54-55.
Joyner argues that, other than the victim’s recorded out -of-court statements, there
was no evidence that Joyner harmed the victi m. He therefore argues that the
“prejudice . . . is readily apparent.”
Although we acknowledge the persuasive value of the victim’s recorded out -of-
court statements and that the state emphasized those statements during opening and closing

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arguments, the state introduced other strong evidence of guilt. Indeed, the record refutes
Joyner’s assertion that , other than the victim’s out -of-court statements, there was no
evidence that he harmed the victim. According to Joyner’s recorded statement to the
responding officer, he pushed the victim onto the bed, he attempted to restrain the victim
by trying to push a pressure point on her back, and he acknowledged that his attempt may
have caused the mark on the victim’s neck. Given this strong evidence of guilt, there is no
reasonable possibility that the challenged evidence significantly affected the jury’s verdict.
The alleged evidentiary error is therefore harmless.
Affirmed.