State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1636

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Abigail Violet Hollingsworth,
Respondent.

Filed June 15, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Pipestone County District Court
File No. 59-CR-23-263

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Damain D. Sandy, Pipestone County Attorney, Adam M. Maloney, Assistant County
Attorney, Pipestone, Minnesota (for appellant)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges the postconviction court’s order vacating,
under the amelioration doctrine, respondent’s conviction of first -degree controlled
substance possession. We affirm.
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FACTS
In July 2023, the state charged respondent Abigail Violet Hollingsworth with
unlawful possession of methamphetamine under Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(a)(1)
(2022), with reference to Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(b) (2022). The state alleged that
she had possessed five ounces of a fluid mixture containing dissolved methamphetamine
in a water pipe on or about July 7, 2023. On August 15, 2023, Hollingsworth pleaded
guilty, and the district court later accepted her guilty plea and entered a judgment of
conviction. The district court sentenced Hollingsworth to an 85 -month term of
imprisonment but stayed that sentence for five years. Hollingsworth did not appeal her
conviction or sentence at that time.
In January 2024, Hollingsworth admitted that she had relapsed and violated the
terms and conditions of her probation. The district court revoked her probation and ordered
that her sentence be executed. Hollingsworth appealed the district court’s revocation of
her probation, and we affirmed. State v. Hollingsworth, No. A24-0608, 2024 WL 4879726
at *1 (Minn. App. Nov. 25, 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2025).
In 2025, the Minnesota Legislature amended various sections of chapter 152 of the
Minnesota Statutes. 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 35, art. 4, §§ 1-6, at 677-81. As is relevant here,
the legislature amended Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(b) (2024), to effectively
decriminalize the possession of any amount of “fluid used in a water pipe or any amount
of a controlled substance that is dissolved in the pipe’s fluid.” Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd.
2(b) (Supp. 2025); 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 35, art. 4, § 1, at 678. The effective-date provision
3
for the amendment states: “This section is effective the day following final enactment and
applies retroactively from August 1, 2023.” 2025 Minn. Laws ch. 35, art. 4, § 1, at 678.
In July 2025, Hollingsworth petitioned for postconviction relief based on the
amendment to Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2(b). Specifically, Hollingsworth argued that
she was entitled to relief under the amelioration doctrine. The state opposed the reque st
for relief. The postconviction court concluded that the amelioration doctrine applied and
vacated Hollingsworth’s conviction.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state contends that the postconviction court erred in vacating Hollingsworth’s
conviction under the amelioration doctrine . We review application of the amelioration
doctrine de novo. State v. Loveless, 987 N.W.2d 224, 238 (Minn. 2023).
The common-law amelioration doctrine “establishes a presumption in Minnesota
that an amendment mitigating punishment applies to non-final cases.” State v. Kirby, 899
N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. 201 7). “[A] statute mitigating punishment is applied to acts
committed before its effective date, as long as no final judgment has been reached.” State
v. Coolidge, 282 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Minn. 1979). More specifically, “[a]n amended statute
applies to crimes committed before its effective date ” if three requirements are me t: “(1)
there is no statement by the Legislature that clearly establishes [its] intent to abrogate the
amelioration doctrine; (2) the amendment mitigates punishment; and (3) final judgment
has not been entered” when the amendment takes effect. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 490. The
sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the first requirement is satisfied.
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As to that requirement, “the phrase ‘statement by the Legislature’ . . . means an
express declaration or clear indication of the Legislature’s intent to abrogate the
amelioration doctrine within an enacted statute.” State v. Robinette, 964 N.W.2d 143, 150
(Minn. 2021). “Abrogate” means “[t]o abolish (a law or custom) by formal or authoritative
action.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 8 (12th ed. 2024) (defining abrogate). The state
argues that “[t]he 2025 amendment contains plain language with a clear statement of intent
to abrogate the amelioration doctrine.”
Caselaw provides examples of statements by the legislature that clearly establish its
intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine. For example, in Edstrom v. State, the supreme
court concluded that the legislature expressly abrogated the amelioration doctrine when it
“clearly indicated its intent that the . . . statutes [would] have no effect on crimes
committed before the effective date of the act.” 326 N.W.2d 10, 10 (Minn. 1982) . The
statute at issue in Edstrom included a clause titled “ ‘Applicability to Past and Present
Prosecutions,’” which stated that “‘crimes committed prior to the effective date of this act
are not affected by its provisions.’” Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 490 (quoting 1975 Minn. Laws
ch. 374, § 12, at 125 ). The Kirby court stated that such language “demonstrates the
Legislature’s ability to state its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine.” Id. at 489.
Similarly, in State v. Otto , the supreme court held that the legislature ’s intent to
abrogate the amelioration doctrine was “crystal clear” because the legislature stated that
the relevant sections became “effective August 1, 2016, and appl[ied] to crimes committed
on or after that date .” 899 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). And in
State v. McDonnell , we held that an effective -date provision did not indicate legislative
5
intent to apply an amendment retroactively because the effective-date provision stated that
the amendment was “effective August 1, 2003, and applies to violations committed on or
after that date.” 686 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), rev. denied
(Minn. Nov. 16, 2004).
In sum, caselaw indicates that the legislature clearly establishes its intent to abrogate
the amelioration doctrine by expressly stating that a new law applies only prospectively.
Conversely, caselaw indicates that the absence of such a statement does not clearly
establish an intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine. For example, in Otto, the supreme
court explained its earlier holding in State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470 (Minn. 1979), as
follows: because new legislation did not include a statement r egarding whether the law
“applied only to crimes committed after the effective date, the presumption to apply the
amelioration doctrine remained intact.” 899 N.W.2d at 503-04.
And in Kirby, the supreme court emphasized the juxtaposition of silence and express
language in this context. 899 N.W.2d at 489-90. The Kirby court noted that the language
at issue in Coolidge was silent regarding whether a statutory change should have
ameliorative effect, whereas the language at issue in Edstrom demonstrated the
legislature’s ability to state its intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine. Id. at 489.
Relying on that distinction, the Kirby court concluded that the following language did not
clearly establish legislative intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine: “T his section is
effective the day following final enactment .”1 Id. at 490, 495 (quotation omitted). The

1 In State v. Basal, we concluded that a statute’s specific effective date alone was sufficient
to abrogate the amelioration doctrine. 763 N.W.2d 328, 336 (Minn. App. 2009). However,
6
supreme court reasoned that the effective -date provision at issue in Kirby was “almost
identical” to language it interpreted in Coolidge and that such language did not abrogate
the common-law amelioration doctrine. Id. at 490. The supreme court also reasoned that
the legislature “expressly stated in other sections of the [act] that those sections only
appl[ied] to crimes committed on or after the effective date.” Id. at 491 (quotation omitted).
The supreme court stated that the absence of such language from the effective -date
provision at issue in Kirby was telling because “ it signal[ed] that the Legislature did not
intend to abrogate the amelioration doctrine” with respect to that provision. Id.
Applying these principles to the language at issue here , we conclude that the
effective-date provision in this case does not clearly establish legislative intent to abrogate
the amelioration doctrine. Again, that provision states: “ This section is effective the day
following final enactment and applies retroactively from August 1, 2023. ” 2025 Minn.
Laws ch. 35, art. 4, § 1, at 678. Unlike the language at issue in Edstrom and Otto, which
explicitly stated that the amendment applied only to crimes commit ted on or after the
effective date, the language at issue here does not restrict application to crimes occurring
on or after the effective date.

this court’s decision in Basal is directly contradicted by the supreme court’s subsequent
decision in Kirby. See Kirby , 899 N.W.2d at 49 0, 495 (holding that the phrase “[t]his
section is effective the day following final enactmen t” did not clearly express the
legislature’s intent to abrogate the amelioration doctrine (quotation omitted)). If this court
and the supreme court address the same legal issue, based on “nearly identical facts,” and
arrive at conflicting holdings that c annot be reconciled, the supreme court’s opinion
supersedes our opinion. State v. M.L.A. , 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010) , rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010). We therefore follow Kirby, and not Basal.
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Moreover, other sections of the law at issue here —which address the definition of
fentanyl and certain fentanyl -related criminal conduct —include the following language:
“This section is effective August 1, 2025, and applies to crimes committed on or after that
date.” Id., §§ 5, 6, at 680-81. “[W]e presume that the Legislature acts with full knowledge
of existing law , including the common law.” State v. Woolridge Carter , 9 N.W.3d 839,
843 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). The legislature’s use of explic it language stating
that the fentanyl-related amendments apply only to crimes committed on or after the
effective date of those amendments indicates that the legislature intended to abrogate the
amelioration doctrine with respect to those amendments, but not with respect to the
amendments at issue here. See Kirby, 899 N.W.2d at 491.
Finally, we note the state’s argument that the postconviction court “used the
amelioration doctrine as a way to insert a ‘magic-words’ requirement.” We disagree. The
postconviction court’s conclusion that t he effective-date provision does not clearly
establish legislative intent to abolish the amelioration doctrine with respect to Minn. Stat.
§ 152.021, subd. 2(b), is soundly based on supreme court precedent.
Because the state has not shown that the postconviction court erred by vacating
Hollingsworth’s conviction, we affirm.
Affirmed.